Thought-reasoning can be defined as the mental process which is related to the dynamic evolving process of problem-solving through which the classification of material and non material objects concerning the self and the environment is performed. (Scharfetter 1976) Through thinking, meaning and importance is attached to these objects, they are understood and their causal relations are explained, meanings are connected to each other, decisions are taken, judgments are made.

          Thought-reasoning as a process is wider than perception, having as a basis the brain (central nervous phenomena).

          It is activated when the man seeks the solution of a problem, the satisfaction of a need. It is the expression of a man’s personality, that’s why thought disorders initiate disorders of the personality. Action is the primary manifestation of thought and a crucial criterion for its rightfulness.

 Factors affecting the function level of thought-reasoning are:

1. A) Psychological and biological conditions, such as:
   • consciousness state 2) state and level of memory, 3) level of intelligence, which is defined by biological and social parameters, 4) emotional state, 5)   level of the organic function of the brain.

1. B) Social and cultural factors

Thought-reasoning disorders are divided in: disorders of thought process and disorders of thought content.

1. a) Disorders of process

1)  the simple, temporary, frequent or constant blocking of thinking, 2) slowness of thinking, 3) flight of thought (distraction into many objects, incapability of concentrating  on something specific), 4) verbiage, trifle talk, pedantic thinking  (concentration on the examination of a single object in depth, focusing on details, on the insignificant aspects, which results in the incapability of perceiving the general essence), 5) incoherent, chaotic thinking (combination or differentiation of things, situations etc, without specific criteria) persistent repetition of particular words or sentences, with or without meaning, 6) incoherence -loose associations (articulated thoughts without any reasonable or emotional coherence)

1. b) Disorders of the content of thinking

• compulsive thoughts against the will of the person
• paranoid or unreasonable thoughts

          Consequently the necessary conditions of a minimum level of objective-reliable perception and comprehension of the environment by the investigator is his-her physiological function of:

1. all the senses, b) the nervous system that transfers the external stimulus from the senses at the proper cerebral centers, c) the cerebral centers that process the stimulus,

all the mental processes since they affect perception and. e) the level of knowledge and experience upon the investigated environment (which  is included in the determinant of  mental processes)      

4. Κnowledge-experience as a basic determinant of perception (Lainos & Nikolaidis 2003, Marsh 2000, Paries Ashleigh 1998)

          Κnowledge (theoretical and practical-experience) that is, the characteristics, the properties, the theoretical principles of evolution – the actual evolution during a particular period of time, the relationships-interactions-consequences of the environment (objects, events, situations) is a basic determinant of perception’s-comprehension’s quality. Consequently it affects decisively the quality of decision-making and therefore effectiveness of action. But knowledge is useful only if it can facilitate the understanding of the environment (close and wider) by a human being who, based on that, may then proceed to decision-making and action towards the

fulfillment of a goal. 

          The optimum quantity of information relative to a particular environment is what the user can perceive, understand and process according to his-her biological, psychological and cognitive abilities. The support provided by the available machinery and electronic means enlarges these abilities. Excessive, unnecessary information especially if it is irrelevant, may cause additional ambiguities to the user, affecting the objectivity of his-her perception and also causing further delay to decision making. Consequently it results to a lower quality of situation awareness instead of a higher one, to a further delay of decision making and acting, due to the user’s inability to  process the available quantity and quality of information. This can be described as “analysis-paralysis”.

          Comprehension-understanding, is the result of a very complicated process. It concerns the correlation between information perceived and stored in the user’s memory. This information is relative to objects, events, situations perceived (developing a mental picture) from the environment through the senses. Perception includes the characteristics, properties, theoretical evolution principles-actual evolution during a particular period of time, relationships-interactions-consequences of the objects, events, situations.

          For example when, during an aerobatic air-show an airplane dives with its nose vertical to the ground, the watcher considers this to be an aerobatic maneuver.  

If however the same watcher sees a commercial airplane at the same position, he-she rather considers that it is going to crash. These two different considerations are a result of the correlation between the position of each airplane and its characteristics, properties etc., that the watcher has stored in his-her memory.

          The reliability-objectivity of human understanding is based-apart from physical and mental functions- on the determination of the percentage of the understanding. This is based: on known information, on assumed information, on known ignorance and on unknown ignorance. It must be noticed that the absolute perception of the objective reality is impossible for every individual due to

• the infinity of external stimuli to the human organism
• the limited capabilities:

1. of the human senses to recognize these stimuli,
2. of the nervous system to transfer these stimuli to the proper brain centers
3. of the brain centers to process these stimuli

.

5. The role of the management functions on the accident occurrence

          Even since the first quarter of the 20^th century (Hawthorn etc.) up to recent times research  has proved that the activity- behavior of every individual at his-her working place, during working time, is strongly, directly and indirectly affected by factors that compose the wider internal airline’s environment. (Andries-Kompier, -Smulders 1996, Beehr 1995, Bright-Mitchel.- Rickman 1996,  Daniels-Harris 1998, MacDonald-Karasek-Punnett-Scharf 2001, Westfall 1998 )

“However the results of this research were not correlated with the managerial decisions and functions, through which the top management introduces the suggestions of the researchers in the internal corporate environment”. (Lainos 2003)

“[…]Only now are safety practitioners realizing the complex nature of accident/incident  causation and the role organizations play in the genesis and management of human error. In fact it is the emphasis that organizational models place on the fallible decisions of managers, supervisors and others in the organization that sets them apart from the other perspectives previously discussed[…]” (Shapell-Wiegmann 2003 )

“[…] Organizational accidents may be truly accidental in the way in which the various contributing factors combine to cause the bad outcome, but there is nothing accidental about the existence of these precursors, nor in the conditions that created them.[…]” (Reason 1997)

          Recent studies have proved that the activity-behaviour of the staff at working place, during working time, is strongly, directly and indirectly affected by factors from the wider internal corporate environment (Αnderson-Kjellberg-Lindberg-Skoldstrom 1996, Beehr 1995, Bright-Mitchel-Rickman 1996, Kelley  1996, Biner 2000,Fingret 2000, Hendy 2003, Caldwell-Caldwell 2003)

 The introduction and preservation of these factors is ultimately determined by the top management decisions (C.E.O., B.O.D.). (Lainos 2003)

“[…] Responsibility for aviation safety begins at the very top of an airline company. History has demonstrated repeatedly that without the complete commitment of the highest management levels within a company, operational safety margins are seriously eroded. This does not suggest that a company will have an accident, but it does suggest that the risk of having an accident is high-the laws of probability will prevail. Management has great leverage in affecting operational safety within a company. Through its attitudes and actions management influences the attitudes and actions of all others within a company: Management defines the safety culture of an organization. This safety culture extends all the way to the maintenance shop floor, to the ramp to the cabin and to the cockpit. Further more the public and the government authorities are increasingly recognizing management’s role in air safety by holding management accountable for a serious incident or accident; this accountability is magnified many-fold if a company suffers several such incidents or accidents during a course of a few years […].”  (Flight Safety Foundation 1994)

“[…]The ultimate responsibility for safety rests with the directors and management of the Company. The Company’s attitude to safety—the Company’s safety culture—is established from the outset by the extent to which senior management accepts responsibility for safe operations, particularly the proactive management of risk.  Regardless of the size, complexity, or type of operation, senior management deter– mines the Company’s safety culture. However, without the wholehearted commitment of all personnel, any safety programme is unlikely to be effective[…].” (Airbus Industry 1999),

            This consideration is based on the fact that the top management has the authority to program, organize, administrate, staff and control the corporate operation and to apply its decisions in the internal corporate environment, through the authorized members of the hierarchy (Lainos 2003). Even in the case that some of the factors of the internal corporate environment that affect negatively the staff’s activity are not the result of top management decisions, but the result of mismanagement by the members of the hierarchy at the various organizational levels, the ultimate responsibility still rests with the top management. The cause is that the top management has the ultimate responsibility of staffing. (Lainos 2003).

6. The functions of the organizations’ management and their content

The knowledge of the functions of the corporate management, its consequences on the influenced areas of the internal corporate environment and the impact of these functions on the employees’ will is a basic determinant of the investigator’s opinion about the primary cause(s) and contributing factors of the accident incident (Lainos 2003)

The functions of the corporate management are: Planning, Organizing, Administrating, Staffing, and Controlling. These functions pursue the achievement of corporate goals based on the economic principle, which is the maximization of the

profits. The corporate areas and operations that are affected by these functions are showed in TABLE 1.

                                                        TABLE 1

In order to create a more clear perception of the managerial functions’ impact on the employees will, the internal corporate factors which affect the employees will are mentioned bellow (see TABLE 2)  

Performance Shaping Factors (PSF’s) from the internal organizational environment    and the management functions which mainly affect them

                                                                   TABLE 2

PART TWO

The case study of the ICAO’s manuals regarding accident and incident investigation

7. The qualifications of the accident investigators

Assuming that all aforementioned presuppositions are fulfilled, job specialty, knowledge and experience play a decisive role in the process which shapes the objective perception. 

The qualifications of the accident investigators are described in the ICAO’s Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation 1-2-2 Paragraph 2.4.3.

7.1. “ Qualifications of the Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigator

 “ It is essential that accident investigators have a practical background in aviation as a foundation on which to develop investigation skills. The experience can be acquired by working as a professional pilot, as an aeronautical engineer or as an aircraft maintenance engineer. Other specialized areas of aviation which could also provide useful experience include management, operations, airworthiness, air traffic services, meteorology and human factors. Since accident investigations will often involve all of these specialized areas, it is important that investigators understand the aviation infrastructure and are able to relate to each of these different areas. It is also beneficial for investigators to leave some piloting experience in addition to their other experience”

In the aforementioned paragraph, ICAO, describes as qualifications of the air accident investigators the required areas of their general job specialty (doctors, pilots, aeronautical engineers, aircraft maintenance engineers) and the required areas of their experience (management, operations, airworthiness, air traffic services, meteorology and human factors). As a basic job specialty and experience is considered to be piloting, a basic knowledge which is required by every investigator. However the investigator during the investigation is obliged to get involved in areas of knowledge different than his-her own job specialty. This is the reason why the ICAO considers necessary for every investigator to have a wider knowledge –regardless of his-her job specialty- in areas such as management, operations, airworthiness, air traffic services, meteorology and human factors. The titles of the chapters that the investigators have to be trained in are mentioned by the ICAO in the description of the information that has to be included in each paragraph of the accident report.

We consider that this system appears to have certain weaknesses, because it does not determine:

1. the specific job specialty of the doctor (pathologist psychiatrist etc), or  of the pilot (jet, tourboprop etc) and  the aircraft type the pilots had to be certified at.
2. the duration of the required experience of every investigator,
3. the content of each title of the syllabus to which each investigator has to be trained.
4. the qualifications of the investigators’ trainers: sector, science,  level of knowledge,  duration of   experience)
5. the physical and mental health of the investigator, although it is a necessary presupposition for an  acceptable level of the investigator’s perception.

This vagueness causes ambiguities regarding which exact characteristics, properties, knowledge, experience etc., ICAO wants the air accident investigators to be armed with.

Consequently we consider that the system under these circumstances does not ensure the unified level of knowledge of the investigator although this unity is considered to be a necessary presupposition for the comparability of accident reports findings, conclusions and recommendations.

However, the investigators’ qualifications – like any other employees’- generally determine the quality of their perception. It is obvious that any differentiation in the qualifications differentiates-ceteris paribus- the quality of perception. This differentiation has a negative impact on the effort of ICAO: a) to focus on upgrading the unification of the perception’s level of the investigators per involved job specialty, during the accident investigation and b) to achieve a higher level comparability of the various accident reports.

8. Criteria of the structure of an accident report

According to ICAO Annex 13 the structure of an accident report must be as shown in the table 3 below.

From the structure of accident reports it becomes obvious that ICAO uses both operational and managerial criteria indiscriminately and without prioritization (special weight).   The operational criteria are related rather to the organizational functions while the managerial are related to the management functions

    As a consequence, various fields of the same managerial function for example “staffing” are mentioned in more than two chapters, paragraphs etc. that is: 1.5. personnel information, 1.17. Organizational and Management information, 2.4. Flight Crew Performance, 2.5. Pilot Training 2.7. Emergency Response.

TABLE 3

1. FACTUAL INFORMATION
   1. History of Flight
   2. Injuries to persons
   3. Damage to Airplane
   4. Other damage
   5. Personnel information
   6. Airplane information
   7. Meteorological Information
   8. Aids to Navigation
   9. Communications
   10. Airport Information
   11. Flight Recorders
   12. Wreckage and Impact Information
   13. Medical and Pathological Information
   14. Fire
   15. Survival Aspects
   16. Tests and Research
   17. Organizational and Management information
   18. Additional Information
2. ANALYSIS
   1. General
   2. Weather Factors on the approach
   3. Accident Sequence
   4. Flight Crew Performance
   5. Pilot Training
   6. Air Traffic Control Factors
   7. Emergency Response
   8. Controlled Flight Into Terrain
   9. Oversight Issues
   10. Flight Data Recorder Documentation
3. CONCLUSIONS
   1. Findings
   2. Probable Cause
4. RECOMMENDATIONS
5. APPENDIXES

We consider that the mixing up of two completely different criteria and  the mentioning of different fields of the same managerial function (e.g. staffing) in different paragraphs of the accident report, is more probable to confuse, and consequently to put barriers to the investigators’ perception (recognition-comprehension) rather than assist them to focus on the main, primary cause(s) and contributing factors.

9. Content of the section “1.17. Organizational and Management information” of the accident report

            Regarding the criteria of “ the content of the chapters of the accident report” this paper focuses on Section 1 paragraph 17 “Organizational and Management information”

The content of this section according to ICAO’s instructions (ICAO ANNEX 13) is described as follows:

[…]1.17.1.  Provide pertinent information on the organizations involved in influencing the operation of the aircraft, if such influence had a bearing on the accident. The organizations to be reported upon in this section could include, but need not to be limited to the following: the operator; the maintenance organization; the air traffic services, aerodrome administration, weather service agencies, the aircraft manufacturer, the certification of listening authority, and the regulatory authority. The information could include, but need not be limited to the following: organizational structure and functions, safety culture; resources; financial viability status; management decisions, policies and practices, internal and external communications and relationships, certification, monitoring, and regulatory framework when these had a bearing on the accident or whose actions, or lack thereof, was related to, or influenced the accident”

1.17.2.  Provide pertinent information concerning the operator, such as type and date of issuance of air operator certificate, types of operations authorized, types and number of aircraft authorized for use, and authorized areas of operation and routes. Also include relevant information concerning the operator’s company operations manual”[…]

A first indication from the comparison of accident reports of United States of America National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000,

2002) and United Kingdom Air Accidents Investigation Branch (UK AAIB 1988,1990,2000a,b, 2001a,b) is that the “Management and organization” chapter of the NTSB reports is filled in more often and in a more detailed way than those of the UK ΑΑΙΒ.

From the aforementioned approach it becomes obvious that the NTSB investigators have wider and more accurate knowledge on issues such as:

• the meaning and content of the management functions,
• the impact from the introduction and preservation in the internal corporate environment of factors which affect decisively the employees’ will,

This knowledge is a basic presupposition for an objective classification and assessment of the findings during an accident investigation, because apart from others it contributes to the discrimination between the initial and the secondary cause(s)-contributing factors.

Error is the result of systemic and not of personal failure. The system of the commercial air transport industry is consisted of organizations such as manufacturers airlines, maintenance centers, airports, civil aviation authorities, airport authorities, weather forecasting service, air traffic controllers etc. That is the reason why ICAO changed its philosophy regarding the responsibility for an accident-incident, from causal factor to contributing factors. Consequently the investigator who wants to contribute positively to the upgrading of aviation safety is obliged to determine the initial cause(s), the actions or omissions of the managerial functions which affected the employee’s will and resulted in the accident-incident occurrence.

This consideration of the role of the investigator is for the benefit of:

1. the shareholders and the top management of the air-carrier, because it determines the causes of probable future errors, and consequently it contributes positively to the upgrading of the quality of their functions (safer, cheaper, more competitive, wider market share, higher long term profits etc.)
2. the passengers (safer and cheaper flights)
3. the insurance companies (fewer accidents-less claims)
4. the employees (safer work)

Consequently:

1. a) if the investigators want to determine all the contributing factors of an accident/incident and make an objective assessment of these factors, they must be able to know the source of every error committed by any employee
2. b) they must be aware of the functions of the top management, their content and the affected areas of the internal corporate environment.

            Regarding the content of the chapter of the accident report “1.17.organization-management”.

Based on a number of recent accident reports, we noted that the implementation of the aforementioned process presents certain difficulties related to the presentation of the findings-facts. These difficulties refer to either the avoidance by the accident investigators to fill in the particular chapter “Organization and Management information” or to report findings that are the results of management functions under the proper chapter. These difficulties are considered to be the result of the classification weaknesses by the investigators. Perhaps due to ignorance of the meaning and role of the two different groups of criteria used in final reports: the operational which rather reflects the results of the organizational functions, and the managerial which concerns the results of the managerial functions.

10. The ICAO’s Training guidelines for Aircraft Accident investigators

In the ICAO’s Training guidelines for Aircraft Accident investigators Chapter 2 “Background Experience For Investigators” Cir 298 AN 172 June 2003, it is mentioned:

“[…] 2.2.  Potential accident investigators must have considerable practical experience in aviation as a foundation on which to build their investigation skills. The experience can be acquired from civil or military qualification as […] aviation related management might also be suitable for accident investigator training […]”

In the chapter 3 Training Guidelines in the paragraph 3.1.3. in  the qualifications required for accident investigators’  trainers are included “[…] experienced investigators, aviation medicine physicians, psychologists, aeronautical engineers and manufacturers’ representatives[…]”

            In the aforementioned description of the experience required for a potential accident investigator, the following remarks may be made

• As background experience for investigators, the verb “might” is used for aviation related management, while for the pilots, aeronautical engineers and aircraft maintenance engineers the verb “must” is used.
• Concerning the aviation related management qualification of the investigators, only the criterion of experience is mentioned and not for theoretical knowledge, while the job specialty of the pilots, aeronautical engineers and aircraft maintenance engineers includes the necessary theoretical knowledge as well.
• For the trainers, managerial knowledge and experience is not required. The omission of determining the trainers’ level of knowledge and specific field of experience in the air transport management, creates a  wide vacuum in  the investigators’ knowledge regarding  the content and impact of the air transport management functions on the internal corporate environment factors which influence the employees’ will
• The accident investigators’ initial training syllabus (Chapter 3.2.) does not include any issue regarding the goal, content, areas of authority, impact etc. of the aviation management.

The aforementioned formulations might create the impression that the ICAO underestimates the knowledge and experience on the field of air transport management, although the investigators are appointed to investigate the negative impact resulting from the implementation of managerial functions on aviation safety.

In the Chapter 4.1.2.20. Organizational information of ICAO’s Training Guidelines For Aircraft Accident investigators, it is mentioned:

“[…] Conducting a review of the organizational structure and functions as well as the management policies and practices of the agencies, authorities and aircraft operator involved is a subject that should be covered. For example, an investigator should have the competence to review an aircraft operator’s management functions, policies and practice in their entirety. There are many aspects of the supervisory process which may have a direct bearing on the accident, such as acceptance of inadequate flight crew qualifications; deficient guidance material; maintenance shortcuts; improper crew rostering; failure to provide proper training in aircraft type; shortcomings in crew resource management; and unreasonable pressure to complete schedules on time. The methods of investigating management and organizational aspects of an organization to determine the presence of any risk factors or other shortcomings is a requirement of a well rounded accident investigation course.  An examination of the means of supervision is very important and will include a review of orders regulations, manuals and independent audits as well as the performance of supervisors, instructors and company management

4.1.2.21. Human performance […]”

4.1.2.22. Determination of the flight crews suitability for the flight[…]”

Remarks on ICAO’s Training guidelines for Aircraft Accident investigators

Our consideration, regarding the content of the Chapter 4.1.2.20. “Organizational information”, ICAO’s Training Guidelines for Aircraft Accident investigators, is:

• There are certain ambiguities regarding  the meaning under which the terms “ organizational function” and “managerial function” are used, since their content is entirely distinguished in the science of management nowadays.
• Issues that belong to different managerial functions are mentioned without any differentiation e.g. inadequate flight crew qualifications; failure to provide proper training in aircraft type (staffing), supervision (controlling), improper crew rostering (programming), administrating etc.
• The issues described in paragraphs 4.1.2.21. “Human performance” and 4.1.2.22. “Determination of the flight crews suitability for the flight”, mainly refer to the content of the managerial function of staffing. The isolated reference in these two different paragraphs of issues which are included in the previous 4.1.2.20. “Organizational information” paragraph, might create the wrong impression that these issues are independent from the managerial function of staffing which is included in the previous paragraph.

The aforementioned approach might generate areas of possible ambiguity , concerning the ICAO’s consideration of :

1. the content and impact of the management functions in the life of the organization
2. the need for implementation by the investigators of scientific criteria in order to assess the top management’s involvement in the accident/incident occurrence,
3. the level of the hierarchy members that are burdened with the main responsibility in case of error commitment.

These facts might give the impression that aviation related management is not considered to be a basic necessary experience of accident investigators.

However, from the analysis of the aforementioned chapters the crucial role of knowledge-experience in situation awareness (recognition-comprehension) of the environment, the decision making and action became clear. How could the investigators recognize and understand the impact of the managerial functions on an accident occurrence, if they do not have adequate and proper theoretical knowledge combined with practical experience upon aviation management issues? 

The investigators lack of knowledge regarding the content and the areas of internal corporate environment  affected by the management functions, combined with the ICAO’s approach of operational and managerial criteria , might create obstacles in the objectivity and the unity of the investigators’ perception.

A higher unification of the investigator’s perception is necessary because leads to:

1. a higher level of recognition and understanding of the various parts of the

      investigated  environment

1. it contributes positively to the unified categorization of the findings according

     to their sources, which leads   to the identification and objective prioritizing of

     the contributing factors.

1. it contributes positively to the unified assessment of the findings according  to unified criteria and knowledge, based on unified methodology
2. it helps the investigators to identify the source(s) of each contributing factor of the accident and consequently to suggest the appropriate safety recommendations
3. it helps the readers to assess whether the conclusions and the safety recommendations reflect the source(s) of the identified contributing factors since they are presented under the appropriate chapter of the accident report
4. it facilitates the unified understanding by the readers who belong  to different cultures with different values, different considerations etc.

The obvious incompatibility between ICAO’s aim of upgrading the aviation’s

safety level and the measures applied for achieving this aim, exists because it does

not determine and ensure:

1. a minimum level of the normal function of the investigators’ senses and mental processes which are decisive determinants of the investigators’ perception-comprehension
2. a unified content of the syllabus of investigators’ training .
3. the field and level of knowledge, as well as field, level and duration of the experience of the trainers
4. the identification of the exact qualifications of the investigators; specific job specialty of the doctor -pathologist psychiatrist etc-, or the pilot –jet, tourboprop etc- the aircraft type they had to be certified at, and how long experience must each investigator have at his-her job specialty. These are necessary presuppositions for the unification of the investigators’ knowledge.
5. the unification of criteria of the accident report structure (managerial and operational criteria are used indiscriminately)
6. the obligatory filling in by the investigators of the accident report’s chapters with information compatible with the content of the particular chapter

11. Conclusions

1) The existing ICAO’s institutional framework which determines the presuppositions and the conditions of the accident investigation, has successfully contributed for decades years to the aviation safety .

For the achievement of the ICAO’s objective to upgrade the aviation’s safety level, the particular institutional framework needs restructuring  in order to improve its efficiency and effectiveness in the near and distant future.

2)  The purpose of this restructuring has to be the achievement of a reliable comparability between various accident reports. The achievement of this goal requires:

• unification of the perception and comprehension of the examined environment by the investigators
• unified methodology of the presentation of  findings, conclusions and   recommendations,

–   restructuring of the accident report based on the differentiation of the use of the managerial and operational criteria. .

3) Regarding the reliability-objectivity of the investigators’ perception, any disorder of their mental processes may result to:

1. selective attention or selective inattentiveness
2. over generalization of a single negative fact, relation, condition etc
3. evaluation of the –objective-environment with subjective criteria
4. maximization or minimization of the negative impact of some contributing factors
5. minimization of positive impact of some factors

• Comparing the ICAO’s consideration about its exclusive objective in an accident investigation and the tools that the ICAO uses for the accomplishment of this goal we consider that there is an incompatibility between the goal and the measures.

12. Proposals

1)  Introduction of tests to access the functional status of the senses and mental processes of each investigator

2)  Determination the specific:

1. job specialty of every accident investigator
2. field and duration of the required experience
3. content of the syllabus-field and level of knowledge (not only the titles) in which the investigators are trained, which must reflect the current global scientific knowledge on the particular cognitive field.
4. field of knowledge, level of knowledge, field and duration of the investigators trainers experience.

3)  Separation of the managerial from the operational criteria is imperative.

The managerial criteria must be used in the chapters-paragraphs concerning the investigation of the sources of the contributing factors, while the operational criteria must be used in the chapters-paragraphs concerning the investigation of the conditions of the accident/incident.

• To make a clear distinction between organizational and managerial functions and

 their impact on the internal corporate environment 

5) To introduce as obligatory in the investigator’s qualifications the theoretical

     knowledge and practical experience on air transport organizational and

     managerial functions and their impact on the internal corporate environment.

• Obviously the same qualifications must be required from the investigators’ trainers as well.

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26^th Conference of the European Association for Aviation Psychology-

Costs and Benefits. 3-7/10/2004 Sesibbra Portugal

The airline’s corporate and social environment, as a basic parameter

of the efficiency and the effectiveness, of the incentives,

applied by the airline’s top management. 

The case study of a Southeastern European Airline’s cabin crewmembers

                                        Yiannis S. Lainos  Ph.D.              

Aircraft Technology Department of Halkis Technological Educational Institution.

Abstract

A research was conducted by the author in April 2004 to investigate the opinion of a South-eastern European Airline’s (Airline) cabin crewmembers regarding the efficiency and the effectiveness of the incentives applied by the airline’s top management. Based on the conclusions of this research, an approach of the causes for the Airline’s cabin crewmembers’ particular consideration is attempted.

Keywords:

Culture (national, labor), flag carrier, cabin crewmembers, human resource management, motivation.

The aim:

The aim of the present paper is the determination and evaluation:

1. of the cabin crewmembers opinion, regarding the efficiency and the effectiveness of the incentives applied by the Airline’s top management.
2. of the negative effect of the political parties and unions’ interference in the management of the airline, on the effectiveness and the efficiency of the incentives applied by the B.O.D.

The author’s contribution:

1. The determination of the impact of the cabin crews’ political ideology, on their perception, regarding the incentives applied by the airline management. This contributes to the human resource management. This take into account the psychological needs of the employees regarding the efficiency and the effectiveness of the applied motives
2. The evaluation of the motivation measures, methods and techniques efficiency and effectiveness, which the airline’s top management applied to the cabin crewmembers.

Introduction

The airline is the former state flag carrier, which was nationalized in 1975. Since then the state has been its exclusive shareholder. (Greece.  (1975)

The State, government and political party mechanisms, interfered with the airline’s management in many fields. The aim of the aforementioned interference was the utilization of the airline as social and political “cover” by the government to improve its image, to increase its popularity and satisfied its voters. (Lainos J.S. 2003, Greece.  1994 )

One of these influenced fields was the personnel management (hiring, appointing, promoting, level of wages, labor terms and conditions etc.).

The managerial methods that were applied by the government, appointed B.O.D. and the external interference, had negative consequences on the airline’s survival. (Lainos J.S. 2003)

The government with its nine years’ efforts (12/1994-12/2002) attempted unsuccessfully: (Lainos J.S. 2003)

1. to achieve the airline’s recapitalization, in order to upgrade its competitiveness and
2. to privatize the airline.

This failure, forced the government in the spring of 2003 to restructure the airline’s group of companies. (Greece 2003/9/4)

During this period the unions held negotiations with the government and the airlines top management, to determine the terms and conditions under which their members could accept to join the restructured airline. However in application of the restructure law, a 30% of the cabin crewmembers were obligatorily retired (among other employees).

The negotiations between the airline’s B.O.D. the government and the cabin crewmembers union, failed, and the union went on strike for 75 days without success on their demands (from the end of November 2003 to the 12^th of February 2004.

Assumptions of our research

Our field research was contacted among the cabin crew who had permanent labor relation with the airline

The criteria which were used by the questionnaires for the categorization of the cabin crewmembers are: Gender, Educational level, Labor relation with the Airline, Previous employment .

The questionnaire was mixed (close and open).  It included thirteen motives in 26 questions. It also gave each cabin crewmember the possibility to express his-her own opinion.  Furthermore the cabin crewmember was requested to prioritize the selected motives.

We evaluated the answers, according to the following criteria:

1. the frequency by which they appeared in the total number of the questionnaires, as well as
2. the prioritization given by each cabin crewmember.

  To minimize the emotional effect on the cabin crewmembers’ answers- due to the negative results of their strike-we conducted our research two months after the last day of their strike.

The profile of the cabin crewmembers participants in our research

Gender

The cabin crew members were: two thirds stewardesses and one third stewards The participated stewards in our research represented the 32% of the airline’s stewards while the participated stewardesses represented the 33% of the airline’s stewardesses.

  This sample is considered to represent with a high accuracy, the opinion of the cabin crewmembers.

Educational level

70,3% of the stewards and  63,3% of the stewardesses are graduates  of  the secondary educational level (Lyceum), 18,3% of the stewards and 17,7% of the stewardesses are university graduates and 5,7% of the stewards and  2,5% of the stewardesses have post graduate degrees. (TABLE 1)

TABLE 1

Labor relation with the Airline

Our research focused on the ordinary cabin crewmembers

Previous employment in the airline (years)

29,3% of the stewards and the 10,1% of the stewardesses more than 18 years. 33,4% of the stewards and 26,6% of the stewardesses from 16 to 17 years. 13,1% of the stewards and 11,4% of the stewardesses from 14 to 15 years. 6,3% of the stewards and 3,8% of the stewardesses from 12 to 13 years, 7,1% of the stewards and 8,9 of the stewardesses 10 to 11 years, 6,5% of the stewards and 16,4% of the stewardesses from 8 to 9 years, 2,3% of the stewards and 10,1% of the stewardesses from 6 to 7 years, 2% of the stewards and 12,7 % of the stewardesses from 1 to 5 years (TABLE 2) 

TABLE 2

Brief results of our research:

• 96,38% of the stewards answered that the Airline’s B.O.D has never applied any incentive for them. This percentage for the stewardesses is 98,6%
• Stewards and stewardesses selected in their first five priorities the same incentives, but with different prioritization.
• In the first two positions the same motives have been selected with different priority. The stewards selected, as their first priority, the salary level and as second the labor conditions. The stewardesses prioritized the opposite.
• In their both third prioritization is the motive “Interest of the management to solve the problems of the cabin crewmembers”
• The fourth and fifth prioritization is the motives “meritocracy in promoting” and “modernization of the aircraft’s fleet”. The stewards prioritized as fourth the motive “modernization of the aircraft’s fleet” and fifth the motive “meritocracy in promoting” while the stewardesses prioritized the opposite.

Analytically (Herzberg, F.2003, Levinson H. 2003, Mc Clelland D.-Burnham D.H. 2003, ManvilleB.-Ober.J. 2003)

The Stewards consideration regarding the incentives which the Airline’s top management has to apply for the cabin crewmembers (Table 3)

1) 96,3% of the stewards consider the increase of the wages level as their motive. 95,8% of the answered stewards assessed this motive in their first five priorities. 57,7% of these stewards, selected it as their first priority, 30,8% selected it as their second priority and 3,8% selected it as their fourth priority. The aforementioned concentration and allocation, makes this motive the strongest among the Airline’s stewards.

2) 88,9% of the stewards consider the Improvement of the labor conditions as their motive. 92,3% of the answered stewards assesed this motive in their first five priorities. 33,3% of these stewards, selected it, as their first priority, the 45,8% selected it, as their second priority, 8,3% selected it, as their third priority and 4,2% selected it, as their fourth and fifth priority respectively*. The aforementioned concentration and allocation, makes this motive the second strongest among the Airline’s stewards.

3) 85,2%% of the stewards consider the Interest of the Airline’s management to solve the problems of the cabin crewmembers as their motive. 95,7% of the answered stewards assessed this motive in their first five priorities. 8,7% of these stewards, selected it as their first and second priority respectively, 65,2% selected it as their third priority and 4,3% selected it as their fourth priority and 8,7 % selected it as their fifth priority. The aforementioned concentration and allocation, makes this motive the third strongest among the Airline’s stewards

4) 77,7% of the stewards consider the modernization of the aircraft’s fleet as their motive. 33,3% of the answered stewards assessed this motive in their first five priorities Non of the stewards assessed this motive as their first second and third priority. 19,1% selected it as their fourth and 14,3% as their fifth priority. The aforementioned concentration and allocation, makes this motive the fourth strongest among the Airline’s stewards.

5) 59,2% of the stewards consider the meritocracy in promotion as their motive. 87,5% of the answered stewards assessed this motive in their first five priorities. None of the stewards assessed this motive as their first priority, 25,0% selected it as their second and third priority respectively, and 37,5% selected it as their fourth and none for their fifth priority. The aforementioned concentration and allocation, makes this motive the fifth strongest among the Airline’s stewards.

TABLE 3

The Airline’s Stewardesses consideration regarding the incentives which the Airline’s top management has to apply for the cabin crewmembers (Table 4)

1) 93% of the stewardesses consider the increase of the wages level as their motive. 93,9% of the answered stewardesses assessed this motive in their first five priorities. 27,3% of these stewardesses, selected it as their first priority, 40,9% selected it as their second priority, 16,6% selected it as their third priority, and 9,1% selected it as their fourth priority. The aforementioned concentration and allocation, makes this motive the strongest among the Airline’s  stewardesses.

2) 91,5% of the stewardesses consider the Increase of the wages as their motive.  93,8% of the answered stewardesses assessed this motive in their first five priorities 41,5% of these stewards, selected it as their first priority, 32,3% selected it as their second priority, 12,3% selected it as their third priority, 4,6% selected it as their fourth priority and 3,1% selected it as their fifth priority. The aforementioned concentration and allocation, makes this motive the second strongest among the Airline’s stewardesses.

3) 80,3%% of the stewardesses consider the Interest of the Airline’s management to solve the problems of the cabin crewmembers as their motive. 84,2% of the answered stewardesses assessed this motive in their first five priorities 8,8% of these stewardesses, selected it as their first priority, 10,5% selected it as their second priority 36,8% selected it as their third priority and 19,3% selected it as their fourth priority and 8,8 % selected it as their fifth priority. The aforementioned concentration and allocation, makes this motive the third strongest among the Airline’s stewardesses

4) 67,6% of the stewardesses consider the meritocracy in promoting as their motive. 72,1% of the answered stewardesses assesed this motive in their first five priorities. 6,2% of these stewardesses, selected it as their first and second priority respectively, 29,2% as their third priority, 13,6% selected it as their fourth and 18,2% as their fifth priority. The aforementioned concentration and allocation, makes this motive the fourth strongest among the Airline’s stewardesses.

5) 62% of the stewardesses consider the modernization of the aircraft’s fleet as their motive. 52,3% of the answered stewardesses assessed this motive in their first five priorities. None of the stewardesses assessed this motive as their first priority, 13,6% selected it as their second priority, 6,8% selected it as their third priority, 13,6% selected it as their fourth and 18,2% selected it for their fifth priority. The aforementioned concentration and allocation, makes this motive the fifth strongest among the Airline’s stewardesses.

TABLE 4

Comments on the findings of our research

1. The Airline’s cabin crewmembers acquired great strength disproportional of their role in the air transport production process, during the second half of 80’s and early 90’s due to, mainly, the marriage of a stewardess to the state’s prime minister
2. This strength, created the illusion, to the cabin crewmembers, that it was a result of their role in the corporate product process. It must be pointed out that the company in order to face the strike of the cabin crewmembers (11/2003-2/2004) trained more than 300 new entrants within 20 days, who replaced successfully the employees who were on strike.
3. The cabin crewmembers were favored by the socialist party, which was in government from 1981 to March 2004, with a three-year break 1990-1993. Among the privileges of the cabin crewmembers were high salaries. According to their collective agreements, they could fly up to eighty hours per month. However due to the ineffective and inefficient human resource management they flew less than 50 hours per month, on a yearly average (statistical data of Airline’s Economic Research Division)
4. However after 1998 (during the so called recovery period (1993-2001), the cabin crewmembers’ salaries were gradually decreased by about 30% (as the rest of the other employees of the company).

A 75 days strike (2003/11-2004/2) of the cabin crewmembers union ended at the beginning of February 2004, with an agreement of about 25% increase of the working time and a further decrease of the salaries by about 15%. 

5. According to the results of our research, the cabin crewmembers believe that the airline’s B.O.D. never gave any motivation to them. We consider that this perception is the result of a combination of the following factors:
6. the cabin crewmembers negative emotional effect due to the negative result of their strike, although our research started two months after the last day of the strike.
7. the policies applied by the almost 20 year socialist government which fostered the employees with:
8. expectations greater than those that the economy could afford for a long term.
9. the ideology of the minimum effort and the maximum benefit

• the ideology and the practice of the employees’ participation in the corporate decision making centers, regardless of their qualifications

1. the practice of the informal participation of the union leaders and the political party mechanisms in the management of the public companies
2. the practice of promotion to the hierarchy, based on political criteria

The aforementioned factors were transformed into a corporate culture.

1. The former high social status of the cabin crewmembers profession as a result of their ability to travel all over the world, to be hosted in luxury hotels, to make acquaintances with high social level people. This status was decreased as a consequence of the deduction of their salaries during the Airline’s recovery period 1993-2001
2. the Airline’s management never had a structured personnel motivation policy. The State, government, political party and especially the unions mechanisms, used to present every offer by the airline’s management to the personnel as their own success.
3. It is underlined that all of the Airline’s personnel is 100% unionized

 Under these circumstances the employees were accustomed to consider any upgrading of labor terms and conditions, as their own right and as an obligation of the government (exclusive shareholder) and the airline’s B.O.D.