ΔΙΕΘΝΗ ΣΥΝΕΔΡΙΑ ΕΦΑΡΜΟΣΜΕΝΗΣ ΑΕΡΟΠΟΡΙΚΗΣ ΨΥΧΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ (HUMAN FACTORS)
1) “Presuppositions for effective introduction of changes in the aviation safety culture, through crew resource management training program. The case study of Olympic Airways”. 100 YEARS OF FLIGHT 12TH INT’L SYMPOSIUM ON AVIATION PSYCHOLOGY (ISAP) April 14-17 2003 Daton-Ohio-USA.
2) “Presuppositions for upgrading the reliability and the comparability
of the accident reports in order to upgrade aviation’s safety level”. World Conference on Transport Research Society. Istanbul. Turkey. July 4-8, 2004.
3) “The airline’s corporate and social environment, as a basic parameter of the efficiency and the effectiveness, of the incentives, applied by the airline’s top management : The case study of a Southeastern European Airline’s cabin crewmembers”. 26th Conference of the European Association for Aviation Psychology-Costs and Benefits. 3-7/10/2004 Sesibbra Portugal
4) “The considerations of a South-eastern European Airline aircraft engineers, regarding the incentives applied by the corporate top management and those required by them”. 13nth INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON AVIATION PSYCHOLOGY (ISAP). Oklahoma city USA April 18-21, 2005
5) “The perceived by the employees, internal corporate environment stressors, and its perceived impact on their labor attitude. The case study of the Olympic Airway’s (O.A.) aircraft engineers”. European Assiciation For Aviaton Psychology. (EAAP). 27th Convention. Berlin-Germany 23-28/10/2006
6) “The compatibility of the two learning procedures accepted by the European Aviation Safety Agency (E.A.S.A.) for the candidate aircraft engineers,
with E.A.S.A.’s aim for high uniform level of civil aviation safety”. European Association for Aviation Psychology. 28th Conference Valencia-Spain. 26-31/10/2008
7) “Η φοβία της πτήσης ή αεροφοβία (fear of flying–aerophobia)”. Εφημερίδα ΕΘΝΙΚΟΣ ΚΗΡΥΚΑΣ ΝΕΑΣ ΥΟΡΚΗΣ. 6-3-2011
8) The impact of knowledge, on perception’s credibility : The case study of accident investigators. 2nd International Cross-industry Safety Conference. Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences-AVIATION ACADEMY. 17-11-2017
A100 YEARS OF FLIGHT 12TH INT’L SYMPOSIUM ON AVIATION PSYCHOLOGY (ISAP) Wright University DATON-OHIO APRIL 14-17 2003
Abstract
The application of a CRM training program to a schedule airline concerns directly the change of the existed culture-attitude of at leas t the flight crew. However:
- a) Although the content of the CRM is obligatory by ICAO common in every air carrier, it is applied to employees with various cultures
- b) For an essential assimilation and a successful application of the content of a CRM, the flight crew has to be convinced and not managerially forced.
Consequently, for the effective application of a unified CRM to the flight crews of various air carriers with different cultures, we consider a research by the management as a necessary presupposition for:e- a proactive determination of the existed attitude/culture of flight crew and the impact
on it as a result of the introduction of changes to its culture through a CRM training program.
– Selection of the most efficient actions, measures and procedures, methods-adopted to the existed cultures “ Hofstede’s central argument is that, given the distinctive cultural breakdown in work-related values, efficient work practices and group processes are likely to vary from country to country (Hofstede, 1980a, 1983, 1991) To be effective, the organisation of work and management practices must reflect the social mores of the relevant culture. Triandis (1980) endorses these sentiments , stating that in recent years “it become very clear that one cannot take a psychological method and use it in another culture without drastic modification (p. 7). It would clearly be foolish to tackle cross-cultural problems of management and group functioning by blindly using a narrow and predefined repertoire of conceptions, prescriptions, and tools” (Johnston 1993) The Olympic Airways (OA), the national Greek air carrier, has recently decided to apply a CRM training program according to ICAO Annex 6 etc and JAR-OPS 1
The aim of the present paper is the determination of:
- a) The proper steps, that the air carrier’s top management has to apply for the fulfilment of the efficient introduction of the necessary changes on the operational sub-culture, through a CRM training program.
- b) The investigation of whether O. A. ’s management has applied the proper steps, procedures, methods, mechanisms and measures for the fulfilment of the efficient introduction of the necessary changes on the corporate operational flight crew sub-culture/attitude, through a CRM training program
Brief theoretical approach
Investigations into the causes of air carrier accidents/incidents have shown that human error is a contributing factor in 60 to 80 percent of all air-carrier incidents/accidents (Freeman & Simmon 1991). Research has demonstrated that these events share common characteristics (U. S. GAO, 1997). Many problems encounter ed by flight crews have very little to do with the technical aspects of operating in a multi-person cockpit. Problems are associated with poor group decision-making, ineffective communication, inadequate leadership, and poor task or resource management instead. (Wiener, Kanki, &Helmreich, 1993; Sa- las, Bowers, & Edens, 2001). Pilot training programs historically focused almost exclusively on the technical aspects of flying and on an individual pilot’s performance; they did not effectively address to crew management issues that are also fundamental to safe flight. These observations have led to a consensus in industry and governmental training programs should place emphasis on the factors that influence crew coordination
and the management of crew resources. (Wiener, Kank i, & Helmreich, 1993; Helmreich, Merritt 1998 Salas, Bowers, & Edens, 2001).
Flight safety culture covers a wide area such as
1) Production methods (Maurino1994, Lainos 1995, 2001,2002)
2) Skills and specialization,
3) Consideration of discipline and penalties ,
4) Style of communication with the colleagues, members of hier arc hy, clients, suppliers e.t.c.
5) The dominant and acceptable administrative methods
- a) Management theories x or y (traditional-bureaucratic or contemporary-human oriented)
- b) Application of motivation systems for
upgrading flight safety (increasing productivity simultaneously with the quality of the job),
- c) Encouraging proposals for innovations introduction e.t.c.
- d) The efficiency of the applied control style (administrative or participating, ex post or ex ante)
- e) Individuality or team spirit
6) The values and the traditions of the company (degree of tolerance of risky, aggressive, conflict and open critic al behaviour, reward criteria, seniority or efficiency in promotion etc.),
7) The standing transactional practice of the Airline Flight safety culture determinants General subcultures that must be taken into account during the planning of methods and measures concerning the introduction of changes at the existing Aviation safety culture are as follows.
(Hofstede, 1980a, 1983, 1991;Lainos, 1991,1995, 2001,2002; Reason 1997)
1) National culture concerning
- a) Individuality – collectivity
- b) The relationship, values and priorities of labour.
2) Development level of the economy of the certain country
3) Development level and tradition of air
transport of the certain country.
4) Flight safety culture introduced by top
management (positive or negative)
It is obvious that t he changes that are intended to be introduced through the CRM training program concern a part of the culture-attitude of the flight crew
The effective introduction of organisational-managerial-productive e. t.c. changes in a company, like those of CRM, is considered as a rather complicated-sophisticated process because it
concerns changes to personal culture-attitude of the employees and the success depends on the efficient overcome of the reactions of the involved and influenced groups and individuals, who have different cultures, interests and psychology
(Maurino, 1994; Johnston 1993;Merritt & Helmreich, 1995).
For the efficient introduction of these changes the flight crew operational sub-culture and the impact of the aforementioned changes, on this has to be deter- mined. The procedures, methods, mechanisms and measures that will be selected for the introduction of the changes has to be adopted to the peculiarities of the culture-attitude of the affected employees This is the cause of the fact that the
knowledge of the flight crew culture and attitude some parts of which is intended to be changed, is a strictly necessary presupposition for an effective
selection of the procedures, methods, mechanisms, measures that will be ap- plied towards the efficient changes introduction. This is the cause of our field
research on the existed culture of the OA flight crew. This is necessary because:
- a) the content of the changes that has to be introduced is probably totally opposed to the existed national and/or corporate culture, although aviation safety requires common behaviour
- b) The proper techniques concerning the effective introduction of the necessary changes into the existed flight safety culture through CRM training programs can potentially be in opposition to the traditionally existed air-carriers management style. Nevertheless s introduction of changes to the traditionally existed air-carriers management style is a necessary presupposition
since the application of the efficient measures for upgrading the aviation-flight safety level requires these measures to be consciously accepted by flight crew, who is finally burden and responsible for the application.
Steps for efficient introduction of changes
Since CRM training programs concern introduction of changes, its effective application must follow the principles and the stages of the effective intro- duction of changes.
Introduction of changes in a company is a very complicated process since the efficiency of this effort depends on the reactions of a great number of involved and influenced groups and individuals
with different cultures, interests and psychology.
This is a reason for which there is not any special prescription for unique world wide procedures, methods, mechanisms, measures for effective introduction of changes.
That is why in every company the role of the leader who is authorized to introduce the changes is crucial.
Based on the international literature (Lewin 1947; Pettigrew 1985; Pettigrew & Whipp 1991, 1993; Kotter 1995; Burnes, 1996,2000) and according to
our more than a decade experience on the O.A.’s effort at recapitalisation (for the effective introduction of organizational, managerial, operational e.t. c. changes), (Lainos 2001) we have
constructed a specific number of steps that must be applied in the specific or- der as follows: (Lainos model)
- A) Determination of the strategic and tactic goals of the air-carrier
- B) Determination and assessment of the current status of the air-carrier
1) Determination of the negative symptoms.
2) Determination of the problem(s) consisted of the aforementioned negative phenomena.
3) Determination of the causes of these problems
4) Determination of the sources of the
aforementioned causes
- C) Research and determination of the necessary changes that must be introduced according to the strategic and tactic goals of the organization
- D) Preparation of the members of hierarchy and the simple employees
1) Building trust and certainty among the
employees for the future goals-intentions of the company
2) Informing the employees about the existence of the problem(s).
3) Focusing on the current and the long-term negative effects of the existed problem(s) for the survival of the company.
4) Focusing on the negative future effects, on certain categories of the employees and even if possible on individuals. The successful result of the aforementioned process must be the
existence of the certain problem(s) acceptance by the employees.
5) Persuading the employees that for the solution of the problem(s) some changes are necessary to be introduced.
6) Inviting the employees to submit proposals concerning their opinion about the necessary changes that must be introduced.
7) Informing the employees about the effects of their proposals on the solution of the problems that the company faces.
8) Starting discussions with the employees to conclude to the mutual accepted proposals concerning:
- a) The number of changes, the field and the time of application
- b) The role of the different categories of the employees to the efficient application of these changes
9) The discussions must be continued concerning all the steps of the process.
- E) Co-decision for the necessary changes that must be introduced according to the strategic and tactic goals of the organization.
- F) Programming of the introduction of the selected changes (which, when, where, how).
- G) Application of the introduction of the selected changes (fulfil all the agreements with the employees ) .
- H) Continuous control-with priority to the voluntary self-control-of the application of the introduction of the changes to each stage of introduction (not to the end) and to each organizational unit.
- I) Assessment of the result of the introduced changes.
- J) Stabilization of the introduced changes and of its results.
- K) In case of failure a new effort must start as soon as the mistakes of the previous effort are being determined and the general circumstances are being matured. It is obvious that the wider alliances of the company’s leader with the formal leadership of the trade unions , and of labour associations together with the informal leaders of specialty-groups,
facilitates the successful introduction of the changes essentially.
The case study of the OA, the Greek flag carrier
The CRM training became obligatory for ICAO member States in 1998 (ICAO annex 6 amendment 23) and for the European airlines members of the
JAA in April 1999 (JAR-OPS1). The Greek State delayed adopting to its national legislation JAR-OPS1 until July 2001 with law 222 (JAR-OPS1
amendment 2) and law 207 (August 2002 JAR-OPS1 amendment 3).
The Olympic Airways was obliged to apply CRM training from effective date 5 November 1998 as an air carrier with worldwide network.
The OA top management introduced the CRM training program through the following procedures, methods mechanisms and measures.
The purchasing had been decided after several non-conformance reports, which had been made as a result of the Greek CAA inspections The O.A.’s management purchased a CRM training programme in early 2001 from a well known and respected UK based company specialised in providing CRM training programmes world wide.
The supplier trained the facilitators for two weeks during Marc h 2001.
Although the majority of the facilitators were not familiar with the CRM before their training, the OA management didn’t take any measures to prepare them for the role they were assigned to.
The OA select ion criteria for the facilitators were
- a) The pilots had to be captains (for at least ten years ) with at leas t 5 years training experience.
- b) The cabin crew facilitators had been
selected according to their high level of
knowledge of English language.
After this training some of these facilitators were called to start training the flight crew. The CRM training course was a two days (sixteen hours)
training, for a period of five months on July 2001.
This, training per iod stopped for nine months and re-started on October 2002.
The Greek National culture
The national culture and corporate culture determine the flight crew sub-culture.
Consequently a basic determinant of the OA’s flight crew attitude is the existing national Greek, the OA corporate and flight crew operational sub-culture.
Four of the national Greek cultural dimensions that strongly affect the flight crew attitude are (Hofstede 1980 a, b, 1991; Johnston 1993)
1) Power distance. This considers the habitual exercise of power within a
culture. (From a scale 11 to 104 Greece scores 60)
2) Uncertainty Avoidance, (Fr om scale 40 to 112 Greeks score 112). This dimension addresses the ease with which cultures cope with novelty, ambiguity, and uncertainty. High Uncertainty-avoidance culture seeks clarity and order in social relationships, favouring rules and regulations.
3) Individualism. (From a scale 8 to 91 Greece scores 35) This dimension
considers the cultural emphasis given to individualistic, as distinct from collectivist, social mores .
4) Masculinity. This relates to beliefs regarding the gender division of social
roles, (from a scale of 5 to 95 Greece scores 57) In masculine cultures ambition and performance are valued. High masculine society tend to have a belief in the independent decision maker and leader value their decision-making autonomy” Some parameters of the OA’s flight crew operational sub-Culture
Assumptions
Our approach on the aforementioned subject was based on the conclusions of two field research.
The first field research is based on questionnaires (course feedback form with sixty-seven questions), which was attached to the purchased by the OA CRM training program. The OA distributed these forms to the trainees (without distinguishing the crewmember, cockpit from cabin crew) at the end of their training period concerning their assessment of the bellow mentioned criteria:
- a) The content and the utility of the CRM training program
- b) The quality of the training means and
- c) The efficiency of the trainer.
The number of the trainees (flight crew) that filled out the OA questionnaires represents the 30 % of the tot al flight crewmembers (cockpit and cabin).
The unique elaboration of the answers was made exclusively by the authors.
The second field research was made by the authors and it is based, on authors, questionnaires with thirty-one questions The questions concerned
- a) The opinion of the cockpit and cabin crew distinguished for the content and role of their profession and the profession of each other.
- b) The motivation methods applied by OA for the flight crews.
The research concerning the pilots was conducted in two periods, with one-two month time distance between them. The first period was early October 2002 and the second November- December 2002,
after the end of their training. Consequently these answers are influenced by the content of their training The research of the cabin crew was conducted only during their training .The number of the filled questionnaires represents the 30 % of the total flight crewmembers (cockpit and cabin) The questionnaire was a multiple choice one with the possibility of expressing the personal opinion, as far as it was not included in the proposed multiple choices.
Results of the research.
The results of the elaboration of the trainees replies to the OA’s questionnaires are as follows
- a) Quality of the trainer: approved by 82% of the trainees,
- b) The course content appropriate to the flight crew job needs : approved by 78% of the trainees
- c) Quality of the training methods and procedures: approved by 71% of the
trainees. According to the replies of our field research
86.6 % cockpit crew see their role as a authoritarian and 12.6 % as members of the team called flight crew. This consideration is in a direct antithesis
with the content of the CRM training programme that they had participated.
“High power distance and/or low individualism cultures the average and often the more effective manager may be a “benevolent autocrat” who sees
little need for participative management. In many countries it is not considered normal or appropriate to enter into discussions with pilot representatives
on such matters. Her e again we meet a cultural gulf with implications for CRM implementation” (Johnston 1993)
A further analysis of the questionnaires according to the aforementioned consideration between captains and first officers shows that only 10 % of the captains and 18 % of the first officers see themselves as members of the team called f light crew. The explanation of the aforementioned results is based on the history of the OA’s flight crew sub-culture.
The OA flight crew sub-culture history
The OA was established by hiring former Hellenic air force pilots . These pilots were the majority of the OA cockpit crew up to 1992. Consequently
their culture (military standards, hie- rarchy, authoritarian, autocrats) was the dominating culture. This culture was and still remains with marginal differentiat ion, the dominant culture of the OA’s cockpit crew.
Motivation
The 90.7% of the cabin crew and the 80.5% of the cockpit crew replied that the OA do not apply any motivation measures.
Comparison of the conclusions of the two research.
The 78% of the trainees answered that the content of the CRM training pro-gram would be useful during their duty. However only the 20% of the cockpit crew and the 23 % of the cabin crew expressed their intention to cooperate with each other (cockpit cabin crew) on their duty time.
Conclusions
1) CRM training program concerns directly the introduction of changes to the existed culture-attitude of the flight crew
2) A necessary presupposition for the effective application of CRM to the flight crews, is a research-study by the management for:
- a) A proactive determination of their existed culture-attitude and the impact on it by the introduction of changes through a CRM training program.
- b) Selection of the most efficient measures, procedures, methods and mechanisms for the existed cultures
3) The OA implemented the CRM training programme because it was obligatory by the Greek legislation and not because the management foresaw its necessity.
4) The OA management purchased a CRM training program that was structured for a culture different from the OA flight crews sub-culture
5) Our research concluded that the basic dimensions of the national Greek culture
determine the OA flight crew sub-culture
6) Although the OA management was aware of the new legislation, it didn’t prepare the flight crews for the introduction of the CRM
- a) Before the beginning of the lessons none research/study had been made by the management-for the determination of the existed flight crew attitude/culture and the reactions that would probably arise due to the intended introduction of CRM changes
- b) There was no research into adopting the teaching methodology to the peculiarities of the specific audience
- c) The trainees had not any in advance
information concerning the special weight and the effect of the CRM training.
7) The facilitators were not subject to any assessment of the level of their understanding the syllabus of the CRM training program and their capability to train their colleagues at the end of their training.
8) The OA hasn’t established any control
mechanisms for the efficiency of the methods-measures- procedures applied by the facilitators
9) The OA’s management didn’t develop trust among the trainees for its intention to apply the CRM (lac k of preparation, continuity and control of training)
10) None mechanism was established for the control of the actual fulfilment by the trainees of the contain of the CRM training program during their line operation.
11) Our researches concluded that the changes that were aimed to be introduced, through the CRM training program, strongly affect structural elements of the existing national, operational subculture of the OA flight crew, mainly the power distance, the muscularity and the uncertainty avoidance.
Final word
The result proves that the procedures methods mechanisms techniques and measures applied by the OA management for the introduction of changes of the flight crew attitude – culture was inefficient. The OA management didn’t persuade the flight crew that it was interested in the application of the aforementioned changes.
We would like to underline that
- a) During the aforementioned period the state owned OA is under privatization procedures
- b) There hasn’t been any fatal accident with jet aircraft during the 27 years state owned period of the OA.
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The flight crew motivation at a scheduled air carrier in a Liberalise International Institutional Environment The case study of the Greek flag carrier the Olympic Airways S.A.
ABSTRACT
The tended competition due to the liberalization of the international institutional environment of the international scheduled passengers carrying air carriers, forced their top management to make strong efforts at minimizing the cost.
In the aforementioned framework, concerning the management of the human factor, a main field of the cost minimizing effort is the increase in the productivity.
Since the survival of the tended competition requires the simultaneous upgrade of the quality of the offered product the motivation arises as a main tool, for the success of the aforementioned effort. There is a particularity about the motivation of the flight crew. It focuses mainly on the upgrade of the quality of the offered airline product aboard. During this specific productive stage, the increase in the productivity can be achieved only with a marginal decrease in the cabin crew number, the minimum of which is determined by the international aviation legislation.
In this case the top management must assure that:
- a) the quality level aboard will not decrease and
- b) the decrease in the cabin crew number will not have a negative influence on the long-term cost, as a result of their resignation, due to exhaustion.
- c) For the upgrade of the flight safety level, I.C.A.O. was guided to concentrate initially on the improvement of the cockpit crew relation issues by adopting its psychological assumptions of their traditional role aboard.
Taking into account the aforementioned orientation, we have made a field research concerning the applied motivation methods and techniques to the flight crew, by the Olympic Airway’s top management. Our research results have been based on the questionnaires filled in by the 40 % of the cockpit crew and the 30% of the cabin crew. The elaborated results have proved that the majority has answered that the Olympic Airways top management does not apply any motivation. However-and this is the paradox- the Olympic Airways, since its nationalization, is one of the safest international scheduled passenger air carriers of the world.
It must be taken into account that
- I) in the Greek national culture there is high uncertainty avoidance (tend to generate rigidity and strong adherence to the formality of rules and regulations) and high masculinity (independent decision-maker)
- II) the Olympic Airways
- a) has been state owned since 1975
- b) has been under restructuring since 1994 and
- c) its employees are 100% unionized.
Keywords:
Culture (national, labor), flag carrier, flight crew, flight safety, human, resource management liberalization, motivation, Olympic Airways.
Brief theoretical approach
Motivation is the psychological force that stimulates, directs and preserves a particular behaviour (to act and or correspond). Source of this force is the will of the human to satisfy his needs according to his current prioritisation at the particular period of time.
Every activity of every human creature aims at the satisfaction of the dominant in the personal hierarchy need(s). NEED + MOTIVATION = DEPOSIT ENERGY-GOAL ACHIEVEMENT
The needs are infinities. The hierarchy of the human needs differs not only form continent to continent, country to country in the same continent, human to human in the same country but also in the same human in different periods of time. Even more the hierarchy of the needs is something very sensitive and it is subject to various influences that may restructure the existed hierarchy at any time. Further more this hierarchy can include contradictory needs of the same prioritization at the same period of time. Consequently for achieving the maximum of the motivating power the manager has to implement a combination of incentives each one adapted to the specific need of the specific employee. The mechanism of the needs assessment by every employee at any time is extremely complicated, so complicated as the human behavior.
The prioritization of the human needs and the impact of the internal corporate environment on them varies, depending on: 1) the national, corporate and personal culture, his values, believes, habits 2) the conditions of the external and internal corporate environment such as political stability, macro and microeconomic growth, economic stability 3) the social status of the employee, 4) the previous, the current and the expected level of life, 5) the age, 6) the sex 7) the educational level, 8) the self-regard,
9) the level of the corporate hierarchy that the employee is appointed to, 10) the applied management methods, 11) the terms and conditions of the labor, 12) the employee’s interest about his job, 13) the meritocracy at promotion, 14) the psychological structure of the employee, 15) the instant emotional situation of the employee etc.
A basic determinant of the intensity of an employee’s effort to fulfil a corporate goal is directly proportional with the intensity of the need and the level of satisfaction that the employee expects through the goal’s achievement. Maslow, A. (1954), Herzberg F.-Mausner B.-Peterson R.- Capwell D. (1957) Herzberg F., Mausner B, Synderman B , (1959), Livingston S.J. (2003) Mc Clelland D.-BurnhamD.H. (2003) Porter L.W., Lawler E.E. (1968), Vroom V. (1964)
The hierarchy of the needs or the group of needs of the employees at a particular period of time has to be determined by periodical researches. Maslow, A. (1954), Herzberg F.-Mausner B.-Peterson R.- Capwell D. (1957), Porter L.W., Lawler E.E.(1968)
The efficiency of a particular incentive depends on: Levinson H. (2003), Mc Clelland D.-Winter D.G. (1973), Mc Clelland D.-BurnhamD.H. (2003), Porter L.H. (1962-12), Porter L.W., Lawler E.E. (1968), Vroom V. (1964)
- the level of employee’s needs hierarchy exists with the need(s) that are satisfied with the result of the employee’s effort motivated by the particular incentive.
- if at the certain level of needs hierarchy of an employee coexist more than one need coexist, then different incentives have to be applied adapted to the satisfaction of each need
- since the implementation of incentives adopted at the needs hierarchy of each employee is a rather complicated effort with indefinable results, the creation of an internal corporate environment that will include all those incentives that could satisfy the needs of all the employees, is a rather affective choice
It must be pointed out that the most effective motivation is self-motivation. The managers can teach it to the employees persuading them to learn and to implement it.
Of course the managers must create and preserve a wider internal corporate environment, that empowers self-motivation.
Basic Motivators of the employees and the determinants of their power
There is not any worldwide recipe for implementation of efficient motivators.
The hierarchy of every employee’s needs, his expectations etc. determine the efficient motivators for the particular employee at the particular period of time
Various theories have been conducted to explain the mechanism of the motivators’ forces. Herzberg, F. (1966), Hersey P. Blanchard K.H. (1977), ManvilleB.-Ober.J. (2003), McGregor, D. (1957), McClelland D, (1955, 1961, 1965), Mc Clelland D.-Burnham D.H. (2003)
Researches have determined the following motivators for the employees in their labor environment: Herzberg F., Mausner B, Synderman B , (1959), Hersey P. Blanchard K.H. (1977) McClelland D, (1953), (1955), (1961), (1965), McGregor, D. (1957)
Good working conditions, Feeling in on things, Tactful disciplining, Full appreciation for work done, Management loyalty to workers, Good wages, Promotion and growth with company, Sympathetic understanding of personal problems, Job security, Interesting work, Autonomy, Personal development, Affiliation, Achievement, Prestige, Power, Authority etc.
Fear-threaten-punishment is a great motivator. Herzberg, F. (2003) However these incentives have two basic weaknesses:
- They last for a short period of time and after that they stimulate negative side effects (from apathy to explosion) which cancel the previous achievement
- They do not motivate the employees to do their best but to achieve a result adequate to avoid their punishment.
The case study of the Greek flag carrier the Olympic Airways (O.A.)
Assumptions
Our approach on the aforementioned subject was based on the conclusions of our field research. This field research is based on questionnaires with thirty-one questions formed by the authors These questions concerned:
- The motivation methods-incentives applied by the OA for the flight crews.
- The motivation methods that the flight crews want to be applied by OA for themselves.
- The opinion of the cockpit and cabin crew apart from the content and the role of their profession.
- The participation in the total number of the cabin crew was 33,3% Stewards and 66,7% Stewardesses
- The participation in the total number of the cockpit crew was 54% pilots and 46% Co-Pilots
- The number of the answered questionnaires represent the 30% of the cabim crew and the 45% of the cockpit crew
The research concerning the pilots was conducted in two periods, with one to two month time distance between them. The first period was in early October 2002 and the second one in November and December 2002,during the negotiation period concerning the O.A.’s privatisation. Consequently these answers were influenced by their feelings stimulated among other causes, by their consideration about the positive or negative impact on their future after the O.A’s privatisation or its bankruptcy according to the rumours. It must be underlined that the pilots union were under negotiations with private tenders for a long period to acquire paying 6,5 bil GRD (US$19,2 mil) a part of the O.A.’s share capital.
Findings
The 28,5% of the cabin crewmembers who answered were flight stewards and the 71,5% were flight Stewardesses.
Flight Stewards
The 28,8 answered that according to their opinion the O.A.’s management implements motives for the cabin crew and the 71,2% answered that according to their opinion the O.A.’s management does not implement any motive for the cabin crew. (TABLE 1)
- Those of the flight Stewards who answered that the O.A.’s management implements motives for the cabin crew:
- Assessed the applied incentives as following:
Personal development-training 60,0%, better labour conditions–higher salary 53,3%, job security 40,0%, participation 30,0%, better labor conditions 13,3%, power 13,3%, recognition 6,6%, higher salary 0,0%. (TABLE 1)
- Their previous employment in the O.A. was:
0,1-5 years the 6,6%, 5,1-10 years the 46,6%, 10,1-15 years the 20,0%, 15,1-20 years the 13,3%. The 13,3% did not answer this question (TABLE 2)
- Their educational level was:
Lyceum 35,3%, Vocational Institute 11,8% College 0,0%, University 17,6%, Other 11,8% No answer21,5%.(TABLE 3)
Those of the flight Stewards who answered that the O.A.’s management does not implement any motive for the cabin crew, stated their preference as following:
- Assessment the preferred incentives:
Personal development-training 73,0%, job security 70,0%, better labor conditions 64,8%, better labour conditions- higher salary 59,4%, participation 51,3%, higher salary 51,3% recognition 48,6%, power 29,7%. (TABLE 1)
Their previous employment in the O.A. was:
0,1-5 years the 8,0%, 5,1-10 years the 40,0%, 10,1-15 years the 21,6%, 15,1-20 years the 27,0%. The 2,7% did not answer this question. (TABLE 2)
- Their educational level was:
Lyceum 40,5%, Vocational Institute 2,7% College 10,8%, University 8,1%, Other 13,5% No answer 24,3% (TABLE 3)
Flight Stewardesses
The 15,4% answered that according to their opinion the O.A.’s management implements motives for the cabin crew and the 84,6% answered that according to their opinion the O.A.’s management does not implement any motive for the cabin crew. (TABLE 1)
2) Those of the flight Stewardesses who answered that the O.A.’s management implements motives for the cabin crew:
- Assessed the applied incentives as following:
Better labour conditions– higher salary 42,1%, %, job security 40,0%, participation 40,0%, %, recognition 36,8%, personal development-training 31,6 better labour conditions 26,3%, higher salary 15,7%, power 0,8,. (TABLE 1)
- Their previous employment in the O.A. was:
0,1-5 years the 15,8%, 5,1-10 years the 5,2%, 10,1-15 years the 57,9%, 15,1-20 years the 21,1%. (TABLE 2)
- Their educational level was:
Lyceum 22,2%, Vocational Institute 11,1% College 0,0%, University 22,2%, Other 22,2% No answer 22,2%. (TABLE 3)
Those of the flight Stewardesses who answered that the O.A.’s management does not implement any motive for the cabin crew, stated their preference as following:
- Assessment the preferred incentives:
better labour conditions– higher salary 81,7%, personal development-training 76,9%, job security 75,0%, better labour conditions 64,8%, recognition 59,6%, participation 46,1%, higher salary 44,2% power 37,5%. (TABLE 1)
- Their previous employment in the O.A. was:
0,1-5 years the 11,8%, 5,1-10 years the 26,6%, 10,1-15 years the 31,8%, 15,1-20 years the 24,5%, 20,1-25 the 4,5%. The 0,9% did not answer this question (TABLE 2)
- Their educational level was:
Lyceum 33,6%, Vocational Institute 1,8% College 5,4%, University 20,0%, Other
11,8% No answer 27,2%. (TABLE 3)
Cockpit crewmembers
The 49,6% of the cockpit crewmembers who answered were pilots and the 50,4% were copilots
3) Those of the pilots who answered that the O.A.’s management implements motives for the cabin crew:
- Assessed the applied incentives as following:
better labour conditions– higher salary 61,8%, %, job security 40,0%, participation 40,0%, %, personal development-training 26,5% recognition 23,5%, better labour conditions 17,6%, higher salary 17,6%, power 0,0%. (TABLE 1)
- Their previous employment in the O.A. was:
0,1-5 years the 0,0%, 5,1-10 years the 27,6%, 10,1-15 years the 51,7%, 15,1-20 years the 6,9%. No answer 13,7%. (TABLE 2)
- Their educational level was:
Lyceum 12,5%, Vocational Institute 0,0% College 0,0%, University 37,5%, Other 12,5% No answers 37,5%. (TABLE 3)
Those of the pilots who answered that the O.A.’s management does not implement any motive for the cabin crew, stated their preference as following:
- Assessment the preferred incentives:
better labour conditions– higher salary 76,3%,%, job security 75,0%, personal development-training 52,6%,%, participation 42,1%, recognition 39,5%, higher salary 36,8% better labour’s conditions 31,5%, power 31,5%. (TABLE 1)
- Their previous employment in the O.A. was:
0,1-5 years the 5,1%, 5,1-10 years the 7,7%, 10,1-15 years the 23,0%, 15,1-20 years the 35,9%, 20,1-25 the 15,3%. The 15,3% did not answer this question. (TABLE 2)
- c) Their educational level was:
Lyceum 11,1%, Vocational Institute 0,0% College 16,6%, University 50,0%, Other 16,6% No answer 5,5%. (TABLE 3)
4) Those of the co-pilots who answered that the O.A.’s management implements motives for the cabin crew:
- Assessed the applied incentives as following:
better labours conditions–higher salary 55,6%, %, job security 55,0%, participation 35,0%, %, recognition 20,0%, personal development-training 40,0% better labours conditions 17,7%, higher salary 15,5%, power 0,0%. (TABLE 1)
- Their previous employment in the O.A. was:
0,1-5 years the 33,3%, 5,1-10 years the 17,9%, 10,1-15 years the 30,8%, 15,1-20 years the 5,1%. No answer 12,8%. (TABLE 2)
- Their educational level was:
There is not available data
Those of the co-pilots who answered that the O.A.’s management does not implement any motive for the cabin crew, stated their preference as following:
- Assessment the preferred incentives:
better labour conditions–higher salary 58,6%, personal development 44,8%, job
security 70,0%, better labour’s conditions 20,7%, recognition 34,5%, participation 45,0%, higher salary 20,7% power 17,2%, (TABLE 1)
- Their previous employment in the O.A. was:
0,1-5 years the 28,1%, 5,1-10 years the 12,5%, 10,1-15 years the 31,2%, 15,1-20 ye- ars the 9,4%, 20,1-25 the 4,5%. The 18,8% did not answer this question. (TABLE 2)
- Their educational level was:
Lyceum 13,3%, Vocational Institute 6,6% College 26,6%, University 33,3%, Other 20,2% . (TABLE 3)
Assessment of the profession
Although more than 80 % of the cabin crew and more than 45% of the cockpit crew in the O.A. answered that the O.A. does not implement any incentive, only 5% of the cabin and 2% of the cockpit crew answered that they could think of changing their profession.
TABLE 1
Replies of the cockpit and cabin crew of
whether the O.A.’s management implements incentives and which
Flight Stewardesses Flight Stewards Pilots Co-Pilots |
Participation to the total number of the specialty 66,7% 33,3% 55% 45% |
Number of questionnaires answered 65% 35% 49,7% 50,3% |
Applied incentives by the O.A. YES% NO%* YES% NO%* YES% NO%* YES% NO%* |
14,7% 83,3% 28,8% 71,2% 43,6% 56,4% 57% 43% |
Better labour conditions- -higher salary a) 42,1 a) 81,7 a) 53,3 a) 76,3 a) 61,8 a) 76,3 a) 55,6 b) 58,6 |
job security b) 40,0 c) 75,0 c) 40,0 b)75,0 b) 40,0 c) 75,0 b) 55,0 a) 70,0 |
participation c) 40,0 f) 46,1 d) 30,0 d)42,1 c) 40,0 d) 42,1 d) 35,0 c) 45,0 |
recognition d) 36,8 e)59,6 g) 6,6 e) 39,5 e) 23,5 f) 39,5 e) 20,0 e) 34,5 |
personal development-training e) 31,6 b)76,9 b) 60,0 c) 52,6 d) 26,5 e) 52,5 c) 40,0 d) 44,8 |
better labour conditions f) 26,3 d) 64,8 e) 13,3 g) 31,5 f) 17,6 b) 76,3 f)17,7 f) 20,7 |
higher salary g) 15,7 g) 44,2 h) 0,0 f) 36,8 g) 17,6 g) 36,8 g)15,5 g) 20,7 |
power h) 0,8 h) 37,5 f) 13,3 h) 31,5 h) 0,0 h) 31,5 h) 0,0 h)17,2 |
* The column with the title “NO” includes the incentives which are required to be implemented by those who replied that the O.A.’s management does not implement any incentive
TABLE 2
Years of previous employment of the flight crewmembers in the O.A.
Years 0,1-5 5,1-10 10,1-15 15,1-20 20,1-25 No reply |
YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO |
Stewardesses 15,8% 11,8% 5,2% 26,6% 57,9% 31,8% 21,0% 24,5% 0,0% 4,5% 0,0% 0,9% |
Stewards 6,6% 8,0% 46,6% 40,0% 20,0% 21,6% 13,3% 27,0% 0,0% 0,0% 13,3% 2,7% |
Pilots 0,0% 5,1% 27,6% 7,7% 51,7% 23,0% 6,9% 35,9% 0,0% 15,3% 13,7% 15,3% |
Co-pilots 33,3% 28,1% 17,9% 12,5% 30,8% 31,2% 5,1% 9,4% 0,0% 0,0% 12,8% 18,8% |
TABLE 3
Educational level of the flight crewmembers
Lyceum Vocational College University Other No reply |
Institute |
YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO |
Stewardesses 33,6% 1,8% 22,2% 5,4% 0,0% 20,0% 22,2% 11,8% 22,2% 27,2% 22,2% 0,0% |
Stewards 35,3% 40,5% 11,8% 2,7% 0,0% 10,8% 17,6% 8,1% 11,8% 13,5% 21,5% 24,3% |
Pilots 12,5% 11,1% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 16,6% 37,5% 50,0% 12,5% 16,6% 37,5% 5,5% |
Co-pilots ND 13,3% ND 6,6% ND 26,6% ND 33,3% ND 20,0% ND 0,0% |
The 86.6 % of the cockpit crew see their role as authoritarian and the 12.6 % as
members of the team called flight crew. A further analysis of the answers shows that only 10 % of the captains and 18 % of the first officers see themselves as members of the team called flight crew. The 80% of the cabin crew consider themselves as members of the team called cabin crew, while only the 20% of the cabin crew consider themselves as members of the wider team called flight crew (cabin and cockpit)
Some necessary parameters the knowledge of which contributes decisively at an objective assessment of research’s results
For an objective assessment of the primary causes of the aforementioned results the knowledge of the following information is considered to be necessary:
Our field research is based thirty-one questions. The questionnaire was a multiple choice one with the possibility of expressing their own personal opinion, as far as it was not included in the proposed multiple choices. The questions concerned
- The motivation measures-methods applied by the OA to the flight crews.
- The opinion of the cockpit and cabin crew apart from the content and the
role of their profession.
Our field research concerning the pilots was conducted in two periods, with one to two month time distance between them. The first period was in early October 2002 and the second one in November and December 2002, after the end of their CRM training. Consequently these answers were influenced by the content of their training Our questions which were relative to the content of the motives applied by the ΟΑ to Cabin and Cockpit crew, included the aforementioned main motives for employees.
The answer of the flight crew that the O.A. never applied any certain motivation pro- gram is compatible with the findings concerning the applied poor management (Restructure program for the O.A. approved by the E.U. on 1994/10)
However it does not mean that the O.A. management never applied any motivation.
– A careful research can prove that the O.A. applies a wide system of economic and other motives without having a plan.
-The following facts are the sources of the negative consideration of the majority of the flight crew relatively with the inexistence of motives:
-The socialistic party that has been in government for almost the last 20 years fostered the employees with:
- expectations greater than those that the economy could afford for a long term.
- the ideology of the minimum effort and the maximum benefit
- the ideology that the unions are basic pylons of the democracy
- the ideology of the employees’ participation in the corporate decision making centers, regardless of their qualifications
- the practice of the informal participation in the unions leaders and the party mechanisms in the management of the companies
- the practice of promotion to the hierarchy based on political criteria
-During the first government 1981-1985 the wages in the O.A. had a rapid increase.
The current level of wages after the about 30% decrease in 1998 does not correspond to the level of life that the employees were used to for the two last decades. Due to that they feel a social degradation. Although the wages level of the flight crew is about the double of that of the private Greek airlines, they feel that the current level of their salary is not a motive since it has been decreased by more than 30% comparatively with the recent past.
-The role of the personnel manager of the O.A., which had been, substituted for a long period of time by the leaders of the unions especially the ones of the federation who simultaneously were members of the governmental socialistic party. The motives about which the top management of the O.A. agreed with the unions, were presented by the union leaders as privileges for the employees having been succeeded through their unionization and unity. Consequently the salary’s level lost its motivation power for the majority of the flight crew
-During the period 1981-2003 almost the 100% of the current flight crew cabin and cockpit had been hired
-The 100% of the O.A.s flight crew is unionized.
-The leaders of the Olympic unions the majority of which are members of the governmental socialistic party, have immediate formal and informal involvement with the administration of the O.A. especially in issues concerning the hiring and the promotion of the personnel, the labor’s terms and condition the investments etc. From the employees’ point of view they share a great responsibility for the manifestation of the crisis at the O.A.
-The substitution of the government’s former strategic goal, relatively to the recovery of the unified and public OA., that had the support of the majority of the employees, with its privatization. This goal that was informally supported by the majority of the union leaders led the employees to a great disappointment. Consequently the employees lost a great part of their previous trust towards their political, airline and union leaders.
-During the last ten years-while the O.A. has been under restructure-the salaries have been reduced by more than 30% in the name of the contribution of the employees to the recovery of the O.A. At the same period of time the labors’ productivity has been increased from 105% to 170%.
At the mean time however instead of recovery, the crisis in the O.A. deepens.
-The rumors about a) the O.A.’s bankruptcy, b) the decrease in the number of the employees c) the further decrease in the wages level undermined the labor’s security, creating uncertainty
– The increase in the labors’ productivity, the decrease in the salaries, the decrease in the days off, the cutting of the subsidization during illness combined with the failure of the restructuring program made the employees believe that they were manipulated by the political leaders
-The appointment of the members of hierarchy is subject to criteria different than those concerning the qualifications or capabilities, due to political influences (introduction report of the recovery law 2602/1998). For the aforementioned reason the employees do not respect those who take promotions. Further more the majority of the employees disagree with the policy applied by the members of the hierarchy (in application of the state shareholder general policy) that resulted to the degradation of their level of life. Consequently the promotion to the general corporate hierarchy has lost its motivation power for the majority of the flight crew.
- The profession of flight crew –cockpit and cabin- is considered to be-and for a particular period of time it was- of a high social prestige, due to the high level and the privileges of a cosmopolitan life that this profession could offer. Further more, one of the informal leaders of the flight Stewardesses, became, in the recent past, wife of the Greek Prime Minister. This fact made the flight Stewardesses-and the flight crew in general- to consider that their role had an even higher special social prestige.
On the other hand, for a long period of time in the past, pilots used to be appointed general managers of the Greek flag carrier by the state shareholder,. Their incapability to correspond to the challenges within a liberalized international environment, especi- ally in that of the restructured OA, led the state shareholder to revise that choice.
The decrease in the salary of flight crew, the growth of their job insecurity the defamation of the O.A. and its employees’ efficiency-professionalism etc. is considered as a reduction in the former acquired level of social prestige of the flight crew profession.
-During our research period of time (2002/10-2003/2) the state shareholder:
- Stopped some main destinations (e.g. domestic, Australia etc.) and decreased a significant number of frequencies for the remained destinations
- was under discussion about:
– a further decrease in the number of the employees (today they are the 40% of those in 1994) and the level of their wages (2002/10-2003/2).
– The bankruptcy of the O.A. due to an extremely high financial penalty by the E.U.
– The privatization of the O.A.
Further more:
-The recovery program for the O.A. that was approved by the E.U. in 1994/10 determined among others the poor management as one of the main causes for the crisis manifestation in the Greek flag carrier, the O.A.
The B.O.D. of the O.A. (2000-2003) that was under examination by a special committee of the Greek parliament (2002/4) concerning the efficiency of its activity, declared that it had not elaborated a long term strategic program because the O.A. was under the privatization process according to the will of the state shareholder The long-term uncertainty stimulated the fear of a further lowering of their life level due to a further decrease in the wages level and a further worsening of the labor’s conditions. The rumours that they would lose their jobs as a consequence of bankruptcy or privatisation, grew up the discontent of the employees, flagged their trust to the BOD and to the state shareholder and created the appropriate conditions for negative reactions and or apathy. All those facts made the O.A.’s flight crew lose of their profession former social prestige together with its former motivation power. Never the less the profession of flight crew (cockpit and cabin) remain a very strong motivator. The Greek National culture The national culture and the corporate culture, determine the flight crew operational sub-culture, which is basic determinant of their needs’ hierarchy. Four of the main national Greek cultural dimensions that strongly affect the flight crew attitude are: (Hofstede 1980 a, b, 1991; Johnston 1993) 1) Power distance. This considers the habitual exercise of power within a culture. (From a scale 11 to 104 Greece scores 60) 2) Uncertainty Avoidance, (From scale 40 to 112 Greeks score 112). This dimension addresses the ease with which cultures cope with novelty, ambiguity, and uncertainty. High Uncertainty-avoidance culture seeks clarity and order in social relationships, favoring rules and regulations. 3) Individualism. (From a scale 8 to 91 Greece scores 35) This dimension considers the cultural emphasis given to the individualistic mores as distinct from the collectivist, the social ones. 4) Masculinity. This relates to beliefs regarding the gender division of social roles, (from a scale of 5 to 95 Greece scores 57) In masculine cultures ambition and performances are valued. High masculine society tends to have a belief in the independent decision maker and leader that value their decision-making autonomy” Some parameters of the OA’s flight crew operational sub-culture |
In “high power distance and/or low individualism cultures the average and often the more effective manager may be a “benevolent autocrat” who sees little need for participative management. In many countries it is not considered normal or appropriate to enter into discussions with pilots representatives on such matters. Here again we meet a cultural gulf with implications for CRM implementation” (Johnston 1993)
The explanation of the consideration of the cockpit crew about their profession is based on the history of the OA’s flight crew sub-culture. The OA was established in 1956 by hiring former Hellenic air force pilots. These pilots were the majority of the OA’s cockpit crew up to 1992. Consequently their culture (military standards, hierarchy, authoritarian, autocrats) was the dominating culture. This culture was and still remains with marginal differentiation, the dominant culture of the OA’s cockpit crew.
Conclusions
Even from a first glance, we can be led to the following general conclusions:
- the consideration that the Olympic Airways does not implement any incentive is supported by the 83,3% of the Stewardesses, the 72,2% of the Stewards, the 56,4% of the Pilots and the 43% of the Co-Pilots
- The motivation power of the incentives for those who argue that the O.A.’s management implements incentives for the flight crew is very weak, since the concentration is not higher than 42,1% per any incentive with an exception of the 53,3% of Stewards relatively with the incentive “better labor conditions-higher salary”
- The motivation power of the incentives, which want to be applied to those who argue that the O.A.’s management does not implement any incentive for the flight crew, is very strong. The concentration per incentive fluctuates from 50% to 100% higher per incentive, compared with those who argue that the O.A. implements incentives for flight crewmembers.
- The combined incentive “better labour conditions–higher salary” is the first motive for all flight crewmembers (cockpit and cabin)
- Other strong incentives common for all the flight crewmembers are the personal development through training, job security, participation and recognition.
- The incentive “job security” is the second or the third most powerful incentive for all the flight crewmembers
- Those of the cockpit crew who answered that the O.A.’s management apply incentives to cockpit crewmembers do not consider as incentive the “power” (promotion in corporate hierarchy level different of their profession).
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Abstract
ICAO’s exclusive objective for air accident investigation is the prevention of future accidents/incidents. For an effective and efficient contribution to the upgrading of the aviation’s safety level, the various accident reports have to be comparable. A reliable comparability of the various accident reports requires a unified perception of the examined environment by the investigators. A unified methodology and structure of the presentation of the findings, conclusions and recommendations is also required. Reading the various accident reports one realizes that in each one of them, the different fields of the same managerial function are allocated in different paragraphs of the given structure. In the institutional framework that the ICAO has established regarding the air accident investigation report, the following presuppositions are defined:
- for being an investigator (the general qualifications of the investigators)
- for making an accident investigation and
- for presenting the results in the accident report (the structure of the accident report and the titles of the contents)
The lack of detailed description in the aforementioned information leaves space for differentiation of the investigators’ perception-knowledge-qualifications. Consequently, this weakness does not contribute positively to the maximization of the effectiveness and efficiency of the accident reports and finally to the upgrading of aviation’s safety level. (C2 Safety Analysis and Policy)
Key words
Aviation-accident-incident-final report, aviation-accident-investigation, aviation-safety,
Air-carrier-management-functions, determinants of human perception.
Introduction
For an effective and efficient contribution to the upgrading of the aviation’s safety level, the various accident reports have to be comparable. A reliable comparability of the various accident reports requires a unified perception and comprehension of the examined environment by the investigators and a unified methodology and structure of the presentation of the findings, the conclusions and the recommendations. .
Reading the various accident reports one realizes that in each one of them the same issues are included in different paragraphs of the given structure.
Of course the absolute unification of the objectivity-reliability level of the perception of each investigator is not possible due to:
- the existence of factors that cannot be determined,
- the infinity of the stimuli by the environment towards the human organism
- the fact that the biological and mental abilities of the human organism are limited.
Among the determinants of the investigators’ perception, the ICAO mentions their general job specialty (doctors, pilots etc) and the minimum level of their knowledge (titles of the issues of the investigators training syllabus)
However it does not determine:
- the specific job specialty of the doctor (pathologist, psychiatrist etc), or the specific job specialty of the pilot (jet, tourboprop etc) and the specific aircraft type they have to be certified at, the duration and the field of their experience. This weakness has a negative impact on the unification of the investigators’ level of knowledge
- the content of each title of the syllabus, consequently the uniformity of the investigators’ level of knowledge
- the qualifications of the investigators’ trainers (the science the sector and the level of their knowledge and experience)
- the investigators’ psychological and physical health
The a,b,c, weaknesses contribute negatively to the uniformity of the investigators’ level of knowledge although, knowledge is a basic determinant of the quality of the investigators’ perception. The d weakness determines the objectivity-reliability of the investigator’s perception.
The problem of the ability, of the process and the determinants of the perception and comprehension of the environment by the human being, is one of the first and main issues that ancient Greek philosophy (Andriopoulos 2003) had faced. (Xenopfanes, Heracletus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Democretus, Plato, Aristotle etc.)
Two main aspects were posed from the beginning:
- the ability or the inability of the human being to have access to the cognition of the physical environment and
- the predominance either of the human senses or the human spirit as to their contribution to the cognition of the physical environment (Andriopoulos 2003).
Since then, the aforementioned problems that compose knowledge theory, have
Been an integral part of any philosophical theory or system. (Windelband &
Heimsoeth 1976). Research during the last (20th) century has concluded that:
(Goleman 1995, Hayes 1994, Louria 1978, Papadopoulos 2003, Scharfetter
1976, Steanberg 1996)
- Perception is one of the mental processes of the human being
- The human’s mental processes involve: consciousness, attention, perception, memory, thinking, emotion, intelligence, learning, orientation etc,
- The parameters of the human mental processes are in a continuous interaction
- The senses are the gates through which the stimuli from the environment are transferred to the relative brain centers through the nervous system.
Consequently the identification of the causes of a particular level of perception requires the analysis into its parameters and the examination of each of these parameters separately. It is obvious that, due to the interaction of the various parameters of mental processes, a disorder in one of them, may cause the disorder of all the others in a different level and intensity This is the reason for our decision to make a brief presentation about: a) mental processes, b) the presuppositions of their regular function, and c) the determinants and the consequences of their disorder.
The present paper is focused on the determinants of the investigators’ perception-comprehension, including their level and areas of knowledge as well as the structure of the accident report, using as case study the paragraph 1.17. Organizational and Management information
PART ONE
Brief theoretical approach
- Definitions
“Investigation. (ICAO 2001)Α process conducted for the purpose of accident prevention which includes the gathering and analysis of information, the drawing of conclusions, including the determination of causes and, when appropriate, the making of safety recommendations.
Investigator-in-charge. (ICAO 2001) Α person charged, on the basis of his or her qualifications,with the responsibility for the organization, conduct and control of an investigation
”Qualifications” are defined as the totality of capabilities, theoretical knowledge and practical experience upon a particular cognitive field. The qualifications of every employee are basic determinants of his-her quality and of the quantity of the employees’ product in a particular period of time.
- The necessary presuppositions for the comparability of all accident reports
The necessary presuppositions for the fulfillment of ICAO’s goal regarding the accident investigation- prevention of future accidents/incidents- is the comparability of all accident reports filled in by every investigator all over the world. This reliable comparability of accident reports, requires the unification of the level of reliability for every region of the world, regarding the:
- perception-comprehension of the environment by the accident investigators
- qualifications of the accident investigators (job specialty, knowledge, experience)
- structure of the accident report
- titles of the chapters of the accident report
5) content of the chapters of the accident report
6) methodology of filling in the accident report.
We must make clear that an absolute unification of the level of the aforementioned factors cannot be achieved, due to the differentiation and limitation of the capabilities of human nature. However we consider that the existing difficulties should not stop us from continuing the effort to achieve the higher level of uniformity which contributes to a higher level of aviation safety.
3) The mental processes as determinants of perception (Goleman 1995, Hayes 1994, Louria 1978, Papadopoulos 2003, Scharfetter 1976, Steanberg 1996)
Human perception is the resultant, the unified expression of a totality of components of mental processes, which are in continuous interaction. To specify the causes of a particular perception’s level, this perception should be analyzed into its components and each component should be examined separately.
The mental processes that form each component of perception are: consciousness, attention, memory, thought, emotion, intelligence, learning, orientation etc.
It is obvious that, because of this interaction, the disordered function of one of them causes disorder to the others, in different levels and intensity.
Perception
Perception, like any other mental process, doesn’t function independently. The quality of its function is in relation with the function quality of all other interacting mental processes. Perception is the mental process, which, along with other mental processes, gives an individual the ability to be aware of external or internal objects, by means of stimuli, which are received by the sensory organs, transmitted to the brain and processed by it. In psychiatry an “object” is defined as anything that can stimulate emotions in a human being. e.g. an idea, a fantasy, a person, a material object, a situation, one’s own self etc. The process of perceiving an object is composed by the phases of: observation-attention (stimulus), sensation, transmission of the stimulus to the corresponding brain centers through the nervous system, encoding of the stimuli (characteristics and qualities of the object) within the consciousness, processing, understanding and interpretation according past knowledge and experience, and finally transmission of the conclusions to those brain centers that will then give our nervous system the orders for the various reactions of the organism. Consequently, perception is not a static process of a given quantity and quality, but it evolves dynamically through development (learning etc).
Only one part of objective reality is possible to be perceived. Full perception of objective reality cannot be achieved by a human being, because our senses are not aroused by a series of visual, auditory stimuli, vibrations, movements of particles, atoms, electrons etc. On the other hand, human brain has the capacity of processing a limited quantity and quality of information. Consequently, the limited ability of our senses to be aroused by the totality of stimuli from the environment, correlates with the ability of our brain to process them, in the context of the defense mechanisms of our organism.
Factors influencing the functional level of perception (Scharfetter 1976)
The following factors influence the process of perception:
- the subjective factor (emotional state, previous experience, level of knowledge, level of intelligence etc) and
- b) the objective factor (intensity, simplicity or complexity of the object).
Disorders of perception
Perception disorders may be caused by conditions such as:
- Organic disorders
1) of the receptive capacity of the sensory organs,
2) of the various brain centers (e.g. the individual can see or hear, but cannot recognize)
- Psychological disorders
1) Hallucination (perception of a non-existing object),
2) Illusion (distorted perception of an existing object).
Consciousness
“Consciousness” in psychiatry is described as the level of alertness of the individual and it is analyzed in two parts:
- the sensory part, which involves the ability of the individual to process the stimuli provided by the external environment and
- the kinetic part, which involves the ability of the individual to process stimuli of the external environment, to select the answer and finally give it.
In the course of this process, defense mechanisms are also involved. They act as a filter and decide which stimuli from the external environment will be kept in consciousness and which will pass into the subconscious. It is obvious that consciousness disorders affect every other mental process.
Consciousness disorders may be the result of:
- psychological causes (stress, fear, psychiatric personality disorders etc)
- organic causes (injuries, brain tumors, toxic and infectious causes etc)
- biochemical causes (medications, alcohol, other toxic substances, drugs etc).
The consequences of consciousness disorders are a decline in other mental processes, such as perception of objective reality, attention, judgment and association processes.
Attention
By the term “attention” is specified the mental process through which the individual classifies by time and space in his memory an internal or external stimulus.
The causes of attention disorders are head trauma or injury, physical and psychological burnout, anxiety, normal phobias, stressful situations, intense emotions (anger, sadness etc), medications, alcohol, other toxic substances, drugs etc).
The consequences of attention disorders are: exhaustion, easy fatigue, fixation, short attention span, distractiveness, selective and non-selective inattentiveness. In the context of the above-mentioned disorders, the individual is incapable of performing the process of attention :
- a) concentrates on one or a few objects,
- b) is incapable of concentrating in general,
- c) is incapable of evaluating external or internal stimuli
- d) is not able to concentrate on one or more stress-inducing objects (defense mechanism of repression).
Add Your Heading Text Here
Memory is the mental process that gives an individual the ability to store past experience, to recall it and motivate it (recognition, recall, constructive memory) each time this is considered to be necessary. All these facts make memory a basic component of the quality of perception and normal behavior. Memory, along with thinking and learning, is a cognitive mental process.
Factors affecting the function of memory are: function level of consciousness-alertness, lapse of time between encoding and storing of the information, function level of perception, function level of attention, motivation and interest of the individual, emotional investment on the information to be stored, various rules of memory techniques for organising information.
As consequences of the memory disorders are reported:
- amnesias (incapability of storing information due to e.g. chronic alcoholism, brain injury and incapability of recalling the information because of recent emotional disorder, intense anxiety, fear etc, permanent or temporary brain damage)
- hypermnesia, panoramic revival of experience, hyperactivity of constructive
memory, exceptionally vivid memory
- paramnesias-delusional memory: recalling events or situations that never
occurred
- confabulation: the “making up” of memories in order to justify specific situations or just to show off, to the point that the individual comes to believe them as reality.
Emotion
Emotion is a mental process that charges pleasantly or unpleasantly every human activity, determining our disposition regarding the activity’s intensity and duration, as well as communication with the environment. It is a strictly subjective situation, and for this reason it is rather experienced than described. Emotions can motivate the individual positively or negatively towards a situation or an object.
Factors affecting the function level of an emotion are: the normal function of the brain (central nervous system), which may be disrupted by injuries, tumors, functional disorders, the peripheral nervous system the endocrinal system.
Disorders in the above-mentioned systems cause emotional disorders, like:
- a) ambivalence (simultaneous appearance of positive and negative affect regarding a choice),
- b) euphoria (permanent and unjustified),
- c) depression and melancholy,
- shallowness of affect (incapability of expressing strong emotions),
- e) incapability of experiencing any feelings at all,
- f) emotional rigidity – inflexibility (incapability of differentiating a feeling according to different stimuli from the environment),
- g) instability (rapid change of emotions even as a result of unimportant stimuli),
- h) incapability of controlling feelings,
- i) inappropriate affect (the manifestation of emotions that do not correspond to the stimulus)
It is obvious that the emotional state of a person (fear, anger, happiness, anxiety, jealousy etc) invariably affects the function of perception.
Learning
It is a complicated process that affects the behavior of a person, and has to do (Skinner) with: “alteration of the probability of a response under the same conditions in which the conjunction between stimuli and response takes place.
Factors affecting the function level of learning are:
- A) Factors related to the person:
1) function level of the central nervous system,
2) motivation for learning
3) emotional interest towards the object of learning,
4) degree of a person’s maturity
5) previous experiences,
6) level of intelligence
The above-mentioned factors, in combination, form the conditions for faster and more complete learning. We underline the word combination, because for example, a high level of intelligence without emotional interest, or, even worse, with emotional aversion does not promote learning process.
- B) Factors related to the environment:
Personality and environment are in a constant interacting process. The quality (clarity, intensity etc), the quantity and coherence of the stimuli contribute positively or negatively to the learning process. As long as the environment is conducive to the emotional investment on the object of learning, or furthermore to the satisfaction of essential needs of the individual as the result of learning, the learning process is facilitated.
Functional disorders of learning are due to:
- disorders of the central nervous system
- psychological disorders that block emotional investment on the object of learning.
- the quality (clarity, intensity etc) and the quantity of external stimuli.
Thought - Reasoning
Thought-reasoning can be defined as the mental process which is related to the dynamic evolving process of problem-solving through which the classification of material and non material objects concerning the self and the environment is performed. (Scharfetter 1976) Through thinking, meaning and importance is attached to these objects, they are understood and their causal relations are explained, meanings are connected to each other, decisions are taken, judgments are made.
Thought-reasoning as a process is wider than perception, having as a basis the brain (central nervous phenomena).
It is activated when the man seeks the solution of a problem, the satisfaction of a need. It is the expression of a man’s personality, that’s why thought disorders initiate disorders of the personality. Action is the primary manifestation of thought and a crucial criterion for its rightfulness.
Factors affecting the function level of thought-reasoning are:
- A) Psychological and biological conditions, such as:
- consciousness state 2) state and level of memory, 3) level of intelligence, which is defined by biological and social parameters, 4) emotional state, 5) level of the organic function of the brain.
- B) Social and cultural factors
Thought-reasoning disorders are divided in: disorders of thought process and disorders of thought content.
- a) Disorders of process
1) the simple, temporary, frequent or constant blocking of thinking, 2) slowness of thinking, 3) flight of thought (distraction into many objects, incapability of concentrating on something specific), 4) verbiage, trifle talk, pedantic thinking (concentration on the examination of a single object in depth, focusing on details, on the insignificant aspects, which results in the incapability of perceiving the general essence), 5) incoherent, chaotic thinking (combination or differentiation of things, situations etc, without specific criteria) persistent repetition of particular words or sentences, with or without meaning, 6) incoherence -loose associations (articulated thoughts without any reasonable or emotional coherence)
- b) Disorders of the content of thinking
- compulsive thoughts against the will of the person
- paranoid or unreasonable thoughts
Consequently the necessary conditions of a minimum level of objective-reliable perception and comprehension of the environment by the investigator is his-her physiological function of:
- all the senses, b) the nervous system that transfers the external stimulus from the senses at the proper cerebral centers, c) the cerebral centers that process the stimulus,
all the mental processes since they affect perception and. e) the level of knowledge and experience upon the investigated environment (which is included in the determinant of mental processes)
- Κnowledge-experience as a basic determinant of perception (Lainos & Nikolaidis 2003, Marsh 2000, Paries Ashleigh 1998)
Κnowledge (theoretical and practical-experience) that is, the characteristics, the properties, the theoretical principles of evolution – the actual evolution during a particular period of time, the relationships-interactions-consequences of the environment (objects, events, situations) is a basic determinant of perception’s-comprehension’s quality. Consequently it affects decisively the quality of decision-making and therefore effectiveness of action. But knowledge is useful only if it can facilitate the understanding of the environment (close and wider) by a human being who, based on that, may then proceed to decision-making and action towards the
fulfillment of a goal.
The optimum quantity of information relative to a particular environment is what the user can perceive, understand and process according to his-her biological, psychological and cognitive abilities. The support provided by the available machinery and electronic means enlarges these abilities. Excessive, unnecessary information especially if it is irrelevant, may cause additional ambiguities to the user, affecting the objectivity of his-her perception and also causing further delay to decision making. Consequently it results to a lower quality of situation awareness instead of a higher one, to a further delay of decision making and acting, due to the user’s inability to process the available quantity and quality of information. This can be described as “analysis-paralysis”.
Comprehension-understanding, is the result of a very complicated process. It concerns the correlation between information perceived and stored in the user’s memory. This information is relative to objects, events, situations perceived (developing a mental picture) from the environment through the senses. Perception includes the characteristics, properties, theoretical evolution principles-actual evolution during a particular period of time, relationships-interactions-consequences of the objects, events, situations.
For example when, during an aerobatic air-show an airplane dives with its nose vertical to the ground, the watcher considers this to be an aerobatic maneuver.
If however the same watcher sees a commercial airplane at the same position, he-she rather considers that it is going to crash. These two different considerations are a result of the correlation between the position of each airplane and its characteristics, properties etc., that the watcher has stored in his-her memory.
The reliability-objectivity of human understanding is based-apart from physical and mental functions- on the determination of the percentage of the understanding. This is based: on known information, on assumed information, on known ignorance and on unknown ignorance. It must be noticed that the absolute perception of the objective reality is impossible for every individual due to
- the infinity of external stimuli to the human organism
- the limited capabilities:
- of the human senses to recognize these stimuli,
- of the nervous system to transfer these stimuli to the proper brain centers
- of the brain centers to process these stimuli
.
- The role of the management functions on the accident occurrence
Even since the first quarter of the 20th century (Hawthorn etc.) up to recent times research has proved that the activity- behavior of every individual at his-her working place, during working time, is strongly, directly and indirectly affected by factors that compose the wider internal airline’s environment. (Andries-Kompier, -Smulders 1996, Beehr 1995, Bright-Mitchel.- Rickman 1996, Daniels-Harris 1998, MacDonald-Karasek-Punnett-Scharf 2001, Westfall 1998 )
“However the results of this research were not correlated with the managerial decisions and functions, through which the top management introduces the suggestions of the researchers in the internal corporate environment”. (Lainos 2003)
“[…]Only now are safety practitioners realizing the complex nature of accident/incident causation and the role organizations play in the genesis and management of human error. In fact it is the emphasis that organizational models place on the fallible decisions of managers, supervisors and others in the organization that sets them apart from the other perspectives previously discussed[…]” (Shapell-Wiegmann 2003 )
“[…] Organizational accidents may be truly accidental in the way in which the various contributing factors combine to cause the bad outcome, but there is nothing accidental about the existence of these precursors, nor in the conditions that created them.[…]” (Reason 1997)
Recent studies have proved that the activity-behaviour of the staff at working place, during working time, is strongly, directly and indirectly affected by factors from the wider internal corporate environment (Αnderson-Kjellberg-Lindberg-Skoldstrom 1996, Beehr 1995, Bright-Mitchel-Rickman 1996, Kelley 1996, Biner 2000,Fingret 2000, Hendy 2003, Caldwell-Caldwell 2003)
The introduction and preservation of these factors is ultimately determined by the top management decisions (C.E.O., B.O.D.). (Lainos 2003)
“[…] Responsibility for aviation safety begins at the very top of an airline company. History has demonstrated repeatedly that without the complete commitment of the highest management levels within a company, operational safety margins are seriously eroded. This does not suggest that a company will have an accident, but it does suggest that the risk of having an accident is high-the laws of probability will prevail. Management has great leverage in affecting operational safety within a company. Through its attitudes and actions management influences the attitudes and actions of all others within a company: Management defines the safety culture of an organization. This safety culture extends all the way to the maintenance shop floor, to the ramp to the cabin and to the cockpit. Further more the public and the government authorities are increasingly recognizing management’s role in air safety by holding management accountable for a serious incident or accident; this accountability is magnified many-fold if a company suffers several such incidents or accidents during a course of a few years […].” (Flight Safety Foundation 1994)
“[…]The ultimate responsibility for safety rests with the directors and management of the Company. The Company’s attitude to safety—the Company’s safety culture—is established from the outset by the extent to which senior management accepts responsibility for safe operations, particularly the proactive management of risk. Regardless of the size, complexity, or type of operation, senior management deter– mines the Company’s safety culture. However, without the wholehearted commitment of all personnel, any safety programme is unlikely to be effective[…].” (Airbus Industry 1999),
This consideration is based on the fact that the top management has the authority to program, organize, administrate, staff and control the corporate operation and to apply its decisions in the internal corporate environment, through the authorized members of the hierarchy (Lainos 2003). Even in the case that some of the factors of the internal corporate environment that affect negatively the staff’s activity are not the result of top management decisions, but the result of mismanagement by the members of the hierarchy at the various organizational levels, the ultimate responsibility still rests with the top management. The cause is that the top management has the ultimate responsibility of staffing. (Lainos 2003).
- The functions of the organizations’ management and their content
The knowledge of the functions of the corporate management, its consequences on the influenced areas of the internal corporate environment and the impact of these functions on the employees’ will is a basic determinant of the investigator’s opinion about the primary cause(s) and contributing factors of the accident incident (Lainos 2003)
The functions of the corporate management are: Planning, Organizing, Administrating, Staffing, and Controlling. These functions pursue the achievement of corporate goals based on the economic principle, which is the maximization of the
profits. The corporate areas and operations that are affected by these functions are showed in TABLE 1.
TABLE 1
In order to create a more clear perception of the managerial functions’ impact on the employees will, the internal corporate factors which affect the employees will are mentioned bellow (see TABLE 2)
Performance Shaping Factors (PSF’s) from the internal organizational environment and the management functions which mainly affect them
TABLE 2
1. Wages level Programming-Administrating-Staffing |
2. Hygiene and safety conditions (warm-cold, |
light-dark, noise, radiation, chemicals etc.) Programming-Administrating |
3. Stress and fatigue due to workload Programming-Administrating- Controlling |
4. Job security Programming-Administrating (motivating)- Staffing |
5. Skills and training Administrating (motivating)- Staffing |
6. Meritocracy or favoritism Administrating (Culture) |
7. The applied management style (human or product |
oriented, motivation’s efficiency, virtual recognition |
of the employees’ contribution to the development |
of the airline, the superiors’ behavior etc) Administrating |
8. Corporate culture applied by the top Management Administrating |
9. Efficiency of the corporate labor |
programming and organizing Programming-Organizing-controlling |
10. Professional and social status |
of a particular labor position Administrating- Staffing |
11. Satisfaction from |
achievement in work Administrating- Staffing –Controlling |
12. Health and physical |
situation of the employee Administrating- Staffing -Controlling |
13. Social status of the airline Programming-Organizing- |
-Administrating-Staffing-Controlling |
PART TWO
The case study of the ICAO’s manuals regarding accident and incident investigation
- The qualifications of the accident investigators
Assuming that all aforementioned presuppositions are fulfilled, job specialty, knowledge and experience play a decisive role in the process which shapes the objective perception.
The qualifications of the accident investigators are described in the ICAO’s Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation 1-2-2 Paragraph 2.4.3.
7.1. “ Qualifications of the Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigator
“ It is essential that accident investigators have a practical background in aviation as a foundation on which to develop investigation skills. The experience can be acquired by working as a professional pilot, as an aeronautical engineer or as an aircraft maintenance engineer. Other specialized areas of aviation which could also provide useful experience include management, operations, airworthiness, air traffic services, meteorology and human factors. Since accident investigations will often involve all of these specialized areas, it is important that investigators understand the aviation infrastructure and are able to relate to each of these different areas. It is also beneficial for investigators to leave some piloting experience in addition to their other experience”
In the aforementioned paragraph, ICAO, describes as qualifications of the air accident investigators the required areas of their general job specialty (doctors, pilots, aeronautical engineers, aircraft maintenance engineers) and the required areas of their experience (management, operations, airworthiness, air traffic services, meteorology and human factors). As a basic job specialty and experience is considered to be piloting, a basic knowledge which is required by every investigator. However the investigator during the investigation is obliged to get involved in areas of knowledge different than his-her own job specialty. This is the reason why the ICAO considers necessary for every investigator to have a wider knowledge –regardless of his-her job specialty- in areas such as management, operations, airworthiness, air traffic services, meteorology and human factors. The titles of the chapters that the investigators have to be trained in are mentioned by the ICAO in the description of the information that has to be included in each paragraph of the accident report.
We consider that this system appears to have certain weaknesses, because it does not determine:
- the specific job specialty of the doctor (pathologist psychiatrist etc), or of the pilot (jet, tourboprop etc) and the aircraft type the pilots had to be certified at.
- the duration of the required experience of every investigator,
- the content of each title of the syllabus to which each investigator has to be trained.
- the qualifications of the investigators’ trainers: sector, science, level of knowledge, duration of experience)
- the physical and mental health of the investigator, although it is a necessary presupposition for an acceptable level of the investigator’s perception.
This vagueness causes ambiguities regarding which exact characteristics, properties, knowledge, experience etc., ICAO wants the air accident investigators to be armed with.
Consequently we consider that the system under these circumstances does not ensure the unified level of knowledge of the investigator although this unity is considered to be a necessary presupposition for the comparability of accident reports findings, conclusions and recommendations.
However, the investigators’ qualifications – like any other employees’- generally determine the quality of their perception. It is obvious that any differentiation in the qualifications differentiates-ceteris paribus- the quality of perception. This differentiation has a negative impact on the effort of ICAO: a) to focus on upgrading the unification of the perception’s level of the investigators per involved job specialty, during the accident investigation and b) to achieve a higher level comparability of the various accident reports.
- Criteria of the structure of an accident report
According to ICAO Annex 13 the structure of an accident report must be as shown in the table 3 below.
From the structure of accident reports it becomes obvious that ICAO uses both operational and managerial criteria indiscriminately and without prioritization (special weight). The operational criteria are related rather to the organizational functions while the managerial are related to the management functions
As a consequence, various fields of the same managerial function for example “staffing” are mentioned in more than two chapters, paragraphs etc. that is: 1.5. personnel information, 1.17. Organizational and Management information, 2.4. Flight Crew Performance, 2.5. Pilot Training 2.7. Emergency Response.
TABLE 3
- FACTUAL INFORMATION
- History of Flight
- Injuries to persons
- Damage to Airplane
- Other damage
- Personnel information
- Airplane information
- Meteorological Information
- Aids to Navigation
- Communications
- Airport Information
- Flight Recorders
- Wreckage and Impact Information
- Medical and Pathological Information
- Fire
- Survival Aspects
- Tests and Research
- Organizational and Management information
- Additional Information
- ANALYSIS
- General
- Weather Factors on the approach
- Accident Sequence
- Flight Crew Performance
- Pilot Training
- Air Traffic Control Factors
- Emergency Response
- Controlled Flight Into Terrain
- Oversight Issues
- Flight Data Recorder Documentation
- CONCLUSIONS
- Findings
- Probable Cause
- RECOMMENDATIONS
- APPENDIXES
We consider that the mixing up of two completely different criteria and the mentioning of different fields of the same managerial function (e.g. staffing) in different paragraphs of the accident report, is more probable to confuse, and consequently to put barriers to the investigators’ perception (recognition-comprehension) rather than assist them to focus on the main, primary cause(s) and contributing factors.
- Content of the section “1.17. Organizational and Management information” of the accident report
Regarding the criteria of “ the content of the chapters of the accident report” this paper focuses on Section 1 paragraph 17 “Organizational and Management information”
The content of this section according to ICAO’s instructions (ICAO ANNEX 13) is described as follows:
[…]1.17.1. Provide pertinent information on the organizations involved in influencing the operation of the aircraft, if such influence had a bearing on the accident. The organizations to be reported upon in this section could include, but need not to be limited to the following: the operator; the maintenance organization; the air traffic services, aerodrome administration, weather service agencies, the aircraft manufacturer, the certification of listening authority, and the regulatory authority. The information could include, but need not be limited to the following: organizational structure and functions, safety culture; resources; financial viability status; management decisions, policies and practices, internal and external communications and relationships, certification, monitoring, and regulatory framework when these had a bearing on the accident or whose actions, or lack thereof, was related to, or influenced the accident”
1.17.2. Provide pertinent information concerning the operator, such as type and date of issuance of air operator certificate, types of operations authorized, types and number of aircraft authorized for use, and authorized areas of operation and routes. Also include relevant information concerning the operator’s company operations manual”[…]
A first indication from the comparison of accident reports of United States of America National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000,
2002) and United Kingdom Air Accidents Investigation Branch (UK AAIB 1988,1990,2000a,b, 2001a,b) is that the “Management and organization” chapter of the NTSB reports is filled in more often and in a more detailed way than those of the UK ΑΑΙΒ.
From the aforementioned approach it becomes obvious that the NTSB investigators have wider and more accurate knowledge on issues such as:
- the meaning and content of the management functions,
- the impact from the introduction and preservation in the internal corporate environment of factors which affect decisively the employees’ will,
This knowledge is a basic presupposition for an objective classification and assessment of the findings during an accident investigation, because apart from others it contributes to the discrimination between the initial and the secondary cause(s)-contributing factors.
Error is the result of systemic and not of personal failure. The system of the commercial air transport industry is consisted of organizations such as manufacturers airlines, maintenance centers, airports, civil aviation authorities, airport authorities, weather forecasting service, air traffic controllers etc. That is the reason why ICAO changed its philosophy regarding the responsibility for an accident-incident, from causal factor to contributing factors. Consequently the investigator who wants to contribute positively to the upgrading of aviation safety is obliged to determine the initial cause(s), the actions or omissions of the managerial functions which affected the employee’s will and resulted in the accident-incident occurrence.
This consideration of the role of the investigator is for the benefit of:
- the shareholders and the top management of the air-carrier, because it determines the causes of probable future errors, and consequently it contributes positively to the upgrading of the quality of their functions (safer, cheaper, more competitive, wider market share, higher long term profits etc.)
- the passengers (safer and cheaper flights)
- the insurance companies (fewer accidents-less claims)
- the employees (safer work)
Consequently:
- a) if the investigators want to determine all the contributing factors of an accident/incident and make an objective assessment of these factors, they must be able to know the source of every error committed by any employee
- b) they must be aware of the functions of the top management, their content and the affected areas of the internal corporate environment.
Regarding the content of the chapter of the accident report “1.17.organization-management”.
Based on a number of recent accident reports, we noted that the implementation of the aforementioned process presents certain difficulties related to the presentation of the findings-facts. These difficulties refer to either the avoidance by the accident investigators to fill in the particular chapter “Organization and Management information” or to report findings that are the results of management functions under the proper chapter. These difficulties are considered to be the result of the classification weaknesses by the investigators. Perhaps due to ignorance of the meaning and role of the two different groups of criteria used in final reports: the operational which rather reflects the results of the organizational functions, and the managerial which concerns the results of the managerial functions.
- The ICAO’s Training guidelines for Aircraft Accident investigators
In the ICAO’s Training guidelines for Aircraft Accident investigators Chapter 2 “Background Experience For Investigators” Cir 298 AN 172 June 2003, it is mentioned:
“[…] 2.2. Potential accident investigators must have considerable practical experience in aviation as a foundation on which to build their investigation skills. The experience can be acquired from civil or military qualification as […] aviation related management might also be suitable for accident investigator training […]”
In the chapter 3 Training Guidelines in the paragraph 3.1.3. in the qualifications required for accident investigators’ trainers are included “[…] experienced investigators, aviation medicine physicians, psychologists, aeronautical engineers and manufacturers’ representatives[…]”
In the aforementioned description of the experience required for a potential accident investigator, the following remarks may be made
- As background experience for investigators, the verb “might” is used for aviation related management, while for the pilots, aeronautical engineers and aircraft maintenance engineers the verb “must” is used.
- Concerning the aviation related management qualification of the investigators, only the criterion of experience is mentioned and not for theoretical knowledge, while the job specialty of the pilots, aeronautical engineers and aircraft maintenance engineers includes the necessary theoretical knowledge as well.
- For the trainers, managerial knowledge and experience is not required. The omission of determining the trainers’ level of knowledge and specific field of experience in the air transport management, creates a wide vacuum in the investigators’ knowledge regarding the content and impact of the air transport management functions on the internal corporate environment factors which influence the employees’ will
- The accident investigators’ initial training syllabus (Chapter 3.2.) does not include any issue regarding the goal, content, areas of authority, impact etc. of the aviation management.
The aforementioned formulations might create the impression that the ICAO underestimates the knowledge and experience on the field of air transport management, although the investigators are appointed to investigate the negative impact resulting from the implementation of managerial functions on aviation safety.
In the Chapter 4.1.2.20. Organizational information of ICAO’s Training Guidelines For Aircraft Accident investigators, it is mentioned:
“[…] Conducting a review of the organizational structure and functions as well as the management policies and practices of the agencies, authorities and aircraft operator involved is a subject that should be covered. For example, an investigator should have the competence to review an aircraft operator’s management functions, policies and practice in their entirety. There are many aspects of the supervisory process which may have a direct bearing on the accident, such as acceptance of inadequate flight crew qualifications; deficient guidance material; maintenance shortcuts; improper crew rostering; failure to provide proper training in aircraft type; shortcomings in crew resource management; and unreasonable pressure to complete schedules on time. The methods of investigating management and organizational aspects of an organization to determine the presence of any risk factors or other shortcomings is a requirement of a well rounded accident investigation course. An examination of the means of supervision is very important and will include a review of orders regulations, manuals and independent audits as well as the performance of supervisors, instructors and company management
4.1.2.21. Human performance […]”
4.1.2.22. Determination of the flight crews suitability for the flight[…]”
Remarks on ICAO’s Training guidelines for Aircraft Accident investigators
Our consideration, regarding the content of the Chapter 4.1.2.20. “Organizational information”, ICAO’s Training Guidelines for Aircraft Accident investigators, is:
- There are certain ambiguities regarding the meaning under which the terms “ organizational function” and “managerial function” are used, since their content is entirely distinguished in the science of management nowadays.
- Issues that belong to different managerial functions are mentioned without any differentiation e.g. inadequate flight crew qualifications; failure to provide proper training in aircraft type (staffing), supervision (controlling), improper crew rostering (programming), administrating etc.
- The issues described in paragraphs 4.1.2.21. “Human performance” and 4.1.2.22. “Determination of the flight crews suitability for the flight”, mainly refer to the content of the managerial function of staffing. The isolated reference in these two different paragraphs of issues which are included in the previous 4.1.2.20. “Organizational information” paragraph, might create the wrong impression that these issues are independent from the managerial function of staffing which is included in the previous paragraph.
The aforementioned approach might generate areas of possible ambiguity , concerning the ICAO’s consideration of :
- the content and impact of the management functions in the life of the organization
- the need for implementation by the investigators of scientific criteria in order to assess the top management’s involvement in the accident/incident occurrence,
- the level of the hierarchy members that are burdened with the main responsibility in case of error commitment.
These facts might give the impression that aviation related management is not considered to be a basic necessary experience of accident investigators.
However, from the analysis of the aforementioned chapters the crucial role of knowledge-experience in situation awareness (recognition-comprehension) of the environment, the decision making and action became clear. How could the investigators recognize and understand the impact of the managerial functions on an accident occurrence, if they do not have adequate and proper theoretical knowledge combined with practical experience upon aviation management issues?
The investigators lack of knowledge regarding the content and the areas of internal corporate environment affected by the management functions, combined with the ICAO’s approach of operational and managerial criteria , might create obstacles in the objectivity and the unity of the investigators’ perception.
A higher unification of the investigator’s perception is necessary because leads to:
- a higher level of recognition and understanding of the various parts of the
investigated environment
- it contributes positively to the unified categorization of the findings according
to their sources, which leads to the identification and objective prioritizing of
the contributing factors.
- it contributes positively to the unified assessment of the findings according to unified criteria and knowledge, based on unified methodology
- it helps the investigators to identify the source(s) of each contributing factor of the accident and consequently to suggest the appropriate safety recommendations
- it helps the readers to assess whether the conclusions and the safety recommendations reflect the source(s) of the identified contributing factors since they are presented under the appropriate chapter of the accident report
- it facilitates the unified understanding by the readers who belong to different cultures with different values, different considerations etc.
The obvious incompatibility between ICAO’s aim of upgrading the aviation’s
safety level and the measures applied for achieving this aim, exists because it does
not determine and ensure:
- a minimum level of the normal function of the investigators’ senses and mental processes which are decisive determinants of the investigators’ perception-comprehension
- a unified content of the syllabus of investigators’ training .
- the field and level of knowledge, as well as field, level and duration of the experience of the trainers
- the identification of the exact qualifications of the investigators; specific job specialty of the doctor -pathologist psychiatrist etc-, or the pilot –jet, tourboprop etc- the aircraft type they had to be certified at, and how long experience must each investigator have at his-her job specialty. These are necessary presuppositions for the unification of the investigators’ knowledge.
- the unification of criteria of the accident report structure (managerial and operational criteria are used indiscriminately)
- the obligatory filling in by the investigators of the accident report’s chapters with information compatible with the content of the particular chapter
- Conclusions
1) The existing ICAO’s institutional framework which determines the presuppositions and the conditions of the accident investigation, has successfully contributed for decades years to the aviation safety .
For the achievement of the ICAO’s objective to upgrade the aviation’s safety level, the particular institutional framework needs restructuring in order to improve its efficiency and effectiveness in the near and distant future.
2) The purpose of this restructuring has to be the achievement of a reliable comparability between various accident reports. The achievement of this goal requires:
- unification of the perception and comprehension of the examined environment by the investigators
- unified methodology of the presentation of findings, conclusions and recommendations,
– restructuring of the accident report based on the differentiation of the use of the managerial and operational criteria. .
3) Regarding the reliability-objectivity of the investigators’ perception, any disorder of their mental processes may result to:
- selective attention or selective inattentiveness
- over generalization of a single negative fact, relation, condition etc
- evaluation of the –objective-environment with subjective criteria
- maximization or minimization of the negative impact of some contributing factors
- minimization of positive impact of some factors
- Comparing the ICAO’s consideration about its exclusive objective in an accident investigation and the tools that the ICAO uses for the accomplishment of this goal we consider that there is an incompatibility between the goal and the measures.
- Proposals
1) Introduction of tests to access the functional status of the senses and mental processes of each investigator
2) Determination the specific:
- job specialty of every accident investigator
- field and duration of the required experience
- content of the syllabus-field and level of knowledge (not only the titles) in which the investigators are trained, which must reflect the current global scientific knowledge on the particular cognitive field.
- field of knowledge, level of knowledge, field and duration of the investigators trainers experience.
3) Separation of the managerial from the operational criteria is imperative.
The managerial criteria must be used in the chapters-paragraphs concerning the investigation of the sources of the contributing factors, while the operational criteria must be used in the chapters-paragraphs concerning the investigation of the conditions of the accident/incident.
- To make a clear distinction between organizational and managerial functions and
their impact on the internal corporate environment
5) To introduce as obligatory in the investigator’s qualifications the theoretical
knowledge and practical experience on air transport organizational and
managerial functions and their impact on the internal corporate environment.
- Obviously the same qualifications must be required from the investigators’ trainers as well.
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Costs and Benefits. 3-7/10/2004 Sesibbra Portugal
The airline’s corporate and social environment, as a basic parameter
of the efficiency and the effectiveness, of the incentives,
applied by the airline’s top management.
The case study of a Southeastern European Airline’s cabin crewmembers
Yiannis S. Lainos Ph.D.
Aircraft Technology Department of Halkis Technological Educational Institution.
Abstract
A research was conducted by the author in April 2004 to investigate the opinion of a South-eastern European Airline’s (Airline) cabin crewmembers regarding the efficiency and the effectiveness of the incentives applied by the airline’s top management. Based on the conclusions of this research, an approach of the causes for the Airline’s cabin crewmembers’ particular consideration is attempted.
Keywords:
Culture (national, labor), flag carrier, cabin crewmembers, human resource management, motivation.
The aim:
The aim of the present paper is the determination and evaluation:
- of the cabin crewmembers opinion, regarding the efficiency and the effectiveness of the incentives applied by the Airline’s top management.
- of the negative effect of the political parties and unions’ interference in the management of the airline, on the effectiveness and the efficiency of the incentives applied by the B.O.D.
The author’s contribution:
- The determination of the impact of the cabin crews’ political ideology, on their perception, regarding the incentives applied by the airline management. This contributes to the human resource management. This take into account the psychological needs of the employees regarding the efficiency and the effectiveness of the applied motives
- The evaluation of the motivation measures, methods and techniques efficiency and effectiveness, which the airline’s top management applied to the cabin crewmembers.
Introduction
The airline is the former state flag carrier, which was nationalized in 1975. Since then the state has been its exclusive shareholder. (Greece. (1975)
The State, government and political party mechanisms, interfered with the airline’s management in many fields. The aim of the aforementioned interference was the utilization of the airline as social and political “cover” by the government to improve its image, to increase its popularity and satisfied its voters. (Lainos J.S. 2003, Greece. 1994 )
One of these influenced fields was the personnel management (hiring, appointing, promoting, level of wages, labor terms and conditions etc.).
The managerial methods that were applied by the government, appointed B.O.D. and the external interference, had negative consequences on the airline’s survival. (Lainos J.S. 2003)
The government with its nine years’ efforts (12/1994-12/2002) attempted unsuccessfully: (Lainos J.S. 2003)
- to achieve the airline’s recapitalization, in order to upgrade its competitiveness and
- to privatize the airline.
This failure, forced the government in the spring of 2003 to restructure the airline’s group of companies. (Greece 2003/9/4)
During this period the unions held negotiations with the government and the airlines top management, to determine the terms and conditions under which their members could accept to join the restructured airline. However in application of the restructure law, a 30% of the cabin crewmembers were obligatorily retired (among other employees).
The negotiations between the airline’s B.O.D. the government and the cabin crewmembers union, failed, and the union went on strike for 75 days without success on their demands (from the end of November 2003 to the 12th of February 2004.
Assumptions of our research
Our field research was contacted among the cabin crew who had permanent labor relation with the airline
The criteria which were used by the questionnaires for the categorization of the cabin crewmembers are: Gender, Educational level, Labor relation with the Airline, Previous employment .
The questionnaire was mixed (close and open). It included thirteen motives in 26 questions. It also gave each cabin crewmember the possibility to express his-her own opinion. Furthermore the cabin crewmember was requested to prioritize the selected motives.
We evaluated the answers, according to the following criteria:
- the frequency by which they appeared in the total number of the questionnaires, as well as
- the prioritization given by each cabin crewmember.
To minimize the emotional effect on the cabin crewmembers’ answers- due to the negative results of their strike-we conducted our research two months after the last day of their strike.
The profile of the cabin crewmembers participants in our research
Gender
The cabin crew members were: two thirds stewardesses and one third stewards The participated stewards in our research represented the 32% of the airline’s stewards while the participated stewardesses represented the 33% of the airline’s stewardesses.
This sample is considered to represent with a high accuracy, the opinion of the cabin crewmembers.
Educational level
70,3% of the stewards and 63,3% of the stewardesses are graduates of the secondary educational level (Lyceum), 18,3% of the stewards and 17,7% of the stewardesses are university graduates and 5,7% of the stewards and 2,5% of the stewardesses have post graduate degrees. (TABLE 1)
TABLE 1
| Lyceum | College | University | Master |
Stewards | 70,3% | 18,3% | 5,7% | 5,7% |
Stewardesses | 63,3% | 17,7% | 3,9% | 2,5% |
Labor relation with the Airline
Our research focused on the ordinary cabin crewmembers
Previous employment in the airline (years)
29,3% of the stewards and the 10,1% of the stewardesses more than 18 years. 33,4% of the stewards and 26,6% of the stewardesses from 16 to 17 years. 13,1% of the stewards and 11,4% of the stewardesses from 14 to 15 years. 6,3% of the stewards and 3,8% of the stewardesses from 12 to 13 years, 7,1% of the stewards and 8,9 of the stewardesses 10 to 11 years, 6,5% of the stewards and 16,4% of the stewardesses from 8 to 9 years, 2,3% of the stewards and 10,1% of the stewardesses from 6 to 7 years, 2% of the stewards and 12,7 % of the stewardesses from 1 to 5 years (TABLE 2)
TABLE 2
| 18 PLUS | 16-17 | 14-15 | 12-13 | 10-11 | 8-9 | 6-7 | 1-5 |
Stewards | 29,3% | 33,4% | 13,1% | 6,3% | 7,1% | 6,5% | 2,3% | 2,0% |
Stewardesses | 10,10% | 26,60% | 11,4% | 3,80% | 8,9% | 16,4% | 10,1% | 12,7% |
Brief results of our research:
- 96,38% of the stewards answered that the Airline’s B.O.D has never applied any incentive for them. This percentage for the stewardesses is 98,6%
- Stewards and stewardesses selected in their first five priorities the same incentives, but with different prioritization.
- In the first two positions the same motives have been selected with different priority. The stewards selected, as their first priority, the salary level and as second the labor conditions. The stewardesses prioritized the opposite.
- In their both third prioritization is the motive “Interest of the management to solve the problems of the cabin crewmembers”
- The fourth and fifth prioritization is the motives “meritocracy in promoting” and “modernization of the aircraft’s fleet”. The stewards prioritized as fourth the motive “modernization of the aircraft’s fleet” and fifth the motive “meritocracy in promoting” while the stewardesses prioritized the opposite.
Analytically (Herzberg, F.2003, Levinson H. 2003, Mc Clelland D.-Burnham D.H. 2003, ManvilleB.-Ober.J. 2003)
The Stewards consideration regarding the incentives which the Airline’s top management has to apply for the cabin crewmembers (Table 3)
1) 96,3% of the stewards consider the increase of the wages level as their motive. 95,8% of the answered stewards assessed this motive in their first five priorities. 57,7% of these stewards, selected it as their first priority, 30,8% selected it as their second priority and 3,8% selected it as their fourth priority. The aforementioned concentration and allocation, makes this motive the strongest among the Airline’s stewards.
2) 88,9% of the stewards consider the Improvement of the labor conditions as their motive. 92,3% of the answered stewards assesed this motive in their first five priorities. 33,3% of these stewards, selected it, as their first priority, the 45,8% selected it, as their second priority, 8,3% selected it, as their third priority and 4,2% selected it, as their fourth and fifth priority respectively*. The aforementioned concentration and allocation, makes this motive the second strongest among the Airline’s stewards.
3) 85,2%% of the stewards consider the Interest of the Airline’s management to solve the problems of the cabin crewmembers as their motive. 95,7% of the answered stewards assessed this motive in their first five priorities. 8,7% of these stewards, selected it as their first and second priority respectively, 65,2% selected it as their third priority and 4,3% selected it as their fourth priority and 8,7 % selected it as their fifth priority. The aforementioned concentration and allocation, makes this motive the third strongest among the Airline’s stewards
4) 77,7% of the stewards consider the modernization of the aircraft’s fleet as their motive. 33,3% of the answered stewards assessed this motive in their first five priorities Non of the stewards assessed this motive as their first second and third priority. 19,1% selected it as their fourth and 14,3% as their fifth priority. The aforementioned concentration and allocation, makes this motive the fourth strongest among the Airline’s stewards.
5) 59,2% of the stewards consider the meritocracy in promotion as their motive. 87,5% of the answered stewards assessed this motive in their first five priorities. None of the stewards assessed this motive as their first priority, 25,0% selected it as their second and third priority respectively, and 37,5% selected it as their fourth and none for their fifth priority. The aforementioned concentration and allocation, makes this motive the fifth strongest among the Airline’s stewards.
TABLE 3
| % of the an- swered | 1rst priority | 2nd priority
| 3rd priority
| 4rth priority
| 5th priority
| The % of the first five answers |
Increase of the wages level | 96,3% | 57,7% | 30,8% | 0,0% | 3,8% | 0,0% | 95,80% |
Improve of the labor conditions | 88,9% | 33,3% | 45,8% | 8,3% | 4,2% | 4,2% | 92,30% |
Interest of the management to solve the problems of the cabin crewmembers |
85,2% |
8,7% |
8,7% |
65,2% |
4,3% |
8,7% |
95,70% |
Modernization of the aircraft’s fleet | 77,7% | 0,0% | 0,0% | 0,0% | 19,1% | 14,3% | 33,30% |
Meritocracy in promotion | 59,2% | 0,0% | 25,0% | 25,0% | 37,5% | 0,0% | 87,50% |
The Airline’s Stewardesses consideration regarding the incentives which the Airline’s top management has to apply for the cabin crewmembers (Table 4)
1) 93% of the stewardesses consider the increase of the wages level as their motive. 93,9% of the answered stewardesses assessed this motive in their first five priorities. 27,3% of these stewardesses, selected it as their first priority, 40,9% selected it as their second priority, 16,6% selected it as their third priority, and 9,1% selected it as their fourth priority. The aforementioned concentration and allocation, makes this motive the strongest among the Airline’s stewardesses.
2) 91,5% of the stewardesses consider the Increase of the wages as their motive. 93,8% of the answered stewardesses assessed this motive in their first five priorities 41,5% of these stewards, selected it as their first priority, 32,3% selected it as their second priority, 12,3% selected it as their third priority, 4,6% selected it as their fourth priority and 3,1% selected it as their fifth priority. The aforementioned concentration and allocation, makes this motive the second strongest among the Airline’s stewardesses.
3) 80,3%% of the stewardesses consider the Interest of the Airline’s management to solve the problems of the cabin crewmembers as their motive. 84,2% of the answered stewardesses assessed this motive in their first five priorities 8,8% of these stewardesses, selected it as their first priority, 10,5% selected it as their second priority 36,8% selected it as their third priority and 19,3% selected it as their fourth priority and 8,8 % selected it as their fifth priority. The aforementioned concentration and allocation, makes this motive the third strongest among the Airline’s stewardesses
4) 67,6% of the stewardesses consider the meritocracy in promoting as their motive. 72,1% of the answered stewardesses assesed this motive in their first five priorities. 6,2% of these stewardesses, selected it as their first and second priority respectively, 29,2% as their third priority, 13,6% selected it as their fourth and 18,2% as their fifth priority. The aforementioned concentration and allocation, makes this motive the fourth strongest among the Airline’s stewardesses.
5) 62% of the stewardesses consider the modernization of the aircraft’s fleet as their motive. 52,3% of the answered stewardesses assessed this motive in their first five priorities. None of the stewardesses assessed this motive as their first priority, 13,6% selected it as their second priority, 6,8% selected it as their third priority, 13,6% selected it as their fourth and 18,2% selected it for their fifth priority. The aforementioned concentration and allocation, makes this motive the fifth strongest among the Airline’s stewardesses.
TABLE 4
| % of the answred | 1rst priority | 2nd priority | 3rd priority | 4rth priority | 5th priority | The % of the first five answers |
Improve of labor conditions | 93,0% | 27,3% | 40,9% | 16,6% | 9,1% | 0,0% | 93,9% |
Increase of the wages | 91,5% | 41,5% | 32,3% | 12,3% | 4,6% | 3,1% | 93,8% |
Interest of the management to solve the problems of the cabin crewmembers |
80,3% |
8,8% |
10,5% |
36,8% |
19,3% |
8,8% |
84,2% |
Meritocracy in promoting | 67,6% | 6,2% | 6,2% | 29,2% | 22,9% | 8,3% | 72,1% |
Modernization of the aircraft’s fleet | 62,0% | 0,0% | 13,6% | 6,8% | 13,6% | 18,2% | 52,3% |
Comments on the findings of our research
- The Airline’s cabin crewmembers acquired great strength disproportional of their role in the air transport production process, during the second half of 80’s and early 90’s due to, mainly, the marriage of a stewardess to the state’s prime minister
- This strength, created the illusion, to the cabin crewmembers, that it was a result of their role in the corporate product process. It must be pointed out that the company in order to face the strike of the cabin crewmembers (11/2003-2/2004) trained more than 300 new entrants within 20 days, who replaced successfully the employees who were on strike.
- The cabin crewmembers were favored by the socialist party, which was in government from 1981 to March 2004, with a three-year break 1990-1993. Among the privileges of the cabin crewmembers were high salaries. According to their collective agreements, they could fly up to eighty hours per month. However due to the ineffective and inefficient human resource management they flew less than 50 hours per month, on a yearly average (statistical data of Airline’s Economic Research Division)
- However after 1998 (during the so called recovery period (1993-2001), the cabin crewmembers’ salaries were gradually decreased by about 30% (as the rest of the other employees of the company).
A 75 days strike (2003/11-2004/2) of the cabin crewmembers union ended at the beginning of February 2004, with an agreement of about 25% increase of the working time and a further decrease of the salaries by about 15%.
- According to the results of our research, the cabin crewmembers believe that the airline’s B.O.D. never gave any motivation to them. We consider that this perception is the result of a combination of the following factors:
- the cabin crewmembers negative emotional effect due to the negative result of their strike, although our research started two months after the last day of the strike.
- the policies applied by the almost 20 year socialist government which fostered the employees with:
- expectations greater than those that the economy could afford for a long term.
- the ideology of the minimum effort and the maximum benefit
- the ideology and the practice of the employees’ participation in the corporate decision making centers, regardless of their qualifications
- the practice of the informal participation of the union leaders and the political party mechanisms in the management of the public companies
- the practice of promotion to the hierarchy, based on political criteria
The aforementioned factors were transformed into a corporate culture.
- The former high social status of the cabin crewmembers profession as a result of their ability to travel all over the world, to be hosted in luxury hotels, to make acquaintances with high social level people. This status was decreased as a consequence of the deduction of their salaries during the Airline’s recovery period 1993-2001
- the Airline’s management never had a structured personnel motivation policy. The State, government, political party and especially the unions mechanisms, used to present every offer by the airline’s management to the personnel as their own success.
- It is underlined that all of the Airline’s personnel is 100% unionized
Under these circumstances the employees were accustomed to consider any upgrading of labor terms and conditions, as their own right and as an obligation of the government (exclusive shareholder) and the airline’s B.O.D.
References
Greece. (1975/14-15/7) Parliamentary Debates. Proceedings of the discussion of the Olympic Airways nationalization
(1994) Parliamentary Debates. Proceedings of the discussion of the law 2271/1994, 9th to 11th December for the O.A.’s recovery
______ (1998). Parliamentary Debates. Proceedings of the discussion of the law 2602/1998 for the Olympic Airways’ recovery
______ (1998b). Government gazette Law 2602/1998
(2002/4/11) Permanent Parliamentary Committee of Social Affairs. Proceedings of the discussion for the Olympic Airways’ recovery
(2003/9/4) Parliamentary Debates. Proceedings of the discussion of the law
for the Olympic Airways’ restructure-merger
Herzberg, F.(2003) One more time: How to motivate employees Harvard Business
Review on Motivating People p. 45-72
Lainos J.S. (2003) Introduction of changes for the restructure of an international
scheduled flag carrier in a liberalize international institutional
environment The case study of the Olympic Airways Aviation
Management Education and Research Conference. Montreal
Canada July 26-27/2003
Lainos J.S.& Nikolaidis E.D. (2003) Presuppositions for the effective introduction of
changes to the aviation safety culture, through Crew Resource
Management training program. The case study of the Olympic
Airways 12th Int’l Symposium on Aviation Psychology Dayton
Ohio USA
Lainos John S. Nikolaidis Elias Cpt (2003) The flight crew motivation at a scheduled
air carrier in a Liberalize International Institutional Environment
The case study of the Greek flag carrier the Olympic Airways
S.A. Aviation Management Education and Research
Conference. Montreal Canada
Levinson H. (2003) Management by whose objectives? Harvard Business Review on
Motivating People p. 73-102
Mc Clelland D.-Burnham D.H. (2003) Power is the great motivator Harvard Business
Review on Motivating People p. 103-132
Manville B.-Ober.J. (2003) Building a company of citizens? Harvard Business Review
on Motivating People p. 1-18
The considerations of a South-eastern European Airline aircraft engineers regarding the incentives applied by the corporate top management and those required by them
ABSTRACT
In October 2003 we conducted a survey among the aircraft engineers of a southeastern European airline (Airline). The research included four questionnaires with 61 questions. The subjects of these questionnaires were:
- The incentives that attracted the a/c engineers to their profession.
- The opinion of the a/c engineers on the incentives applied by the Airline’s top management
- The incentives which the a/c engineers require to be applied by corporate top management.
- The opinion of the a/c engineers regarding the effects of the recently organizational restructuring of the Airline’s group
The sample used for this research represented 25% of the total number of the a/c engineers. This percentage is regarded as statistically adequate for an absolutely reliable result.
The construction of the questionnaires and the classification of the answers of the a/c engineers was based on Herzberg’s Needs theory. which was adopted at the particularities of the national and labor culture.
Key words
Airplane: engineers, maintenance unit, culture (national, labor) labor relations, incentives, perception determinants.
Introduction
The southeastern European Airline which is the subject of our case study is a State-owned former flag carrier that has been 100% nationalized since 1975.
The interference of the government, the political parties and union mechanisms in the Airline’s management had disastrous results not only on its competitiveness but also on its very survival. (Lainos 1992, Verelis 2004) The crisis was manifested after 1993 when the EU applied the
open-skies policy, establishing the air transport liberalization. The state (the Airline’s exclusive shareholder) from 1993 to 2004, after six efforts, failed to make the Airline competitive and to privatize it. Finally in December 2003 the flight division of the Airline, as well as that of its regional subsidiary, was spun off and merged with its charter subsidiary company that was re-named. The maintenance unit remained with the old structure although its main client is still the Airline. (Lainos 2003) Our research was conducted during October 2003 with the solidarity of the Airline management and the a/c engineers union. The answers of the respondents in our research were obviously affected by the Airline’s group organizational restructuring, which was in process during this period of time. Our approach regarding the causes of the:
- particular prioritization of the incentives which attracted the a/c engineers in their profession and the incentives they require to be applied by the Airline’s corporate top management
- a/c engineers consideration regarding the effects of the Airline’s group organizational restructure on the survival of the maintenance unit and on their labor position is based on the results of the elaboration of the answers which gave the majority of the a/c engineers participants in our research during personal interviews after they had answered the questionnaires.
The construction of the questionnaires and the categorisation of the answers was based on Herzberg’s needs theory (Herzberg 1966) adopted at the particularities of the national and labour culture of the Airline a/c engineers
Brief theoretical approach
Herzberg based his dual factors needs theory, (Herzberg, Mausner, Synderman, 1959) on Maslow’s five levels Hierarchy of Needs theory (Maslow, 1954). Maslow’s needs theory reflect all the needs in a person’s life. Maslow argued that the lower level has to be satisfied so that the human will proceed in satisfaction of the next group of needs
Herzberg developed a list of factors that are more closely related to labor environment. These factors fall into two groups. Hygiene or Maintenance factors or Dissatisfiers and the Motivators or Satisfiers . (Herzberg 1966, 2003), The hygiene or maintenance factors or disatisfiers are shown in TABLE 1
TABLE 1
Hygiene or Maintenance factors or Dissatisfiers
Herzberg argued that these group of factors do not have motivation power because they will not increase the employees satisfaction within their job. However they will help remove feelings of dissatisfaction. They include a decent salary, acceptable working conditions and the way a company views and treats its employees.
The hygiene or maintenance factors or disatisfiers must be satisfied in the job before the application of motivators-satisfiers. Since hygiene factors are reliably met, the following second set of motivations-satisfiers arises. (TABLE 2)
TABLE 2
Motivators-Satisfiers
Herzberg argued that these factors are the real motivators.
The results of our research
- The top 6 incentives that attracted the a/c engineers
in this particular a/c Maintenance Unit at their profession
The top 6 incentives that were selected by more than 50% of the a/c engineers participated in our research-are shown in TABLE 3
TABLE 3
The top 6 incentives that attracted the a/c engineers of the particular Maintenance Unit to their profession
Classification of the answers according to the Herzberg’s Hygiene and Motivational factors
The received answers of “A” questionnaire were classified according to Herzberg’s labor incentives structure, are shown in TABLE 4
TABLE 4
Classification of the a/c engineers answers according to the Herzberg’s
Hygiene and Motivational factors
The causes for the particular prioritization of the incentives that attract the Maintenance Unit engineers to their profession
- 73,1% Job stability, certainty, permanency
We consider that the reasons that guided the majority of the a/c engineers of this southeastern
European Airline to select this motive in their first priority are the following:
The national culture
A basic pillar of the Greek national culture is Uncertainty Avoidance, (From scale 40 to 112 Greeks score 112). This dimension addresses the ease with which cultures cope with novelty, ambiguity and uncertainty. (Hofstede 1980 a, b, 1991; Johnston 1993)
The labour culture
Even though the position of the Airline which is the main client of the Maintenance Unit being surveyed, was and still is unstable, the a/c engineers believe that the security of their job is not in danger. The factors which contributed to shaping this particular consideration are:
- The country’s need for at least one airline. Consequently, they consider that one aircraft Maintenance and Repair Unit is necessary.
- Their awareness of the minimum four years required to educate a B1 and B2 aircraft engineer
- Their experience from the Maintenance unit of the Belgian flag carrier Sabena, which is still in operation even though the airline Sabena ceased its operation since 2002.
- The quality of their job. This particular Maintenance unit was awarded a prize from the European Maintenance Management Academy (Auditing Organisation approved by IATA). in 1999
- The power of the union. One hundred per cent of the personnel is unionized, with a history of strong and long term struggles. Their most famous strikes were against the military junta in 1973 and the 70- day strike against the conservative government in 1980.
- The consideration that their jobs are not in danger is promoted mainly by the aircraft engineers’ union.
- The incentives prioritised in two and four
Priority of TABLE 3 (Satisfaction with the Airline’s and its maintenance unit world flight safety record, and satisfaction from the achievement of the a/c engineers labor) have the same content, which is the a/c engineers satisfaction with their job’s achievement. This consideration is an international incentive necessary for aircraft engineers to compensate for the stress resulting from their professional responsibility to maintain the aircraft airworthiness that protects passengers’ lives. The motto of the International Union of the Aircraft Engineers is “We keep them flying safely”. The a/c engineers of this particular Airline have developed this consideration as a corporate culture due to the flight safety record of their company and its maintenance unit.
3) Incentive number three The wage level (62,0% ) is related to the decline of the market value of their salaries over the last 15 years.
4) Incentives number five and six (The content of the profession and its social status and The social status of the Airline) besides reflecting an existing social consideration, is related to the number two consideration of the a/c engineers.
- B) The consideration of the a/c engineers regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of the incentives applied by corporate management
Some 80,2% consider that the Airline management does not apply any incentives for them.
The causes of the particular consideration
The elaboration of the answers, of the a/c engineers participants in our research, during their personal interviews, concluded that the causes of this approach are considered to be the following:
- The inefficient and ineffective policy applied by the government, the Airline’s exclusive shareholder, and the corporate top management appointed by it, regarding the measures applied for survival and the growth perspectives of the Airline and its maintenance unit
- The non meritocracy criteria of promotion
- The decrease buying power of their wages over the past fifteen years
- C) The top 7 incentives which the Airline’s aircraft engineers want to be applied by the corporate top management
The top seven incentives out of the 13, included in this questionnaire, which were selected by more than 50% of the a/c engineers participants in our research are showed in TABLE 5
TABLE 5
The top 7 incentives which the Airline’s aircraft engineers want to be applied
by the corporate top management
.
Classification of the answers according to the Herzberg’s Hygiene and Motivational factors
The received answers of the “C” questionnaire were classified according to Herzberg’s labor incentives structure, as TABLE 6
TABLE 6
Classification of the answers according to the Herzberg’s Hygiene and Motivational factors
A simple glance at the answers in the questionnaire regarding “The top 6 incentives that attract the personnel of this particular airplane Maintenance Unit to their profession” and the questionnaire answers regarding “the consideration of the a/c engineers regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of the incentives applied by corporate management” indicates an obvious incompatibility. The incentives which attract the a/c engineers at their profession are
focused mainly on the Herzberg’s satisfiers while the required to be applied by the corporate top management are focused mainly on Herzberg’s disatisfiers. We consider that the cause is the incompatibility between the consideration of the a/c engineers regarding their current professional and social status and the objective reality.
The causes of these considerations
The reasons for the incentives that the a/c engineers require to be applied by corporate management and their prioritizations are:
- Regarding the requirement for improving their wage level: Twelve years ago (1993), when the government applied for the Airline a “recovery program” approved by the E.U., the purchase power of their wages decreased owing to incompatibility of wage increases and inflation.
2) Regarding the requirement for improving their working conditions:
- Over the past seven years three aircraft engineers died most probably of cancer owing to the benzolium they come in contact with.
- The government’s effort to privatize the company meant that the tools of their profession were not updated properly.
- The a/c engineers consider that their job is not efficiently and effectively organized
3) Regarding the requirement to improve a/c engineers training level: A quick comparison between the a/c engineers’ second answer to questionnaire “A”, according to which they are proud of being in the international vanguard of the safety of their Maintenance Unit, and their requirement to improve their training level could generate ambiguities relative to the compatibility of these two answers. How could a Maintenance Unit be in the forefront of flight safety without a high level of aircraft engineer training? But in fact, there is no contradiction. The essence of the a/c engineers’ requirement that corporate management improve the training level is mainly economic. The Airline’s fleet includes more than three aircraft types. The a/c engineers need more than four years to acquire certificates for these aircraft types. According to their collective agreement, when an a/c engineer acquires the certificate for each aircraft type, his salary increases on a percentage basis. So the deeper essence of this requirement is to accelerate their training in order to acquire certificates for all types of aircraft in the fleet in order to increase their earnings.
- The number four requirement is related to numbers five and six (TABLE 5). It expresses the disappointment of the a/c engineers with the inability of corporate top management to manage general issues regarding the current operation and growth of the aircraft Maintenance Unit. Thus their union is obliged to become involved with these issues even though they are not included in its typical role. For example:
- a) The union presses top management to expand the Maintenance Unit activities internationally to cover an existing demand, in order to increase the corporate income. However top management has not responded to this demand arguing that they have insufficient available qualified personnel. (Statement of the Airline C.E.O. 2004)) However simultaneously the top management do not hire the proper personnel.
- b) Despite the 100% increase of the a/c engineers’ (and other specialists’) job productivity over the last ten years, the financial results of the Airline showed a deficit. (Lainos 2004)
During the government’s negotiations in the summer of 2000 to privatize the Airline, the investor stated that he could not accept some contracts regarding aircraft acquisition by the Airline because the price was about 50% higher than the corresponding market prices. (Manos 2001) The a/c engineers argue that their contribution to corporate survival and development has been canceled by such malfunctions.
4) The number five requirement expresses:
- a) the disappointment of a/c engineers at the ten years of ineffective and inefficient efforts by the Airline’s top management and the government, as its exclusive shareholder, to ensure the Airline’s survival and to give it a developmental perspective. They are unwilling to accept that this failure has not been due to incapability, but is the result of a government plan to scuttle the survival effort and thus to persuade the society of the necessity to privatize the Airline, despite its world record in flight safety that was acquired during its state-owned period. (Greek Parliament 2002, Lainos 2003)
- b) the inability of corporate top management and the government, the Airline’s exclusive shareholder, to protect it from the mass slander campaign by the press. The aircraft engineers do not want to accept that this slander campaign is tolerated if not coordinated by the Airline’s exclusive shareholder and the corporate top management appointed by the shareholder. The aim of the shareholder is to persuade the society of the necessity of privatizing the flag carrier. (Lainos 2003)
5) Requirement number six expresses the a/c engineers’ conviction of their ability to use their knowledge to contribute to the survival and development of the Airline group. The first determinant of this consideration is based on the a/c engineers’ upgraded self confidence due to the international recognition of the superior quality of their work. The second determinant is their union’s belief that they collectively possess sufficient professional qualifications to realize this aim effectively. The union has organized successfully in recent years:
- a) a conference of the International Association of Aircraft Engineers (AEI 2001) and
- b) professional conferences regarding the causes of the Airline’s crisis and the requirements for its competitive growth (2004)
- The number seven incentive (The Airline’s
top management should offer bonuses (extra wages, additional days off, paid vacations and international travel, etc), supported by 52,4% of the participants, expresses the way in which the a/c engineers require that corporate top management actively recognize their effort of the Maintenance Unit to retain its flight safety record.
- D) The opinion of the a/c engineers regarding the effects of the recent organizational restructuring of the Airline’s group on their job status and on survival and development of the maintenance unit is shown in TABLE 7
TABLE 7
The causes of the aforementioned answers
1) The strong and long term opposition of the a/c engineers union against the privatization
- Their fear which is based on their international experience that:
- a) their labor conditions will worsen due to privatization.
- b) their job security-stability will be lost due to the decrease of the Airline’s network which will result at the decrease of their job positions which will not be replaced by a probable expansion of the Maintenance Unit works.
Conclusions
- A) The considerations of the aircraft engineers of this particular Maintenance Unit regarding
- a) the effectiveness and efficiency of the incentives applied by corporate top management b) the incentives which they require to be applied by corporate top management, are affected by the following internal and external corporate environment factors:
- The national culture and the corporate labour culture.
- Their international experience
- The unreliability of the state-shareholders’ selections regarding the developmental prospects of the company
- The awareness of the a/c engineers power (monopolistic position, 100% unionised)
- The international official recognition of the superior quality of the results of the a/c engineers work on flight safety.
- The union’s consideration
- The political ideology.
- B) The need for a social recognition is very strong among the particular a/c engineers
- C) The selection of the incentives which attracted the a/c engineers in their profession, those which they required to be applied by the corporate management and its prioritisation we consider that are biased by :
- a) the a/c feelings arose by the failure of the ten years efforts of the government the Airline’s exclusive shareholder, to make the Airline competitive.
- b) the organisational restructuring of the Airline’s corporate group that took place during our research period of time. which the a/c engineers considered that it will have negative effect on their job status.
Bibliography
Airline’s C.E.O. (2004/4/29) Proceedings of the Airline’s Aircraft Engineers Union congress “The Air Transport Policy for the next decade for the “Airline” and its maintenance base ” Athens-Greece
European Union (1994) Recovery program of the Olympic Airways S.A. (October)
European Maintenance Management Academy (1999/10) Auditors approved by I.A.T.A.
Greek Parliament (2002) Statement of the minister of Transportation mr Verelis, in the 12th of April 2002 debate among the members of the “economic transparency
committee” regarding the Olympic Airways
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The perceived by the employees, internal corporate environment stressors, and its perceived impact on their labor attitude. The case study of the Olympic Airway’s (O.A.) aircraft engineers
Abstract
The last thirteen years Olympic Airways is under a recovery effort towards privatization (Lainos 1992, 2006). The state-shareholder announced (Karamanlis 2005) O.A.’s withdrawal from the market by October of 2005 and its substitution by a new private airline (Greece 2005)
The published business plan of this airline included: (Gazettes 2006)
- the dismissal all of the O.A.’s employees,
- those employees who will be rehired by the new airline they will lose their labor permanency-stability (only annual contracts) and their salary will be dramatically decreased.
In order to determine the consideration of the O.A.’s aircraft engineers regarding:
- whether the aforementioned facts aroused stress
- the current main stressor of the internal corporate environment
- the impact of the main corporate stressor on their labour attitude
we conducted a field research among them.
Keywords:
Aircraft engineers, Internal-corporate-environment, Stressors
Brief theoretical approach
“Stress” as the mental or physical tension that results from physical, emotional, or chemical causes, which is provoked by facts-conditions perceived as negative, has stronger and longer negative impact on the physical and psychological health than stress that comes from, facts-conditions perceived as positive.
Researches have proved that a person who has been exposed periodically in stress develops endurance on the particular stressors. (Dienstbier 1989). However the efforts of the body to be adapted to the uninterrupted presence of stress may weak its defence mechanisms to a wide range of physical and psychological diseases (Atkinson R.and R., Smith, Daryl, Nolen-Hoeksema S. 2000)
Every person assess subjectively the facts as stressors based on his-her own capabilities (Lippa 2003) and his-her culture.
Stress disorders
The following disorders are known either to be caused by stress or exacerbated by stress: (Site of “The life health institute” (2006))
1 ADDICTIVE DISORDERS 2 ANXIETY DISORDERS 1.1 Alcohol addiction 2.1 Agoraphobia 1.2 Anorexia 2.2 Generalized anxiety disorder 1.3 Bulemia 2.3 Obsessive/compulsive disorder 1.4 Drug addiction 2.4 Panic attacks 1.5 Multiple substance abuse 2.5 Performance anxiety 1.6 Overeating/Obesity 2.6 Phobias (simple) 1.7 Smoking addiction 2.7 Post-traumatic stress disorder 1.8 Weight addiction 2.8 Social phobias 1.9 Other 2.9 Test anxiety
2.10 Other
3 AUTOIMMUNE DISORDERS 4 CANCER 3.1 Allergies 4.1 Bone cancer 3.2 Arthritis 4.2 Brain cancer 3.3 Fibromyalgia 4.3 Breast cancer 3.4 Fibromytosis 4.4 Cervical cancer 3.5 Lupus 4.5 Colon cancer 3.6 Multiple sclerosis 4.6 Hodgkin’s disease 3.7 Rheumatoid arthritis 4.7 Leukemia 3.8 Sjogren’s Syndrome 4.8 Liver cancer 3.9 Vitiligo 4.9 Lung cancer 3.10 Other 4.10 Lymphoma
4.11 Multiple myeloma
4.12 Ovarian cancer
4.13 Pancreatic cancer
4.14 Prostate cancer
4.15 Skin cancer
4.16 Other
5 CARDIOVASCULAR DISORDERS 6 DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS 5.1 Arrhythmia 5.2 Arteriosclerosis 6.1 Attention deficit 5.3 Burger’s disease 6.2 Concentration problems 5.4 Essential hypertension 6.3 Conduct Disorder 5.5 Fibrillation 6.4 Dyslexia 5.6 Mitral valve prolapse 6.5 Hyperkinesis 5.7 Palpitations 6.6 Language and speech disorders 5.8 Peripheral vascular disease 6.7 Learning disabilities 5.9 Raynaud’s disease 5.10 Stroke 5.11 Tachycardia 5.12 Wolff-Parkinson-White Syndrome 5.13 Other
“Culture” includes learned values, beliefs, principles customs, and habits e.t.c. (Helmreich, Merritt 1998, Brown 1998) upon which every one relies his-her situation awareness of the environment and his-her consideration of his-her needs structure and behaviour. Consequently the existing national and corporate culture is a basic determinant of what must be considered as stressor and what must be the proper labour attitude.
Corporate Culture covers a wide area such as
1) Production methods (Maurino1994, Lainos 1995, 2001,2002)
2) Skills and specialization,
3) Consideration of discipline and penalties ,
4) Style of communication with the colleagues, members of hierarchy, clients, suppliers etc.
5) The dominant and acceptable administrative methods
- a) Management theories x or y (product or human oriented)
- b) Application of motivation systems for increasing quantity simultaneously with the quality of the offered job,
- c) Encouraging proposals for introduction of innovations etc.
- d) The efficiency of the applied control style (administrative or participating, ex post or ex ante)
- e) Individuality or team spirit.
6) The values and the traditions of the company (degree of tolerance of risky, aggressive, conflict and open critical behaviour, reward criteria, seniority or efficiency in promotion etc.),
7) The standing transactional practice of the Airline.
For understanding our comments on the findings of our researches, we consider the presentation of the basic parameters of the Greek national culture, as important.
The national Greek culture
Four of the national Greek cultural dimensions-which obviously strongly affect the O.A.’s aircraft engineers labour attitude-are (Hofstede 1980 a, b, 1991; Johnston 1993).
1) Power distance. (From a scale 11 to 104 Greece scores 60)
This considers the habitual exercise of power within a culture.
2) Uncertainty Avoidance, (From scale 40 to 112 Greeks score 112).
This dimension addresses the ease with which cultures cope with novelty, ambiguity, and uncertainty. High Uncertainty-avoidance culture seeks clarity and order in social relationships, favouring rules and regulations.
3) Individualism. (From a scale 8 to 91 Greece scores 35)
This dimension considers the cultural emphasis given to individualistic, as distinct from collectivist, social mores.
4) Masculinity. (from a scale of 5 to 95 Greece scores 57)
This relates to beliefs regarding the gender division of social roles, In masculine cultures ambition and performance are valued. High masculine society tend to have a belief in the independent decision maker and leader value their decision-making autonomy” Some parameters of the OA’s a/c engineers sub-Culture
Herzberg’s dual factor theory
The prioritisation of the needs plays a significant role-as motivator-to the shaping of the employees attitude since every individual tries to adapt his-her labour’s attitude at the maximisation of the satisfaction of his-her needs according to every one’s current prioritisation. In our present research we determined the O.A.’s a/c engineers consideration regarding the impact of the dominant labour stressor on the prioritisation of the incentives which attract them in their profession. These incentives and its prioritisation determine the needs which the O.A.’s a/c engineers want to be satisfied and its prioritisation.
Frederich Hertzberg, a fan of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs theory, adapted it to labour’s environment. He identified factors affecting job satisfaction listed them under two categories:
- a) Hygiene or Maintenance factors or They are not considered motivational of themselves, but their absence is sure to cause dissatisfaction
- b) Motivators or satisfiers are factors which actually enhance motivation and performance.
- a) Hygiene or Dissatisfiers includes:
Working conditions, policies and administrative practices, salary and benefits, supervision, status, job security, fellow workers, and personal life.
- Motivators or Satisfies includes:
Recognition, achievement, advancement, growth, responsibility, job challenge
It is obvious that Hygiene factors must be fulfilled before motivators’ introduction to stimulate a particular employee’s behaviour
The case study of Olympic Airways
The last thirteen years Olympic Airways is under a recovery effort towards privatization. During this time, the number of aircraft engineers was decreased by 50%.
In early September 2005 the State, the O.A.’s exclusive shareholder, announced that the O.A. will be withdrawn from the market and it will be replaced with a new private airline, by the end of October of 2005 (Karamanlis 2005). For the fulfilment of this statement the government passed the Law 2331/23-11-2005.
The published business plan of the new airline included measures such as the dismissal of all the O.A.’s employees. According to this plan some employees would be rehired with annual contracts losing the job stability they used to have and with a dramatic decrease of their salary (Gazettes 2006).
The last fifty years the OA’s international reputation aroused by its brand logo-the Olympic Circles- combined with its world vanguard in flight safety records, during its public ownership. As a consequence of the aforementioned advantages, the O.A., offered to its employees, job security- stability, satisfaction for their achievement, pride, self respect-dignity and a high level of social status. These facts were embodied in the corporate culture, as the main determinants (Lainos 2004).
Our present field research was conducted in cooperation with the O.A.’s aircraft engineers union’s B.O.D.
Characteristics of our field research
- Sample: 25% of the a/c engineers which is scientifically adequate for absolutely safe results
- Date: between 10th to 14th of April 2006
- Methodology: Questionnaires (open-close) along with personal interviews.
Findings of our research
1) The current dominant stressor of the O.A.’s internal corporate environment
It must be noted that according to the results of our 2003 and 2006 research, more than 82% and 94% respectively of the OA’s aircraft engineers are opposing the privatization of the O.A., as they consider that their labour terms and conditions will be worsen. It must be noticed that according to the results of the 2005 a/c engineers’ union elections about 50 % of them are voters of the present government which supports and promotes the privatization of the O.A.
We consider that the 12% difference between 2003 and 2006 results of our reswearches is because in 2003 in power was the socialist government, which although it promoted as well the privatisation none believed that they would fulfill it. And they did not.
So some of the O.A.’s a/c engineers voters of the conservatives felt safe and they had then the luxury to support the privatisation that was the policy of their party which then was in opposition.
When this party become government after March 2004 and on September of 2005 the greek Prime Minister announced the withdrawal of the O.A. from the market, the a/c engineers voters of this party felt unsafe for their future and their social status.
We consider that this is the explanation for the increase of the opposed of the O.A. privatisation between 2003 and 2006.
It must be noticed that according to the results of the 2005 a/c engineers’ union elections about 50 % of them are voters of the present government which supports and promotes the privatization of the O.A.
The results of our research show that only a 6% of the a/c engineers voters of the government supports its program for privatisation of O.A..
It is obvious that –at list at the particular case, the national and the corporate culture play the main role for the determination of the internal corporate environment stressors. Their role cancels the strong role of the political ideology which traditionally was dominant due to the political contradictions of the Greek society of the 20th century (mainly the civil war in 1946-1949 and the military hunda 1967-1974)
2) The consideration of the O.A.’s a/c engineers regarding the impact of the dominant corporate stressor on their labour attitude (Table 1)
The opinion of O.A.’s a/c engineers regarding the negative effects on their labor behavior due to the stress resulted from the negative prospects on their own professional future is:
- a) The main effect for 58% of the answered is the decrease of their interest for the content of their profession-job. It must be underlined that the motive “interest for the
content of the profession-job” has been prioritized in another questionnaire of the same research, as the first attractor at their profession today This incompatibility means that the current negative prospects for the O.A.’s future have canceled the motivation power
of their most powerful motive.
TABLE 1
The consideration of O.A.’s aircraft engineers regarding the top three consequences on their labor behavior of the dominant corporate stressor
1) Decrease of the interest for the content of their profession-job……….58%
2) Arousal of aggressiveness –irritation………………………….…………41%
3) Decrease of the quantity of the offered work……..……..……………..36%
- b) For the 41% of the answered that aggressiveness–irritation is considered to be the second main effect on their labor behavior.
- c) For the 36% of the answered the decrease of the quantity of the offered work is considered to be the third main effect on their labor behavior. Obviously this answer is one of the consequences of the first one.
3) a)The consideration of the O.A.’s a/c engineers regarding the impact of the dominant corporate stressor on the structure of the incentives which attract them in their profession (researches 2003 and 2006).
- b) Comparison of the prioritization of these incentives with Herzberg’s Hygiene and Motivational factors (Table 2) Causes of this relationship
TABLE 2
Comparison among the prioritization of O.A.’s a/c engineers incentives
which attract them in their profession (researches 2003 and 2006)
and Herzberg’s Hygiene and Motivational factors classification
Herzberg Research 2003 Research 2006
Motivators
5) ACHIEVEMENT…………….…4rth…61,4%…………………..6th…57%
RESPONSIBILITY
JOB CHALLENGE……….……5th…..57,9%…………………..1st…78%
4) RECOGNITION………..….…..2nd….73,0%…………………..5th…60%
ADVANCEMENT
STATUS……………….…5th…57,9% & 6th… 53,8%………….4th…61%
Hygiene or Maintenance factors or Dissatisfiers
- CORPORATE POLICIES & ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES,
FELLOW WORKERS,
QUALITY OF SUPERVISION
2) JOB SECURITY …………..…1rst…73,1%……………………5th…55%
LABOR CONDITIONS……………………………………….3rd..63%
PERSONAL LIFE,
1) PERSONAL LIFE
SALARY & BENEFITS….……3rd…… 62%……………………….2nd..69%
- a) The incentive “Job challenge” was classified by Herzberg at the fifth priority of employees needs. In our 2003 research, O.A.’s a/c engineers prioritized it at the fifth position since it was selected by 57,9% while in our 2006 research it was selected by 78% of A.’s a/c engineers, This percentage prioritises it as their top incentive. The 52% of them included it among their top three priorities fact which arises it as their dominant motive.
- b) The incentive “Salary and benefits” was classified by Herzberg at the first priority of employees needs. In our 2003 research it was selected by 63% of O.A.’s a/c engineers percentage which brought this incentive at the third position, while in our 2006 research it was selected by 69% of them percentage which prioritized it at the second position. The 44% of them prioritized it among their top three priorities.
We consider that this upgrading of the prioritization of the particular incentive is due to the loss of the a/c engineers belief at their job security which resulted at the reorientation of their efforts in maximizing of their immediate benefits
- c) The incentives “Job security” and “Labour conditions” was classified by Herzberg at the second priority of employees needs.
- i) The criteria “Job security” according to the results of our 2003 research it was selected by 73% of O.A.’s a/c engineers. This percentage brought this criteria in their first priority for 2003. However according to the results of our 2006 research it was selected by only 55% of O.A.’s a/c engineers which brings it in their fifth prioritization.
We consider that the changes that were introduced in the internal O.A.’s corporate environment between 2003 and 2006 explain the aforementioned differentiation. In 2003 the state, the exclusive shareholder of O.A., announced, that it was decided the O.A.’s dichotomization which it was fulfilled in December 2003. The Technical Base was not included in the new company. Due to this fact negative rumors were developed regarding the future of the Base. It must be noticed that negative rumors regarding the O.A.’s future, started since O.A.’s nationalization in 1975. Although relative rumors were strengthened after 1994 when the first recovery program was applied, it seems that up to October of 2003 (when we conducted our first research) they have not aroused any stress to the O.A.’s a/c engineers. Their long term-more than fifty years- labour stability and security did not let them, then, any ambiguity regarding the negative prospects of their professional future. In correlation with their national and corporate culture which consider the “uncertainty avoidance” and the “job security” as their basic parameters, guided them to keep them up to 2003 on prioritizing the “job security” the top incentive which attracted them in their profession. The following three years after 2003, the fulfillment of O.A.’s dichotomization, the tense of the rumors regarding the cease operation of O.A. and its Technical Base, were periodically sharpened. Even Mr Prime Minister announced in September of 2005 that the operation of O.A. would have ceased up to the end of October of 2005. However this decision was never fulfilled. The decrease of the priority of the inventive “job security” in our 2006 research at the fifth position, seems to reflect the uncertainty that was aroused at the majority of the O.A.’s a/c engineers regarding their job stability..
However the 33% of the answered still selected this motive among their top three priorities fact which upgrades its motivation power in the third position.
- ii) The criteria “Labour conditions” in our 2003 research it was not prioritized by O.A.’s a/c engineers in the top seven positions, while in our 2006 research it was prioritized at the third position since it was selected by 63%. However only the 27% of the a/c engineers prioritized it among their top three priorities fact which decreases the motivation power of the particular incentive. We consider that the upgrading of the particular incentive is due to the loss of the a/c engineers belief at their job security. This is considered to be the reason that they have oriented their efforts in maximizing their immediate benefits
- d) The incentive “Social status” was classified by Herzberg at the fourth priority of
employees needs. In our 2003 research it was prioritized by the O.A.’s a/c engineers in the fifth and sixth position with 57,8% and 53,8% respectively, while in our 2006 research it was prioritized at the fourth position since it was selected by the 61%. However only 28 % of them prioritized it among their top three priorities, fact which weaken the motivation power of the particular incentive. This result reflects the contradiction between the “glorious” past and the current degrading of O.A.’s social status due to the extended defamation campaign against O.A. especially of the last three years.
- e) The incentive “Recognition” was classified by Herzberg at the fourth priority of employees needs. In our 2003 research it was prioritized by 73% of O.A.’s a/c engineers in the second position, while in our 2006 research it was prioritized at the fifth position since it was selected by the 60% of them. However only the 28 % of them prioritized it among their top three priorities fact which weaken the motivation power of the particular incentive. We consider that this degrading expresses the disappointment of the O.A.’s a/c engineers and is considered to be a consequence of the uncertainty regarding their professional future.
- f) The incentive “Achievement” was classified by Herzberg at the fifth priority of employees needs. In our 2003 research it was prioritized by the 61,4% of O.A.’s a/c engineers at the fourth position, while in our 2006 research it was prioritized by the 57% of them at the sixth However only the 15 % of them prioritized it at their top three priorities fact which weaken dramatically the motivation power of the particular incentive. We considered that the particular result expresses the disappointment of the a/c engineers and is a consequence of the uncertainty regarding their professional future.
Conclusions
1) The announced by Mr Prime Minister O.A.’s privatization or its withdrawal from the market is considered by it’s a/c engineer as negative prospect of the O.A.’s Technical Base and of their future:
2) This negative prospect operated as dominant stressor because it strikes at the heart, the uncertainty avoidance, the individualism and the social status, which are the main pylons of the O.A.’s aircraft engineers, national and corporate culture,
3) due to the stress which was stimulated to the O.A.’s a/c engineers as a result of their unsafety from the expected O.A.’s privatization or its withdrawal from the market, they have restructured their prioritization of the top seven incentives which attracted them after 2003 at their profession, compared with the results of our respective research in 2003,
4) the stress which was stimulated to the O.A.’s a/c engineers as a result of their unsafety from the expected O.A.’s privatization or its withdrawal from the market:
- a) decreases their interest for their profession,
- b) decreases the quantity of the offered work while simultaneously
- c) increases their aggressiveness.
We are afraid that the combination of the aforementioned results could have negative impact on the a/c engineers attention, situation awareness, arousal e.t.c. during the fulfillment of their work It is obvious that the negative O.A.’s prospects, finally affect negatively not only the quantity of the offered werk, result which the a/c engineers have already openly accepted, but its quality as well. This approach although is not openly accepted is concluded by the aforementioned answers.
Consequently if the O.A.’s management and the state-shareholder want to preserve its world vanguard in flight safety, they must immediately cancel the causes of the existence of the aforementioned internal corporate environment stressor.
Indicated bibliography-References
Atkinson R.and R.-Smith E-Daryl B.
-Nolen-Hoeksema S. (2000) Hilgard’s Introduction to Psychology U.S.A.
Brown A.(1998) “ Organisational culture” Financial Times. Pitman Publishing Second Edition. Great Britain.
Gazettes (2006) “Kathimerini” 14-1-2006, Eleftherotypia” 16-1-2006, “Ta Nea” 16-1-2006, “
Greece (2005) Law 2331/23-11-2005
Helmreich R.L., Merritt A.(1998) “Culture at work in Aviation and medicine” Ashgate USA
Herzberg, F. (1966). Work and the Nature of Man. Cleveland: World Publishing Co.
(2003) One more time: How to motivate employees Harvard Business
Review on Motivating People p. 45-72
Karamanlis (2005) Speech of the Greek Prime Minister during the opening of the annual International exhibition of Thessalonica 9 & 10-9-05.
Lainos Y.S.(1992) “Is the privatization the only way? Editions STAXY Athens
Lainos (2004) “The considerations of a south-eastern European Airline aircraft
engineer regarding the incentives applied by the corporate top
management and those required by them.” Proceedings of 13th
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON AVIATION. PSYCHOLOGY
Oklahoma city April 18-21, 2005
Lainos (2006) “The truth behind the crisis at Olympic Airways S.A.” Editions
Papazisis. Athens
Lippa R.A (1997) “Introduction to social psychology” Brooks/Kole Publishing Co
Greek Edition ELLHN Athens p 671
Luria A.R.(1978) “Cognitive development. It’s cultural and Social Foundation” Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts and London
The compatibility of the two learning procedures accepted by the European Aviation Safety Agency (E.A.S.A.) for the candidate aircraft engineers, with E.A.S.A.’s aim for high uniform level of civil aviation safety
Introduction
Our incentive to conduct the present research-study is our consideration regarding the incompatibility, between the content of EASA’s (the Civil Aviation Authorities of the E.U.) Law 2042/2003, Part 66 module 9 Human Factors especially the fields of Memory, Perception, Thought, Information processing, Learning, Situation awareness, Decision making etc and the learning processes accepted by EASA ’s institutional framework regarding candidate a/c engineers
Brief theoretical approach
Learning is a relatively permanent change of an individual’s attitude-behavior that is the result of the individual’s response to repeated stimuli, signals, situations (e.g. exercise, observation, experiences), that are automatically stored in the brain and are subject to brain processing. Consequently, permanent changes which stem from intrinsic reactions – reflexive instincts, biological evolution-maturity of the body, ailments, temporary condition of the body that results from fatigue, drug abuse etc., are not included in the factors conducive to the learning process.
Aim of learning is the satisfaction of an individual’s needs through a permanent change of attitude via the acquisition of: a) skills b) theoretical knowledge, c) acceptance and adaptation of a certain behavioral pattern, d) adaptation to the demands of the individual’s specific natural and social environment (Atkinson et al 2000, Byrnes 2001, Sternberg 2003)
Categories of Learning
Initially at the end of 19th century the behaviourists expressed the consideration that exists a unique learning mechanism for all creatures and for all the categories of cognitive fields. Yet, even in the first quarter of the 20th century, several scientific researches proved that at least as far as primates are concerned, there are differ rent learning procedures for different categories of cognitive fields. The main theories regarding learning procedures are mentioned below. (Atkinson et al 2000, Flin et al 1997, Sternberg 2003)
Learning by experience (approval-rejection),experiments of Thorndike, Skinner, Hull.
Classical conditioning (conjunction of two stimuli-independent and dependent-which are appeared with time proximity). Experiments of Pavlov, Watson, Guthrie.
Operant conditioning, (ex post awarded of a desired behavior). Experiments of Skinner
Supervisional-intuitional learning. (Critical cognitive elaboration of the stimuli and its interrelations). Experiments of Kohler, Tοlman, Piaget, Gagner, Neisser.
The basic factors which affect cumulatively the function of the brain mechanisms involved in the learning procedures, consequently affect the quality of the applied learning procedures are: (Atkinson et al 2000, Argyris 1996, Brown & Duguid 2002, Byrnes 2001, Cook & Brown 2002, Hawkins 1997, Hayes 1994, Sternberg 2003, Telfer 1994)
1) The efficiency of the applied motivation in which are included: The applied learning procedures, the particularities of the environment of learning, the used audio-visual means, the instructor’s attitude and his-her adequacy of the theoretical knowledge and the practical experience, the adequacy and appeal of the existing text books, the level of interest of the learner for the subject taught etc.
2) The tutorial methodology (open dialog, general overview of the syllabus at the beginning, conclusions at the end, determination of the interrelations – interactions among the various issues of the syllabus, its impact on the final result of the aircraft engineer’s work and finally on aviation safety)
3) The family, the corporate and the national culture of the learner.
4) The expectations of the learner.
5) The adaptability of the knowledge with the values, beliefs of the learner.
6) The condition of the learner’s physical senses.
7) The permanent and the temporary psychological situation of the learner.
8) The age of the learner
The case study
Determinants of the quality of the aircraft engineer’s labor
As quality of the aircraft engineer’s labor can be defined the ability of their labor results to satisfy the aims of E.A.S.A. ’s relative institutional framework. (E.A.S.A. 2003 a) The quality of the aircraft engineer’s labor is affected mainly by the following factors:
1) the adequacy of the aircraft engineer’s theoretical education and training
2) the quality of the aircraft engineer’s practical experience
3) the compatibility of the aircraft engineer’s and maintenance organisation culture,
with the requirements of aviation safety,
4) the efficiency of the applied motivation by the top management.
- B) Taking into consideration the determinants of the quality of the aircraft engineer’s labor, E.A.S.A. has established the relative institutional framework. (E.A.S.A. 2003a)
The aims of the European Aviation Safety Agency commercial aviation institutional framework are the “[…] high uniform level of civil aviation safety and environmental protection […] The need to ensure uniformity in the application of common technical requirements in the field of continuous airworthiness of aeronautical parts and appliances […] ensuring the continuous airworthiness […]” (E.A.S.A. 2003 b & c)
- C) The tools which E.A.S.A. ’s institutional framework uses in order to succeed its aforementioned aims-regarding the quality of the aircraft engineers labor- are the following: (EASA 2003 d,f)
1) the Authorities that are responsible to certify the Maintenance Training Organisations, (M.T.O.) the Aircraft Maintenance Organisations, the airlines, the aircraft engineers etc
2) the presuppositions under which the Authorities can certify a Maintenance Training Organization or candidate aircraft engineers. (E.A.S.A. 2003 d,f)
- a) the name and the number of lessons which have to be taught, by the certified M.T.O., the detailed syllabus, the duration of every taught lesson (theoretical and practical), the instructors’ qualifications, the minimum number of administrational staff and its qualifications, the minimum organizational structure of the M.T.O. e.t.c.
- b) the content, the terms and the conditions of the examinations which the a/c engineers must pass
- c) the years of practical experience in a certified M.T.O.(E.A.S.A. 2003 g) needed by any candidate a/c engineer for acquiring his/her certification (E.A.S.A. 2003 d)
3) the presuppositions under which the Authorities can certify a Maintenance Organization where the candidate aircraft engineers will acquire the required by E.A.S.A. practical experience.
4) the terms and conditions for an a/c engineer’s acquiring the type rating (EASA 2003h). One of the decisive determinants of the aviation safety is the quality of aircraft maintenance, the quality of the aircraft engineer’s labor. “Safety starts on ground” (Pigeon -O’leary 1994, Patankar -Taylor 2004, Reason & Hobbs 2003 Hawkins 1997).
E.A.S.A. offers to the candidate a/c engineers the opportunity to participate in the exams after self-teaching (only theoretical) as well, that is without having attended the proper lessons and practical training in an M.T.O. (E.A.S.A. 2003 d)
E.A.S.A. seems to support that the quality of the results of the two learning procedures (attended in an M.T.O. and self-teaching) produce equal results (E.A.S.A. 2007). Moreover, E.A.S.A. seems to argue that examinations and practical experience are adequate mechanisms to ensure the equality of learning quality of the two aforementioned procedures. (E.A.S.A. 2007)
- D) Regarding the two learning procedures approved by E.A.S.A. for certification of the candidate aircraft engineers: (EASA 2003d)
1) The theoretical training of the candidate a/c engineers’ at an M.T.O. includes analysis of meanings and the presentation of Icons.
The practical training at an M.T.O’s laboratory includes practical application of the acquired theoretical knowledge.
2) Attending an M.T.O.:
* provides information from the syllabus determined by EASA’s legislation,
* provides the methodology and the criteria of proper analysing and understanding of
these information,
* determines the relationship among the various provided data (subsystems),
* provides basic experience into the laboratories of the M.T.O.,
* constructs the infrastructure of aviation safety culture, consequently
* minimizes the impact on learning of the aforementioned factors which affect negatively the objectivity of learning, therefore maximise the unification of understanding of the taught information-meaning, its impact on the a/c engineers quality of work and finally on aviation safety,
3) Self-teaching provides to the self taught-candidate aircraft engineer-information/ knowledge which, however, is processed through the different methodology by the different mental capabilities, different experience and different culture of every learner. This procedure, although based on a common syllabus, may result in different level of knowledge-perception-conclusions, and as a result, in different quality of work for each aircraft engineer. Consequently, it does not contribute to the fulfilment of EASA’ s aim for high uniformity level of civil aviation safety.
4) The absence of a textbook which will include the E.A.S.A.’s syllabus and the presentation of various meanings would take into account the specific needs for unified learning of the average (if we may say so) self learner-candidate aircraft engineer-, do not facilitate the efficiency of the self teaching procedure.
5) The procedure applied by the M.T.O.’s- offered e-learning- of electronic answers to the submitted questions by the attending self-learners, cannot substitute the efficiency of vital teaching in the class by the instructor, because the submitted questions include only what the self learner considers he-she has not understood.
6) It should be pointed out that for the a/c engineer’s acquiring of any type rating, E.A.S.A. has established as an obligatory prerequisite the candidate’s attending the relative lessons in an M.T.O. which, however, is not necessary for the acquisition of the main certification. (EASA 2003 d)
7) E.A.S.A. argues that the establishment of self-teaching process ensures the right of the individuals to become a/c engineers, even if due to lack of time and/or money, they do not have the opportunity to attend the relative studies in an M.T.O. (EASA 2007)
- E) Regarding examinations: in the general learning process, examination is one of the stages and not the exclusive stage for a formal assessment of the effectiveness of the particular educational procedure in which the examinations are placed. This means that if two individuals study the same syllabus in an MT.O -on the one hand-and through self teaching, on the other – and both succeed in the exams on the common syllabus, it does not mean that they will have the same level of knowledge of the studied common syllabus because:
1) The aim of learning of the subject of the a/c engineers is not only the acquisition of a number of information but it includes a particular way of thinking, acting and reacting, believing -behaving e.t.c. These characteristics of the personality are included in the aviation safety culture. It must be emphasized that the basic infra and over structure of aviation safety culture which decisively affects the continuous airworthiness and finally aviation safety, cannot be acquired by a self-taught candidate a/c engineer through studying the books. It is initially acquired during his/her attending in an M.T.O. and developed during his/her practical experience.
2) Further more, even if the examined candidate aircraft engineer proves through the examinations that he/she “knows” the examined subject, we feel obliged to remind the difference between the meaning of the words “know” “understand” and “assimilate” of the knowledge (Cook & Brown 2002) consequently to be able to apply this knowledge properly and safely.
The “knowledge” of the subject even if it concerns the proper amount of necessary information on how the work has to be done is not enough without:
- a) the knowledge of the interaction of the various mechanical, electric-electronic, hydraulic e.t.c. sub systems and their special role in aviation safety.
- b) the proper structure and methodology of thinking and acting regarding the entire a/c maintenance
- c) mainly knowing the content of the aviation safety culture, which is a basic determinant of aviation safety level, the theoretical part of which is acquired attending lessons in an M.T.O..
3) The results of examinations prove that the examined person knows or does not know the required particular amount of information. This procedure does not ensure the EASA’s aim for uniformity of understanding and assimilation of the way an entire system operates, including the interactions of its various subsystems. All these are initially ensured by attending an M.T.O. It should be pointed out that the candidate a/c engineers are not examined by the authorities of every E.U. State-member on the identical syllabus since the examined syllabus is depended on the national educational system of each country.
- F) Regarding the practical experience which is required from the Authorities (EASA 2003 d) by the candidate aircraft engineers to be acknowledged by a certified aircraft maintenance organization: (EASA 2003 d)
- a) The role of EASA is to “require the Commission to adopt the necessary implementation rules to ensure their uniform application […]” (EASA 2003 b,c)
- b) The quality of the experience acquired by the candidate a/c engineers at any a/c maintenance organization, is not examined by the Authorities although the experience is legally required (EASA 2003 d). The Authorities consider as adequate a certification by the certified maintenance organization where the candidate aircraft engineer acquired his-her practical experience. This means that EASA authorizes-de facto-every certified maintenance organization, to assure on EASA’s behalf, the compatibility of the acquired practical experience by the candidate aircraft engineers-especially the safety culture-with the requests of the E.A.S.A. (E.A.S.A. 2003a).
Conclusions
1) The content of the a/c engineer’s labor is to maintain the continuous airworthiness of the aircrafts. The criterion according which the quality of the aircraft engineer’s labor is determined and assessed is the level of satisfaction of the aims of E.A.S.A.’s relative institutional framework, regarding commercial aviation. Consequently, every deduction on the required quality level of the a/c engineer’s labor is directly reflected on the aviation safety level. The decades of maintenance related aircraft accidents, do not assure the required general application of E.A.S.A.’s regulations by every certified M.T.O., regarding the aircraft continuous airworthiness. (Hofstede 1991, Maurino 1994, Pigeon-O’leary 1994, Reason & Hobbs 2003)
2) Attending the candidate aircraft engineers, lessons in an M.T.O., results at a superior quality a) of their learning, b) consequently of their work and finally c) on aviation safety, compared to self-teaching. Consequently, the procedure of self teaching cancels the EASA’s aim regarding the required uniformity of the civil aviation safety and the application of common technical requirements in the field of continuous airworthiness. However, both of these procedures are legally accepted by E.A.S.A.
The superiority of the results of the officially organized education in comparison to self-teaching, is based on the universal human experience after the Dark Ages. This assessment is included in the relative syllabus of the “Human factor” lesson (EASA 2003 d) which is obligatory taught to the candidate aircraft engineers.
3) Examinations generally prove that the examined person knows the required particular amount of information. It does not ensure the uniformity of understanding and assimilating of the way of operation of the entire system including the interactions of its various subsystems. Therefore, examinations per se, do not maximise the possibilities of equalisation of the results of attending in an M.T.O. and the self teaching on: a) the quality of the aircraft engineer’s work b) on aviation safety.
4) The quality of experience which the candidate aircraft engineer acquires at his/her practical training during a particular number of years, per educational category, at every certified maintenance organization is not examined by EASA. Consequently, EASA does not examine the compatibility of the quality of the acquired experience by the candidate aircraft engineers with the aims of the existing institutional framework regarding continuous airworthiness. As a result, the applied experience procedure may undermine the EASA’s aim regarding the efficiency and the uniformity of the acquired practical experience by the candidate aircraft engineers according to EASA’s requirements.
5) Since self-teaching may have negative impact on the quality of the a/c engineers work-consequently on aviation safety-that is on the lives of the passengers and of the European citizens-it is obvious that there seems to be a conflict of interest between self-learners-candidate a/c engineers-on the one hand and the lives of the passengers and the European citizens on the other. It is obvious that the predominant interest lies with the lives of the passengers and of the European citizens.
Indicated bibliography – Sources
Argyris C. (1996) “On organizational learning” Blackwell. USA
Atkinson R.& R.-Smith E-Daryl B.-Nolen-Hoeksema S. (2000) “Hilgard’s Introduction
to Psychology” 13nth Edition U.S.A.
Brown J.S. & Duguid P. (2002) “Organising Knowledge” In “Managing Knowledge”
Open University-Sage Publications. London
Byrnes J.P. (2001) “Minds, brains and learning”. Guilford Press USA
Cook S.D.N. & Brown J.S. (2002) “Bridging Epistemologies: the general Dance
between Organisational Knowledge and Organisational Knowing” ” In
“Managing Knowledge” Open University-Sage Publications. London
EASA (2003a) Regulation 2042/20-11
EASA (2003b) Regulation 2042/20-11. Introduction
EASA (2003c) Regulation 2042/20-11. Article 1
EASA (2003d) Regulation 2042 Part 66
EASA (2003e) Regulation 2042 Part 66, lesson 9.
EASA (2003f) Regulation 2042 Part 147
EASA (2003g) Regulation 2042 Part 145
EASA (2003h) Regulation 2042 Part 66.A.45 (c)
EASA (2007) Rulemaking Directorate JAN/ime/R(4) 2007D 54191 Cologne 18-10
Flin R. Salas E. Strub M.Martin L (1997) Decision Making under stress. Ashgate.
U.K.-U.S.A.
Hawkins F.H. (1997) “Human Factors in Flight” Ashgate Second Edition. England
Hayes N. (1994) Foundations of Psychology. An introductory text. Routledge. London
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Ashgate Publishing Company. England-USA
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Practice” Avebury Technical. England
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Company. England
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Inc.3rd Edition USA
Telfer R.(1994) “Improving Aviation Instruction” in “Aviation Psychology in
Practice”Avebury Technical. England
Η φοβία της πτήσης ή αεροφοβία (fear of flying-aerophobia)
Τι εννοούμε λέγοντας «φοβία» ;
Διαταραχή Φοβικού άγχους (Φοβία) είναι μια ειδική κατηγορία αγχώδους διαταραχής που αφορά στην βίωση αδικαιολόγητου, υπερβολικού, διαρκούς και επίμονου φόβου για κάποιο αντικείμενο, γεγονός, χώρο, άνθρωπο, ζώο ή κατάσταση, με αποτέλεσμα το άτομο να αποφεύγει το αντικείμενο της φοβίας του. Η ιδιαιτερότητά της φοβίας έγκειται στο ότι η αιτία πρόκλησής της και η ένταση με την οποία βιώνεται από τον ασθενή, θεωρούμενη από λογική άποψη, δεν αντιστοιχεί στην αντικειμενική πραγματικότητα, είναι παράλογη. Η φοβία μπορεί να εμφανιστεί σε οποιαδήποτε ηλικία. Οι ασθενείς που πάσχουν από φοβία-με εξαίρεση τα παιδιά-συνήθως αναγνωρίζουν πως οι φόβοι τους δεν είναι βάσιμοι και ότι οι άλλοι άνθρωποι δικαιολογημένα δεν φοβούνται τα ίδια αντικείμενα, γεγονότα, καταστάσεις. Όμως η βίωση του συναισθήματος της φοβίας δεν μπορεί να ελεγχθεί και να αποτραπεί από την θέληση του ασθενούς.
Πόσο δικαιολογημένη είναι η φοβία των πτήσεων ;
Η φοβία των ανθρώπων για τις πτήσεις με αεροσκάφος αποτελεί ένα κοινό πρόβλημα για πολλές χιλιάδες ανθρώπους. Η αεροφοβία τα τελευταία τριάντα χρόνια αυξήθηκε ραγδαία λόγω της ραγδαίας αύξησης του αριθμού των επιβατών που πραγματοποιούν αεροπορικά ταξίδια, σαν συνέπεια τόσο της μείωσης του κόστους του αεροπορικού ταξιδιού όσο και της ανόδου του βιοτι κού επιπέδου. Στατιστικά μιλώντας, σε κάθε σειρά των τριών καθισμάτων σε μια πτήση επιβατικού αεροπλάνου κάθεται τουλάχιστον ένας επιβάτης που θα προτιμούσε να μη βρίσκεται εκεί.
Στις αρχές των εμπορικών αερομεταφορών μετά τη λήξη του Α! παγκοσμίου πολέμου και κατά τη δεκαετία του 20, ο φόβος της πτήσης δεν ήταν μία παράλογη φοβία. Ήταν ένας λογικός φόβος διότι τα ποσοστά των δυστυχημάτων και της θνησιμότητας ήταν υψηλά, σε σχέση με τον αριθμό των επιβατών και τα διανυόμενα επιβατικά μίλια. Αυτό συνέβαινε, κυρίως, λόγω της πρωτόγονης-σε σχέση με την σημερινή- τεχνολογίας του αεροσκάφους, του χαμηλού-σε σχέση με το σημερινό- επιπέδου συντήρησής του, της τότε-ανύπαρκτης-κουλτούρας ασφαλείας πτήσεων των πιλότων- οι οποίοι, ειρήσθω εν παρόδω, ήσαν οι πρώην πιλότοι της πολεμικής αεροπορίας, καθώς και του χαμηλού τεχνολογικού επιπέδου των τηλεπικοινωνιών και της μετεωρολογίας.
Όμως σήμερα το επιβατικό αεροσκάφος είναι το πλέον ασφαλές από τα μεταφορικά μέσα σαν συνέπεια :
1) Της τεχνολογικής αναβάθμισης του αεροσκάφους (δομή, κινητήρες, συστήματα, ηλεκτρονικός εξοπλισμός)
2) Του επιπέδου της-υποχρεωτικής προληπτικής συντήρησής του με βάση το εγχειρίδιο του κατασκευαστή και τον Νόμο 2042/2003 της Ε.Ε.
3) του επιπέδου εκπαίδευσης και της κουλτούρας ασφαλείας πτήσεων των πιλότων οι οποίοι πλέον πέραν των άλλων διδάσκονται υποχρεωτικά και αεροπορική ψυχολογία
4) Tου επιπέδου ανάπτυξης της μετεωρολογίας.
5) Του επιπέδου ανάπτυξης της τεχνολογίας των τηλεπικοινωνιών
Ο καθηγητής Ρόμπερτ Μπορ αναφέρει ότι ένα άτομο σήμερα έχει περισσότερες πιθανότητες να σκοτωθεί από κλωτσιά γαϊδάρου απ΄ ότι να σκοτωθεί σε συντριβή αεροπλάνου.
Η φοβία της πτήσης (ή αεροφοβία) είναι μια σύνθετη φοβία, δηλαδή η αφορμή της εκδήλωσής της δεν αφορά σε ένα μεμονωμένο ερέθισμα, π.χ. υψοφοβία. Κατά την διάρκεια της πτήσης ένα άτομο, ενδέχεται να μην παρουσιάσει αγοραφοβία κατά την είσοδό του στην αίθουσα του αεροδρομίου με το πολύβουο πλήθος, ενδέχεται να μην παρουσιάσει κλειστοφοβία μόλις μπει στο αεροσκάφος, ενδέχεται να μην αναπτύξει φοβία κατά την διάρκεια της απογείωσης ή από τους θορύβους του αεροσκάφους, αλλά να εκδηλώσει υψοφοβία κάποια στιγμή που το αεροσκάφος φθάσει το μέγιστο ύψος πτήσης ή να εκδηλώσει φοβία λόγω των αναταράξεων ή να εκδηλώσει υδροφοβία κατά την διάρκεια της πτήσης πάνω από θάλασσα, ερμηνεύοντας τα γεγονότα αυτά ως ένδειξη ύπαρξης κινδύνου. Σαν συνέπεια των λανθασμένων ερμηνειών των συγκεκριμένων γεγονότων, το άτομο προχωρεί σε σκέψεις για επαπειλούμενη καταστροφή με αποτέλεσμα να βιώνει εντονότατο και βασανιστικό στρες το οποίο στις περισσότερες των περιπτώσεων σωματοποιείται (εκδηλώνεται με σωματικά συμπτώματα). Το πρόβλημα της φοβίας της πτήσης δημιουργεί μεγάλες δυσχέρειες στην προσωπική και επαγγελματική ζωή των φοβικών ανθρώπων.
Με ποια συμπτώματα εκδηλώνεται η φοβία της πτήσης ή αεροφοβία ;
Η εμφάνιση φοβίας για την αεροπορική πτήση δεν εκδηλώνεται σε όλους τους ανθρώπους με τα ίδια συμπτώματα, ούτε με την ίδια ένταση. Ένας αριθμός συμπτωμάτων με τα οποία εκδηλώνεται η φοβία για πτήση είναι τα ακόλουθα : πανικός, ζαλάδα, ξηροστομία, εξάψεις, ωχρότητα, κοιλιακή δυσφορία, τάση για εμετό, ταχυπαλμία, έντονη εφίδρωση, δύσπνοια, πόνο στο στήθος, μούδιασμα στα άκρα, μυϊκός τρόμος, αίσθημα αστάθειας και έλλειψης ισορροπίας, απαισιοδοξία, μειωμένη δυνατότητα ορθής κρίσης, φόβο ότι ζουν τις τελευταίες τους στιγμές και έντονη αίσθηση της καταστροφής, προλιποθυμικές καταστάσεις “σβήσιμο”. Οι περισσότεροι που πάσχουν από αεροφοβία δεν θεωρούν την πτήση ως μία επισφαλή κατάσταση (το 94% των ερωτηθέντων), αλλά αποφεύγουν να ταξιδεύουν με αεροπλάνο για να μην βιώσουν τα συναισθήματα που αισθάνονται κάθε φορά που βρίσκονται σε αυτό.
Πως προσεγγίζουν τις πηγές δημιουργίας των φοβιών γενικά και ειδικά της φοβίας της πτήσης οι διάφορες θεωρίες ;
Ο άνθρωπος δε γεννιέται με την φοβία των αεροπορικών πτήσεων. Την αποκτά κατά τη διάρκεια της ζωής του. Ανεξάρτητα από το τι πιστεύει κάθε επί μέρους-φοβικό- άτομο, οι άνθρωποι δεν αναπτύσσουν φοβίες χωρίς λόγο. Η φοβία για την πτήση ενδέχεται να μην έχει καμία αρχική σχέση με την πτήση καθ’ εαυτήν. Διαφορετικοί άνθρωποι αντιδρούν στην διαταραχή του φοβικού άγχους (φοβία τους), με διαφορετικούς τρόπους και βιώνουν τα αρνητικά συναισθήματα σε διάφορα επίπεδα έντασης. Από ήπια συναισθήματα άγχους μέχρι κρίσεις πανικού. Οι επόμενες ερμηνείας δίδουν μία ιδέα για τις αιτίες προέλευσης και ανάπτυξης της αεροφοβίας.
Η ψυχοδυναμική-Φροϋδική προσέγγιση των αιτίων προέλευσης της φοβίας των πτήσεων
Η ψυχαναλυτική προσέγγιση των φοβιών θεωρεί ότι οι φοβίες είναι αποτέλεσμα αμυντικών λειτουργιών και έχουν ως αφετηριακό σημείο: α) τις απωθημένες ανεπίλυτες συγκρούσεις κατά την παιδική ηλικία μεταξύ των (σεξουαλικών κυρίως) ενστίκτων και των ορμών (του θέλω) που ζητούν ικανοποίηση και της απαγόρευσης για ικανοποίησή τους από τους κανόνες της κοινωνικά αποδεκτής συμπεριφοράς (πρέπει-δεν πρέπει). β) του άγχους που προκαλείται στο βρέφος από έναν ανασφαλή δεσμό με τη μητέρα του κατά τα δύο πρώτα στάδια ανάπτυξης της προσωπικότητάς του (στοματικό και πρωκτικό) ήτοι κατά τα τρία πρώτα χρόνια της ζωής του βρέφους-νηπίου. γ) του μη διαχειρίσιμου από το ΕΓΩ του ατόμου, άγχους, το οποίο ο ασθενής βίωσε κατά την παιδική ή την εφηβική του ηλικία λόγω της οξύτατης συναισθηματικής σύγκρουσης που προκλήθηκε -σαν αποτέλεσμα της έκθεσής του σε κάποιο γεγονός (π.χ. μη ομαλός χωρισμός γονέων, σοβαρό ατύχημα) κατά την διάρκεια του οποίου βίωσε υπερβολικά επίπεδα στρες.
Το αρχικό γεγονός (οι ανεπίλυτες συγκρούσεις, το άγχος που προκαλείται στο βρέφος από έναν ανασφαλή δεσμό με τη μητέρα του ή από άλλες μεταγενέστερες τραυματικές εμπειρίες του) και η αρχική φοβική αντίδραση του παιδιού στο γεγονός αυτό, απωθούνται. Σε περιπτώσεις όπως η πτήση, ο ενήλικας μεταθέτει αυτόματα μη συνειδητά στη πτήση (φοβικό αντικείμενο), και κατά την διάρκειά της αναβιώνει, τα συναισθήματα του άγχους, της ανασφάλειας, του πανικού κ.λπ. καθώς και το υπερβολικό-μη διαχειρίσιμο-στρες που βίωσε ως παιδί κατά το αρχικό γεγονός.
Οι συμπεριφορικές θεωρίες αντιμετωπίζουν την φοβική συμπεριφορά σαν αποτέλεσμα :
α) της μάθησης. Παιδιά των οποίων οι γονείς ή άτομα του αμέσου οικογενειακού περιβάλλοντος υποφέρουν από αεροφοβία είναι πολύ πιθανόν και τα ίδια να αναπτύξουν την ίδια φοβία στο βαθμό που τα προαναφερθέντα άτομα περιγράφουν τα αρνητικά συναισθήματα ή και την κρίση πανικού όπως οι ίδιοι τα βίωσαν κατά την διάρκεια της πτήσης. Μέσα από αυτή την διαδικασία μάθησης το παιδί θεωρώντας ότι η συγκεκριμένη συμπεριφορά του ενήλικα σχετικά με την αεροφοβία είναι η σωστή, μαθαίνει να βιώνει τα αεροπορικό ταξίδι σαν κάτι το οποίο πρέπει να φοβάται με συνέπεια να αναπτύσσει αντίστοιχη φοβική συμπεριφορά.
β) αρνητικών εμπειριών του παρελθόντος είτε του συγκεκριμένου ατόμου είτε κάποιου άλλου από το περιβάλλον του σχετικά με τα αεροπορικά ταξίδια επιδρούν έντονα στην διαμόρφωση της φοβικής συνείδησης του ατόμου σχετικά με τις πτήσεις. Τέτοια γεγονότα μπορεί να είναι αναταράξεις, φωτιά σε κάποιον κινητήρα, αναγκαστική προσγείωση, ή οποιοδήποτε άλλο συμβάν ή ατύχημα κατά την διάρκεια μιας πτήσης. Τα προαναφερθέντα γεγονότα μπορεί το άτομο να έχει ακούσει ότι συνέβησαν το καθένα σε διαφορετικές πτήσεις και σε διαφορετικά άτομα ή το ίδιο το άτομο να έχει βιώσει κάποια από αυτά σε διαφορετικές πτήσεις και σε χρονικές περιόδους οι οποίες απέχουν πολύ μεταξύ τους. Στην αντίληψή του όμως καταγράφονται αθροιστικά Έτσι η φοβία που δημιούργησε ένα γεγονός σε μία πτήση γενικεύεται σε φοβία για όλες τις πτήσεις. Η φοβία αυτή επιτείνεται και εμπεδώνεται μετά από τις μεγάλες αεροπορικές καταστροφές είτε οφείλονται σε ανθρώπινο λάθος είτε σε τρομοκρατική ενέργεια.
γ) του ρόλου που διαδραματίζουν τα Μέσα Μαζικής Ενημέρωσης σχετικά με τον τρόπο που χειρίζονται τις αεροπορικές καταστροφές προωθώντας την μεγιστοποίηση της τηλεθέασης-ακροαματικότητας και όχι την αντικειμενική ενημέρωση. Έχει ερευνητικά διαπιστωθεί ότι μετά από πολύνεκρα αεροπορικά δυστυχήματα παρατηρείται αύξηση του ποσοστού αεροφοβιών και μάλιστα σε άτομα τα οποία ως εκείνη τη στιγμή δεν υπέφεραν από την συγκεκριμένη φοβία.
Οι συμπεριφορικές θεωρίες όμως δεν είναι σε θέση να προσδιορίσουν τον ακριβή μηχανισμό που ενεργοποιείται κάθε φορά σε κάθε άτομο.
Οι γνωστικές-συμπεριφορικές προσεγγίσεις επικεντρώνουν στις επιδράσεις τις οποίες δέχεται η συμπεριφορά του ατόμου από τα σχήματα και τα στερεότυπα με βάση τα οποία σκέπτεται, ερμηνεύει τα γεγονότα και με βάση τις ερμηνείες αυτές αισθάνεται και συμπεριφέρεται. Το άτομο νιώθει ήδη πολύ άγχος, για διάφορους λόγους πριν ανεβεί στο αεροσκάφος. Το άγχος αυτό εντείνεται ακόμα περισσότερο όταν ανεβαίνει στο αεροπλάνο όταν ανακαλεί στην μνήμη τις πολύνεκρες αεροπορικές καταστροφές, γεγονότα τα οποία αποσυντονίζουν την ψυχική ισορροπία πολλών ανθρώπων.
Μια άλλη αιτία διέγερσης άγχους είναι η αίσθηση του ανθρώπου ότι δεν έχει τον έλεγχο της κατάστασης. Η μεγάλη πλειοψηφία των ανθρώπων για να νοιώθει ασφαλής θέλει να έχει την ψευδαίσθηση ότι μπορεί και ελέγχει όλες εκείνες τις παραμέτρους του περιβάλλοντός της οι οποίες προσδιορίζουν την ασφαλή τους διαβίωση. Σαν συνέπεια αυτής της ψευδαίσθησης η συνειδητοποίηση εκ μέρους κάποιων ατόμων της αδυναμίας τους για άσκηση ελέγχου εφ’ όλων των κατά την άποψή τους παραμέτρων της πτήσης (κατάσταση αεροσκάφους, ποιότητα πιλότου, αξιοπιστία της μετεωρολογικής υπηρεσίας, ποιότητα των μηχανισμών ασφαλείας κ.λπ.) τους διεγείρει αεροφοβία.
Τέτοιες καταστάσεις ενδέχεται να πυροδοτήσουν την έναρξη της διαδικασίας εκδήλωσης επεισοδίου άγχους ή πανικού όταν το άτομο ανεβεί στο αεροσκάφος για να ταξιδεύσει. Στη συνέχεια το άτομο φοβάται να ξαναπετάξει με αεροπλάνο, για να μην αναβιώσει τα αρνητικά συναισθήματα που βίωσε την προηγούμενη φορά.
Θεραπεύεται η φοβία της πτήσης ;
Όταν αναφερόμαστε στην αποτελεσματική θεραπεία της αεροφοβίας εννοούμε το να μπορεί το άτομο να πραγματοποιεί και να απολαμβάνει τα αεροπορικά ταξίδια χωρίς να του διεγείρονται σκέψεις ότι κατά την διάρκεια της πτήσης θα του συμβεί κάποιο ατύχημα με συνέπεια να πυροδοτείται το έντονο άγχος το οποίο του προκαλεί τις προαναφερθείσες συναισθηματικές και σωματικές διαταραχές σαν συνέπεια της φοβίας του.
Όταν οδηγούμε ένα αυτοκίνητο γνωρίζουμε ότι μπορεί να μας συμβεί κάποιο ατύχημα και μάλιστα θανατηφόρο. Η γνώση μας όμως αυτή δεν μας διεγείρει τέτοιο άγχος που να μας προκαλεί τις προαναφερθείσες συναισθηματικές και σωματικές διαταραχές σε βαθμό που να μας αποτρέπει από το να οδηγούμε.
Κατ’ αναλογία όποιος πετά με αεροπλάνο δεν σημαίνει ότι έχει πεισθεί ότι όλα θα πάνε καλά στις πτήσεις του. Η δημιουργία της πεποίθησης ότι δεν πρόκειται να συμβεί οποιοδήποτε ατύχημα κατά την πτήση, θα ήταν αποτέλεσμα ψυχοπαθολογικής λειτουργίας που αφορά στη διέγερση της «άρνησης» σαν μηχανισμού άμυνας του «εγώ». Θα ήταν παραβίαση του Νόμου του Merphy ο οποίος διδάσκει ότι εφ’ όσον κάτι μπορεί να συμβεί γενικά, αυτό μπορεί να συμβεί και σ’ εμένα.
Η θεραπεία πρέπει να στοχεύει στην αναίρεση των γενεσιουργών αιτίων των φοβιών που θα έχει σαν αποτέλεσμα την αποδυνάμωση των αυτόματων αρνητικών συνειρμών που διεγείρονται από το υποσυνείδητο με βάση τον προγραμματισμό του από παρελθούσες εσωτερικές συγκρούσεις, αρνητικές εμπειρίες ή μαθημένες συμπεριφορές,.
Η αποτελεσματική αντιμετώπιση της αεροφοβίας αφορά σε κάθε άτομο ξεχωριστά αφού οι αιτίες οι οποίες την προκαλούν αφορούν στο κάθε άτομο ξεχωριστά.
Η προσπάθεια της θεραπείας μπορεί να είναι αποτελεσματική μόνον αν συνδυασθούν η βοήθεια του εξειδικευμένου θεραπευτή με την θέληση για θεραπεία και την ουσιαστική συμβολή του πάσχοντος στην επίτευξή της θεραπείας του.
Παρ’ όλον ότι υπάρχουν διαθέσιμες περί τις 50 προσεγγίσεις για την θεραπεία της φοβίας των πτήσεων δεν έχει προσδιορισθεί ακόμη μία απολύτως αποτελεσματική μέθοδος θεραπείας .
- Ψυχαναλυτική-ψυχοδυναμική προσέγγιση της θεραπείας της φοβίας των πτήσεων
Η θεραπεία των φοβιών μέσω της ψυχανάλυσης αφορά:
α) στον προσδιορισμό των αιτίων που τις προκαλούν δηλαδή των απωθημένων ανικανοποίητων ενορμήσεων-επιθυμιών που προκάλεσαν την αρχική σύγκρουση κατά τη βρεφική ηλικία οπότε και το βρέφος βίωσε πρωταρχικά την ανασφάλεια και τα αρνητικά συναισθήματα τα οποία και του προκάλεσαν το μη διαχειρίσιμο άγχος.
β) στον προσδιορισμό των αρνητικών επιπτώσεών του απωθημένου, μη διαχειρίσιμου άγχους της παιδικής ηλικίας, στην οργάνωση της προσωπικότητας του ενήλικου ατόμου. Μία από τις εκδηλώσεις των αρνητικών επιπτώσεων του απωθημένου μη διαχειρίσιμου άγχους είναι η δημιουργία των φοβιών.
Η θεραπευτική παρέμβαση της ψυχανάλυσης στοχεύει στην αναίρεση των αιτιών που διαμόρφωσαν την συγκεκριμένη φοβική προσωπικότητα. Έτσι δίνει διέξοδο και εκτονώνει τις διάφορες εκδηλώσεις των πρωτογενών συγκρούσεων στα διάφορα πεδία της ενήλικης ζωής-όπως είναι οι φοβίες για συγκεκριμένα φοβικά αντικείμενα π.χ. πτήση με αεροπλάνο-οι οποίες διεγείρουν το μη διαχειρίσιμο από το ΕΓΩ μας, φοβικό άγχος.
Μειονέκτημα της ψυχαναλυτικής θεραπείας είναι ότι είναι χρονοβόρα και γι’ αυτό ακριβή.
Το πλεονέκτημά της συνίσταται στο ότι προσφέρει θεραπεία όχι μόνο στην συγκεκριμένη φοβία, αλλά στη γενικότερη αρνητική επίδρασή της σύγκρουσης μεταξύ του «θέλω» και του «πρέπει» στη δομή της προσωπικότητας του ατόμου. Η επιτυχία αυτή οφείλεται στο ότι εντοπίζει και εκτονώνει την αντίθεση της αρχικής σύγκρουσης μεταξύ του θέλω μας και της μη ικανοποίησής του, η οποία οδήγησε -μέσω της απώθησης και της μετάθεσης ως μηχανισμών άμυνας του ΕΓΩ– στη μετατροπή της σε φοβίες.
- Η συμπεριφορική (behavioral) προσέγγιση
της θεραπείας της φοβίας των πτήσεων
Η συμπεριφορική προσέγγιση της θεραπείας της φοβίας των πτήσεων επικεντρώνει κυρίως στην συστηματική απευαισθητοποίηση του ατόμου από την φοβική κατάσταση-πτήση. Στόχος είναι ο ασθενής να μάθει να ελέγχει τον φόβο του και τελικά να τον μειώσει ουσιωδώς. Για παράδειγμα, μια κοινή αλλά αναποτελεσματική συμπεριφορά φοβικών ατόμων είναι να αποφεύγουν να έρχονται σε επαφή με καταστάσεις-αντικείμενα που μπορούν να τους δημιουργήσουν άγχος, συμπεριφορά η οποία μπορεί να γίνει ακραία και να επηρεάσει καθοριστικά την καθημερινή ζωή του φοβικού ατόμου. Στην περίπτωση αυτή μπορεί να εφαρμοσθεί ένα είδος συμπεριφορικής θεραπείας που ονομάζεται «Θεραπεία έκθεσης» .
Στα πλαίσια της προσπάθειας αυτής το φοβικό άτομο ενθαρρύνεται να χαλαρώσει και να σκέπτεται τρομακτικές αεροπορικές καταστροφές. Στη συνέχεια ο θεραπευτής τον ρωτά για τα συναισθήματα που βίωσε κατά την διάρκεια των σκέψεών του. Πολλοί θεραπευτές εκθέτουν στη συνέχεια τους ασθενείς τους σε πραγματικές συνθήκες φέρνοντάς τους σε επαφή με το αντικείμενο της φοβίας τους είτε με μετάβασή τους στο αεροδρόμιο είτε και τοποθετώντας τους σε προσομοιωτή πτήσεων όπου δημιουργούνται συνθήκες πραγματικής πτήσης.
- Γνωστική-συμπεριφορική προσέγγιση
της θεραπείας της φοβίας των πτήσεων (Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy)
Σύμφωνα με την προσέγγιση της γνωστικής-συμπεριφορικής θεραπείας, ένα
φοβικό άτομο βιώνει ένα αντικείμενο ή μια κατάσταση ως επικίνδυνη όταν έρθει σε επαφή με αυτήν. Σαν συνέπεια το άτομο οδηγείται σε αρνητικές αυτόματες σκέψεις και συνεπακόλουθα αρνητικά συναισθήματα που οδηγούν σε συμπεριφορά φοβικής αντίδρασης.
H Γνωστική Συμπεριφορική Θεραπεία έχει ως στόχο να εκτονώσει την οξύτητα των συμπτωμάτων μέσα από τ6ην αλλαγή των σκέψεων και των παραγόμενων από αυτές αρνητικών συναισθημάτων που παράγουν και τις φοβικές συμπεριφορές. Η θεραπεία αυτή έχει πάρει στοιχεία τόσο από την γνωστική θεραπεία όσο και από τη συμπεριφορική θεραπεία (απευαισθητοποίηση- θεωρία μάθησης).
Το πλεονέκτημα της γνωστικής-συμπεριφορικής προσέγγισης της θεραπείας της φοβίας των πτήσεων έγκειται στην ταχύτητά της (μπορεί και σε είκοσι συνεδρίες) και το χαμηλό της κόστος.
Το μειονέκτημά της είναι ότι δεν είναι συμβατή με όλες τις προσωπικότητες και ότι δεν προσφέρει σφαιρική και ριζική θεραπεία των αιτιών αλλά επικεντρώνεται στην εκτόνωση των συμπτωμάτων.
Πως θα συνοψίζαμε όλα τα ανωτέρω ;
1) Φοβία είναι η βίωση υπερβολικού, διαρκούς, επίμονου αλλά αδικαιολόγητου και παράλογου φόβου για κάποιο αντικείμενο, γεγονός, χώρο, άνθρωπο, ζώο ή κατάσταση .
2) Συνέπεια της φοβίας είναι ότι το φοβικό άτομο επιδιώκει να αποφεύγει το αντικείμενο της φοβίας του π.χ. αποφεύγει να πετά με αεροπλάνο.
3) Η φοβία μπορεί να εμφανιστεί σε οποιαδήποτε ηλικία.
4) Κανένας άνθρωπος δεν γεννιέται με φοβίες
5) Ως αιτίες εκδήλωσης της φοβίας αναφέρονται:
α) Οι μαθημένες συμπεριφορές
β) Η αδυναμία ικανοποίησης της ανάγκης για άσκηση από το φοβικό άτομο, απόλυτου ελέγχου στους όρους και τις συνθήκες της πτήσης
γ) Οι προηγούμενες αρνητικές εμπειρίες κατά την πτήση
δ) Η βίωση κατά την βρεφική και παιδική κυρίως ηλικία από τον ασθενή υπερβολικού στρες λόγω ανεπίλυτων συγκρούσεων μεταξύ του θέλω και του πρέπει-δεν πρέπει, που απωθήθηκαν τότε. Τα αρνητικά αυτά συναισθήματα και το άγχος που βίωσε ο ασθενής κατά την παιδική του ηλικία τα μεταθέτει ως ενήλικος στην πτήση, με συνέπεια να θεωρεί ότι η πτήση είναι υπεύθυνη για τα αρνητικά συναισθήματα, την ανασφάλεια και τα μη διαχειρίσιμα επίπεδα άγχους.
ε) Ο ρόλος που διαδραματίζουν τα Μέσα Μαζικής Ενημέρωσης
6) Δύο κατηγορίες θεραπείας των φοβιών είναι διαθέσιμες:
α) αυτές οι οποίες στοχεύουν στην αναίρεση των γενεσιουργών αιτιών των φοβιών και
β) αυτές που στοχεύουν στην αναίρεση των επιπτώσεων των γενεσιουργών αιτιών σε διάφορα επίπεδα (μάθηση, τρόπος του σκέπτεσθαι, συναισθήματα, συμπεριφορές).
The impact of knowledge, on perception’s credibility. The case study of accident investigators
Abstract
ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, for air accident investigation, aims to avoid re-occurrence, thus the prevention accidents/incidents in the future. Basic factors for a credible comparability between various accident reports are two parameters. First the investigators’ perception, one of the basic determinants of which is their knowledge and second a common structure and methodology of reporting the findings, conclusions and recommendations. Our research pursue to determine: First whether ICAO guidelines for investigators training syllabus, includes the proper and adequate knowledge for investigators, to fulfill ICAO provisions, regarding the impact of managerial functions on a/c operation and on accident occurrence. A review of numerous of final accident reports, indicates a confusion-misunderstanding, as the managerial functions affected the accident, either may not mentioned, in the final accident report, and or are allocated in fields other than the appropriate and or are allocated in various irrelative fields. This fact obstructs shaping a unified readers’ perception, regarding the ICAO’s provision that is the impact of managerial functions on a/c operation and accident occurrence. It is obvious that the aforementioned confusion, has negative impact on the credibility and comparability of the accident reports and finally on aviation safety. Second factor for a credible comparability between various accident reports is the clarity of final accident report format. In our case it concerns the investigators’ obligation to report information regarding management functions, in different paragraphs. Third, is the adequacy of investigators’ job specialties/qualifications, description. Fourth factor is ICAO Final Accident Report Format,
to ensure that in each paragraph are reported comparable facts. In our case it concerns the coexistence in the same paragraph, of state authorities whose role is to issue certificates-licenses and to perform oversight on the private organisations and private corporations which acquire license from state authorities by whom are controlled.
Key words
Aviation-accident-investigation, aviation-safety, Aviation- corporate-management-functions, aviation-accident-investigators-training, ICAO-final-accident-report1.
Introduction
Some of the basic determinants to fulfill ICAO’s provision for enhancing aviation safety -regarding accident investigation are : credibility and comparability,
- format to ensure the readers’ unified presentation of each object,
- the absence of “gray areas” in the description of the investigators’ job specialties’ and qualifications.
- To avoid comparisons among facts-which seems similar, however come from different causes.
1.1. ICAO’s provisions regarding the determination by investigators of the managerial functions’ impact on a/c operations and on accident occurrence. (Guidance Doc 9756 Part IV reporting Appendix 1 Chapter 1.17.1., 1.17.2., 1.17.3. & Annex 13 Appendix 1 Par. 1271.17.2. & 1.17.3.)
“Organizational and management information.
1.17.1. Pertinent information concerning the organizations and their management involved in influencing the operation of the aircraft. The organizations include, for example: the operator; the air traffic services; airway, aerodrome and weather service agencies; and the regulatory authority. The information could include, but not be limited to, organizational structure and functions, resources, economic status, management policies and practices, and regulatory framework. […]
[…]1.17.2 When deficiencies in the organizational structure and functions had a bearing on the accident[…]
[…] 1.17.3 When relevant, provide pertinent information concerning the operator, such as type and date of issuance of the air operator certificate, types of operations authorized, types and number of aircraft authorized for use, and authorized areas of operation and routes. Also, include information concerning any deficiencies found in the operator’s company operations manual and other operator documentation, when the deficiencies had a bearing on the accident.[…]”
ICAO’s provision regarding the necessity-generally-of proper and adequate knowledge’s acquisition
“[…]4. Qualified technical personnel
4.1 The State shall establish minimum qualification requirements for the technical personnel performing safety-related functions and provide for appropriate initial and recurrent training to maintain and enhance their competence at the desired level.[…]” (Annex 19 Appendix 1. Par 1.4.).
“[…]Since the outcome of an accident investigation is largely dependent upon the aviation
knowledge, skills and experience of the assigned aircraft accident investigators, they should have: […] the ability to identify and analyse pertinent evidence in order to determine the causes[…]” Doc 298 Chapter 2 BACKGROUND EXPERIENCE FOR INVESTIGATORS Par. 2.4.
1.2. ICAO’s Final Accident Investigation format ANNEX 13 Appendix 1. requires organizational and management information to be reported in Par. 1.17. while Personnel information, in Par. 1.5..
1.3. In ICAO Cir 298 ICAO’s Annex 13 Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation 1-2-2 Paragraph 2.4.3.) and Doc 9756 are mentioned provisions relative to Investigators’ job specialty’s qualifications.
1.4. In ICAO’s accident investigation final report format, coexist in the same paragraph state and private owned organisations (Doc 9756 Part IV reporting Chapter 1 Appendix 1 paragraph 1.17.1. and Annex 13 Appendix 1.17.)
“1.17 Organizational and management information
1.17.1 When relevant to the accident, provide pertinent information on any organization and its management whose activities may have directly or indirectly influenced the operation of the aircraft. The organizations to be addressed in this section could include:
- a) operator;
- b) maintenance organizations;
- c) air traffic services;
- d) aerodrome administration;
- e) meteorological services;
- f) aircraft manufacturer;
- g) certification and licensing authority; and
- h) regulatory authority.”
1.5.. Structure of the paper
1 Abstract
2 Key words
3 Introduction
3.1. ICAO’s provisions.
3.2. Methodology
3.3. Aim of the paper
- Brief theoretical approach
4.1. The procedure through which is shaping the perception of an object, a fact e.tc.
4.2. The relationship between opinion and knowledge
4.3. Associations : Ancient Greek philosophical and contemporary psychology
4.4. The five functions of scientific management
2 The case study
2.1 Incompatibility between a) ICAO provisions regarding investigating by investigators the impact of managerial functions” on a/c operation and on accident and b) the relative knowledge with which ICAO provide the investigators to fulfill the required aim.
2.2.. TABLE 2 Classification, according to the structure of scientific management’s functions, of the “managerial and organisational” factors, mentioned in ICAO’s Annex 13 Appendix 1 para. 1.5, 1.17 Guidance Doc 9756 Part IV reporting Chapter 1
2.3. Are the investigators trained to acquire the proper knowledge to fulfil ICAO provisions regarding the impact of the managerial functions on accident ?
2.4. Five major accident investigator training organisations do not include in its accident investigators training syllabus, the subject of corporate management and its functions
2.5. Results of our research on 50 final accident reports (see bibliography), regarding filling of “Organizational and managerial information”
2.5.1. Remarks upon how “organizational and managerial” information is presented by investigators at ICAO format final accident reports. Sample of 50 intercontinental final accident reports
3) The clarity of final accident report format. Investigators obligation to report information regarding managerial functions in different paragraphs
- Inadequate description of investigators job specialties qualifications
5) ICAO Final Accident Report Format, to ensure that in each paragraph are reported
comparable facts : coexistence, in the same paragraph, of state authorities and private corporations
Bibliography
1.6 Methodology
Study ICAO’s , references, documents and circulars, concerning:
a. Objectives of air accident investigation.
b. Training Guidelines-syllabus for Accident Investigators
- Comparison between ICAO guidelines for investigators training syllabus (ICAO Circ. 298) and what the investigators are required by ICAO to investigate and report, in regards to the impact of managerial functions e.tc. on a/c operation and accident occurrence (Annex 13 Appendix 1 & ICAO Doc. 9756 Appendix 1).
4) Research of weather the accident investigator training syllabi of five accident investigator training organisations, include the corporate management functions.
5) Research on the subjects that are reported at 50 intercontinental final accident reports, regarding “Organizational and managerial information” and comparison with the relative ICAO provisions. (Annex 13 Appendix 1. Par.1.5. & 1.17) 6) Research of whether ICAO description of investigators job specialties qualifications is adequate or allows “grey areas”.
7) Research on weather the coexistence in the same paragraph, of state authorities and private corporations, (ICAO provisions of Annex 13 Appendix 1 Par 1.17.) contribute positive on the clarity of conclusions.
1.7. Aim of the paper
Aim of the paper is to determine:
1) Whether ICAO guidelines for investigators training syllabus, includes the proper and adequate knowledge for investigators, to fulfill ICAO provisions regarding the impact of managerial functions on a/c operation and on accident occurrence.
2) Whether the final accident report format, obliges investigators to report managerial functions in different paragraphs.
3) Whether the description of investigators’ job specialties/qualifications, contribute positively on aviation safety.
4) Whether the coexistence in ICAO Final Accident Report Format, at the same paragraph, state authorities (controllers) and private corporations (controlled), contributes positively on the clarity of conclusions (ICAO Annex 13 Appendix 1.17, Doc 9756 Part IV reporting Appendix 1 to Chapter 1, 1.17.1.).
Brief theoretical approach
A dilemma that our research attempts to address regarding accident investigators knowledge relative to organizational and managerial functions, (Annex 13, Appendix 1. Paragraph 1.17.) is :
- whether investigators must record in accident report: their personal opinion which is not based on knowledge but on other subjective associations (considerations) or
- to record their personal opinion which is based on their knowledge.
Which of the above two approaches contributes positively on aviation safety ?
Plato 2500 years ago, had replied the aforementioned dilemma, as follows: How will you investigate something you don’t know? And if, by chance, you meet it, how will you know that it is the thing you are searching? (a) Plato Meno)
- The procedure through which is shaping the perception of a person
regarding an object, a fact e.tc.
Human perception is mental process, which is in continuous interaction with other mental processes. Perception gives the ability to the human to be aware of the properties and the form of an object, fact, person e.tc. of our external and or internal environment. This is a result of comparison, between the entering stimuli, with the already stored in the sensory stores, from the past, of knowledge and experience. In psychology, object is defined everything that can stimulate senses-emotions. Perception is crucial and necessary presupposition for the cognitive process. . (a) Sternberg R.J. 2000)
The perceptions’ shaping, procedure, is composed by the following phases : Sternberg (2007)
– observation-attention (stimuli from the environment),
– creation of the cense ,
– transmission of stimuli through neurotransmitters to the proper encephalon’s fields ,
– classification of the stimuli (characteristics and properties of the object) in the conscious
– Comparison of the characteristics and properties of the object (stimuli) with the already registered in the proper sensory stores, knowledge-experiences from the past. This comparison results at the understanding and explanation of the object.
– transmission of the conclusions at the proper fields of encephalon to give the proper orders at the neuron system of the body in order to stimulate the required reactions.
Factors influencing the functional level of perception (Hayes N 1994, Lippa R. 1997, (b) Sternberg 2007).
The following factors (among others) influence the process of perception:
- the subjective factor (emotional state, level of knowledge, previous experience, level of intelligence and consciousness, cultural environment, expectations, motives, values, attitude e.tc) and
- b) the objective factor (natural conditions, intensity, simplicity or complexity of the object).
- Κnowledge-experience as a basic determinant of perception (Hunt J. W. 1992, Lainos & Nikolaidis 2003, (b) Sternberg (2007).
Knowledge includes (theoretical and practical-experience) that is: the characteristics, the properties, the theoretical principles of evolution – the actual evolution during a particular period of time, the relationships-interactions-consequences of the environment (objects, events, situations). Knowledge is a basic determinant of perception’s-comprehension’s quality. Consequently it affects decisively the quality of decision-making and therefore the effectiveness of the action. Knowledge is useful only if it can facilitate the understanding of the environment (close and wider). A human being based on his knowledge, may then proceed to decision-making and action towards the fulfillment of a goal.
The optimum quantity of information relative to a particular environment, depends on the user’s biological, psychological and cognitive abilities to perceive, understand and to process accordingly. The support provided by the available machinery and electronic means enlarges these abilities. Excessive, unnecessary information especially if it is irrelevant, may cause additional ambiguities to the user, affecting the objectivity of his-her perception and also causing further delay to decision making. The user’s inability to process the available quantity and quality of information, results to a lower quality of situation awareness, instead of a higher one, to additional delay of decision making and acting. This can be described as “analysis-paralysis”.
Comprehension-understanding, is the result of a very complicated process. It concerns the correlation between information perceived and stored in the user’s memory. This information is relative to objects, events, situations perceived (developing a mental picture) from the environment through the senses.
For example when, during an aerobatic air-show an airplane dives vertical to the ground, the observer considers this to be an acrobatic maneuver. If however the same observer sees a commercial airplane at the same position, he-she rather considers that it is going to crash. These two different considerations are a result of the correlation between the position of each airplane and its characteristics, properties etc. that the observer has stored in his-her memory.
The reliability, credibility and objectivity of human understanding, is based-further to physical and mental functions-on the determination of the percentage of the understanding. This is based: on known information, on assumed information, on known ignorance (when we are aware of our ignorance) and on unknown ignorance (when we are not aware of our ignorance). (b) Plato “Alcibiades” It must be noticed that the absolute perception of the objective reality, is impossible for every individual, due to the infinity of the external stimuli towards the human organism and the limited capabilities of the human organism, especially of the:
- human senses to recognize these stimuli,
- nervous system to transfer these stimuli to the proper brain fields
- brain fields to process these stimuli
2.3. The relationship between opinion and knowledge
The decisive impact of knowledge on shaping of a credible or not opinion, has been pointed out by the ancient Greek philosophers. They considered that knowledge and opinion have different objects and different functions. (c) Plato), different aims and different results depended on its different powers” (d) Plato). There is not any chance to be the same thing, what we really know and something we imagine. (e) Plato). Knowledge is an infallible power- Opinion is a fallible power. (f) Plato ). The opinion which is not based on knowledge is fallible and uncertain, so it guides its users at fallible and uncertain decisions. (Gorgias Helen). We consider that a human knows-understands the fact, if he possesses the scientific knowledge of its primary cause.(a) Aristotle Metaphysics). We cannot recognize something, unless we have acquire previously, the knowledge about it. (Plotinus). It is obvious that if investigators’ opinion is not based on previously acquired knowledge but on other subjective associations-considerations, they will be guided at error commitment.
- Associations Recollection, retrieve, is when we relive-even beyond our will (c) Aristotle) (that is unconsciously)-what we saw or suffered in the past, based on succession of stimuli. (g) Plato (d) Aristotle, Plotinus). What we recall at our memory is necessary to have already learn then in previous time. (h) Plato). How will you investigate something you don’t know? And if, by chance, you meet it, how will you know that it is the thing you are searching? (a) Plato)
Which is the process of recollection? One must get hold of a starting-point. The cause is that they pass swiftly in thought from one point to another, e.g. from milk to white, from white to mist, and thence to moist, from which one remembers Autumn (the ‘season of mists’), if this be the season he is trying to recollect. (b) Aristotle)
Pavlov (1849-1936)-Classical conditioning, Sigmund Freud (1856-1939)-free associations, Thorndike (1874-1949)-Operant conditioning, Watson (1878-1958)-Classical conditioning, Skinner (1904-1990)- Operant conditioning, Bandura (1925- )-social learning, brought in 19nth and 20th century and developed the ideas of Plato and Aristotle regarding “associations”. (Lainos 2008)
Association in contemporary psychology is defined as a mental process regarding connection between concepts, events, or mental states, which are usually stimulated by previous specific knowledge-experiences. (Klein, Stephen (2012). An association can be created due to contiguity of facts ideas e.tc. which tend to happen simultaneously due to its similarity or its contrast. (Sternberg R.J. 2003)
2.5. The five functions of scientific management Fayol, Henry. (1917). Urwick, Lyndall (1937) Harold Koontz, Cyril O’Donnell (1959) Montana P.& Charnov B.H. (1993)
The functions of the corporate management are: Planning, Organizing, Administrating,
Staffing, and Controlling. These functions pursue the achievement of corporate goals based on the economic principle, which is the maximization of the profits with simultaneously minimization of the cost. The knowledge of the functions of the corporate management, its consequences on the influenced areas of the internal corporate environment and its impact on the employees’ volition, is a basic determinant of the investigator’s opinion shaping, about the primary cause(s) and contributing factors of the accident incident (Lainos 2003)
- Classification of the “managerial and organisational” factors,
according to the structure of managerial functions, (ICAO’s Annex 13 Appendix 1 para 1.5. & 1.17 Guidance Doc 9756 Part IV reporting Chapter 1)
TABLE 1
1.5. Personnel Staffing |
1.17.2. |
a) safety culture; Programming, Administrating |
b) resources and financial viability; Programming, Administrating-Controlling |
c) management policies and practices Programming, Administrating |
d) internal and external communications Programming, Administrating |
e) certification, safety oversight and regulatory framework. Programming-Organising -Controlling |
Results
- Are the investigators trained to acquire the proper knowledge to fulfill ICAO provisions regarding the impact of the managerial functions on a/c operation and on accident ?
ICAO ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION TRAINNING COURSE neither in BASIC nor in ADVANCED COURSE includes any lesson regarding aviation corporate management and its functions. This absence indicates that investigators are not trained relative to managerial functions, although ICAO requires from them, to determine the impact of managerial functions on a/c operation and on accident occurrence. (Guidance Doc 9756 Part IV reporting Chapter 1 Appendix 1. Par. 1.17.1, 1.17.2. 1.17.3.)
Which are the consequences due to the absence from investigators of the adequate and proper knowledge relative to managerial functions?
Results of our research from a sample of 50 final accident reports (see bibliography), regarding reporting of “Organizational and managerial information”. (ICAO Annex 13. Appendix 1, Par. 17.)
Remarks upon how “organizational and managerial” information is presented by investigators at ICAO final accident reports.
- Australia (ATSB) do not follow ICAO final accident report format. Information regarding managerial functions are reported in various paragraphs, fact which brake the unification consequently, arises confusion on readers perception.
- From a sample of thirteen Canadian (TSB) accident reports, regarding major accidents airline jets, five of them (41,66 %) did not have information under the title “organizational and managerial” of ICAO final accident report format (Annex 13 Appendix 1)
- From 23 USA-NTSB, European and Asian final accident reports :
- a) 8,33% did not contain information at the “organizational and managerial” of ICAO final accident report format (Annex 13 Appendix 1)
- b) 12,5% the “organizational and managerial” paragraph, were filled in 8-10 lines with a brief profile of the operator involved in the accident
The rest, at the “organizational and managerial” paragraph of ICAO final accident report were reported information relative to :
a/c technical standards,
flight procedures,
cockpit and cabin crew duties,
evacuation procedures,
Crew Resource Management,
personnel training,
medical certification process for flight crews,
psychiatric evaluation during medical certification of flight crews, operator’s
Crew Schedule Information,
corporate organizational structure,
members of hierarchy,
national and international legislation, authorities Oversight,
technical findings on the a/c,
hazardous materials, operator’s previous accidents,
aircraft deicing program (ground), Cockpit door security,
ATC,
flight plan data (control strips),
radar system of ACC, Situation in the control room at ACC,
organization of the night shift at ACC,
management tasks during the night shift,
the radar controller,
audit Information,
Aviation Section Policies,
procedures, and practices, description of the accident,
conditions of the accident, Corporation’s economic state,
structure of operator’s network and frequencies,
human factors theory,
refueling procedures e.tc.
- The majority of the aforementioned information have not any direct relation with the
required by ICAO, impact of managerial functions on a/c operation and on accident.
- The methodology with which the aforementioned information is reported, interrupts the unification of the reader’s perception, because is reported among other irrelevant information.
The aforementioned way of reporting by the investigators-as result of their ignorance-of the content and the essence of the “organizational and managerial functions” do not contribute positively :
- at the comparability and credibility of accident report,
- at the fulfillment of ICAO requirement for determination of the impact of managerial functions on a/c operation and on accident.
- at implementing of ICAO supreme target which is enhancing aviation safety
A ) Our research on accident investigators training syllabus,
of five major accident investigator training organisations
Following ICAO provisions we reviewed five well reputable accident investigator training organisations (1) ΙΑΤΑ, 2) ISASI, 3) The Cranfield university, 4) Embry-Riddle Aeronautical university 5) USC, university Southern California).
The aforementioned five well reputable accident investigator training organisations do not include in its publically available syllabi (Relative Aviation accident investigators training syllabi, published on internet, October 2017), the lesson of “corporate management and its functions” although ICAO requires from investigators to determine its impact on a/c operation and on accident.,
- B) Our research concluded that ICAO Final Accident Investigation Format, obliges investigators to report information regarding managerial functions in different paragraphs : a) Annex 13 Appendix 1. Paragraph 1.5. and Paragraph 1.17., although “Staffing” which is the same with ICAO “Personnel” is the third of the five managerial functions.
- C) Inadequate description of investigators job specialties (Doc 9756 Chapter 2. Par 2.4. Personnel)
Our research determined limited and somehow one could argue inadequate information regarding description of investigators’ job specialties qualifications. For example are mentioned job specialties of pilots, a/c engineers, doctors, e.tc. without however determination of further detailed qualifications could be: for pilots a/c type, flight hours per type-for a/c engineers a/c types, years of experience per type, for doctors specialty and experience e.tc. Further more is not mentioned weather the investigator must be specialized at the type of the investigated a/c.
- D) In ICAO Final Accident Report Format, coexist in the same paragraph state authorities and private corporations
In ICAO Annex 13, Appendix 1 Par. 1.17 and Doc 9756 Part IV reporting Chapter 1 Appendix 1 paragraph 1.17.1., our research, based on the criterion of ownership regime, determined two categories of organizations with essential different roles and targets :
- a) State authorities whose role is to issue certificates-licenses and to perform oversight on the private organizations, whether they comply with existing legislation/regulations. Its main target is maintaining and enhancing, were necessary, aviation safety and
- b) Private organizations which are certified by the state authorities which perform the
oversight.
Further more private organisations target is maintaining and enhancing, were necessary, of aviation safety, however the primary strategic target is its profits’ maximization.
Discussion
- A) Are the investigators trained to acquire the proper knowledge to fulfill ICAO provisions regarding the impact of the managerial functions on a/c operation and on accident ?
We agree with the ICAO principle that the investigators must be appropriate trained at the desired level (Annex 19). It is obvious that the appropriate and desired level of training, concerns the compatibility of the acquired knowledge by investigators, with the ICAO provision, for investigators to determine “deficiencies in the organizational structure and functions had a bearing on the accident.” Consequently, the appropriate and desire level of investigator training must include the impact of the managerial functions (Lainos 2003) on a/c operation and on accident occurrence.
However as our research proved, that the investigators, are not trained upon the aforementioned issue. As result of their ignorance regarding managerial functions, they may base their perception during investigation, on subjective associations-considerations. This will happen because the information, which they recall in their memory, is necessary to have been learned previously. (Plato Phaidon). What is the content of those subjective associations and what is its impact on shaping of a credible investigators’ perceptions’? And which would be the credibility of the accident report based on subjective associations of each one of the investigators which is not based on their relevant and adequate knowledge? Investigator during investigation, receives mainly visual stimuli from a/c wreckage and other corporate documents. Investigators compare these stimuli with the knowledge-experience, which is already stored from the past in his-her brain stores. The result of this comparison is the creation of associations, which shape the investigator’s perception. From what factors will be shaped the investigators perception if there are not stored in their brain stores, of the proper knowledge to be compared with the incoming stimuli? What associations will be created?. There is not other reply than the subjective considerations of each investigator other than knowledge. What is the impact of-other than knowledge-subjective associations regarding the impact of the managerial functions on a/c operation and on accident? Does the absence of the relative knowledge from investigators, contribute positively on enhancing of the aviation safety? The ancient Greek philosophical psychology and the contemporary psychology as well, have concluded at the same thesis. When our subjective associations-considerations are not relied on knowledge we will commit error. (Lainos 2017). That is why it is obvious that ICAO accident investigators training syllabus guidance needs to include a lesson relative to corporate managerial functions.
- B) The ICAO Final Accident Investigation Report Format, obliges investigators to report information regarding managerial functions in different paragraphs : (Annex 13 Appendix 1. Paragraph 5. and Paragraph 17.)
does not contribute positively at:
i) the unified presentation of the information relative to managerial functions of the involved organizations which directly or indirectly influenced the operation of the aircraft and the accident occurrence .
- ii) the unification of the readers perception relative to the accident’s main causes and
contributing factors (confuses the readers).
Consequently ICAO needs to amend the Accident Investigation report format regarding managerial functions, so to unify structure of scientific corporate management functions
- C) Inadequate description of investigators job specialties (Doc 9756 Chapter 2. Par 2.4. Personnel)
The information regarding investigators’ job specialty’s qualifications, maybe characterized as limited-inadequate. This will result in absence of : a) adequate and b) proper knowledge of the investigators. Moreover this luck of knowledge does not have positive contribution on credibility along with the comparability of accident reports and finally on aviation safety. That is why ICAO needs to build a more detailed description of the investigators job specialties qualifications. For example for pilots : a/c type, flight hours per type-for a/c engineers a/c types, years of experience per type, for doctors’ specialty and experience e.tc.
- D) ICAO Final accident Report Format may arise confusion to the readers due to
investigators’ obligation to report in the same paragraph information come from state authorities and private corporations regarding : “activities may have directly or indirectly influenced the operation of the aircraft.” (Doc 9756 Appendix 1. Par 17.1 Organizational and management information)
However due to different ownership regime, their role and targets are different.
Consequently the results of their activities even if they seem to be similar, their origin comes from different sources. This fact discriminates them, because similar results (for example Personnel malfunctions), come from different causes-sources (state authorities and private organisations) are not comparable. «[…]We must acquire the scientific knowledge of the primary causes (because only then we consider that a human knows, when he acquires the primary cause […]».(f) Aristotle Metaphysics). «We cannot say that we know an object before we understand for what it has happened […]».(g) Aristotle Metaphysics)
Consequently these investigation results of managerial functions of organizations with different ownership regime, are co-presented in the same paragraph-as it required in the aforementioned ICAO publications. This may cause confusion of the readers perception. They may perceive that these results have the same cause (managerial functions). Consequently they may conclude that in order to correct them we must apply the same measures. This approach-conclusion is not necessarily correct. This fact has not a positive contribution on aviation safety. That is why ICAO needs to amend Accident Investigation Final Report Format so the results of managerial functions of state authorities and private corporations, to be reported separately (in different paragraphs).
Final Accident Reports investigated
ASIA
1) KOMITE NASIONAL KESELAMATAN TRANSPORTASI PT. FINAL KNKT.14.12.29.04. PK-AXC Republic of Indonesia 28 December 2014
2) Bandaranayake International Aircraft, Katunayake, Sri Lanka Accident 16th Oct. 2005
3) AirAsia QZ8501 A-320 Crash: Final Report Points to Faulty Component, Crew
Action
4) TransAsia Airways Flight GE235 accident Final Report Released on Jul 1st, 2016.
AUSTRALIA-ATSB
1) Transport Safety Report Aviation Occurrence Investigation AO-2014-043 Final-13 November 2017.
2) ATSB Transport Safety Report Aviation Occurrence Investigation AO-2017-039 Final – 5 September 2017
3) ATSB Final Investigation AO 2016-045 September 2017
4) ATSB Transport Safety Report Aviation Occurrence Investigation AO-2017-051 Final – 30 August 2017
5) ATSB Transport Safety Report Aviation Occurrence Investigation AO-2017-012 Final – 27 July 2017
6) ATSB Transport Safety Report Aviation Occurrence Investigation AO-2017-079 Final – 17 November 2017
7) ATSB Transport Safety Report Aviation Occurrence Investigation AO-2017-034 Final – 18 September 2017.
8) ATSB Transport Safety Report Aviation Occurrence Investigation AO-2017-051 Final – 30 August 2017
9) ATSB Transport Safety Final Report AO-2014-081 1 June 2017
10) ATSB Transport Safety Report Aviation Occurrence Investigation AO-2016-167 Final – 24 May 2017.
11) ATSB Transport Safety Report Aviation Occurrence Investigation AO-2016-173 Final – 27 April 2017.
12) ATSB Transport Safety Report. Aviation Occurrence Investigation. AO-2016-169 Final – 24 March 2017.
13) ATSB Transport Safety Report External Aviation Final Investigation AE-2014-054- . Published 3 October 2017. Operator Malaysia Airlines,. Vanishing in March 8, 2014
CANADA-TSB
1) AVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT A16Q0020. 03 February 2016
2) AVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT A16O0016. 30 January 2016
3) AVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT A16A0041. 20 April 2016
4) AVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT A15Q0120. August 2015
5) AVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT A15Q0075. 05 June 2015
6) AVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT A15H0002. 29 March 2015
7) AVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT A15F0165. 30 December 2015
8) AVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT A14W0127. 04 AUGUST 2014
9) AVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT A14Q0155. 07 October 2014
10) AVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT A14O0165. 05 SEPTEMBER 2014
11) AVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT A14H0002. 05 JUNE 2014
12) AVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT A14F0065. 10 May 2014
13) Aviation Investigation Report A05H0002. 02 August 2005
EUROPE
1) HELLENIC REPUBLIC (AAIASB) AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT HELIOS AIRWAYS 14 AUGUST 2005 11 / 2006
2) Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile Final Report Accident on 24 March 2015, operated by Germanwings
3) German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation: Accident Date: 1 July 2002 Type of aircraft: 1. Boeing B757-200 2. Tupolev TU154M
4) SWISS Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications No. 1781 Final Report of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau
5) Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile. Final report AF 447, Published 27 July 2012
6) Civil Aviation Department Hong Kong. July 2013. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT 2/2013
7) Foreign Investigation Authority: Dutch Safety Board (DSB). Final Report: Tuesday, 13 October, 2015. Accident involving Operator Malaysia Airlines, Flight MH17, Hrabove Ukraine, crash 17 July 2014. Donetsk
U.S.A. -NTSB
1) Accident Number: DCA11PA075
2) Aircraft Accident Report Asiana Airlines Flight 214 Boeing 777-200ER, HL7742 San Francisco, California July 6, 2013
3) Aircraft Accident Brief. Pilot/Race 177, The Galloping Ghost North American P-51D, N79111 September 16, 2011
4) Aircraft Accident Report. Pilatus PC-12/45, N128CM. March 22, 2009
5) Aircraft Accident Report GCI Communication Corp. de Havilland DHC-3T, N455A. August 9, 2010
6) Aircraft Accident Report, N606SP June 9, 2009
7) Aircraft Accident Report Empire Airlines Flight 8284 N902FX. January 27, 2009
8) Aircraft Accident Report. East Coast Jets Flight 81 Hawker Beechcraft Corporation July 31, 2008
9) Aircraft Accident Report Pinnacle Airlines Flight 4712. N8905F April 12, 2007
10) Aircraft Accident Report Southwest Airlines Flight 1248, N471WN
11) Aircraft Accident Report Corporate Airlines Flight 5966, N875JX October 19, 2004
12) Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/02 PB2004-910402 Notation 7501B July 26, 2002
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The impact of the internal corporate environment stressors on the labor behavior of the aircraft engineers. The case study of Olympic Airways
Abstract
The last twelve years Olympic Airways is under a recovery effort towards privatization.[1] Six months ago the state-shareholder announced[2] O.A.’s exit of the market up to October of 2006 and its substitution by a new airline.[3] The published business plan[4] of this airline included:
- the dismissal all of the O.A.’s employees,
- those employees who will be rehired by the new airline they will lose their labor permanency (only annual contracts) and their salary will be dramatically decreased.
In order to determine whether the aforementioned current negative evolutions for Olympic Airways future, operated as stressors on its aircraft engineers and if yes, which are its effects on their labor behavior, we conducted a field research among the O.A.’s a/c engineers.
[1] a) Lainos Y.S. (1992) “Is the privatization the only way? Edtitions STAXY Athens b) (2006) “The truth behind the crisis at Olympic Aieways S.A.” Editions Papazisis. Athens
[2] Statement of the Greek Prime Minister on 9 & 10-11-06
[3] Law 2331/23-11-1995
[4] Gazettes “Kathimerini” 14-1-06, “Ta Nea” 16-1-06, “Eleftherotypia” 16-1-06
Keywords:
Aircraft engineers, Internal-corporate-environment, Stressors
Brief theoretical approach
Stress – Stressors – Impact on employees attitude
As stress can be defined the experience of facts of our external environment or internal conscious or unconscious conflicts, which are subjectively perceived as threat against the natural and psychological welfare. Such conflicts can be stimulate by-for example-selection between mutual excluded aims, like: Independence – Dependence, familiarity-isolation, cooperation-competitiveness e.t.c. Some conditions even they stimulate joy and or enthusiasm-however due to pressure under which they are perceived (for example marriage), even when they are highly controllable and predictable, operate as stressors because they a) push the human to the limits of his-her capabilities b) challenge-put into ambiguity-the consideration that the person has for his-herself. c) force for obligatory adaptation-compromise of many parts of the personality e.t.c.
Stress usually has painful physical and or psychological impact. Stress that is provoked by negative facts-conditions has stronger and much more long term negative impact on the physical and psychological health than stress comes from positive facts-conditions.
Research have proved that a person who has been exposed periodically in stress develops endurance on the particular stressors. (Dienstbier 1989)
However the efforts of the body to be adapted to the uninterrupted presence of stress may weak its defense mechanisms to a wide range of physical and psychological diseases.[1]
Every person assess subjectively the facts as stressors.[2] Culture includes learned values, beliefs, principles customs, habits e.tc. [3]upon which every one relies his-her consideration of his-her life-behavior, his-her perception shaping [4]. Consequently a basic determinant of the OA’s aircraft engineers labour attitude, is the existing national Greek, culture. For understanding the comments on our findings we consider the presentation of the basic parameters of the Greek national culture, as important.
The national Greek culture
Four of the national Greek cultural dimensions-which obviously strongly affect the aircraft engineers labour attitude-are (Hofstede 1980 a, b, 1991; Johnston 1993).
1) Power distance. (From a scale 11 to 104 Greece scores 60)
This considers the habitual exercise of power within a culture.
2) Uncertainty Avoidance, (From scale 40 to 112 Greeks score 112).
This dimension addresses the ease with which cultures cope with novelty, ambiguity, and uncertainty. High Uncertainty-avoidance culture seeks clarity and order in social relationships, favouring rules and regulations.
3) Individualism. (From a scale 8 to 91 Greece sc ores 35)
This dimension considers the cultural emphasis given to individualistic, as distinct from collectivist, social mores .
4) Masculinity. (from a scale of 5 to 95 Greece scores 57)
This relates to beliefs regarding the gender division of social roles, In masculine cultures ambition and performance are valued. High masculine society tend to have a belief in the independent decision maker and leader value their decision-making autonomy” Some parameters of the OA’s a/c engineers sub-Culture
Herzberg’s dual factor theory
Frederich Hertzberg, a fan of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs theory, adapted it to labour’s environment. He identified factors affecting job satisfaction listed them under two categories:
- a) Hygiene or Maintenance factors or They are not considered motivational of themselves, but their absence is sure to cause dissatisfaction
- b) motivators or satisfiers, are factors which actually enhance motivation and performance.
- a) Hygiene or Dissatisfiers includes:
Working conditions, policies and administrative practices, salary and benefits, supervision, status, job security, fellow workers, personal life.
- Motivators or Satisfies includes:
Recognition, achievement, advancement, growth, responsibility, job challenge
It is obvious that Hygiene factors must be fulfilled before motivators’ introduction to stimulate a particular employee’s behaviour
The case study of Olympic Airways
The last twelve years Olympic Airways is under a recovery effort towards privatization.[5] On early September 2005 the state-shareholder announced[6] O.A.’s withdrawal of the market, up to the end of October of 2005 and its substitution by a new airline.[7] The published business plan[8] of this airline included the dismissal all of the O.A.’s employees. According to this plan those employees who will be rehired they will lose their labor permanency (only annual contracts) and their salary will be dramatically decreased.
On the other hand the O.A.’s positive international reputation aroused by its brand name-the Olympic Circles- combined with its world vanguard in flight safety records during its public ownership, offered the last fifty years to its employees, job security- stability, satisfaction for their achievement, pride, personal self respect-dignity and a high level of social status. These facts have been embodied as main pylons at the corporate culture.[9] In order to determine the effects of the current negative evolutions for Olympic Airways future, on the labor behavior of its a/c engineers, we conducted a field research.
Assumptions
Our field research was conducted in cooperation with the B.O.D. of the union of the O.A.’s aircraft engineers.
Methodology of our field research
- Sample: 25% of the a/c engineers
- Date: between 10 and 14 of April 2006
- Questionnaire: Open and close including 34 questions
- The factors that our field research required to be determined were:
- a) the prioritization of the incentives which more than of 50% of the questioned O.A.’s aircraft engineers consider that attract them at their profession today (TABLE 1).
These results are compared with Herzberg’s Dual factor theory (Hygiene and
Motivational factors prioritization of needs in labor’s environment) [10]
- b) the main current labor stressor.
- c) The consideration of the O.A.’s aircraft engineers regarding the top three consequences of the main labor stressor on their labor behavior (TABLE 2)
Comments on findings of TABLE 1 from the comparison of the prioritization of O.A.’s a/c engineers answers (researches 2004 and 2006) with Herzberg’s Hygiene and Motivational factors classification
1) The incentive “JOB CHALLENGE” was classified by Herzberg at the fifth priority of the employees needs. In our 2003 research, O.A.’s a/c engineers prioritized it at the fifth position selected by 57,9% while in our 2006 research it was selected by 78% of O.A.’s a/c engineers, This percentage brigs it as their top incentive. The 52% of them prioritized it among their top three priorities fact which arises it as their dominant motive.
2) The incentive “SALARY & BENEFITS” was classified by Herzberg at the first priority of the employees needs. In our 2003 research it was selected by 63% of O.A.’s a/c engineers percentage which brought this incentive at the third position, while in our 2006 research it was selected by 69% of them percentage which prioritized it at the second position. The 44% of them prioritized it among their top three priorities.
We consider that this upgrading of the prioritization of the particular incentive is due to the loss of the a/c engineers belief at their job security which resulted at the reorientation of their efforts in maximizing of their immediate benefits
3) The incentives “JOB SECURITY” and “LABOR CONDITIONS” was classified by Herzberg at the second priority of the employees needs.
- a) The criteria “JOB SECURITY” according to the results of our research in 2003 it was selected by 73% of O.A.’s a/c engineers. This percentage brought this criteria in their first priority for 2003. However according to the results of our research in 2006 it was selected by only 55% of O.A.’s a/c engineers which brings it in their fifth prioritization.
We consider that the changes that were introduced in the internal O.A.’s corporate environment between 2002 and 2006 give the explanation of the aforementioned differentiation.
In 2003 the state, the exclusive shareholder of O.A.’s announced, that it was decided O.A.’s dichotomization. The Technical Base was not included in the new company. Due to this fact negative rumors were developed regarding the future of the Base. In 2003 it seems that the O.A.’s a/c engineers did not suffered by any stress since they did not had as yet any ambiguity regarding the negative prospects of their professional future. In correlation with their national and corporate culture which consider the “uncertainty avoidance” and the “job security” as their basic parameters, guided them to keep on prioritizing the “job security” in their first priority which attracted them in their profession. The following three years the fulfillment of dichotomization, the tense of the rumors regarding the cease operation of O.A. and its Technical Base, were periodically sharpened. Even Mr Prime Minister announced in September of 2005 that the operation of O.A. would have ceased up to the end of October of 2005. However this decision was never fulfilled. The decrease of the priority of the inventive “job security” in our 2006 research at the fifth position, seems to reflect the uncertainty of the majority oa the O.A.’s a/c engineers regarding their job stability..
However the 33% of the answered still selected this motive among their top three priorities fact which upgrades its motivation power in the third position.
- b) The criteria “LABOR CONDITIONS” in our 2003 research was not prioritized by O.A.’s a/c engineers in the top seven positions, while in our 2006 research it was prioritized at the third position since it was selected by 63%. However only the 27% of them prioritized it among their top three priorities fact which decreases the motivation power of the particular incentive. We consider that the upgrading of the particular incentive is due to the loss of the a/c engineers belief at their job security. This is considered to be the reason that they have oriented their efforts in maximizing their immediate benefits
4) The incentive “SOCIAL STATUS” was classified by Herzberg at the fourth priority of
TABLE 1
Comparison of the prioritization of O.A.’s a/c engineers answers (researches 2004 and 2006) with Herzberg’s Hygiene and Motivational factors classification
Herzberg Research* 2003 Research 2006
5) ACHIEVEMENT…………….…4rth…61,4%…………………..6th…57%
RESPONSIBILITY
JOB CHALLENGE……….……5th…..57,9%…………………..1st…78%
4) RECOGNITION………..….…..2nd….73,0%…………………..5th…60%
ADVANCEMENT
STATUS…………..…5th…57,9% & 6th… 53,8%………………4th…61%
3) CORPORATE POLICIES & ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES,
FELLOW WORKERS, QUALITY OF SUPERVISION
2) JOB SECURITY …………..…1rst…73,1%……………………5th…55%
LABOR CONDITIONS……………………………………….3rd..63%
PERSONAL LIFE,
1) PERSONAL LIFE
SALARY & BENEFITS…………3rd… 62%……………………..2nd..69%
the employees needs. In our 2003 research it was prioritized by O.A.’s a/c engineers in the fifth and sixth position with 57,8% and 53,8% respectively, while in our 2006 research it was prioritized at the fourth position since it was selected by the 61%. Howe- ver only 28 % of them prioritized it among their top three priorities, fact which weaken the motivation power of the particular incentive. This result reflects the contradiction between the “glorious” past and the current degrading of O.A.’s social status due to the extended defamation campaign against O.A. especially of the last three years.
5) The incentive “RECOGNITION” was classified by Herzberg at the fourth priority of the employees needs. In our 2003 research it was prioritized by 73% of O.A.’s a/c engineers in the second position, while in our 2006 research it was prioritized at the fifth
position since it was selected by the 60%. However only the 28 % of them prioritized it among their top three priorities fact which weaken the motivation power of the particular incentive. This degrading expresses the disappointment of the a/c engineers and is considered to be a consequence of the uncertainty regarding their professional future.
6) The incentive “ACHIEVEMENT” was classified by Herzberg at the fifth priority of the employees needs. In our 2003 research it was prioritized by the 61,4% of O.A.’s a/c engineers at the fourth position, while in our 2006 research it was prioritized by the 57% of them at the sixth position. However only the 15 % of them prioritized it at their top three priorities fact which weaken dramatically the motivation power of the particular incentive. This result is considered that expresses the disappointment of the a/c engineers and is a consequence of the uncertainty regarding their professional future.
TABLE 2
The consideration of O.A.’s aircraft engineers regarding the top three consequences on their labor behavior of the corporate stressors
1) Decrease of the interest for the content of the profession-job ……….58%
2) Aggressiveness –irritation………………..…………………….…………41%
3) Decrease of the quantity of the offered labor……..……..……………..36%
Comments on findings of TABLE 2
The opinion of O.A.’s a/c engineers regarding the negative effects on their labor behavior due to the stress resulted from the negative prospects on their own professional future is:
1) The main effect for 58% of the answered is the decrease of their interest for the content of their profession-job. It must be underlined that the motive “ interest for the content of the profession-job” has been prioritized in another questionnaire of the same research, as the first attractor at their profession today This incompatibility means that the current negative evolutions have canceled the motivation power of their most powerful motive.
2) For the 41% of the answered aggressiveness–irritation is considered to be the second main effect on their labor behavior.
3) For the 36% of the answered the decrease of the quantity of the offered job is considered to be the third main effect on their labor behavior. Obviously this answer is one of the consequences of the first one.
[1] Atkinson R.and R., Smith E., Daryl B., Nolen-Hoeksema S. ( 2000)
[2] Lippa R.A (2003) p.671
[3] a) Helmreich R.L., Merritt A. (1998) b) Brown A. (1998)
[4] Luria A.R. (1978)
[5] a) Lainos Y.S. (1992) “Is the privatization the only way? Editions STAXY Athens b) (2006) “The truth behind the crisis at Olympic Airways S.A.” Editions Papazisis. Athens
[6] Statement of the Greek Prime Minister on 9 & 10-11-06
[7] Law 2331/23-11-1995
[8] Gazettes “Kathimerini” 14-1-06, “Ta Nea” 16-1-06, “Eleftherotypia” 16-1-06
[9] Lainos J.S. (2004) “The considerations of a southeastern European Airline aircraft engineers regarding the incentives applied by the corporate top management and those required by them.” Proceedings of 13 th INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON AVIATION PSYCHOLOGY. Oklahoma city April 18-21, 2005
[10] a) Herzberg, F. (1966). Work and the Nature of Man. Cleveland: World Publishing Co. b) Herzberg, F.(2003) One
more time: How to motivate employees Harvard Business Review on Motivating People p. 45-72
Conclusions
The current negative prospects of O.A.’s and of its a/c engineers future:
- a) operated as stressors since they strike at the heart the main pylons of O.A.’s aircraft engineers, national and corporate culture. The uncertainty avoidance the individualism and the social status, b) has restructured their prioritization of the top seven incentives which attract them today at their profession, compared with the results of our respective research in 2003, c) had negative impact on their interest for their profession, on the quantity of the offered work while simultaneously increased their aggressiveness.
We are afraid that the combination of the aforementioned results could have direct negative impact on the a/c engineers attention, objective perception, arousal e.t.c. It is obvious that the current negative evolution of the O.A.’s prospects, finally affect negatively not only the quantity of the offered job result which the a/c engineers have already openly accepted, but its quality as well, fact that although is concluded by the aforementioned answers is not openly accepted. Consequently if the O.A.’s management and the state-shareholder want to preserve the world vanguard in flight safety of Olympic Airways, they must immediately cancel the causes of the existence of the aforementioned internal corporate environment stressors.
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The compatibility of the two learning procedures accepted by the European Aviation Safety Agency (E.A.S.A.) for the candidate aircraft engineers, with E.A.S.A.’s aim for high uniform level of civil aviation safety
Introduction
Our incentive to conduct the present research-study is our consideration regarding the incompatibility, between the content of EASA’s (the Civil Aviation Authorities of the E.U.) Law 2042/2003, Part 66 module 9 Human Factors especially the fields of Memory, Perception, Thought, Information processing, Learning, Situation awareness, Decision making etc and the learning processes accepted by EASA ’s institutional framework regarding candidate a/c engineers
Brief theoretical approach
Learning is a relatively permanent change of an individual’s attitude-behavior that is the result of the individual’s response to repeated stimuli, signals, situations (e.g. exercise, observation, experiences), that are automatically stored in the brain and are subject to brain processing. Consequently, permanent changes which stem from intrinsic reactions – reflexive instincts, biological evolution-maturity of the body, ailments, temporary condition of the body that results from fatigue, drug abuse etc., are not included in the factors conducive to the learning process.
Aim of learning is the satisfaction of an individual’s needs through a permanent change of attitude via the acquisition of: a) skills b) theoretical knowledge, c) acceptance and adaptation of a certain behavioral pattern, d) adaptation to the demands of the individual’s specific natural and social environment (Atkinson et al 2000, Byrnes 2001, Sternberg 2003)
Categories of Learning
Initially at the end of 19th century the behaviourists expressed the consideration that exists a unique learning mechanism for all creatures and for all the categories of cognitive fields. Yet, even in the first quarter of the 20th century, several scientific researches proved that at least as far as primates are concerned, there are differ rent learning procedures for different categories of cognitive fields. The main theories regarding learning procedures are mentioned below. (Atkinson et al 2000, Flin et al 1997, Sternberg 2003)
Learning by experience (approval-rejection),experiments of Thorndike, Skinner, Hull.
Classical conditioning (conjunction of two stimuli-independent and dependent-which are appeared with time proximity). Experiments of Pavlov, Watson, Guthrie.
Operant conditioning, (ex post awarded of a desired behavior). Experiments of Skinner
Supervisional-intuitional learning. (Critical cognitive elaboration of the stimuli and its interrelations). Experiments of Kohler, Tοlman, Piaget, Gagner, Neisser.
The basic factors which affect cumulatively the function of the brain mechanisms involved in the learning procedures, consequently affect the quality of the applied learning procedures are: (Atkinson et al 2000, Argyris 1996, Brown & Duguid 2002, Byrnes 2001, Cook & Brown 2002, Hawkins 1997, Hayes 1994, Sternberg 2003, Telfer 1994)
1) The efficiency of the applied motivation in which are included: The applied learning procedures, the particularities of the environment of learning, the used audio-visual means, the instructor’s attitude and his-her adequacy of the theoretical knowledge and the practical experience, the adequacy and appeal of the existing text books, the level of interest of the learner for the subject taught etc.
2) The tutorial methodology (open dialog, general overview of the syllabus at the beginning, conclusions at the end, determination of the interrelations – interactions among the various issues of the syllabus, its impact on the final result of the aircraft engineer’s work and finally on aviation safety)
3) The family, the corporate and the national culture of the learner.
4) The expectations of the learner.
5) The adaptability of the knowledge with the values, beliefs of the learner.
6) The condition of the learner’s physical senses.
7) The permanent and the temporary psychological situation of the learner.
8) The age of the learner
The case study
- A) Determinants of the quality of the aircraft engineer’s labor
As quality of the aircraft engineer’s labor can be defined the ability of their labor results to satisfy the aims of E.A.S.A. ’s relative institutional framework. (E.A.S.A. 2003 a) The quality of the aircraft engineer’s labor is affected mainly by the following factors:
1) the adequacy of the aircraft engineer’s theoretical education and training
2) the quality of the aircraft engineer’s practical experience
3) the compatibility of the aircraft engineer’s and maintenance organisation culture,
with the requirements of aviation safety,
4) the efficiency of the applied motivation by the top management.
- B) Taking into consideration the determinants of the quality of the aircraft engineer’s labor, E.A.S.A. has established the relative institutional framework. (E.A.S.A. 2003a)
The aims of the European Aviation Safety Agency commercial aviation institutional framework are the “[…] high uniform level of civil aviation safety and environmental protection […] The need to ensure uniformity in the application of common technical requirements in the field of continuous airworthiness of aeronautical parts and appliances […] ensuring the continuous airworthiness […]” (E.A.S.A. 2003 b & c)
- C) The tools which E.A.S.A. ’s institutional framework uses in order to succeed its aforementioned aims-regarding the quality of the aircraft engineers labor- are the following: (EASA 2003 d,f)
1) the Authorities that are responsible to certify the Maintenance Training Organisations, (M.T.O.) the Aircraft Maintenance Organisations, the airlines, the aircraft engineers etc
2) the presuppositions under which the Authorities can certify a Maintenance Training Organization or candidate aircraft engineers. (E.A.S.A. 2003 d,f)
- a) the name and the number of lessons which have to be taught, by the certified M.T.O., the detailed syllabus, the duration of every taught lesson (theoretical and practical), the instructors’ qualifications, the minimum number of administrational staff and its qualifications, the minimum organizational structure of the M.T.O. e.t.c.
- b) the content, the terms and the conditions of the examinations which the a/c engineers must pass
- c) the years of practical experience in a certified M.T.O.(E.A.S.A. 2003 g) needed by any candidate a/c engineer for acquiring his/her certification (E.A.S.A. 2003 d)
3) the presuppositions under which the Authorities can certify a Maintenance Organization where the candidate aircraft engineers will acquire the required by E.A.S.A. practical experience.
4) the terms and conditions for an a/c engineer’s acquiring the type rating (EASA 2003h). One of the decisive determinants of the aviation safety is the quality of aircraft maintenance, the quality of the aircraft engineer’s labor. “Safety starts on ground” (Pigeon -O’leary 1994, Patankar -Taylor 2004, Reason & Hobbs 2003 Hawkins 1997).
E.A.S.A. offers to the candidate a/c engineers the opportunity to participate in the exams after self-teaching (only theoretical) as well, that is without having attended the proper lessons and practical training in an M.T.O. (E.A.S.A. 2003 d)
E.A.S.A. seems to support that the quality of the results of the two learning procedures (attended in an M.T.O. and self-teaching) produce equal results (E.A.S.A. 2007). Moreover, E.A.S.A. seems to argue that examinations and practical experience are adequate mechanisms to ensure the equality of learning quality of the two aforementioned procedures. (E.A.S.A. 2007)
- D) Regarding the two learning procedures approved by E.A.S.A. for certification of the candidate aircraft engineers: (EASA 2003d)
1) The theoretical training of the candidate a/c engineers’ at an M.T.O. includes analysis of meanings and the presentation of Icons.
The practical training at an M.T.O’s laboratory includes practical application of the acquired theoretical knowledge.
2) Attending an M.T.O.:
* provides information from the syllabus determined by EASA’s legislation,
* provides the methodology and the criteria of proper analysing and understanding of
these information,
* determines the relationship among the various provided data (subsystems),
* provides basic experience into the laboratories of the M.T.O.,
* constructs the infrastructure of aviation safety culture, consequently
* minimizes the impact on learning of the aforementioned factors which affect negatively the objectivity of learning, therefore maximise the unification of understanding of the taught information-meaning, its impact on the a/c engineers quality of work and finally on aviation safety,
3) Self-teaching provides to the self taught-candidate aircraft engineer-information/ knowledge which, however, is processed through the different methodology by the different mental capabilities, different experience and different culture of every learner. This procedure, although based on a common syllabus, may result in different level of knowledge-perception-conclusions, and as a result, in different quality of work for each aircraft engineer. Consequently, it does not contribute to the fulfilment of EASA’ s aim for high uniformity level of civil aviation safety.
4) The absence of a textbook which will include the E.A.S.A.’s syllabus and the presentation of various meanings would take into account the specific needs for unified learning of the average (if we may say so) self learner-candidate aircraft engineer-, do not facilitate the efficiency of the self teaching procedure.
5) The procedure applied by the M.T.O.’s- offered e-learning- of electronic answers to the submitted questions by the attending self-learners, cannot substitute the efficiency of vital teaching in the class by the instructor, because the submitted questions include only what the self learner considers he-she has not understood.
6) It should be pointed out that for the a/c engineer’s acquiring of any type rating, E.A.S.A. has established as an obligatory prerequisite the candidate’s attending the relative lessons in an M.T.O. which, however, is not necessary for the acquisition of the main certification. (EASA 2003 d)
7) E.A.S.A. argues that the establishment of self-teaching process ensures the right of the individuals to become a/c engineers, even if due to lack of time and/or money, they do not have the opportunity to attend the relative studies in an M.T.O. (EASA 2007)
- E) Regarding examinations: in the general learning process, examination is one of the stages and not the exclusive stage for a formal assessment of the effectiveness of the particular educational procedure in which the examinations are placed. This means that if two individuals study the same syllabus in an MT.O -on the one hand-and through self teaching, on the other – and both succeed in the exams on the common syllabus, it does not mean that they will have the same level of knowledge of the studied common syllabus because:
1) The aim of learning of the subject of the a/c engineers is not only the acquisition of a number of information but it includes a particular way of thinking, acting and reacting, believing -behaving e.t.c. These characteristics of the personality are included in the aviation safety culture. It must be emphasized that the basic infra and over structure of aviation safety culture which decisively affects the continuous airworthiness and finally aviation safety, cannot be acquired by a self-taught candidate a/c engineer through studying the books. It is initially acquired during his/her attending in an M.T.O. and developed during his/her practical experience.
2) Further more, even if the examined candidate aircraft engineer proves through the examinations that he/she “knows” the examined subject, we feel obliged to remind the difference between the meaning of the words “know” “understand” and “assimilate” of the knowledge (Cook & Brown 2002) consequently to be able to apply this knowledge properly and safely.
The “knowledge” of the subject even if it concerns the proper amount of necessary information on how the work has to be done is not enough without:
- a) the knowledge of the interaction of the various mechanical, electric-electronic, hydraulic e.t.c. sub systems and their special role in aviation safety.
- b) the proper structure and methodology of thinking and acting regarding the entire a/c maintenance
- c) mainly knowing the content of the aviation safety culture, which is a basic determinant of aviation safety level, the theoretical part of which is acquired attending lessons in an M.T.O..
3) The results of examinations prove that the examined person knows or does not know the required particular amount of information. This procedure does not ensure the EASA’s aim for uniformity of understanding and assimilation of the way an entire system operates, including the interactions of its various subsystems. All these are initially ensured by attending an M.T.O. It should be pointed out that the candidate a/c engineers are not examined by the authorities of every E.U. State-member on the identical syllabus since the examined syllabus is depended on the national educational system of each country.
- F) Regarding the practical experience which is required from the Authorities (EASA 2003 d) by the candidate aircraft engineers to be acknowledged by a certified aircraft maintenance organization: (EASA 2003 d)
- a) The role of EASA is to “require the Commission to adopt the necessary implementation rules to ensure their uniform application […]” (EASA 2003 b,c)
- b) The quality of the experience acquired by the candidate a/c engineers at any a/c maintenance organization, is not examined by the Authorities although the experience is legally required (EASA 2003 d). The Authorities consider as adequate a certification by the certified maintenance organization where the candidate aircraft engineer acquired his-her practical experience. This means that EASA authorizes-de facto-every certified maintenance organization, to assure on EASA’s behalf, the compatibility of the acquired practical experience by the candidate aircraft engineers-especially the safety culture-with the requests of the E.A.S.A. (E.A.S.A. 2003a).
Conclusions
1) The content of the a/c engineer’s labor is to maintain the continuous airworthiness of the aircrafts. The criterion according which the quality of the aircraft engineer’s labor is determined and assessed is the level of satisfaction of the aims of E.A.S.A.’s relative institutional framework, regarding commercial aviation. Consequently, every deduction on the required quality level of the a/c engineer’s labor is directly reflected on the aviation safety level. The decades of maintenance related aircraft accidents, do not assure the required general application of E.A.S.A.’s regulations by every certified M.T.O., regarding the aircraft continuous airworthiness. (Hofstede 1991, Maurino 1994, Pigeon-O’leary 1994, Reason & Hobbs 2003)
2) Attending the candidate aircraft engineers, lessons in an M.T.O., results at a superior quality a) of their learning, b) consequently of their work and finally c) on aviation safety, compared to self-teaching. Consequently, the procedure of self teaching cancels the EASA’s aim regarding the required uniformity of the civil aviation safety and the application of common technical requirements in the field of continuous airworthiness. However, both of these procedures are legally accepted by E.A.S.A.
The superiority of the results of the officially organized education in comparison to self-teaching, is based on the universal human experience after the Dark Ages. This assessment is included in the relative syllabus of the “Human factor” lesson (EASA 2003 d) which is obligatory taught to the candidate aircraft engineers.
3) Examinations generally prove that the examined person knows the required particular amount of information. It does not ensure the uniformity of understanding and assimilating of the way of operation of the entire system including the interactions of its various subsystems. Therefore, examinations per se, do not maximise the possibilities of equalisation of the results of attending in an M.T.O. and the self teaching on: a) the quality of the aircraft engineer’s work b) on aviation safety.
4) The quality of experience which the candidate aircraft engineer acquires at his/her practical training during a particular number of years, per educational category, at every certified maintenance organization is not examined by EASA. Consequently, EASA does not examine the compatibility of the quality of the acquired experience by the candidate aircraft engineers with the aims of the existing institutional framework regarding continuous airworthiness. As a result, the applied experience procedure may undermine the EASA’s aim regarding the efficiency and the uniformity of the acquired practical experience by the candidate aircraft engineers according to EASA’s requirements.
5) Since self-teaching may have negative impact on the quality of the a/c engineers work-consequently on aviation safety-that is on the lives of the passengers and of the European citizens-it is obvious that there seems to be a conflict of interest between self-learners-candidate a/c engineers-on the one hand and the lives of the passengers and the European citizens on the other. It is obvious that the predominant interest lies with the lives of the passengers and of the European citizens.
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