3) Τα αποτελέσματα της πολιτικής της εξυγίανσης που εφαρμόσθηκε στην Ολυμπιακή Αεροπορία Α.Ε. (1994-2001). ΔΙΕΘΝΕΣ ΣΥΝΕΔΡΙΟ ΓΙΑ ΤΙΣ ΑΕΡΟΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΕΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΑ ΑΕΡΟΔΡΟΜΙΑ. ΕΞΕΛΙΞΕΙΣ ΣΤΟΝ 21Ο ΑΙΩΝΑ Πανεπιστήμιο Πατρών Σπουδαστήριο Τεχνικής Μεταφορών και Κυκλοφορίας. Πάτρα 3-4 Δεκεμβρίου 2001.

 

6) Η επίδραση της ανωτάτης διοίκησης του αερομεταφορέα
και των Μηχανικών αεροσκαφών, στην ασφάλεια των πτήσεων. Σύλλογος Ελλήνων συγκοινωνιολόγων. 1ο Διεθνές Συνέδριο για την έρευνα στις μεταφορές στην Ελλάδα 21-22/2/2002.

 

7) The impact of the Airline’s top management functions on flight safety, in a globalised environment. Air Transport Research Society Conference. Toulouse-France. July 2003.

 

8) Introduction of changes to restructure of an international scheduled flag carrier in a liberalize international institutional environment : The case study of Olympic Airways (Greece) Aviation Management Education and Research Conference. Montreal-Canada 21/22-7-2003.

 

11) The causes of failure of Olympic Airways’ s restructuring efforts applied by the Greek state. 14nth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology Dayton, Ohio-USA April 23-26, 2007.

 

12) The causes of failure of the Greek State’s efforts to introduce changes into the Olympic Airways internal environment towards overcoming of its crisis. 12th Conference of Air Transport Research Society (ATRS) 8-10 July 2008 Athens-Greece.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ΔΙΕΘΝΕΣ ΣΥΝΕΔΡΙΟ ΓΙΑ ΤΙΣ ΑΕΡΟΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΕΣ
ΚΑΙ ΤΑ ΑΕΡΟΔΡΟΜΙΑ. ΕΞΕΛΙΞΕΙΣ ΣΤΟΝ 21Ο ΑΙΩΝΑ
Πανεπιστήμιο Πατρών
Σπουδαστήριο Τεχνικής Μεταφορών και Κυκλοφορίας.
Πάτρα 3-4 Δεκεμβρίου 2001
-.-
Τα αποτελέσματα της πολιτικής της εξυγίανσης που εφαρμόσθηκε στην Ολυμπιακή Αεροπορία Α.Ε. (1994-2001)

Δρα Ιωάννη Σ. Λαϊνου
Αναπληρωτή καθηγητή (Π.Δ. 407/1981)
Τμήμα Πολιτικών Μηχανικών-Τομέας Συγκοινωνιολόγων
Πανεπιστήμιο Θεσσαλίας

Ολυμπιακή Αεροπορία
Τομέας Ερευνών και Οικονομικών Μελετών

Περίληψη

Επειδή μέχρι την 31-12-1992 η Ολυμπιακή Αεροπορία Α.Ε. (Ο.Α ) ενεφάνιζε λογιστικά ελλείμματα 275 δις. Δρχ και επειδή για τη συνέχιση της λειτουργίας της απαιτείτο κρατική ενίσχυση την οποία απαγόρευε η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, η τότε κυβέρνηση της Νέας Δημοκρατίας υπέβαλε το 1993 στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση (Ε.Ε.) σχέδιο εξυγίανσης . Το πρόγραμμα αυτό απερρίφθη ως ανεπαρκές. Το αναθεωρημένο πρόγραμμα που υπέβαλε τον Μάϊο του 1994 η εκλεγείσα τον 10/1993 κυβέρνηση του ΠΑ.ΣΟ.Κ ενεκρίθη. Η παραπομπή και των δύο προαναφερθέντων εξυγιαντικών προγραμμάτων της Ο.Α. στην Ε.Ε. για έγκριση, στηρίχθηκε στην παραδοχή ότι για την εξυγίανση της Ο.Α. απαιτείτο κρατική ενίσχυση η οποία απαγορευόταν ρητά από την πολιτική αερομεταφορών της Ε.Ε. όπως αυτή αναφερόταν στο τρίτο πακέτο απελευθέρωσης η ισχύς του οποίου άρχισε του 1993.
Μελέτη του Τομέα Οικονομικών μελετών της Ο.Α. που εκπονήθηκε τον Μάϊο του 1994 σε υλοποίηση απαίτησης του Επιτρόπου μεταφορών κ. A. Matutes απέδειξε ότι οι μη καταγεγραμμένες στα βιβλία οφειλές του κράτους-μετόχου προς την Ο.Α. σαν αποτέλεσμα της επιβάρυνσης των οικονομικών της Ο.Α. από την υποχρεωτική υλοποίηση των εκάστοτε κυβερνητικών πολιτικών, μέχρι το 1992 ήσαν άνω των 650 δις.δρχ έναντι 275 δις. Δρχ. του εμφανιζόμενου τότε λογιστικού ελλείμματος. Αυτό σημαίνει ότι την 31-12-1992 τα αποτελέσματα της Ο.Α. ήσαν κέρδη της τάξεως των 377 δις. Δρχ. και όχι έλλειμμα 275 δις. Δρχ όπως εμφανιζόταν στους ισολογισμούς της. Κατά συνέπεια δεν συνέτρεχε οικονομικός λόγος έγκρισης από την Ε.Ε. του προγράμματος εξυγίανσης της Ο.Α,
Τα μέτρα που προέβλεπε το πρόγραμμα που ενέκρινε η Ε.Ε. για την
εξυγίανση της Ο.Α. περιελήφθησαν στον νόμο 2271/12-1994. Στα πλαίσια αυτά η επιστροφή μέρους των οφειλομένων από το κράτος στην Ο.Α. αποκλήθηκε ως κρατική ενίσχυση. Από τα μέτρα του νόμου 2271/94 για την εξυγίανση της Ο.Α. υλοποιήθηκαν από τις διοικήσεις της Ο.Α. η ανάληψη από το Ελληνικό Δημόσιο των λογιστικών χρεών της Ο.Α. η συνταξιοδότηση περί των 1800 εργαζομένων και η αλλαγή των όρων και των συνθηκών εργασίας. Την 31-12-1997 με τη λήξη της ισχύος του νόμου 2271/1994 η τότε κυβέρνηση αποφάσισε να επεξεργασθεί συμπληρωματικά μέτρα εξυγίανσης της Ο.Α. τα οποία κωδικοποιήθηκαν στον Νόμο 2602/4-1998 με ισχύ μέχρι την 31-12-2001.
Τον Ιανουάριο του 1999 εννέα μήνες μετά την ψήφιση του δεύτερου Νόμου εξυγίανσης της Ο.Α. (Ν. 2602/4-1998) και με το επιχείρημα της μη υλοποίησής του, η κυβέρνηση ανακοινώνει την προκήρυξη διαγωνισμού για την ανάθεση της διοίκησης σε ξένο ανάδοχο ο οποίος θα αγόραζε και τμήμα του πακέτου των μετοχών της Ο.Α.. Ο διαγωνισμός αυτός που κατακυρώθηκε στην Speedwing θυγατρική του Βρετανικού αερομεταφορέα British Airways καταγγέλθηκε τόσο από μερίδα του τύπου όσο και από συμμετασχόντες ως διαβλητός. Παρά την αρχική αισιοδοξία για την εξυγιαντική και αναπτυξιακή πορεία της Ο.Α. υπό την ηγεσία της Speedwing, μετά την παρέλευση έτους η κυβέρνηση θεώρησε τα αποτελέσματα αρνητικά αφού δεν επετεύχθη κανένας από τους συμβατικά προβλεπόμενους στόχους. Επιπροσθέτως η Speedwing μετά την παρέλευση έτους αρνήθηκε να αγοράσει το 20% των μετοχών της Ο.Α. όπως προβλεπόταν από την σύμβαση της με το Ελληνικό Δημόσιο. Σαν αποτέλεσμα αυτών η Ελληνική κυβέρνηση επέβαλε την αποχώρησή της Speedwing από την διοίκηση της Ο.Α. τον Ιούνιο του 2000. Από τότε η Ο.Α. με απόφαση της κυβέρνησης, βρίσκεται στην τροχιά της ιδιωτικοποίησης συζητώντας με τον Ελληνικό αερομεταφορέα ΑΧΟΝ και το Αυστραλιανό consortium ΙΑS.

Λέξεις κλειδιά : Αερομεταφορές, Κρίση, Εξυγίανση, Ολυμπιακή Αεροπορία Α.Ε

Σκοπός του άρθρου
Σκοπός του άρθρου είναι να διερευνήσει τις αιτίες της εμφάνισης της κρίσης στην Ο.Α. και της αποτυχίας των δύο εξυγιαντικών προγραμμάτων που εφήρμοσαν οι κυβερνήσεις στην Ο.Α.
Συνεισφορά του συγγραφέα
Είναι η εφαρμοσθείσα μεθοδολόγία ανάλυσης και σύνθεσης η οποία καταλήγει στα συμπεράσματα των πραγματικών αιτιών τόσο της εμφάνισης της κρίσης όσο και της αποτυχίας των προγραμμάτων εξυγίανσης. Η μεθοδολογία αυτή μπορεί να εφαρμοσθεί σε κάθε ανάλογη περίπτωση.

Δομή της εργασίας

1 Εισαγωγή
2 Μεθοδολογία προσέγγισης της κρίσης μιας επιχείρηση
3 Η οικονομική κατάσταση της Ο.Α. την 31-12-1994
4 Αιτίες της κρίσης της Ο.Α.
4.1. Απόψεις της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης
4.1.1.Κριτική τοποθέτηση επί των απόψεων της Ε.Ε. αναφορικά με τις αιτίες της κρίσης της ΟΑ
4.2. Απόψεις των κομμάτων αναφορικά με τις αιτίες της κρίσης της Ο.Α.
4.3. Η άποψή μας
4.3.1. Τα φαινόμενα εκδήλωσης της κρίσης στην Ο.Α.
4.3.2. Οι αιτίες εμφάνισης της κρίσης στην Ο.Α. από την οπτική γωνία του εσωτερικού της περιβάλλοντός
4. 3.3. Οι αιτίες εμφάνισης της κρίσης στην Ο.Α. από την οπτική γωνία του εξωτερικού της περιβάλλοντος
5. Τι προέβλεπε ο νόμος 2271/12-1994 για την εξυγίανση της Ο.Α.
5.1. Τα κυριότερα μέτρα που προέβλεπε ο Ν. 2271/1994 ήσαν:
5.2. Ποια μέτρα του νόμου 2271/1994 υλοποιήθηκαν και ποια όχι
6. Συμπληρωματικό πρόγραμμα εξυγίανσης Νόμος 2602/4-98
6.1. Τι προέβλεπε ο Νόμος 2602/1998 για την ολοκλήρωση της εξυγίανσης
6.2. Ποια μέτρα του νόμου 2602/1998 υλοποιήθηκαν και ποια όχι
7. Ιδιωτικοποίηση της διαχείρισης της Ο.Α
8 Η πορεία ιδιωτικοποίησης της Ο.Α.
9 Η στάση των συνδικάτων της Ο.Α.
ΠΙΝΑΚΑΣ Λειτουργικό προφίλ της Α. 1994 – 1999
10 Συμπεράσματα

Εισαγωγή
1) Η Ολυμπιακή Αεροπορία Α.Ε. ιδρύθηκε το 1956 από τον Αριστοτέλη Ωνάση στα πλαίσια του υφισταμένου τότε διεθνούς θεσμικού καθεστώτος των εναερίων μεταφορών που απέρρεε από τη Σύμβαση του Σικάγο του 1944. Η ίδρυση της Ο.Α. ήταν αποτέλεσμα της αποτυχίας τριών άλλων ιδιωτικών αερομεταφορέων των Τ.Α.Ε., Α.Μ.Ε. και ΕΛΛΑΣ να επιβιώσουν στην ελληνική αγορά.
2) Οι όροι λειτουργίας της Ο.Α. τους οποίους συμφώνησε ο Ωνάσης με την τότε Ελληνική κυβέρνηση περιείχαν όρους που στη Βουλή μεταγενέστερα αποκλήθηκαν και από βουλευτές του ΠΑΣΟΚ αποικιοκρατικοί. Ανεξαρτήτως του πολιτικού χαρακτηρισμού τους ήσαν οι όροι που επέτρεπαν οι κρατούσες τότε συνθήκες της ελεύθερης αγοράς και όχι μόνο στην Ελλάδα.
3) Την Ο.Α. κρατικοποίησε το 1975 η κυβέρνηση υπό την ηγεσία του
Κων/νου Καραμανλή σαν αντίδραση στις απαιτήσεις του Ωνάση για περαιτέρω κρατικές επιδοτήσεις τις οποίες η τότε κυβέρνηση θεώρησε απαράδεκτες. Ας σημειωθεί ότι ο Ωνάσης ζητούσε ετήσια επιδότηση για το 1975 περί τα 60 εκατ. δολάρια όταν η κυβέρνηση τον ίδιο χρόνο με 68 εκατ. δολάρια εξαγόρασε την Ο.Α. (Πρακτικά της Βουλής. Υπουργός Συντονισμού, Παπαληγούρας-Υπουργία Συγκοινωνιών, Βογιατζής)
4) Όλες οι κυβερνήσεις από το 1975 και μετά χρησιμοποίησαν την Ολυμπιακή Αεροπορία όπως και τις άλλες κρατικής ιδιοκτησίας επιχειρήσεις-σαν εργαλείο υποχρεωτικής υλοποίησης της πολιτικής τους σε διαφόρους τομείς της κοινωνικής δραστηριότητας όπως εξωτερική πολιτική, περιφερειακή-αναπτυξιακή πολιτική, κοινωνική πολιτική, δημοσιονομική πολιτική,αμυντική πολιτική κ.α.

2 Μεθοδολογία προσέγγισης της κρίσης μιας επιχείρησης
Για να μπορέσει ένας οικονομολόγος-ερευνητής με επιτυχία να διαπιστώσει ποια είναι τα μέτρα που απαιτεί η εξυγίανση και η ανάπτυξη της Ο.Α. θα πρέπει να εφαρμόσει την ακόλουθη διαδικασία:
1) συλλογή στοιχείων,
2) προσδιορισμός των αρνητικών φαινομένων,
3) αξιολόγηση και ιεράρχησή τους με βάση το ειδικό τους βάρος στη
δημιουργία συγκεκριμένου προβλήματος τη δεδομένη χρονική
στιγμή.
4) προσδιορισμός των προβλημάτων που συντίθεται από το κάθε
υποσύνολο των αρνητικών φαινομένων,
5) προσδιορισμός των γενεσιουργών αιτιών του προβλήματος,
6) επιλογή της επιθυμητής λύσης, του προς επίτευξη στόχου
7) προσδιορισμός και επιλογή των μέτρων που είναι αναγκαία και εφικτά
για την υπέρβαση των συγκεκριμένων αιτιών που δημιούργησαν την
κρίση στην Ο.Α. από το σύνολο των μέτρων που διαθέτει το
οπλοστάσιο της πολιτικής οικονομίας και του management
8) προγραμματισμός της εφαρμογής των μέτρων -εισαγωγής των
αλλαγών (ποιες, πότε, πού, πως)
9) υλοποίηση της εφαρμογής των μέτρων -εισαγωγής των αλλαγών
10) έλεγχος της εφαρμογής των μέτρων,
11) επίτευξη του στόχου της εξυγίανσης ανάπτυξης κ.λπ. από την
εφαρμογή των μέτρων -εισαγωγής των αλλαγών,
12) αξιολόγηση του αποτελέσματος από την εισαγωγή των αλλαγών,
13) σταθεροποίηση των εισαχθεισών αλλαγών και των αποτελεσμάτων
τους.
Ας δούμε όμως τι θα συμβεί εάν για οποιοδήποτε λόγο παραβιασθεί η προαναφερθείσα διαδικασία.
1) Εάν δεν συλλεχθούν όλα τα στοιχεία και με αντικειμενικότητα, δεν θα καταστεί δυνατός ο προσδιορισμός όλων των αρνητικών φαινομένων ή και
2) Εάν δεν καταστεί δυνατός ο προσδιορισμός όλων των αρνητικών φαινομένων ή αν αξιολογηθούν διαφορετικά από το ειδικό τους βάρος τη συγκεκριμένη χρονική στιγμή στη ζωή της επιχείρησης,
πιθανότατα θα υπάρξει μια αλυσίδα σφαλμάτων που θα ξεκινά από το λαθεμένο προσδιορισμό των προβλημάτων και των αιτιών εμφάνισής τους μέχρι την λαθεμένη επιλογή των μέτρων υπέρβασης των αρνητικών φαινομένων ή ακόμα και των αιτιών ή και
3) Εάν δεν καταστεί δυνατός ο ακριβής προσδιορισμός των αιτιών που προκάλεσαν την εμφάνιση των αρνητικών φαινομένων στη ζωή της επιχείρησης, ή εάν δεν επιλεγούν τα αποτελεσματικά μέτρα υπέρβασής τους ή εάν τα επιλεγέντα μέτρα δεν εφαρμοσθούν από την διοίκηση και την ιεραρχία στα προταθέντα χρονικά διαστήματα, στην προταθείσα δοσολογία και για το προταθέν συνολικό χρονικό διάστημα εξυγίανσης ή και
4) Εάν δεν σταματήσει η «μόλυνση» της επιχείρησης κατά την διάρκεια ή και μετά το τέλος της εξυγίανσής της από τις συγκεκριμένες αιτίες που προκάλεσαν την επέλευση της κρίσης τότε η όλη διαδικασία της υπέρβασης της κρίσης της επιχείρησης είναι καταδικασμένη σε αποτυχία.

3 Η οικονομική κατάσταση της Ο.Α. την 31-12-1994
Με βάση το τρίτο πακέτο απελευθέρωσης της Ε.Ε. που αφορά στην κοινοτική πολιτική αερομεταφορών η ισχύς του οποίου άρχιζε την 1-1-1993 απαγορεύθηκαν οι κρατικές ενισχύσεις προς τους αερομεταφορείς για την προστασία του ανταγωνισμού. Η Ο.Α. την 31-12-1992 εμφανιζόταν να έχει υπέρογκα λογιστικά ελλείμματα της τάξης των 275 δις.δρχ Για να μπορέσει να συνεχίσει τη λειτουργία της, η τότε κυβέρνηση της Νέας Δημοκρατίας υπέβαλε το 1993 στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση (Ε.Ε.) σχέδιο εξυγίανσης με βάση το οποίο ζητούσε να της επιτραπεί από τα όργανα της Ε.Ε. η κρατική επιχορήγηση προς την Ολυμπιακή Αεροπορία. Το πρόγραμμα αυτό απερρίφθη ως ανεπαρκές. Το αναθεωρημένο πρόγραμμα που υπέβαλε τον Μάϊο του 1994 η εκλεγείσα τον 10/1993 κυβέρνηση του ΠΑ.ΣΟ.Κ ενεκρίθη. Η παραπομπή και των δύο προαναφερθέντων εξυγιαντικών προγραμμάτων της Ο.Α. στην Ε.Ε. για έγκριση στηρίχθηκε στην παραδοχή ότι για την εξυγίανση της Ο.Α. απαιτείτο κρατική ενίσχυση η οποία απαγορευόταν ρητά από την πολιτική αερομεταφορών της Ε.Ε. όπως αυτή αναφερόταν στο τρίτο πακέτο απελευθέρωσης. Για την αξιολόγηση της οικονομικής κατάστασης της Ο.Α. ο τότε Επίτροπος Μεταφορών της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής κ. Α. Matutes ζήτησε από την Ελληνι- κή κυβέρνηση την εκπόνηση μελέτης αναφορικά με τις οικονομικές σχέσεις του κράτους μετόχου με την Ο.Α. Με βάση τη μελέτη αυτή (Μάϊος 1994 Τομέας Οικονομικών Μελετών της Ο.Α. Δρ. Ιωάννης Σ. Λαϊνος) απεδείχθη ότι το κράτος όχι μόνο ήταν ασυνεπές ως προς την υλοποίηση των εκ του νό- μου και της ιδιότητάς του ως μοναδικού μετόχου απορρεουσών υποχρεώσεων του απέναντι στην Ο.Α. αλλά επί πλέον υποχρέωνε την Ο.Α. από την κρατικοποίησή της να υλοποιεί πτυχές της κυβερνητικής πολιτικής χωρίς να καλύπτει το κόστος από την υλοποίηση αυτή όπως το (υπερ)κάλυπτε επί Ωνάση και χωρίς το κόστος αυτό να υπολογίζεται και να καταγράφεται στα βιβλία της Ο.Α..
Οι ασυνέπειες του κράτους –μετόχου και οι πτυχές αυτές της κυβερνητικής πολιτικής αφορούσαν σε :
1) Μη καταβολή του οφειλόμενου από το 1982 μετοχικού κεφαλαίου
2) Υποχρεωτική κατ’απαίτηση της Επιτροπής Τιμών και
Εισοδημάτων υποτιμολόγηση των κομίστρων του εσωτερικού
δικτύου
3) Υποχρεωτική κατ’εντολή των κυβερνήσεων χορήγηση εκπτώσεων σε ορισμένες κατηγορίες επιβατών χωρίς την κάλυψη των διαφυγόντων εσόδων από τον κρατικό προϋπολογισμό
4) Μη καταβολή του κόστους υποχρεωτικής για την Ο.Α. χρήσης των αεροσκαφών της από την πολιτική και πολιτειακή ηγεσία
5) Μη καταβολή του κόστους μετακίνησης με την Ο.Α. για υπηρεσιακούς λόγους των δημοσίων υπαλλήλων
6) Υποχρεωτική υποτιμολόγηση κατά 97% της τιμής μεταφοράς του ημερήσιου και περιοδικού τύπου
7) Μη καταβολή των οφειλών των κομμάτων από την υποχρεωτική για την Ο.Α. μεταφορά των ψηφοφόρων τους σε περιόδους εκλογικών αναμετρήσεων
. Μέχρι την 31-12-1992 η Ολυμπιακή Αεροπορία Α.Ε. ενεφάνιζε συνολικά λογιστικά ελλείμματα 275 δις.δρχ. Με βάση τα αποτελέσματα της προαναφερθείσας μελέτης μέχρι την 31-12-1992 οι οφειλές του κράτους-μετόχου προς την Ο.Α. έφθασαν το ποσό των 652 δις. δρχ. παρ’ όλον ότι όπως αναφέρεται στη μελέτη πολλά στοιχεία για μία σειρά ετών δεν ανευρέθησαν στα αρχεία της Ο.Α. και κατά συνέπεια δεν συμπεριελήφθησαν στην αποτίμηση. Για παράδειγμα, για το κόστος μεταφοράς των ψηφοφόρων κατά τις εκλογικές αναμετρήσεις ανευρέθησαν επίσημα στοιχεία μόνο για το 5%. Στη μελέτη αυτή δεν συμπεριελήφθησαν:
– το κόστος κάλυψης από την Ο.Α. του μισθού περί των εκατό υπαλλήλων της αποσπασμένων σε διάφορα πολιτικά στελέχη το μέσο ύψος του οποίου υπολογίσθηκε με βάση μελέτη μας σε τιμές 1992 στα 400 εκατ. Δρχ ετησίως
– η κάλυψη από την Ο.Α. τμήματος του κόστους λειτουργίας των θυγατρικών της και ιδιαιτέρως της Ολυμπιακής Αεροπλοϊας το μέσο ύψος του οποίου υπολογίσθηκε με βάση μελέτη μας σε τιμές 1992 στα 3 δις. δρχ ετησίως
Οι οφειλές του κράτους μετόχου στην Ο.Α. την 31-12-1994 έφθασαν σύμφωνα με μεταγενέστερη μελέτη μας, τα 1,203.322 τρισεκατομμύρια Δρχ λόγω και του υψηλού την εποχή εκείνη χρηματοοικονομικού κόστους της Ο.Α. Την 31-12-1994 πριν την «ανάληψη των χρεών» της Ο.Α. από το κράτος το ύψος του συνολικού λογιστικού ελλείμματος της Ο.Α. ήταν της τάξης των 455 δις. Δρχ. Εάν κατά συνέπεια το κράτος-μέτοχος δεν επιβάρυνε την Ο.Α. με το κόστος της υποχρεωτικής υλοποίησης πλευρών της πολιτικής των αλληλοδιάδοχων κυβερνήσεων τότε η Ο.Α. την 31-12-1994 θα είχε συνολικά κέρδη της τάξεως των 748.322 δις. δρχ και όχι συνολικό έλλειμμα 455 δις. δρχ.
Αυτό το οικονομικό αποτέλεσμα καταδεικνύει το ότι:
– η Ο.Α. δεν ήταν υπό πτώχευση. Αντίθετα ήταν ένας εύρωστος οικονομικά αερομεταφορέας.
– δεν είχε ανάγκη κρατικής επιδότησης για τη συνέχιση των δραστηριοτήτων της. Αρκούσε η καταβολή των οφειλομένων από το κράτος μέτοχο.
– δεν υπήρχε ανάγκη αδείας από την Ε.Ε. για χορήγηση κρατικής επιδότησης
– κατά συνέπεια η παραπομπή του προγράμματος εξυγίανσης της Ο.Α. στην Ε.Ε. για έγκριση-και επιβολή όρων –και περιορισμών-λειτουργίας δεν στηρίχθηκε σε οικονομικές αναγκαιότητες.

Η ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΗ ΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΣΗ ΤΗΣ Ο.Α.
ΤΗΝ 31-12-1992 ΚΑΙ 31-12-1994

ΕΛΛΕΙΜΜΑΤΑ ΜΗ ΚΑΤΑΓΡΑΜΕΝΕΣ
ΛΟΓΙΣΤΙΚΑ ΣΤΑ ΒΙΒΛΙΑ ΤΗΣ Ο.Α. ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΙΚΑ
ΚΡΑΤΙΚΕΣ ΟΦΕΙΛΕΣ ΚΕΡΔΗ

31-12-1992 275 Δισ. Δρχ. 652 Δις. Δρχ. 377 Δις. Δρχ.
31-12-1994 455 “ “ 1,203 Τρις. Δρχ. 748 Δις. Δρχ.
Στις 7 Οκτωβρίου του 1994 η Ε.Ε. κοινοποίησε στην Ελληνική κυβέρνηση τους όρους που ενέκρινε για την εξυγίανση της Ο.Α. Οι όροι αυτοί συνοψίσθηκαν στο περιεχόμενο του Νόμου 2271/1994..

4 Ατίες της κρίσης της Ο.Α.
4.1. Απόψεις της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης
Ως αιτίες της επέλευσης της κρίσης στην Ο.Α. η Ε.Ε. βασίζεται στις απόψεις που διατυπώνει η Ελληνική Κυβέρνηση στο υποβληθέν στις 17/5/1994 προς την Επιτροπή πρόγραμμα εξυγίανσης της Ο.Α. Στα πλαίσια αυτά ως αιτίες της προβληματικής κατάστασης της Ο.Α. αναφέρονται οι ακόλουθες : (2)
1) Η Εποχιακή κίνηση
2) Το χαμηλό-συγκριτικά με αυτό των άλλων Ευρωπαϊκών αερομεταφορέων-επίπεδο παραγωγικότητας των συντελεστών παραγωγής .
3) Σφάλματα διαχείρισης, χαμηλή ποιότητα management έλλειψη συστήματος εσωτερικού ελέγχου,
4) Επιβολή υποχρεώσεων παροχής δημόσιας υπηρεσίας χωρίς οικονομικό αντιστάθμισμα
5) Ανεπάρκεια κεφαλαίων της εταιρίας
6) Ψηλά ελλείμματα
7) Ψηλές χρηματοοικονομικές δαπάνες

4.1.1.Κριτική τοποθέτηση επί των απόψεων της Ε.Ε. αναφορικά με τις αιτίες της κρίσης της Ο.Α.
Ακόμα και από μία –πρώτη πρόχειρη ανάγνωση των αιτιών επέλευσης της αποκαλούμενης κρίσης στην Ο.Α. που αναφέρει στην απόφασή της εβδόμης Οκτωβρίου 1994 η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση καθίσταται προφανές το ότι αναφέρονται σωρευτικά και χωρίς διαχωρισμό αιτίες και φαινόμενα εκδήλωσης της κρίσης. Έτσι εξισώνονται τα ελλείμματα και οι ψηλές χρηματοοικονομικές δαπάνες με τις οφειλές του κράτους προς την Ο.Α. και με το αναποτελεσματικό management που εφαρμόζεται από τις διοικήσεις και τα μέλη της επιχειρησιακής ιεραρχίας της Ο.Α.
Για το προσδιορισμό των αιτίων της κρίσης της Ο.Α. η Ε. Έ. στηρίζεται βασικά στο υφιστάμενο θεσμικό πλαίσιο ήτοι στα άρθρα 85-94 της συνθήκης της Ρώμης περί ελεύθερου ανταγωνισμού, στα τρία πακέτα απελευθέρωσης των εναερίων μεταφορών και στα προβλεπόμενα σχετικά με τις κρατικές ενισχύσεις.
Η Ελληνική κυβέρνηση παρέπεμψε την εξυγίανση της Ο.Α. στην Ε.Ε. παρ’ όλον ότι στην απάντησή της 7/5/94 προς την Ε.Ε. αποδέχεται ότι τα χρέη του κράτους προς την Ο.Α. ήσαν κατά πολύ περισσότερα από τα λογιστικά ελλείμματά της. Από τη πλευρά της η Ε.Ε. αναφερόμενη στα χρέη του Ελληνικού κράτους προς την Ο.Α. ως μοναδικού μετόχου της επισημαίνει:: «[…]Οι ελληνικές αρχές έδωσαν επίσης διευκρινήσεις όσον αφορά τον τρόπο με τον οποίο είναι δυνατόν να υπολογισθούν τα υποτιθέμενα διαφυγόντα κέρδη της εταιρίας κατά το χρονικό διάστημα 1975-1991, τα οποία αποδίδονται την πολιτική της ελληνικής κυβέρνησης σχετικά με τον έλεγχο των τιμών, την εκπλήρωση των υποχρεώσεων παροχής δημοσίας υπηρεσίας και την ανεπάρκεια των κεφαλαίων της επιχείρησης. Οι διευκρινήσεις αυτές επιτρέπουν, εξάλλου, να υπολογισθεί σε πέντε δισεκατομμύρια δραχμές, από το 1991 έως το 1993 η ετήσια ζημία την οποία υπέστη η Ο.Α. λόγω του περιορισμού των τιμών στις εσωτερικές ελληνικές γραμμές. Οι ζημίες που οφείλονται σε άλλες επιβαρύνσεις παροχής δημόσιας υπηρεσίας (μεταφορά δημοσίων υπαλλήλων, προσωπικοτήτων, εκπροσώπων του τύπου), είναι δυνατόν να υπολογισθούν σε ποσό λίγο μικρότερο από τέσσερα δισεκατομμύρια δραχμές ετησίως από το 1989 και το 1990 και μικρότερο από δύο δισεκατομμύρια ετησίως από το 1991 και εφεξής[…]» (2)
Από την ανωτέρω θέση της Επιτροπής της Ε.Ε. αναφορικά με τις
οφειλές προς την Ο.Α. κατά κατηγορία προέλευσής τους, του Ελληνικού Δημοσίου-Μετόχου της Ο.Α. προκύπτουν τα ακόλουθα:
1) Εφ’ όσον τα χρέη του κράτους προς την Ο.Α. είναι υποτιθέμενα-και κατά συνέπεια ανύπαρκτα-πώς στη συνέχεια η ίδια η Επιτροπή τα υπολογίζει και μάλιστα κατά κατηγορία προέλευσής τους;
2) Εφ’ όσον τα χρέη προς την Ο.Α. του Ελληνικού Δημοσίου-Μετόχου της Ο.Α. αφορούν-όπως αποδέχεται η Επιτροπή-στο χρονικό διάστημα 1975-1991 γιατί η Επιτροπή υπολογίζει μόνο τα χρέη που προκύπτουν μετά το 1989 ενώ τα ελλείμματα της Ο.Α. τα υπολογίζει σωρευτικά από το 1975 μέχρι το 1993;
3) Γιατί η Επιτροπή εφ’ όσον αποδέχεται τις διευκρινήσεις του Ελληνικού Κράτους αναφορικά με τα χρέη του προς την Ο.Α. δεν αναφέρεται πουθενά τόσο το συνολικό τους ύψος όσο και ο τρόπος με τον οποίο θα επιστραφούν
Εάν όμως το Ελληνικό κράτος-μοναδικός μέτοχος της Ο.Α. επέστρεφε τα οφειλόμενα και δεν παρενέβαινε στην καθημερινή λειτουργία της (προσλήψεις, προμήθειες, τιμολογιακή πολιτική κ.λπ.) αλλά άφηνε την Ο.Α. να λειτουργήσει στα πλαίσια των κανόνων της αγοράς σύμφωνα με την σύμβαση λειτουργίας της, είναι προφανές το ότι δεν υπήρχε – τουλάχιστον στη συγκεκριμένη χρονική περίοδο- αναγκαιότητα προσφυγής της Ελληνικής κυβέρνησης στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση ζητώντας άδεια για την κρατική ενίσχυση της Ο.Α. Επισημαίνεται ότι η σύμβαση λειτουργίας της κρατικής Ο.Α. ήταν η ίδια που είχε υπογράψει το κράτος με τον πρώην ιδιώτη ιδιοκτήτη της Ο.Α. Ωνάση στον οποίο κατέβαλε κάθε χρόνο τις επιβαρύνσεις που του προκαλούσε

4.2. Απόψεις των κομμάτων αναφορικά με τις αιτίες της κρίσης της Ο.Α.
«[…] Όμως έχουμε χρέος σήμερα να τονίσουμε κάποιες βασικές αιτίες οι οποίες έφθασαν τη κατάσταση μέχρι σήμερα εδώ, και να μην τις επαναλάβουμε. Ποιες είναι αυτές; Είκοσι χρόνια τώρα – θέλω να υπενθυμίσω στο Σώμα ότι ήδη έχουν κυλήσει είκοσι χρόνια από το 1975 που ο Ωνάσης εκχώρησε την επιχείρηση στο Δημόσιο – δεν υπήρξε ένα σταθερό συνεκτικό σχέδιο ανάπτυξης της Ολυμπιακής Αεροπορίας. Δεν ασκήθηκαν σταθερές πολιτικές από την πλευρά των διοικήσεων. Αντίθετα αυτές οι διοικήσεις χαρακτηριζόντουσαν από πολιτική ατολμία. Και όχι μόνο οι διοικήσεις αλλά και όλες οι κυβερνήσεις που πέρασαν είδαν την Ολυμπιακή Αεροπορία σαν ένα προνομιούχο χώρο άντλησης κάποιων ρουσφετολογικών και πελατειακών σχέσεων και κατάστρωσης τέτοιων μηχανισμών. […]Καμία πολιτική αξιόπιστη δεν ασκήθηκε όλα αυτά τα προηγούμενα χρόνια και έχουμε φθάσει σήμερα σε αυτό το οδυνηρό σημείο[…]»Πρακτικά της Βουλής 5-12-1994 κατά τη συζήτηση για τη ψήφιση του Ν2271/1994 κ. Λάμπρος Κανελλόπουλος Αγορητής του ΠΑΣΟΚ πρώην υπάλληλος της Ο.Α.
«[…] Βασική αιτία κατά την άποψή μου της εξέλιξης του
ελλείμματος από το έτος 1975 εως το έτος 1988 ήταν η πολιτική που ακολούθησε το Κράτος απέναντι στην Ολυμπιακή Αεροπορία […]Βεβαίως με αυτά που είπα δεν σημαίνει ότι η Ολυμπιακή Αεροπορία όλα αυτά τα χρόνια λειτουργούσε υποδειγματικά. Αντίθετα λειτούργησε πάντα με πολλά προβλήματα, προβλήματα οργανωτικά, προβλήματα επιχειρησιακά […].» Πρακτικά της Βουλής 5-12-1994 κατά τη συζήτηση για τη ψήφιση του Ν2271/1994 κ. Α. Ακριβάκης Εισηγητής της πλειοψηφίας ΠΑΣΟΚ, πρώην πρόεδρος του Δ.Σ. της Ο.Α. 1986-1989)
«[…]Το Κράτος το οποίο είναι και ο μοναδικός μέτοχος της Ολυμπιακής Αεροπορίας αντί να επιδείξει συμπεριφορά μετόχου, επέδειξε συμπεριφορά κομματικής φαυλοκρατίας και κυβερνητικής ολιγωρίας.[…] Πρακτικά της Βουλής 5-12-1994 κατά τη συζήτηση για τη ψήφιση του Ν2271/1994 κ. Δ.Ν. Κωστόπουλος Εισηγητής της μειοψηφίας (ΝΔ).
«[…] Τα αίτια είναι πολλά αλλά θα αναφερθώ ενδεικτικά σε μερικά. Άλλαξαν 28 διοικήσεις από το 1975 όλες κομματικές και επιρρεπείς στην εξυπηρέτηση του κομματικού συμφέροντος. Δεν υπήρξε μακροχρόνιος προγραμματισμός. Βέβαια έγιναν πολλές αναθέσεις μελετών, αλλά καμία δεν υλοποιήθηκε. Δεν υπάρχει και δεν υπήρξε ουσιαστικά οργανόγραμμα στην εταιρία αλλά ούτε υπάρχει ουσιαστικά κανονισμός προσωπικού με αποτέλεσμα οι αναθέσεις των διευθύνσεων και των προϊσταμένων να γίνονται ανεξέλεγκτα και άνευ αντικειμένου, σύμφωνα με τις φιλικές ή κομματικές σχέσεις διευθύνσεως προσωπικού.[…] Η τιμολογιακή πολιτική ησκείτο από το Κράτος δια της Επιτροπής Τιμών και Εισοδημάτων για λόγους Εθνικούς και κοινωνικούς για τους οποίους όμως ποτέ δεν κατεβλήθη ούτε μία δραχμή. Τριάντα τέσσερις κατηγορίες πολιτών ετύγχανον μεγάλων εκπτώσεων στα εισιτήρια. Έγιναν μεγάλες και ενεξέλεγκτες κυβερνητικές δαπάνες για τις οποίες δεν κατεβλήθη ποτέ ούτε μία δραχμή. Έγιναν αλόγιστες και υπεράριθμες προσλήψεις συνήθως ακατάλληλων προσώπων με κομματικά κριτήρια. Έγιναν αυξήσεις μετοχικού κεφαλαίου αλλά δεν κατεβλήθησαν ποτέ εκ μέρους του Ελληνικού Κράτους. Καινούργιες γραμμές συνήθως ζημιογόνες εδημιουργούντο χωρίς προηγούμενη μελέτη. Αγοράσθηκαν αεροπλάνα μεγαλύτερης χωρητικότητας απ’ ότι απαιτούσαν οι ανάγκες, με τις γνωστές συνέπειες κόστους αγοράς και λειτουργίας. Τέλος δεν υπήρξε αλλά κυρίως δεν υπάρχει σήμερα τρόπος παρακολούθησης των απαιτήσεων ώστε μεγάλα ποσά να χάνονται διότι δεν ξέρουμε που να τα αναζητήσουμε, ή όταν τα αναζητούμε έχουν ήδη παραγραφεί[…].» Πρακτικά της Βουλής 5-12-1994 κατά τη συζήτηση για τη ψήφιση του Ν2271/1994 κ. Κ. Χατζηδημητρίου Εισηγητής της Πολιτικής Άνοιξης
«[…]Αν πληρώσει το Ελληνικό Δημόσιο τα βερεσέδια του προς την Ολυμπιακή Αεροπορία- θα έπρεπε να το κάνει- τώρα θα συζητούσαμε μόνο ένα άρθρο για την Ολυμπιακή Αεροπορία την αύξηση του μετοχικού της κεφαλαίου γιατί υπήρχε μια ανωμαλία σχετικά με το καθεστώς αυτό. Τίποτα άλλο..[…] Πρακτικά της Βουλής 7-12-1994 κατά τη συζήτηση για τη ψήφιση του Ν2271/1994 κ. Δημήτρης Κωστόπουλος Κοινοβουλευτικός Εκπρόσωπος του Κομμουνιστικού Κόμματος Ελλάδας.
Εντύπωση προκαλεί το ότι ενώ τα κόμματα δια των εκπροσώπων τους αναγνωρίζουν το ότι υπεύθυνο για την κατάσταση της Ο.Α. είναι το κράτος μέτοχος το οποίο μέσα από την υλοποίηση διαφόρων πολιτικών των εκάστοτε κυβερνήσεων επιβάρυνε καταστρεπτικά τα οικονομικά αποτελέσματα της Ο.Α. δεν πρότειναν –με εξαίρεση το Κ.Κ.Ε.) ούτε ψήφισαν την επιστροφή στην Ο.Α. των οφειλόμενων από τα κράτος

4.3. Η άποψή μας
4.3.1. Τα φαινόμενα εκδήλωσης της κρίσης στην Ο.Α.
Ως “κρίση” – σε μικροοικονομικό επίπεδο – ορίζεται η αδυναμία της επιχείρησης να λειτουργήσει, μακροχρόνια, όχι μόνο με βάση την οικονομική αρχή, αλλά ακόμα και με βάση την ιδιοσυντήρηση. Στην Ο.Α. η κρίση με τη συγκεκριμένη οξύτητά της δεν εκδηλώθηκε σαν κεραυνός εν αιθρία, αλλά τα πρώτα συμπτώματά της εμφανίστηκαν από τα πρώτα χρόνια της κρατικοποίησής της.
Τα κυριότερα φαινόμενα με τα οποία εκδηλώθηκε η κρίση στην Ο.Α. είναι τα ακόλουθα:
1. Τα ραγδαία αυξανόμενα λογιστικά ελλείμματα
2. Ο υψηλός βαθμός δανειακής εξάρτησης
3. Η ανορθολογική σύνθεση του στόλου
4. Η υπερτιμολόγηση των αγοραζόμενων αεροσκαφών
5. Η ύπαρξη ενός απαρχαιωμένου οργανογράμματος με ανορθολογική διάρθρωση, η οποία δεν συναρτάται και γι’ αυτό δεν συμβάλλει στην υλοποίηση των προγραμματισμένων στόχων της επιχείρησης.
6. Τα απαρχαιωμένα και αναποτελεσματικά συστήματα διοίκησης-υποκίνησης προσωπικού
7. Η ανυπαρξία θεσμοθετημένων αποτελεσματικών μηχανισμών ελέγχου σε όλα τα επίπεδα της υπηρεσιακής ιεραρχίας, με αποτέλεσμα την έλλειψη αξιόπιστων στοιχείων για την επίδοση και κατά συνέπεια την αξιολόγηση του κάθε εργαζομένου αλλά και για την πορεία υλοποίησης του προγράμματος.
8. Η πτωτική τάση του επιπέδου της παραγωγικότητας της εργασίας σε σχέση με το αντίστοιχο των ανταγωνιστών (Ι.Α.Τ.Α.)

4.3.2. Οι αιτίες εμφάνισης της κρίσης στην Ο.Α. από την οπτική γωνία του εσωτερικού της περιβάλλοντός
1. Η απουσία στρατηγικού στόχου και αξιόπιστου αναπτυξιακού προγράμματος.
2. Η ζημιογόνα απέναντι στην κρατική Ο.Α. συμπεριφορά του κράτους – μετόχου σε αντίθεση με τη συμπεριφορά του ίδιου κράτους απέναντι στον ιδιώτη πρώην ιδιοκτήτη της Ωνάση.
3. Ο διορισμός από τον μέτοχο στο διοικητικό συμβούλιο της Ο.Α. ατόμων
όχι μόνο με ελάχιστη έως ανύπαρκτη γνώση και πείρα σχετικά με το αεροπορικό management, αλλά φορέων και εκπροσώπων συμφερόντων αντιτιθέμενων σε αυτά της Ο.Α.
4. Η κακοδιαχείριση των υποθέσεων της Ο.Α. από τα εντεταλμένα διοικητικά και άλλα στελέχη της επιχειρησιακής ιεραρχίας.
5. Η ανάληψη από την Ο.Α. τμήματος του κόστους λειτουργίας των θυγατρικών της

6 Η άτυπη παρέμβαση των μελών της κομματικής-συνδικαλιστικής ιεραρχίας στη διοίκηση της Ο.Α.
7. Η κάλυψη του κόστους εργασίας των αποσπασμένων υπαλλήλων της σε διάφορες πολιτικές θέσεις

3.3. Οι αιτίες εμφάνισης της κρίσης στην Ο.Α. από την οπτική γωνία του εξωτερικού της περιβάλλοντος
1. Όροι και συνθήκες εξαγοράς (κρατικοποίησης) της Ο.Α. του Ωνάση από το Ελληνικό Δημόσιο
2. Η παρέμβαση των διαφόρων κρατικών, κυβερνητικών και κομματικών μηχανισμών και στελεχών στη διαχείριση της Ο.Α. και η επιβολή επιλογών όπως τιμολογιακής πολιτικής, προμηθειών, προμηθευτών, επενδύσεων, αριθμού εργαζομένων – προσλήψεων, τοποθετήσεων, προαγωγών κλπ – που αποφασίστηκαν σε κέντρα λήψης αποφάσεων εκτός Ο.Α.
3. Την κρίση οξύνει η διεθνής αρνητική συγκυρία

4. Τι προέβλεπε ο νόμος 2271/12-1994
για την εξυγίανση της Ο.Α.

Τα κυριότερα μέτρα που προέβλεπε ο Ν. 2271/1994 ήσαν:

 Ανάληψη από το κράτος των χρεών της Ο.Α.
 Καταβολή από το Κράτος του οφειλόμενου μετοχικού κεφαλαίου της Ο.Α. ύψους 54 δισ.δρχ
 Προσαρμογή του τιμολογίου των κομίστρων μεταφοράς από την Ο.Α. του ημερήσιου και περιοδικού τύπου στις κρατούσες τιμές (κατάργηση της παρεχόμενης έκπτωσης ύψους 95% )
 Σύνταξη νέου οργανογράμματος με τέσσερα μόνον επίπεδα ιεραρχίας.
 Επαναξιολόγηση από μηδενική βάση του συνόλου των εργαζομένων για την κατάληψη των θέσεων της ιεραρχίας που προβλέπει το νέο οργανόγραμμα, με κριτήρια τις απαιτήσεις της θέσης σε σχέση με τα τυπικά και ουσιαστικά τους προσόντα.
 Εκπόνηση μέχρι 30-6-1995 προγράμματος δρομολογίων και σύνθεσης στόλου αεροσκαφών που να ανταποκρίνεται στα δρομολόγια αυτά.
 Μείωση του αριθμού των χρησιμοποιούμενων τύπων α/φων
 Χορήγηση από το Κράτος εγγύησης 379 εκατομμυρίων δολαρίων για αγορές νέων α/φών.
 Εκπόνηση μέχρι 30-6-1995 σύγχρονου κανονισμού εργασίας.
 Κέρδη 70 δις. δρχ μέχρι την 31-12- 1997
 Εθελουσία αποχώρηση 1500 εργαζομένων
 Πάγωμα των αποδοχών των εργαζομένων για το 1994 και 1995.
 Μείωση των ημερών αναπαύσεως των εργαζομένων σε ετήσια βάση κατά
δέκα.
 Μείωση των ετήσιων ημερών αδείας.
 Θεσμοθέτηση του διακεκομμένου ωραρίου σε περιφερειακούς σταθμούς.
 Μείωση της χορηγούμενης επιδότησης κατά τη διάρκεια της ασθενείας.

5.3. Ποια μέτρα του νόμου 2271/1994 υλοποιήθηκαν και ποια όχι
Μια αντικειμενική αξιολόγηση του βαθμού υλοποίησης του νόμου 2271/94 θεωρούμε ότι πρέπει να στηρίζεται στα συμπεράσματα που προκύπτουν από τη σύγκριση των μέτρων που υλοποιήθηκαν και του ποσοστού υλοποίησής τους με τα προβλεπόμενα από τον Νόμο 2271/94 – μέσα στα δεδομένα χρονικά πλαίσια.
Οι βασικότεροι από τους στόχους την επίτευξη των οποίων έθεσε ως άμεση προτεραιότητα ο νόμος είναι:
 Χορήγηση από το Κράτος εγγύησης 379 εκατομμυρίων δολαρίων για αγορές νέων α/φών.
Όμως, η Ευρωπαϊκή Ενωση απαγόρευσε την προβλεπόμενη από το πρόγραμμα εξυγίανσης χορήγηση κρατικής εγγύησης ύψους 378 εκατομμυρίων δολαρίων όταν κατά τη διάρκεια της συγκεκριμένης χρονικής περιόδου οι διοικήσεις της Ο.Α. πραγματοποίησαν παραγγελίες α/φων ύψους ενός δισεκατομμυρίου δολαρίων Η ενέργεια αυτή στηρίχθηκε στα αποτελέσματα του ελέγχου που πραγματοποίησαν εξουσιοδοτημένοι από την Ε.Ε. ελεγκτές, Deloit and Touch, οι οποίοι στον έλεγχο που διενήργησαν το 1997 διεπίστωσαν ότι η Ελληνική κυβέρνηση συνέχισε τις ασφυκτικές παρεμβάσεις της στη διαχείριση της Ο.Α. χωρίς να συμμορφώνεται με τις επιταγές του προγράμματος εξυγίανσης που η ίδια είχε υποβάλει για έγκριση στην Ε.Ε. Πιο συγκεκριμένα, η απόφαση της Ε.Ε. στηρίχθηκε στο ότι:
Η κυβέρνηση χρηματοδότησε την αποχώρηση των εργαζομένων το 1995 και 1996 με 11 δισ. δρχ.
Η κυβέρνηση συνέχισε να εμπλέκεται στις προσλήψεις της Ο.Α.
Η διοίκηση της Ο.Α.:
α) δεν κατάργης ε τις απαράδεκτες εκπτώσεις στα τιμολόγια μεταφοράς του τύπου ύψους 95%
β) δεν εκπόνησε νέο οργανόγραμμα
γ) δεν προκήρυξε τις θέσεις της επιχειρησιακής ιεραρχίας στη
διεκδίκηση των οποίων να συμμετέχει το σύνολο των εργαζομένων με
βάση τα τυπικά και ουσιαστικά τους προσόντα
δ) δεν εκπόνησε νέο κανονισμό εργασίας.
 Καταβολή από το Κράτος του οφειλόμενου μετοχικού κεφαλαίου της Ο.Α. ύψους 54 δισ. Δρχ
Μετά την καταβολή της πρώτης δόσης των 19 δισ. Δρχ. το 1995, η Ε.Ε. για τους προαναφερθέντες λόγους δεν επέτρεψε τη συνέχιση της καταβολής των υπολοίπων δόσεων συνολικού ύψους 35 δισ. δρχ.
 Προσαρμογή του τιμολογίου των κομίστρων μεταφοράς του ημερήσιου και
περιοδικού τύπου στις κρατούσες τιμές (κατάργηση της παρεχόμενης έκπτωσης ύψους 95% )
Ούτε η κυβέρνηση ούτε η διοίκηση της Ο.Α. φάνηκε να είναι διατεθειμένες να εφαρμόσουν το μέτρο αυτό, που θα τις έφερνε αντιμέτωπες με τα συγκροτήματα του Τύπου, παρ’ όλον ότι η Ο.Α. είχε κάθε χρόνο απώλεια εσόδων και επιβάρυνση του λειτουργικού κόστους της πάνω από τρία δισ. Δρχ. σε τιμές 1993 από αυτή την αιτία.(Ιωάννη Σ. Λαϊνου «Οι επιπτώσεις στην οικονομική αποτελεσματικότητα της Ο.Α. από την ακολουθούμενη τιμολογιακή πολιτική κατά την μεταφορά του Ελληνικού ημερήσιου και περιοδικού Τύπου» Τομέας Οικονομικών Μελετών Ολυμπιακής. 12-7-1993) Η μη συμμόρφωση της διοίκησης της Ο.Α. στο μέτρο αυτό του προγράμματος εξυγίανσης υπήρξε μία από τις αιτίες της αναστολής από την Ε.Ε. της καταβολής των κρατικών υποχρεώσεων απέναντι στην Ο.Α.
 Απαλλαγή των κερδών της Ο.Α. για τις χρήσεις 1994-1997 από κάθε φόρο και τέλος. Υλοποιήθηκε.
 Επίτευξη για την τριετία σωρευτικών κερδών 70 δισ. δρχ.
Όμως ο ισολογισμός του 1995 εμφάνισε κέρδη μόνον 9,9 δισ. δρχ. Ακόμα όμως και το ποσό αυτό δεν ανταποκρίνεται στην πραγματικότητα, αφού, εάν είχε συνυπολογισθεί και η κρατική επιχορήγηση των 11 δισ. δρχ. για την πρόωρη συνταξιοδότηση των εργαζομένων, το αποτέλεσμα θα ήταν ζημία 1,1 δισ. δρχ. Επί πλέον είχε καταβληθεί η πρώτη δόση του οφειλομένου μετοχικού κεφαλαίου ύψους 19 δις. Δρχ.
Το 1996 ο ισολογισμός της Ο.Α. εμφάνισε κέρδη 14 δισ. Δρχ. Το 1997, με βάση τον ισολογισμό, δημιουργήθηκαν ζημίες της τάξης των 39,5 δισ. Δρχ. Τα αποτελέσματα αυτά σημαίνουν ότι αντί των αναμενόμενων 70 δισ. Δρχ. κερδών για την τριετία 1995-1997 η Ο.Α. είχε ζημίες της τάξης των 14 δισ. Δρχ. Η απόκλιση ανέρχεται σε 600%.
 Σύνταξη μέχρι την 30-6-1995 νέου οργανογράμματος με τέσσερα μόνο επίπεδα ιεραρχίας
Αναγνωρίζοντας ο νομοθέτης την αναποτελεσματικότητα του υφισταμένου οργανογράμματος το κατάργησε. Η διοίκηση της Ο.Α. προσέλαβε ως σύμβουλο τον Ιανουάριο 1995 μετά από διαγωνισμό την εταιρία McKinsey. Η συνεργασία με την McKinsey διακόπηκε με απόφαση της 3/3/1995 του νέου Δ.Σ. της Ο.Α. υπό τον πρόεδρό της κ. Δογάνη, αναιρώντας έτσι την απόφαση της προηγούμενης διοίκησης. Σε ανακοίνωση του προέδρου του Δ.Σ. κ. Δογάνη, σαν επιχείρημα υπέρ της διακοπής της συνεργασίας προβλήθηκε το εκ 350 εκατ. δρχ. κόστος της μελέτης. Σε ανακοίνωσή του το σωματείο των πτυχιούχων διοικητικών επισήμανε σαν αιτία της διακοπής της συνεργασίας της Ο.Α. με την McKinsey την απαίτησή της να εποπτεύσει την υλοποίηση των προτάσεων της μελέτης της, όρο που περιείχε η προκήρυξη της Ο.Α. και είχε αποδεχθεί και η McKinsey. Με την ίδια απόφασή του το Δ.Σ. της Ο.Α. ανέθεσε την αναδιοργάνωσή της σε επιτροπή από διευθυντικά στελέχη της. Αυτό σημαίνει ότι τόσο η ανορθολογική οργανωτική δομή που δημιούργησαν οι αλλεπάλληλες διοικήσεις όσο και τα άτομα που τη στελεχώνουν, αφού οδήγησαν την Ο.Α. στην κρίσιμη κατάστασή της , επανατοποθετήθηκαν για να διαχειριστούν οι ίδιοι την έξοδό της από την κατάσταση στην οποία αυτοί την είχαν οδηγήσει. Η εκπόνηση του οργανογράμματος ολοκληρώθηκε από την εταιρία σύμβουλο McKinsey την άνοιξη του 1997, δύο δηλαδή χρόνια αργότερα από τις 30-6-1995, ημερομηνία που έθετε ο νόμος. Αλλά ακόμα και τότε το οργανόγραμμα αυτό δεν εφαρμόσθηκε.
 Επαναξιολόγηση από μηδενική βάση του συνόλου των εργαζομένων για την κατάληψη της ιεραρχίας που προβλέπει το νέο οργανόγραμμα, με κριτήρια τις απαιτήσεις της θέσης σε σχέση με τα τυπικά και ουσιαστικά τους προσόντα.
Μέχρι την λήξη της ισχύος του νόμου την 31-12-1997 δεν είχε υλοποιηθεί. Αντ’ αυτού έγιναν πάνω από 1.300 αναθέσεις καθηκόντων (προαγωγές) με κριτήρια στις περισσότερες περιπτώσεις διαφορετικά από τα τυπικά και ουσιαστικά προσόντα των εργαζομένων. Για την υπόθεση αυτή, το Επιστημονικό Σωματείο των διοικητικών υπαλλήλων της Ο.Α. υπέβαλε μήνυση, η έρευνα της οποίας ανατέθηκε σε τακτικό ανακριτή. Εντύπωση προκαλεί η αναντιστοιχία των προσόντων των στελεχών με τις απαιτήσεις των θέσεων που κατείχαν. Έτσι, ενώ σε νευραλγικές διευθύνσεις είχαν διοριστεί απόφοιτοι γυμνασίου με σχετική πρακτική εμπειρία στο αντικείμενο, στις μετέπειτα προκηρύξεις για τις ίδιες θέσεις απαιτήθηκε, πέραν της πρακτικής εμπειρίας, και μεταπτυχιακός τίτλος.
 Εκπόνηση μέχρι 30-6-1995 σύγχρονου κανονισμού εργασίας
Μέχρι την λήξη της ισχύος του νόμου την 31-12-1997 δεν είχε ολοκληρωθεί η εκπόνηση παρά το ότι:
α) η αναποτελεσματικότητα του management της Ο.Α. επισημαίνεται ρητά στο πρόγραμμα εξυγίανσης που ενέκρινε η Ε.Ε.
β) η διοίκηση, μετά από συνομιλίες με τους εργαζομένους, είχε συμφωνήσει σε συγκεκριμένο κείμενο κανονισμού, το οποίο όμως ουδέποτε προώθησε για εφαρμογή.
 Εκπόνηση μέχρι 30-6-1995 προγράμματος δρομολογίων και σύνθεσης στόλου αεροσκαφών που να ανταποκρίνεται στα δρομολόγια αυτά.
Η τότε διοίκηση της Ο.Α. προσέλαβε την εταιρία σύμβουλο Arthur D. Little – Cantor για την εκπόνηση προγράμματος δομής των δρομολογίων και σύνθεσης του στόλου της. Η μελέτη αυτή παραδόθηκε τον Μάιο του 1997, δηλαδή δύο περίπου χρόνια αργότερα από την προθεσμία που προέβλεπε ο Νόμος εξυγίανσης της Ο.Α.
 Εθελουσία αποχώρηση 1500 εργαζομένων
Επισημαίνεται ότι ο συνολικός αριθμός των εργαζομένων που υπέβαλαν αίτηση πρόωρης συνταξιοδότησης με βάση το νόμο ανήλθε σε 2.800 περίπου, για την πληρωμή των οποίων δεν προβλέφθηκαν τα αναγκαία κεφάλαια ύψους 15 δισ. δρχ. περίπου πέραν των 11 δισ. δρχ. που κατέβαλε το κράτος. Αντ’ αυτού τα 11 δισ. που προέβλεπε ο νόμος, λόγω λανθασμένων υπολογισμών της διοίκησης της Ο.Α. (η οποία εισηγήθηκε το ποσό αυτό στον υπουργό Μεταφορών και Επικοινωνιών) μόλις έφτασαν για την αποχώρηση μόνον 1.150 εργαζομένων.
 Πάγωμα των αποδοχών των εργαζομένων για τα χρόνια 1994 και 1995.
Πραγματοποιήθηκε με μείωση του εργασιακού κόστους της Ο.Α. κατά είκοσι τουλάχιστο δισ. δρχ. και αντίστοιχη μείωση του βιοτικού επιπέδου των εργαζομένων.
 Μείωση των ημερών αναπαύσεως των εργαζομένων σε ετήσια βάση κατά δέκα τρεις
Πιο συγκεκριμένα, ζητήθηκε από τη διοίκηση της Ο.Α. η μείωση των μηνιαίων αναπαύσεων των εργαζομένων κατά δύο ημέρες (υποχρεωτική δωρεάν προσφορά εργασίας) μέχρι του αριθμού των 13 ημερών μέσα στο 1995. Το μέτρο αυτό υλοποιήθηκε μερικώς παρ’ όλη την
προσπάθεια της ιεραρχίας και διοίκησης και προσωπικά του προέδρου της Ο.Α. κ. Ρ. Δογάνη. Η αποτυχία αυτή οφείλεται στην άρνηση των εργαζομένων να εργασθούν τις ημέρες αυτές δωρεάν και χωρίς ασφάλιση, όπως επέμενε η διοίκηση της Ο.Α. σύμφωνα με την ερμηνεία που έδινε στη συγκεκριμένη διάταξη του νόμου.
 Μείωση των ετησίων ημερών αδείας………………………….. Υλοποιήθηκε
 Θεσμοθέτηση του διακεκομμένου ωραρίου σε περιφερειακούς
σταθμούς………………………………………………….………Υλοποιήθηκε
 Μείωση της χορηγούμενης επιδότησης κατά τη διάρκεια της ασθενείας τους………………………………………………………………..Υλοποιήθηκε με αποτέλεσμα μία επιπλέον ετήσια μείωση του εργασιακού κόστους για την Ο.Α. ύψους άνω των 5 δισ. δρχ. (μελέτη της 6-11-1995 του Τομέα Μελετών της Ο.Α. από τον Δρα Ι.Σ. Λαϊνο, Επιστημονικό Συνεργάτη του ΤΕΙ Αθηνών).

6. Συμπληρωματικό πρόγραμμα εξυγίανσης Νόμος 2602/4-98
Την 31-12-1997 μετά την λήξη της ισχύος του Ν.2271/1994 για την εξυγίανση της Ο.Α. και αφού η αποτυχία ήταν προφανής άρχισε από την πλευρά πρώτης τάξεως κυβερνητικών στελεχών ένας καταιγισμός κατηγοριών κατά των εργαζομένων ως υπαιτίων της αποτυχίας.
Στις 9-3-1998 δημοσιεύθηκε στον «Ελεύθερο Τύπο» συνέντευξη του Υπουργού Μεταφορών και Επικοινωνιών κ. Τ. Μαντέλη στην οποία ανάμεσα στα άλλα διατυπώθηκε η θέση για κλείσιμο της Ο.Α. μέχρι το Πάσχα. «Αν δεν πάρουν μέτρα είναι από εκεί και πέρα θέμα χρόνου να κλείσει.» αφήνοντας αιχμές κατά των εργαζόμενων « λόγω των τεράστιων αυξήσεων που δόθηκαν…Γιατί αυτές οι αυξήσεις τίναξαν στον αέρα την εταιρία.» Αντίστοιχου περιεχόμενου ρεπορτάζ για κλείσιμο της Ο.Α. δημοσιεύθηκε την Κυριακή 8-3-1998 στο έγκυρο Γερμανικό περιοδικό «DER SPIEGEL».
Καθίσταται συνεπώς προφανές ότι ο κ. Υπουργός ως υπεύθυνους της αποτυχίας του προγράμματος εξυγίανσης της Ο.Α. θεωρεί τις υφιστάμενες εργασιακές σχέσεις, τους όρους και τις συνθήκες εργασίας των εργαζόμενων στην Ο.Α. Την θέση αυτή παρουσίασε στο Κοινοβούλιο και ο κ. Πρωθυπουργός απαντώντας την ίδια εποχή σε επίκαιρη ερώτηση του προέδρου του Συνασπισμού κ. Ν. Κωνσταντόπουλου. Σε άλλο σημείο όμως της συνέντευξης ο κ. Υπουργός αναιρεί την θέση του περί καθοριστικής ευθύνης των εργαζόμενων αφού δήλωσε ότι οι διοικήσεις της Ολυμπιακής κατά το πρόσφατο παρελθόν του παρουσίαζαν την εικόνα της Ο.Α. εντελώς διαφορετική από την πραγματική.
Ο κ. Παπαντωνίου τότε Υπουργός Εθνικής Οικονομίας της κυβέρνησης του ΠΑΣΟΚ δήλωσε στους «Financial Times» της 7-2-98 στο Λονδίνο ότι αν η κυβέρνηση καταφέρει και νικήσει το συνδικάτο της Ο.Α.(δηλαδή τα μέλη και στελέχη του ΠΑΣΟΚ τα οποία και αποτελούσαν τότε πλειοψηφία στο συνδικάτο) η νίκη αυτή θα ισοδυναμεί με αυτή της Μ Θάτσερ επί των ανθρακωρύχων. Ο προκάτοχος του κ. Μαντέλη πρώην Υπουργός Μεταφορών κ. Χ. Καστανίδης επισήμανε όμως ότι η δυσφημιστική αυτή εκστρατεία της κυβέρνησης εναντίον των εργαζομένων στην Ο.Α. στόχο έχει την δημιουργία «ψευδών εντυπώσεων», τόνισε δε ότι η κατηγορία για παραβίαση της εισοδηματικής πολιτικής της κυβέρνησης από τους εργαζομένους της Ο.Α. είναι προσχηματική. Η Συλλογική Σύμβαση Εργασίας του 1997 φέρει τις υπογραφές των εκπροσώπων του κατήγορου των εργαζομένων της Ο.Α. κ. Παπαντωνίου ο οποίος υπό την ιδιότητά του ως Υπουργού Εθνικής Οικονομίας τελούσε εν γνώσει των διαπραγματεύσεων και της συμφωνίας πριν την υπογραφή της. «Η πραγματική πρόθεση είναι να φθάσει σε αδιέξοδο η ιστορία γιατί αναμένουν αγοραστές της Ολυμπιακής» (Πρώην Υπουργός Μεταφορών Επικοινωνιών Χ. Καστανίδης Αιγαίο FM 20-3. Εφημερίδα «Αθηναϊκή» 21-3)

6.1. Τι προέβλεπε ο Νόμος 2602/1998 για την ολοκλήρωση της εξυγίανσης
Το νομοσχέδιο αναφορικά με την Ο.Α. του οποίου η ψήφιση ολοκληρώθηκε την Πέμπτη 9/4/98 τιτλοφορείται «Για την ολοκλήρωση της εξυγίανσης και την ανάπτυξη της Ολυμπιακής Αεροπορίας Α.Ε.» Τα βασικά μέτρα του νόμου ήσαν τα ακόλουθα:
– Η Ο.Α. θα λειτουργεί με τους κανόνες της ιδιωτικής οικονομίας και του ελεύθερου ανταγωνισμού
– Εντός τεσσάρων μηνών από την δημοσίευσή του η διοίκηση καταρτίζει ή προσαρμόζει κανονισμό προμηθειών
– Εντός δύο μηνών από την δημοσίευσή του η διοίκηση καταρτίζει ή προσαρμόζει το οργανόγραμμα στις σύγχρονες ανάγκες του διεθνούς φιλελευθεροποιημένου αεροπολιτικού περιβάλλοντος.
– Εντός ενός μηνός από την κατάρτιση του οργανογράμματος το Δ.Σ. στελεχώνει τις θέσεις εργασίας του νέου οργανογράμματος με στελέχη που θα προκύψουν από την αξιολόγηση όλων των εργαζομένων με βάση τα τυπικά και ουσιαστικά τους προσόντα.
– Εντός δύο μηνών από την δημοσίευση το Ελληνικό Δημόσιο εξοφλά όλες τις οφειλές του προς την Ο.Α.
– Οι οφειλές των πολιτικών κομμάτων εξοφλούνται τμηματικά μέχρι την 31-12-1999
– Αναπροσαρμόζεται από 1/6/1998 το τιμολόγιο μεταφοράς του ημερήσιου και περιοδικού τύπου στα επίπεδα που προβλέπονται από την ΙΑΤΑ (καταργείται η έκπτωση του 95%).
– Παύση της πληρωμής από την Ο.Α. των αποσπασμένων υπαλλήλων της σε πολιτικούς και σε άλλες θέσεις εκτός Ο.Α.
– Μείωση των μισθών κατά 20% από 1/4/1998 και τριετές πάγωμά τους, αύξηση των ωρών εργασίας από οκτώ σε δέκα, εισαγωγή των ατομικών συμβάσεων εργασίας της ελαστικής και εποχιακής εργασίας σε μόνιμη βάση.

6.2. Ποια μέτρα του νόμου 2602/1998 υλοποιήθηκαν και ποια όχι
 Η Ο.Α. θα λειτουργεί με τους κανόνες της ιδιωτικής οικονομίας και του ελεύθερου ανταγωνισμού. Υλοποιήθηκε εν μέρει αφού η Ο.Α. λειτουργούσε παράλληλα με άλλους ιδιωτικής ιδιοκτησίας αερομεταφορείς συνεχίσθηκαν όμως οι διοικητικές παρεμβάσεις του μετόχου στην καθημερινή διαχείριση της Ο.Α.
 Εντός τεσσάρων μηνών από την δημοσίευσή του η διοίκηση καταρτίζει ή προσαρμόζει κανονισμό προμηθειών …,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,…..Υλοποιήθηκε
 Εντός δύο μηνών από την δημοσίευσή του η διοίκηση καταρτίζει ή προσαρμόζει το οργανόγραμμα στις σύγχρονες ανάγκες του διεθνούς φιλελευθεροποιημένου αεροπολιτικού περιβάλλοντος. Η προσαρμογή του οργανογράμματος ενός αερομεταφορέα στο διεθνές φιλελευθεροποιημένο αεροπολιτικό περιβάλλον είναι συνάρτηση της θέλησης του μετόχου για λειτουργία εντός του συγκεκριμένου θεσμικού πλαισίου, της ύπαρξης συγκεκριμένων τακτικών και στρατηγικών στόχων. Οι προϋποθέσεις αυτές απουσίαζαν από το management της Ο.Α. Κατά συνέπεια το εφαρμοσθέν οργανόγραμμα αντανακλούσε τις προαναφερθείσες αδυναμίες και ελλείψεις.
 Εντός ενός μηνός από την κατάρτιση του οργανογράμματος το Δ.Σ. στελεχώνει τις θέσεις εργασίας του νέου οργανογράμματος με στελέχη που θα προκύψουν από την αξιολόγηση όλων των εργαζομένων με βάση τα
τυπικά και ουσιαστικά τους προσόντα.
Προκηρύχθηκε διαγωνισμός για τη πλήρωση των θέσεων της ιεραρχίας που προέβλεπε το οργανόγραμμα αλλά αποκλείσθηκε το σύνολο των εργαζομένων που δεν είχαν στο παρελθόν τοποθετηθεί σε θέση ιεραρχίας. Αυτό επετεύχθη με όρο που έθεσε η διοίκηση της Ο.Α. στην προκήρυξη του διαγωνισμού σύμφωνα με τον οποίο δικαίωμα να συμμετάσχουν είχαν μόνον όσοι στο παρελθόν είχαν στελεχική θέση τουλάχιστον επί μία τριετία. Έτσι όχι μόνο παραβιάσθηκε το γράμμα του νόμου αλλά και το πνεύμα του αφού τα στελέχη που επέλεξε η διοίκηση για την εξυγίανση της Ο.Α. ήσαν τα ίδια η δραστηριότητα των οποίων είχε σαν αποτέλεσμα να οδηγηθεί η Ο.Α. στην κρίση. Πέραν της παραβίασης αυτής του νόμου έγιναν και μια σειρά τοποθετήσεις στελεχών ακόμα και της ανώτατης ιεραρχίας, εκτός της διαδικασίας του διαγωνισμού Είναι φανερή η προσπάθεια της διοίκησης να λειτουργήσει με μία ομάδα στελεχών για τα οποία η εισηγητική έκθεση του νόμου αναφέρει ότι τοποθετήθηκαν με κριτήρια διαφορετικά από τα τυπικά και ουσιαστικά τους προσόντα.
 Εντός δύο μηνών από την δημοσίευση το Ελληνικό Δημόσιο
εξοφλά όλες τις οφειλές του προς την Ο.Α. .…………Υλοποιήθηκε εν μέρει
 Οι οφειλές των πολιτικών κομμάτων εξοφλούνται τμηματικά
μέχρι την 31-12-1999……………………..……………Υλοποιήθηκε εν μέρει
 Αναπροσαρμόζεται από 1/6/1998 το τιμολόγιο μεταφοράς του ημερήσιου και περιοδικού τύπου στα επίπεδα που προβλέπονται από την ΙΑΤΑ (καταργείται η έκπτωση του 95%).
Υλοποιήθηκε εν μέρει. Η εφαρμοζόμενη τιμολογιακή πολιτική δεν καλύπτει το πραγματικό τρέχον κόστος
 Παύση της πληρωμής από την Ο.Α. των αποσπασμένων υπαλλήλων
της σε πολιτικούς και σε άλλες θέσεις εκτός Ο.Α…………….Υλοποιήθηκε
 Μείωση των μισθών κατά 20% από 1/4/1998 και τριετές πάγωμά τους, αύξηση των ωρών εργασίας από οκτώ σε δέκα, εισαγωγή των ατομικών συμβάσεων εργασίας της ελαστικής και εποχιακής εργασίας σε μόνιμη βάση………………………,,,,,…………………………………… Υλοποιήθηκε

7. Ιδιωτικοποίηση της διαχείρισης της Ο.Α
Πριν την πάροδο μηνός από την ψήφιση του Νόμου 2602/4-1998 ανώτατα στελέχη της κυβέρνησης εξέφραζαν δημοσίως στον έντυπο και ηλεκτρονικό τύπο τη γνώμη τους περί αποτυχίας του εγχειρήματος και την ανάγκη ανάληψης της Ο.Α. από στρατηγικό επενδυτή. Έτσι η Υπουργός Εσωτερικών κ. Βάσω Παπανδρέου στο ραδιόφωνο του SKY 5-5-998 (Εφημερίδα “Καλημέρα” 6-5-1998) και Flash 6-5-1998 πήρε θέση υπέρ της εκχώρησης της Ο.Α. σε στρατηγικό επενδυτή ή του κλεισίματός της.. Ο κ. Ι Παπαντωνίου δήλωσε ότι δεν πιστεύει στην επιτυχία της εξυγίανσης και ότι τη λύση θα τη δώσει η αγορά εάν η Ο.Α. δεν καταστεί κερδοφόρα. (Ελευθεροτυπία της Κυριακής 25-4-1998) Ο τότε Υπουργός των Εξωτερικών κ. Θ. Πάγκαλος διατύπωνε την άποψη ότι η Ο.Α. πρέπει να κλείσει (Ελευθεροτυπία 30-4-1998) Στην ίδια συνέντευξη ο κ. Υπουργός είχε δηλώσει ότι κανένας
λογικός άνθρωπος δεν πετά πιά με την Ολυμπιακή. Η επιλογή τμήματος των ανώτατων στελεχών της κυβέρνησης υπέρ της εκχώρησης της Ο.Α. σε στρατηγικό επενδυτή είναι προφανής. Αντίστοιχα δημοσιεύματα εντάθηκαν το επόμενο χρονικό διάστημα. Στις 31 Ιανουαρίου 1999 το κράτος- μοναδικός μέτοχος της Ο.Α. δια των εξουσιοδοτημένων συμβούλων του Salomon Brothers International LTD και ETEBΑ A.E. δημοσίευσε στον τύπο ΠΡΟΣΚΛΗΣΗ ΥΠΟΒΟΛΗΣ ΕΚΔΗΛΩΣΗΣ ΕΝΔΙΑΦΕΡΟΝΤΟΣ για την εκχώρηση της διαχείρισης της Ο.Α. σε ιδιώτη βάσει του Νόμου 2000/1991
Το κυρίως αντικείμενο του Management Contract διακηρυσσόταν ότι ήταν η υλοποίηση του προγράμματος εξυγίανσης της Εταιρίας, αφού πρώτα ο Management Contractor υποχρεούτο να εξετάσει αντικειμενικά, το αναπτύξει και το προσαρμόσει, εφ’ όσον χρειάζεται, σύμφωνα με την επαγγελματική του κρίση. Το Management Contract, αποσκοπούσε σύμφωνα με τη διακήρυξη στην λειτουργική και οικονομική εξυγίανση της Ο.Α. ούτως ώστε η Εταιρία να καταστεί κερδοφόρα και να διασφαλιστεί η μακροπρόθεσμη βιωσιμότητά της με ιδιωτικοοικονομικά κριτήρια. Ο στόχος του Management Contractor ήταν να διαμορφώσει τις συνθήκες εκείνες στο εσωτερικό της Ο.Α. που να της επιτρέπουν την ένταξή της, με τους καλλίτερους δυνατούς όρους και προοπτικές, σε κατάλληλη για την Ο.Α. διεθνή «στρατηγική συμμαχία» αερομεταφορέων. Η επιλογή της Speedwing αποφασίσθηκε επισήμως στις 19-6-1999. Η επιλογή ανακοινώθηκε ότι έγινε με κριτήρια τη γενικότερη και ειδικότερη εμπειρία των ενδιαφερομένων καθώς και τη φερεγγυότητά τους εν όψει του μεγέθους και του εύρους της συγκεκριμένης προβλεπόμενης ανάθεσης. Όμως. Η ανάθεση της διοίκησης της Ο.Α. σε αλλοδαπή εταιρία συμβούλων διοίκησης, σαν ιδέα και θέση του μετόχου για την διέξοδο του Εθνικού αερομεταφορέα από την κρίση πρωτο-εμφανίζεται επίσημα τον Απρίλιο του 1998 κατά την συζήτηση για την ψήφιση του 2602 δευτέρου νόμου για την ολοκλήρωση της εξυγίανσης της Ο.Α στις δηλώσεις του Υπουργού Μεταφορών και Επικοινωνιών κ. Μαντέλη. Τότε δήλωνε ότι η Ο.Α. για να επιβιώσει και να αναπτυχθεί θα επιδιώξει να ενταχθεί σε διεθνή στρατηγική συμμαχία. Στις ίδιες δηλώσεις είχε αποκλείσει την περίπτωση εισόδου στην Ο.Α. στρατηγικού επενδυτή. Το όνομα των νέων διαχειριστών της Ο.Α. είχε ανακοινωθεί από την εφημερίδα «ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ» στις 8-1-1999 δηλαδή 22 ημέρες πριν την προκήρυξη του διαγωνισμού και έξι μήνες πριν την ανακοίνωση από τη κυβέρνηση του αποτελέσματος. Ο εκ των συμμετασχόντων στον διαγωνισμό Αμερικανικός αερομεταφορέας AMERICAN με επιστολή του διαμαρτυρήθηκε για τις κατά τη γνώμη της αδιαφανείς διαδικασίες που ακολουθήθηκαν στον διαγωνισμό. Στο συμβόλαιο που κατάρτισε η κυβέρνηση με την Speedwing δεν προβλεπόταν ρήτρα για περίπτωση μη υλοποίησης των δεσμεύσεων που αναφερόντουσαν στο συμβόλαιο ενώ προβλεπόταν υψηλοτάτη αμοιβή για την Speedwing. Για το λόγο αυτό ο τύπος και όχι μόνο αποκάλεσε τη σύμβαση αυτή λεόντια.

7.1. Το περιεχόμενο του Νόμου 2000/91 με βάσει τον οποίο εκχωρήθηκε η διοίκηση της Ο.Α. σε αλλοδαπούς ιδιώτες ανταγωνιστές
Με την πρώτη παράγραφο της προκήρυξης γνωστοποιείται ότι με απόφαση της διυπουργικής επιτροπής της 29-1-1999 η Ολυμπιακή εντάσσεται στον Νόμο 2000/91. Μόνο όμως από μία απλή ανάγνωση του τίτλου του νόμου αυτού διαπιστώνεται ότι δεν ρυθμίζει τα της εξυγίανσης των δημοσίων επιχειρήσεων όπως αναφέρεται στην πρόσκληση εκδήλωσης ενδιαφέροντος για την Ο.Α. αλλά αφορά στην :
«[…] αποκρατικοποίηση και απλούστευση των διαδικασιών εκκαθάρισης […]»
Πιο συγκεκριμένα ο νόμος 2000/91 αφορά σε :
« ‘Αρθρο1
Πεδίο εφαρμογής αποκρατικοποίησης
1. Για την εφαρμογή των διατάξεων του παρόντος νόμου αποκρατικοποίηση θεωρείται:[…]
β. Η μεταβίβαση σε ιδιώτες φορέων του Δημοσίου ή περιουσιακών στοιχείων, δικαιωμάτων και προνομίων των φορέων αυτών, κατά τα οριζόμενα στο άρθρο 5 (ιδιωτικοποίηση).[…]
Άρθρο 5
Τρόποι και μορφές ιδιωτικοποίησης
[…] ιδιωτικοποίηση πραγματοποιείται με έναν από τους παρακάτω τρόπους ή με συνδυασμό αυτών.
[…] στ. Ανάθεση σε ιδιώτες της διαχείρισης της επιχείρησης με ή χωρίς δικαίωμα εξαγοράς για συγκεκριμένη χρονική περίοδο και με ή χωρίς ταυτόχρονο με την ανάθεση καθορισμό του
τιμήματος εξαγοράς.»
Καθίσταται συνεπώς προφανές ότι η ανάθεση της διοίκησης της Ο.Α. βάσει του νόμου 2000 / 1991 από τη κυβέρνηση στην SPEEDWING δηλαδή σε ιδιώτη και μάλιστα σε θυγατρική ανταγωνίστριάς της Ο.Α. (της British Airways) αφορά στην διαδικασία ιδιωτικοποίησής της και όχι εξυγίανσής της στα πλαίσια του υφισταμένου κρατικού ιδιοκτησιακού καθεστώτος όπως διακηρυσσόταν

7.2. Τα αποτελέσματα της διαχείρισης της Ο.Α. από τους Βρετανούς managers
Τα οικονομικά αποτελέσματα της Ο.Α. την διετία 1999-2000 ήσαν ελλείμματα της τάξεως των 50 δις.δρχ. όπως είχε αναφέρει και κατά την εξέτασή του από επιτροπή του κοινοβουλίου την 27-6-2000 ο τότε Διευθύνων Σύμβουλος κ. Rod Linch (28-6-2000 Το ΒΗΜΑ, Η ΒΡΑΔΥΝΗ, ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΟΤΥΠΙΑ, ΕΞΠΡΕΣ, ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, ΤΑ ΝΕΑ, ΝΙΚΗ, ΧΡΗΜΑΤΙΣΤΗΡΙΟΝ, Η ΧΩΡΑ,)
Επισημαίνεται ότι στα προγράμματα που υπέβαλλε προς την κυβέρνηση η Βρετανική διοίκηση της Ο.Α. προβλεπόντουσαν ελλείμματα για μεν το 1999 8 δις. δρχ για δε το 2000 16. Δις. Δρχ.
Η επιβατική κίνηση το 1999 μετά την ραγδαία κατά 11 % περίπου πτώση που είχε το 1998 σαν αποτέλεσμα της μαζικής δυσφήμισης της Ο.Α. από ανώτατα κυβερνητικά στελέχη, είχε μία μικρή αύξηση της τάξεως του 1,9% ενώ το 2000 αυξήθηκε κατά 6,8% .
– Επιχειρήθηκε η αναδιάρθρωση της σύνθεσης του στόλου των α/φων της Ο.Α. Μία από τις αιτίες της αποτυχίας ήταν οι αμφιβόλου διαφάνειας διαδικασίες πώλησης των α/φων σε συνδυασμό με το ουσιωδώς χαμηλότερο τίμημα της πώλησής τους. Ενώ δηλαδή στο πρόγραμμα που υπέβαλε η Βρετανική διοίκηση στη κυβέρνηση τον Οκτώβριο του 1999 το ύψος των εσόδων από την πώληση του στόλου προβλεπόταν περί τα 23 δις.δρχ ή συμφωνία που κατάρτισε η διοίκηση της Ο.Α. με την εταιρία GECAS τέσσερις μήνες μετά προέβλεπε έσοδα περί τα 15 δις. Δρχ. μόνο.
– Επιχειρήθηκε η κατάργηση του εμπορικού σήματος της Ο.Α. (των πέντε κύκλων) που ανεστάλη μετά την σοβαρή αντίδραση των εργαζομένων. Εδώ πρέπει να επισημανθεί ότι η απόπειρα αυτή δεν πρέπει να ήταν εν αγνεία της κυβέρνησης η οποία στη διακήρυξη για ιδιωτικοποίηση της Ο.Α. ένα χρόνο μετά περιέλαβε όρο για την διατήρηση του σήματος της Ο.Α. από τον νέο ιδιοκτήτη της μόνο για δύο χρόνια.
– Επιχειρήθηκε η εκχώρηση της γραμμής της Αυστραλίας στην αεροπορική εταιρία ΑNSETT στην οποία συμμετείχε και η Βritish Αirways. μητρική εταιρία των Βρετανών managers της Ο.Α. Ας σημειωθεί ότι η εταιρία αυτή ένα χρόνο μετά- το καλοκαίρι του 2001- πτώχευσε. Η απόπειρα αυτή-παρά την προσωπική μετάβαση του κ. Rod Linch στην Αυστραλία- απέτυχε λόγω της εντονότατης αντίδρασης της ομογένειας ή ηγεσία της οποίας έκανε παράσταση και στο Έλληνα υπουργό εξωτερικών. Επισημαίνεται ότι για τη μη διακοπή της γραμμής αυτής προσφέρθηκε η Αυστραλιανή κυβέρνηση να χρηματοδοτήσει τμήμα του λειτουργικού της κόστους. Στις 21-7-2000 η κυβέρνηση κατήγγειλε τη σύμβαση με την British Airways-Speedwing που είχε υπογράψει από κοινού με την -Ο.Α. και της γνωστοποίησε ότι δεν σκοπεύει να της καταβάλει τα οφειλόμενα 900 εκατ. Δρχ.

8 Η πορεία ιδιωτικοποίησης της Ο.Α.
Στις 31-8-2000 ο Υπουργός Μεταφορών και Επικοινωνιών κ. Βερελής. προτείνει τη διάσπαση της Ο.Α. σε δύο εταιρίες. Η μία θα αναλάβει το παθητικό και θα μείνει στο κράτος ενώ η άλλη που θα έχει μόνο το ενεργητικό θα ιδιωτικοποιηθεί. (Αδέσμευτος Τύπος Μήτση, Αδέσμευτος Τύπος Ρίζου, ΑΠΟΓΕΥΜΑΤΙΝΗ, ΤΟ ΒΗΜΑ, ΒΡΑΔΥΝΗ, ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, ΤΟ ΚΑΡΦΙ, ΤΑ ΝΕΑ, ΧΡΗΜΑΤΙΣΤΗΡΙΟΝ)
Στην ομιλία του στην Έκθεση Θεσ/κης του 2000 ο πρωθυπουργός κ. Κ. Σημίτης αφού αναγνώρισε την αποτυχία της κυβέρνησης στην επιλογή Speedwing δήλωσε ότι μέσα στους επόμενους μήνες θα λυθεί το πρόβλημα της Ο.Α. ενώ στην αντίστοιχη ομιλία του το 1999 είχε δηλώσει ότι μέσα στους επόμενους μήνες θα λυνόταν το πρόβλημα της Ο.Α. με την επιτυχία των Βρετανών της Speedwing.
Με την υπ’ αριθμ. 455/12-9 2000 απόφασή της η κυβέρνηση αποφασίζει να την πώληση πλειοψηφικού πακέτου των μετοχών της Ο.Α. Στις 28-11-2000 σε κοινή του σύσκεψη με τον Υπουργό Μεταφορών και Επικοινωνιών κ. Βερελή ο κ. Πρωθυπουργός ανακοίνωσε την προ- κήρυξη διαγωνισμού για την πώληση του 65% των μετοχών της Ο.Α. με ταυτόχρονη εκχώρηση του management. Είχε ήδη προηγηθεί στις 29-11-2000 ερώτηση 61 βουλευτών του ΠΑΣΟΚ αναφορικά με το μέλλον της Ο.Α. στην οποία απάντησε στις 30-11-2000 ο. κ. Βερελής
Στις 10-12-2000 δημοσιεύθηκε από την Ελληνική κυβέρνηση στους Financial Times του Λονδίνου πρόσκληση εκδήλωσης ενδιαφέροντος για την εξαγορά πλειοψηφικού πακέτου της Ο.Α.
Ως σύμβουλος της Ελληνικής κυβέρνησης ο οποίος θα παρελάμβανε και θα αξιολογούσε τις προσφορές διορίσθηκε η Credit Swiss First Boston.
Στις 4-1-2001 εγκρίθηκε το σχέδιο ιδιωτικοποίησης της Ο.Α. από την διϋπουργική επιτροπή.
Στην προκήρυξη της Ελληνικής κυβέρνησης για την εξαγορά του πλειοψηφικού πακέτου των μετοχών της Ο.Α. ανταποκρίθηκαν μέχρι τις 18-6-2001 την τελευταία μετά από μερικές αναβολές της καταληκτική ημερομηνία υποβολής αναθεωρημένων προσφορών, οι ακόλουθοι: (7)
1) Golden Aviation Holdings του εφοπλιστή κ. Ρέστη
2) Integrated Airline Solutions Consortium
3) Cyprus Airways Consortium
4) Axon Airlines
Από τις προαναφερθείσες προσφορές ο σύμβουλος προτείνει ως οικονομικά ισχυρότερη αυτή της AXON του κ. Θ. Λιακουνάκου ο οποίος είναι εμπορικός αντιπρόσωπος στην Ελλάδα της BOEING MILITARY (στρατιωτικοί εξοπλισμοί). Η Boeing commercial παράγει τα γνωστά πολιτικά αεροσκάφη. Η AXON AIRLINES έκανε έναρξη λειτουργίας το καλοκαίρι του 1999 με δύο καινούργια jet BOEING B-737-700 ενοικιασμένα. Στη συνέχεια αύξησε το στόλο της με άλλα jet α/φη EMBRAER Το αρχικά κατατεθειμένο μετοχικό της κεφάλαιο ήταν 5.137 δις. δρχ Η απόφαση για αύξησή του αφορά σε 4.105 δις. δρχ ενώ οι ζημίες την 31-12-2000 ανήρχοντο σε 5.039 δις. Δρχ. (Δημοσιευμένος ισολογισμός) Η πρόταση AXON προβλέπει: (7)
1) Εξαγορά του 51% των μετοχών της Ο.Α.
2) Επένδυση 100 εκατομμυρίων ECU με ταυτόχρονη συνεισφορά 96 εκατομμυρίων ECU από το Ελληνικό Δημόσιο.
3) Αν απαιτηθεί μελλοντικά η ΑΧΟΝ θα επενδύσει επιπροσθέτως 100 εκατομμύρια ECU με ταυτόχρονη επιπρόσθετη συνεισφορά 96 εκατομμυρίων ECU από το Ελληνικό Δημόσιο
4) Η ιδιωτικοποιημένη Ο.Α.-ΑΧΟΝ θα μπορεί να λάβει δάνειο 135 εκατομμυρίων ECU με εγγύηση της Ελληνικής κυβέρνησης πληρωτέο σε 10,5 έτη με ημερομηνία έναρξης καταβολής της πρώτης δόσης τρία χρόνια μετά την έκδοσή του.
5) Μείωση του μόνιμου προσωπικού στα 4.533 άτομα (σήμερα είναι περί τα 5700. Μείωση κατά 20,5%) με όρους και συνθήκες εργασίας που ισχύουν για τους εργαζομένους της ΑΧΟΝ.
6) Αναθεώρηση εκ μέρους της Ελληνικής κυβερνήσεως των όρων χρήσης του αεροδρομίου των Σπάτων (προφανώς αναφέρεται στην μείωση των τελών)
7) Η χρηματοδότηση θα πραγματοποιηθεί είτε μέσω της AXON HOLDING της οποίας κύριος μέτοχος είναι ο κ. Θ.Λιακουνάκος, είτε με απ’ ευθείας καταβολή των αναγκαίων κεφαλαίων από τον κ. Θ. Λιακουνάκο και από άλλες πηγές επενδυτικών κεφαλαίων. Επειδή η AXON HOLDING είναι εισηγμένη στο χρηματιστήριο ο σύμβουλος διατυπώνει επιφυλάξεις για το ενδεχόμενο χρονοβόρων διαδικασιών.
Στο εξάμηνο χρονικό διάστημα που επακολούθησε την υποβολή των τελικών προσφορών της 19/6, άρχισαν διαπραγματεύσεις μεταξύ Δημοσίου και ΑΧΟΝ οι οποίες όμως δεν κατέληξαν σε θετικό αποτέλεσμα.
Στις 18/11/2001 η κυβέρνηση ανακοίνωσε την έναρξη διαπραγματεύσεων με το Integrated Airline Solutions Consortium τα μέλη του οποίου δεν έγιναν γνωστά στον σύμβουλο CSFB Η πρότασή του προβλέπει:
1) Εξαγορά του 100% των μετοχών της Ο.Α. με πρόβλεψη δυνατότητας πώλησης εντός εξ ετών του 49% στο Ελληνικό Δημόσιο αντί 74 εκατ ECU
2) Επένδυση 150 εκατομμυρίων ECU με διερεύνηση για εξεύρεση επιπρόσθετων 50 εκατομμυρίων ECU από επενδυτικά κεφάλαια.
3) Συνεργασία με ενδεχόμενη κεφαλαιακή συμμετοχή της Ένωσης Χειριστών Πολιτικής Αεροπορίας (συνδικάτο πιλότων Ο.Α.)
4) Επέκταση του υφισταμένου δικτύου προορισμών της Ο.Α.
5) Δεν αναφέρεται σε μείωση του αριθμού των εργαζομένων ούτε σε αλλαγή των όρων και των συνθηκών εργασίας.
Την 30-11-2001 και ώρα 17.00 η ΑΧΟΝ έκανε διακοπή δραστηριοτήτων και απεχώρησε από την αγορά αποσύροντας το ενδιαφέρον της για την απόκτηση της Ο.Α..
Την ημέρα της απόσυρσής της η ΑΧΟΝ ο ΥΜΕ κ. Βερελής έδωσε εντολή στη διοίκηση της Ο.Α. να μεριμνήσει για την κατάσχεση ενός αεροπλάνου τύπου EMBRAER της ΑΧΟΝ προς εξασφάλιση χρεών της προς την Ο.Α. από επί πιστώσει παροχή επίγειας εξυπηρέτησης (ground handling) . Όμως η AXON δεν είχε ιδιόκτητα α/φ αφού τα EMBRAER είχαν μεταφερθεί σε άλλη εταιρία.
Ο κ. Υπουργός δεν τήρησε την ίδια στάση όταν στις αρχές Νοεμβρίου
είχαν δημοσιευθεί πληροφορίες ότι η ΑΧΟΝ όφειλε στην Ο.Α. 580 εακατ δρχ από υπηρεσίες επίγειας εξυπηρέτησης (ground handling) και μάλιστα χωρίς να έχει υπογραφεί σύμβαση παροχής υπηρεσιών και χωρίς να έχει κατατεθεί από την ΑΧΟΝ η απαιτούμενη εγγυητική επιστολή. Βέβαια το χρονικό εκείνο διάστημα συνεχιζόντουσαν οι διαπραγματεύσεις της κυβέρνησης με την ΑΧΟΝ για την αγορά την Ο.Α. στο διάστημα των οποίων η ΑΧΟΝ επιβάρυνε την Ο.Α. με τμήμα του λειτουργικού της κόστους.
Ένα άλλο γεγονός που άπτεται της διαφάνειας της ιδιωτικοποίησης της Ο.Α. είναι ότι εναντίον της CREDIT SUISSΕ FIRST BOSTON του συμβούλου που επέλεξε η κυβέρνηση για την ιδιωτικοποίηση της Ο.Α., είχαν αρχίσει από την Αμερικανική κυβέρνηση ανακρίσεις αναφορικά με την αξιοπιστία του.
Υπενθυμίζεται ότι η CREDIT SUISSΕ FIRST BOSTON είχε επιλέξει την ΑΧΟΝ ως τον επικρατέστερο υποψήφιο για την αγορά της Ο.Α. παρ’όλον ότι η οικονομική κατάσταση αυτού του αερομεταφορέα δεν ήταν υγιής όπως αποδεικνυόταν και από τους δημοσιευμένους ισολογισμούς του. Σε άλλες δηλώσεις του ο κ. Βερελής τόνισε ότι ήδη από το καλοκαίρι υπήρχαν φωνές στην κυβέρνηση για πώληση της Ο.Α. στην ΑΧΟΝ με τις οποίες σύμφωνα
με δημοσιογραφικές πληροφορίες φωτογράφιζε τον πρώην Υπουργό Εθνικής Οικονομίας κ. Παπαντωνίου. Εντύπωση προκάλεσαν και οι δηλώσεις του κ. πρωθυπουργού το Σάββατο 1/12 αναφορικά με το ότι η κυβέρνηση επιθυμεί Εθνικό Αερομεταφορέα που να μην επιβαρύνει τον Έλληνα φορολογούμενο. Και όμως όπως αποδείχθηκε για μια ακόμη φορά με την πτώχευση της ΑΧΟΝ όπως και με άλλους ελληνικής ιδιοκτησίας ιδιωτικούς αερομεταφορείς στο παρελθόν, δεν είναι η Ο.Α. που επιβαρύνει τον Έλληνα φορολογούμενο. Αντιθέτως μέχρι την 31-12-2000 είχε επιδοτήσει τον κρατικό προϋπολογισμό με 1,4 τρις.δρχ.

9 Η στάση των συνδικάτων της Ο.Α.
Ήδη από την εποχή της πρώτης διακυβέρνησης από το ΠΑΣΟΚ οι εργαζόμενοι της Ο.Α. είχαν δεχθεί μία ιδιαίτερα έντονη ιδεολογική πίεση. Το επιχείρημα για μισθολογικά ρετιρέ-Ο.Α. και υπόγεια-ιδιωτικός τομέας ήταν ευρύτατα διαδεδομένο. Η πίεση αυτή εντάθηκε με τη διακυβέρνηση το διάστημα 1989-1993 από την Ν.Δ.. Τα επιχειρήματα των επικριτών των εργαζομένων στην Ο.Α. βασιζόντουσαν στις υφιστάμενες αντικειμενικές συνθήκες όπως οι κυβερνητικές-κομματικές παρεμβάσεις στη διαχείριση της Ο.Α. η κομματικοποίηση του συνδικαλισμού, η παρέμβαση των συνδικαλιστών στη διοίκηση για προώθηση πελατειακών σχέσεων με τους εργαζομένους (προσλήψεις, προαγωγές κ.λ.π.) Κατά συνέπεια όταν το ΠΑΣΟΚ το 1994 θέλησε με το νόμο 2271/1994 να επιβάλλει δραστική χειροτέρευση των εργασιακών σχέσεων των εργαζομένων στην Ο.Α. βρήκε πρόσφορο έδαφος και έλαβε τη συγκατάθεση της ομοσπονδίας ΟΣΠΑ όπου-ειρήσθω εν παρόδω-η κυβερνητική συνδικαλιστική παράταξη ΠΑΣΚΕ είχε την τελευταία δεκαπενταετία την απόλυτη πλειοψηφία. Η συγκατάθεση αυτή ήταν απαραίτητη στη κυβέρνηση για την νομοθετική αλλοίωση των εργασιακών σχέσεων με βάση το υφιστάμενο θεσμικό πλαίσιο της Ε.Ε. Μετά όμως την εμπειρία τους από την αποτυχία της πρώτης προσπάθειας εξυγίανσης κατά τη διάρκεια της οποίας οι εργαζόμενοι είχαν υποβληθεί στις προαναφερθείσες θυσίες το κλίμα άλλαξε άρδην. Η κυβέρνηση αντιλαμβανόμενη τη δύσκολη κατάσταση άρχισε διάλογο με το συνδικάτο. Στις 30/3/1998 και παρά τον συνεχιζόμενο διάλογο ο τότε υπουργός Μεταφορών και Επικοινωνιών κ. Α. Μαντέλης καταθέτει το νομοσχέδιο στη Βουλή. Στις 3/4/1998 από το Λονδίνο όπου βρίσκεται ο Πρωθυπουργός κ. Σημίτης συμμετέχοντας στην διάσκεψη των αρχηγών των Ευρωπαϊκών Σοσιαλιστικών Κομμάτων, δηλώνει ότι παρά τον διάλογο το νομοσχέδιο για την Ο.Α. θα προωθηθεί χωρίς αλλαγές. Οι εργαζόμενοι με αποφάσεις Γενικών Συνελεύσεων αρχίζουν κινητοποιήσεις. Μέσα σε ένα τέτοιο κλίμα στη συνεδρίαση του Δ.Σ. της ΟΣΠΑ της 6-4/1998 δεν έγιναν αποδεκτές οι αλλαγές των εργασιακών σχέσεων που περιελάμβανε ως νομοσχέδιο-τότε- ο μετέπειτα νόμος 2602 με το επιχείρημα ότι παρά την προηγούμενη χειροτέρευση των εργασιακών σχέσεων η εξυγίανση δεν επέτυχε με ευθύνη των διοικούντων και της κυβέρνησης. Στο συνέδριο που επακολούθησε η απόρριψη του νομοσχεδίου ήταν μαζική αφού το 50% περίπου των εκλεκτόρων της ΠΑΣΚΕ το καταψήφισε. Όμως παρά την καταψήφιση του νομοσχεδίου από όλα τα εμπλεκόμενα συνδικαλιστικά όργανα ο Πρόεδρος της Ομοσπονδίας κ. Μ. Πέρρος και ο Γ.Γ. κ. Νίκου αποστέλλουν στο Υπουργό Μεταφορών έγγραφο με την έγκρισή τους στο νομοσχέδιο. Έχοντας έτσι την τυπική έγκριση των εργαζομένων προχώρησε στη συζήτηση του νομοσχεδίου. Έκτοτε το συνδικάτο παρά τις όποιες οριακές διαφοροποιήσεις είτε πραγματικές είτε για άλλοθι χρησιμοποιείται όπως άλλωστε και στο παρελθόν σαν πολιορκητικός κριός επιβολής προς πάσα κατεύθυνση των προειλημμένων κυβερνητικών-κομματικών αποφάσεων. Στα πλαίσια αυτά στις 5-1-2001 η ηγεσία της Ομοσπονδίας – ΟΣΠΑ είχε συζητήσεις στην αίθουσα «Πήγασος» του ξενοδοχείου HILTON με τον σύμβουλο της κυβέρνησης αναφορικά με τις επιπτώσεις της ιδιωτικοποίησης της Ο.Α. στις θέσεις και τις συνθήκες εργασίας (ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ 14-1-2001)

10 Συμπεράσματα

1. Η επιλογή της ιδιωτικοποίησης της Ο.Α. υπήρξε πάγια και ρητή επιδίωξη του κόμματος της αξιωματικής αντιπολίτευσης Ήδη από το 1991 ο τότε πρωθυπουργός κ. Κ. Μητσοτάκης είχε δηλώσει ότι η Ελλάδα μπορεί να κάνει και χωρίς την Ολυμπιακή.

ΛΕΙΤΟΥΡΓΙΚΟ ΠΡΟΦΙΛ ΤΗΣ Ο.Α. 1994 – 1999 *

ΠΑΡΑΓΩΓΗ ΠΑΡΑΓΩΓΙΚΟΤΗΤΑ
Μ ε τα φ ε ρ θ έ ν τ ε ς Αριθμός Επιβάτες
Επιβάτες (εκατ.) Χιλιομετρικοί Εργαζομένων ανά μέσο
Τόνοι (εκατ.) εργαζόμενο)
ΕΣΩ ΕΣΩ ΕΞΩ
1994 3,3 2,5 97,3 805,2 10.348 56,0
1995 3,5 +6,1% 2,5 0,0% 104,3+7.2% 736,7 -8,5% 9.140 -11,7% 65,6 +17,1%
1996 3,8 +15,1% 2,6 +4,0% 110,1+13,2% 822,5 +2,1% 8.625 -16,7% 73,0 + 30,3%
1997 4,2 +27,3% 2,9 +16,0%112,6+15,7% 756,6 -6,0% 8.227 -20,5% 86,3 + 54,1%
1998 3,7 +12,0% 3,0 +20,0% 7.357 -28,9% 91,1 + 62,5 %
1999 3,6 + 9,0% 2,6 + 4,0% 103,6 +6,5% 795,6 -1,2% 7.030 -32,1% 88,2 + 57,5%
• Επεξεργασμένα στοιχεία από Ι.Α.Τ.Α.-W.A.T.S. 1994-1999

2. Η Ο.Α. θεωρήθηκε πτωχευμένη-και με αυτό το επιχείρημα, η εξυγίανσή της υποβλήθηκε για έγκριση στην Ε.Ε.- διότι στους ισολογισμούς της δεν κατεγράφοντο τα χρέη του κράτους μετόχου προς αυτή που προερχόντουσαν από την υποχρεωτική υλοποίηση διαφόρων κυβερνητικών πολιτικών όπως αναπτυξιακή, κοινωνική, εξωτερική, αμυντική κ.λπ.
3. Κατά τη συζήτηση του νόμου 2271/1994 οι κοινοβουλευτικοί εκπρόσωποι του ΠΑΣΟΚ κ.κ.Κανελόπουλος-Ακριβάκη αναγνώρισαν σαν αιτίες της κρίσης στην Ο.Α. τις κρατικές παρεμβάσεις και τα χρέη του κράτους προς την Ο.Α. που αυτές δημιούργησαν. Και όμως δεν ψήφισαν την επιστροφή των χρεών του κράτους προς την Ο.Α. αλλά την παραπομπή της Ο.Α. στην Ε.Ε. ως εταιρίας υπό πτώχευση.
4. Οι δύο νόμοι 2271/1994 και 2602/1998 που υποτίθεται ότι προωθούσαν την εξυγίανση της Ο.Α. δεν προέβλεπαν καμία ποινή για όσους τους παραβίαζαν.
5. Οι νόμοι αυτοί δεν υλοποιήθηκαν από τις διοικήσεις της Ο.Α. και ουδείς διώχθηκε γι’ αυτό
6. Ένα μήνα μετά τη ψήφιση του 2602/1998 για την ολοκλήρωση της εξυγίανσης της Ο.Α. ανώτατα κυβερνητικά στελέχη που είχαν ψηφίσει τον νόμο δήλωναν στον τύπο την άποψή τους υπέρ της ιδιωτικοποίησης της Ο.Α.
7. Ο νόμος 2000/1991 στον οποίο στηρίχθηκε η κυβέρνηση για να εκχωρήσει το management της Ο.Α. στους Βρετανούς δεν αναφέρεται στην εξυγίανση αλλά στην ιδιωτικοποίηση των ΔΕΚΟ
8. Καθίσταται συνεπώς προφανές ότι η αποτυχία της προσπάθειας εξυγίανσης της Ο.Α. οφείλεται στο ότι δεν υπήρχε πολιτική βούληση για εξυγίανση αλλά για ιδιωτικοποίηση. Η επίκληση της εξυγίανσης ήταν πολιτικό τέχνασμα για να αποφύγει η κυβέρνηση να επωμισθεί το πολιτικό κόστος από την αλλαγή της πολιτικής της στο τομέα αυτό και την ταύτισή της με τη θέση της αξιωματικής αντιπολίτευσης.
Το συμπέρασμα αυτό τεκμηριώνεται και από το ότι στους αποκληθέντες
εξυγιαντικούς νόμους 2271/1994 και 2602/1998 :
1) δεν διαχωρίσθηκαν τα φαινόμενα εκδήλωσης του προβλήματος από τις αιτίες που το προκαλούν με αποτέλεσμα να ληφθούν ενδεχόμενα σωστά μέτρα για την αντιμετώπιση του συγκεκριμένου φαινομένου όχι όμως και του προβλήματος μία από τις εκφράσεις του οποίου αποτελεί το συγκεκριμένο φαινόμενο
2) δεν αξιολογήθηκε σωστά το ειδικό βάρος τόσο των φαινομένων εκδήλωσης του προβλήματος όσο και των αιτιών που το προκαλούν με αποτέλεσμα να μην ληφθούν τα ενδεδειγμένα μέτρα που οδηγούν στην υπέρβαση της γενεσιουργού αιτίας-αιτιών στον ενδεδειγμένο χρόνο

Η έλλειψη πολιτικής βούλησης για εξυγίανση εκφράστηκε και σε επίπεδο εφαρμογής. Κανένα από τα δομικά μέτρα που προέβλεπαν οι νόμοι που στόχευαν στην εξυγίανση της Ο.Α. δεν υλοποιήθηκε: ήτοι:
1) Δεν ορθολογικοποιήθηκε, όπως προβλεπόταν από το νόμο, η σύνθεση του στόλου. Αντίθετα στο διάστημα της “Εξυγίανσης” αυξήθηκαν αντί να μειωθούν οι τύποι των α/φων.
2) Παρ’ όλον ότι η χαμηλή ποιότητα του management της Ο.Α. έχει καθοριστικές ευθύνες για την εμφάνιση της τρέχουσας κρίσης, γεγονός που επισημαίνεται και από την Ε.Ε., δεν κρίθηκε σκόπιμο να τροποποιηθεί το θεσμικό πλαίσιο της επιλογής των μελών του Διοικητικού Συμβουλίου το οποίο μέχρι σήμερα εξακολουθεί να διορίζεται από την εκάστοτε κυβέρνηση. Δεν ορίσθηκαν τα ελάχιστα κριτήρια και συγκεκριμένα προσόντα για το διορισμό κάποιου ως μέλους του Δ.Σ. της Ο.Α. Από την άποψη αυτή είναι χαρακτηριστικό το ότι τα μισά περίπου μέλη του Δ.Σ. που διορίστηκε μετά την ψήφιση του Νόμου 2271/94 και που είναι επιφορτισμένα με την εξυγίανσή της, συμμετείχαν σε προηγούμενα Δ.Σ. τα οποία έχουν καθοριστικές ευθύνες για την κρίσιμη κατάσταση της Ο.Α.
3) Με ευθεία παραβίαση των διατάξεων του νόμου οι διοικήσεις της Ο.Α. διατήρησαν στην ιεραρχία σχεδόν τα ίδια άτομα που ήσαν την τελευταία τριετία (κατά κανόνα την τελευταία δεκαετία και πλέον) τα οποία κατά τεκμήριο ευθύνονται για τα αρνητικά αποτελέσματα της προηγηθείσας διαχείρισής τους
4) Η κομματική εξάρτηση και η ενσωμάτωση του συνδικαλιστικού κινήματος της Ο.Α. στη συνδιαχείριση παρά την κομματική εξάρτηση και την ανυπαρξία των αναγκαίων για την συνδιαχείριση προσόντων των εμπλεκομένων, όχι μόνο δεν του επέτρεψε να διαδραματίσει αυτόνομο εποικοδομητικό ρόλο στην εξυγίανση, αλλά έχει επωμισθεί σοβαρότατες ευθύνες για την κατάσταση της ΟΑ
Ενδεικτική Βιβλιογραφία
1) Πρόγραμμα εξυγίανσης της Ο.Α. υποβληθέν στην Ε.Ε. από την Ελληνική κυβέρνηση την 10-5-94
2) Απόφαση της Ε.Ε. της 7-10-1994
3) Πρακτικά της συζήτησης στη Βουλή των Ελλήνων του Νόμου 2271/1994
4) Νόμος 2271/1994 και Εισηγητική Έκθεση
5) Πρακτικά της συζήτησης στη Βουλή των Ελλήνων του Νόμου 2602/1998
6) Νόμος 2602/1998 και Εισηγητική Έκθεση
7) CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON/ ALLEN & OVERY/M&P. BERNITSAS LAW OFFICES/ NORTON ROSE 29-6-2001
8) Ι.Σ. Λαϊνου «Μονόδρομος η ιδιωτικοποίηση; Φάκελος Ολυμπιακή Αεροπορία Α.Ε.» Εκδόσεις ΣΤΑΧΥ Αθήνα 1992
9) Ι. Σ. Λαϊνου (1999) «Οικονομική Εναερίων Μεταφορών σε ανταγωνιστικό περιβάλλον» Εκδόσεις ΣΤΑΜΟΥΛΗΣ Αθήνα
10) Ι. Σ. Λαϊνου «Οι επιπτώσεις στην οικονομική αποτελεσματικότητα της Ο.Α. από την ακολουθούμενη τιμολογιακή πολιτική κατά την μεταφορά του Ελληνικού ημερήσιου και περιοδικού Τύπου» Τομέας Οικονομικών Μελετών Ολυμπιακής. 12-7-1993
11) Ι.Σ. Λαϊνου «Οι επιπτώσεις στην οικονομική αποτελεσματικότητα της Ο.Α. από: α) την μη υλοποίηση από το κράτος-μέτοχο ορισμένων
άρθρων της σύμβασης λειτουργίας της,
β) την επιβάρυνση από το κράτος-μέτοχο των
οικονομικών αποτελεσμάτων της Ο.Α. με δαπάνες
του κρατικού προϋπολογισμού» Τομέας μελετών
της Ο.Α Αθήνα 5/1994.
12) Ι.Σ. Λαϊνου «Ιδού γιατί πετά με ομίχλη η Ολυμπιακή» Οικονομική
εφημερίδα «Επενδυτής» 10-12-1994.
13) Ι.Σ. Λαϊνου “Η “εξυγίανση” εξασθένησε τη διεθνή θέση της Ο.Α.”
Οικονομική εφημερίδα «Επενδυτής» 29-12-1995
14) Ι.Σ. Λαϊνου «Οι αιτίες της κρίσης στην Ολυμπιακή». Οικονομική
εφημερίδα «Επενδυτής» 27-1-1996
15) Ι.Σ. Λαϊνου «Έτσι θα εξυγιανθεί η Ολυμπιακή». Οικονομική εφημερίδα
«Επενδυτής» 2-3-1996
16) J.S. Lainos “The Greek Airline Industry” TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
IFAC/IFIP/IFORS Symposium. Greece Chania 1997 June
16-18 Proceedings. Volume 1 Pages 201-208
17) Ι.Σ. Λαϊνου «Το κλείσιμο της Ο.Α. διαπραγματευτικό όπλο ή οικονομική
αναγκαιότητα;» Οικονομική εφημερίδα Επενδυτής» 14-3-1998
18) Ι.Σ. Λαϊνου «Τελειώνει η κρίση στην Ο.Α. με την αλλαγή των όρων
εργασίας;” Οικονομική εφημερίδα «Επενδυτής» 29-3-1998
19) Ι.Σ. Λαϊνου «Ιδού λοιπόν τι δεν αναφέρει ο νέος αναπτυξιακός νόμος για
την Ο.Α.» Οικονομική εφημερίδα «Επενδυτής» 25-4-1998
20) Ι.Σ. Λαϊνου «Πολλές οι τακτικές ένας ο στόχος της κυβέρνησης για την
Ο.Α.» Οικονομική εφημερίδα «Επενδυτής»16-5-1998
21) Ι.Σ. Λαϊνου «Ζημιογόνες επιλογές αεροσκαφών από τη διοίκηση της Ο.Α.
Οικονομική εφημερίδα «Επενδυτής» 6-6-1998

AEGEAN UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCES

INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONVENTION 1997
“TOURISM AT INSULAR AREAS AND SPECIAL DESTINATIONS”

Dr Yiannis S. Lainos
Associate Professor (ΠΔ.407/1981) University of Thessaly.
School of Political Engineers
Sector of Traffic engineers

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Σύλλογος Ελλήνων συγκοινωνιολόγων. 1ο Διεθνές Συνέδριο
για την έρευνα στις μεταφορές στην Ελλάδα 21-22/2/2002

Η επίδραση της ανωτάτης διοίκησης του αερομεταφορέα
και των Μηχανικών αεροσκαφών
στην ασφάλεια των πτήσεων

Δρα Ιωάννη Σ. Λαϊνου
Αεροπορικές Μεταφορές Πανεπιστήμιο Θεσσαλίας

Περιεχόμενα
Περίληψη
Λέξεις κλειδιά
Σκοπός του άρθρου
Συνεισφορά του συγγραφέα
Εισαγωγή-Μεθοδολογία
¬Συνοπτική θεωρητική προσέγγιση
Παράγοντες εμπλεκόμενοι στην ασφάλεια των πτήσεων
Οι πλέον συνήθεις αιτίες επίδειξης από τους εργαζομένους συνειδητής συμπεριφοράς που θέτει σε κίνδυνο την ασφάλεια των πτήσεων
Παράγοντες του εσωτερικού περιβάλλοντος του aερομεταφο- ρέα που επιδρούν στη σωματική και ψυχολογική κατάσταση των εργαζομένων άρα και στην μη συνειδητή διαμόρφωση της ποιότητας της προσφερόμενης εργασίας τους
Επίπεδο αμοιβών
Βεβαιότητα αναφορικά με τη διασφάλιση της σταθερότητας της εργασίας
Χρησιμοποιούμενες μέθοδοι διοίκησης-υποκίνησης που επικεντρώνουν στην παραγωγή-αποτέλεσμα ή στον άνθρωπο.
Οι λειτουργίες του management των εναερίων μεταφορών (Προγραμματισμός, οργάνωση, διεύθυνση-συντονισμός, στελέχωση, έλεγχος)
Ποιος ο φορέας της ευθύνης για τη δημιουργία των παραγόντων του εσωτερικού περιβάλλοντος του αερομεταφορέα που επιδρούν στη διαμόρφωση της ποιότητας της εργασίας των μηχανικών α/φων
Οι δύο θεωρήσεις της υπευθυνότητας κατά τη διερεύνηση ενός συμβάντος-ατυχήματος
Η θεώρηση του «αιτιώδους παράγοντα» ( Οι επιπτώσεις από τη θεώρηση του «αιτιώδους παράγοντα»)
Η θεώρηση των “συνεισφερόντων παραγόντων”
Τομείς της συμπεριφοράς των μηχανικών α/φων στο χώρο της εργασίας τους που υφίστανται επιδράσεις από παράγον- τες του εσωτερικού περιβάλλοντος του αερομεταφορέα
• Ομαδοποίηση των αιτιών των διαπιστωθέντων λαθών επισκευής-συντήρησης
• Η επίδραση της παγκοσμιοποίησης των εναερίων μεταφορών (1978-1997) στους μηχανικούς α/φων των αερομεταφορέων μελών της ΙΑΤΑ
• Η επίδραση της παγκοσμιοποίησης των εναερίων μεταφορών (1978-1997) στους μηχανικούς α/φων των αερομεταφορέων μελών της ΙΑΤΑ
• Οι επτά κυριότερες αιτίες πτώσης του α/φους οφειλόμενες σε σφάλματα επισκευής-συντήρησης [12-13]
• Συμπεράσματα

ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΗ

Έρευνες ακόμα και από τις αρχές του εικοστού αιώνα (Hawthorn κ.λπ..) απέδειξαν ότι η ποιότητα και η ποσότητα της προσφερόμενης εργασίας δέχεται έντονες άμεσες ή έμμεσες επιδράσεις από παράγοντες του ευρύτερου εσωτερικού περιβάλλοντος της επιχείρησης. Οι παράγοντες αυτοί στο σύστημα της ελεύθερης αγοράς προσδιορίζονται αποκλειστικά από την ανωτάτη διοίκηση της επιχείρησης μέσα από τις λειτουργίες του προγραμματισμού, της οργάνωσης της διεύθυνσης, της στελέχωσης και του ελέγχου. Προσωπική μας πρωτογενής έρευνα σε μηχανικούς α/φων ανέδειξε μία σειρά παραγόντων του εσωτερικού περιβάλλοντος του αερομεταφορέα οι οποίοι επιδρούν στην ποιότητα της παρεχόμενης εργασίας από τους μηχανικούς α/φων. Η διαμόρφωση των παραγόντων αυτών ευρίσκεται σχεδόν αποκλειστικά στη δικαιοδοσία της διοίκησης και της ανωτάτης ιεραρχίας του αερομεταφορέα. Η απελευθέρωση των διεθνών αερομεταφορών είχε σαν συνέπειες:
α) την ένταση του ανταγωνισμού μεταξύ των αερo μεταφορέων
β) την τάση για ραγδαία αύξηση των αναφερθέντων συμβάντων-ατυχημάτων που οφείλονται στη συντήρηση των α/φων κατά 1200 % (1978-1997) όταν στο ίδιο χρονικό διάστημα η τάση εξέλιξης της παραγωγικότητας της εργασίας των μηχανικών ήταν αυξητική κατά 100% περίπου
γ) τη χειροτέρευση των όρων και συνθηκών εργασίας των μηχανικών α/φων
Παρ’όλον ότι :
α) στα έντυπα που οφείλουν να συμπληρώσουν οι διερευνητές των αεροπορικών ατυχημάτων υπάρχει ειδικό κεφάλαιο που αναφέρεται σε ενέργειες ή παραλείψεις της διοίκησης
β) οι διερευνητές έχουν εντοπίσει ενέργειες ή παραλείψεις της διοίκησης που συνέβαλαν στην πρόκληση του ατυχήματος εν τούτοις η πλειοψηφία των διερευνητών δεν καταγράφει τα γεγονότα αυτά στο ειδικό κεφάλαιο αλλά συνήθως τα εντάσσουν σε γενικά σχόλια. Το γεγονός αυτό αφ’ενός μεν υπερτονίζει τις ευθύνες των μηχανικών που υπέπεσαν σε λάθος – αφού δεν εξετάζονται ή δεν αναφέρονται οι αιτίες που τους οδήγησαν στο λάθος αυτό – αφ’ ετέρου δεν συμβάλλει στη προσπάθεια για υποκίνηση της διοίκησης προς απάλειψη των αιτιών αυτών.

Λέξεις κλειδιά
Αερομεταφορέας, Αερομεταφορών διοίκηση, παγκοσμιοποίηση , Αεροπορικό συμβάν-ατύχημα, Αεροπορικού ατυχήματος διερεύνηση, Ασφάλεια-πτήσεων.

Σκοπός του άρθρου
Σκοπός του άρθρου είναι:
1) η ανάδειξη των παραγόντων του εσωτερικού περιβάλλοντος των αερομεταφορέων που επιδρούν καθοριστικά στη διαμόρφωση της ποιότητας της εργασίας των μηχανικών α/φων
2) ο προσδιορισμός της επίδρασης αυτής και η αξιολόγηση των επιπτώσεών της στην ασφάλεια των πτήσεων
3) η επίδραση που ασκεί στη διαμόρφωση των παραγόντων αυτών η ανωτάτη διοίκηση (Διοικητικό Συμβούλιο, Διευθύνων Σύμβουλος, στελέχη της ανωτάτης επιχειρησιακής ιεραρχίας)

Συνεισφορά του συγγραφέα
Η συνεισφορά του συγγραφέα είναι η απόδειξη ότι:
1) παράγοντες του εσωτερικού περιβάλλοντος του αερομεταφορέα επιδρούν καθοριστικά στην ποιότητα των αποτελεσμάτων της εργασίας των μηχανικών α/φών.
2) οι παράγοντες αυτοί προσδιορίζονται σχεδόν αποκλειστικά από την ανωτάτη διοίκηση και τα μέλη της ανωτάτης ιεραρχίας του αερομεταφορέα
3) για τους προαναφερθέντες λόγους οι μηχανικοί α/φων δεν μπορεί να είναι απ0κλειστικά υπεύθυνοι για ενέργειες ή παραλείψεις τους κατά την διάρκεια της εκτέλεσης της εργασίας τους οι οποίες έχουν σαν αποτέλεσμα την πρόκληση αεροπορικού συμβάντος ή ατυχήματος

1. Εισαγωγή
Από το 1978 έως το 1997 ενώ η τάση αύξησης της παραγωγικότητας της εργασίας των μηχανικών α/φων των αερομεταφορέων μελών της ΙΑΤΑ κυμάνθηκε στο 100% [18] η τάση αύξησης των συμβάντων και ατυχημάτων κυμάνθηκε στο 1200% (επεξεργασμένα στοιχεία [13]). Το χρονικό αυτό διάστημα οξύνθηκε ραγδαία ο διεθνής ανταγωνισμός των αερομεταφορέων λόγω της απορύθμισης των αερομεταφορών στις ΗΠΑ από το 1978 και της απελευθέρωσης των αερομεταφορών στην Ε.Ε. από το 1993 με αποτέλεσμα πέραν των άλλων τη χειροτέρευση των όρων και των συνθηκών εργασίας των μηχανικών α/φων [22]
Έρευνά μας ανέδειξε ότι κατά τη διερεύνηση των αεροπορικών ατυχημάτων μέχρι το 1994, η φιλοσοφία του προσδιορισμού της υπευθυνότητας με βάση το ισχύον τότε θεσμικό πλαίσιο, επικεντρωνόταν κυρίως στην απόδοση ευθυνών στους μηχανικούς των οποίων συγκεκριμένες ενέργειες ή παραλείψεις κατά την άσκηση των καθηκόντων τους είχαν σαν αποτέλεσμα την επέλευση του συμβάντος ή ατυχήματος (causal factor) [15]. Μετά το 1994 φαίνεται ότι περιορίζεται ουσιαστικά η προαναφερθείσα μονομέρεια και η φιλοσοφία αντιμετώπισης των ευθυνών πρόκλησης αεροπορικών ατυχημάτων τείνει προς την αντίληψη της ενοχοποίησης μιας σειράς παραγόντων (contributing factors) που θεωρούνται ότι έχουν συνεισφορά στην πρόκληση του ατυχήματος.
Όμως το ισχύον διεθνές αεροπορικό θεσμικό πλαίσιο [16] εξακολουθεί να θεωρεί απολύτως υπεύθυνο και υπόλογο (accountable) τον πιστοποιημένο (certified) μηχανικό για την εκτέλεση συγκεκριμένων επιθεωρήσεων χωρίς να υπεισέρχεται στις αιτίες που προκάλεσαν τη συγκεκριμένη συμπεριφορά του. Αυτός μετά την ολοκλήρωση των αναγκαίων εργασιών επί του α/φους πριν την αναχώρησή του από τη τεχνική βάση, διαθέτοντας το κατάλληλο πτυχίο (certificate) επιθεωρεί και πιστοποιεί (υπογράφει) την σύμφωνη προς τα εγχειρίδια εκτέλεσή τους.

2. Παράγοντες εμπλεκόμενοι στην ασφάλεια των πτήσεων [19, 28]
Τα συμβάντα ή τα ατυχήματα στην εμπορική βιομηχανία εναερίων μεταφορών οφείλονται σε ταυτόχρονη παραβίαση των κανόνων της ασφαλείας των πτήσεων σε πλευρές των ακόλουθων παραμέτρων:
2.1. Αεροσκάφος (σχεδιασμός κατασκευή, επισκευή, συντήρηση)
2.2. Λειτουργικά πρότυπα
2.3. Ιπτάμενο πλήρωμα
2.4. Εκπαίδευση
2.5. Έλεγχος εναερίου Κυκλοφορίας -Αεροδρόμιο

3. Οι πλέον συνήθεις αιτίες επίδειξης από τους εργαζομένους συνειδητής συμπεριφοράς που θέτει σε κίνδυνο την ασφάλεια των πτήσεων [28]
Αυτές μπορούν να κατανεμηθούν στις ακόλουθες ομάδες παραγόντων:
3.1. Ψυχολογικές ανάγκες όπως η αυτό-επιβεβαίωση, η αποδοχή από ομάδα-ες άτυπης οργάνωσης κ.λπ.
3.2. Εκδίκηση προς τον προϊστάμενο ή την εταιρία για άρνηση ικανοποίησης αιτημάτων
3.3. Πρόκληση της εύνοιας του προϊσταμένου σε περιβάλλον απουσίας αξιοκρατίας
3.4. Έλλειψη γνώσης λόγω μειωμένων προσόντων ή χαμηλού επιπέδου εκπαίδευσης
3.5. Εναρμόνιση με τη φιλοσοφία της διοίκησης η οποία στην ασφάλεια των πτήσεων αντιπαρατάσσει τη μείωση του κόστους και την αύξηση της απόδοσης του κεφαλαίου
4. Παράγοντες του εσωτερικού περιβάλλοντος του αερομεταφορέα που επιδρούν στη σωματική και ψυχολογική κατάσταση των εργαζομένων άρα και στην μη συνειδητή διαμόρφωση της ποιότητας της προσφερόμενης εργασίας τους [1-4, 6-11,17,23-27 29-30]
Πέραν της υφισταμένης σύγχρονης διεθνούς επιστημονικής βιβλιογραφίας και πρόσφατη πρωτογενής έρευνά μας κατέληξε στο συμπέρασμα ότι βασικοί παράγοντες του εσωτερικού περιβάλλοντος της επιχείρησης που επηρεάζουν θετικά ή αρνητικά τη ψυχολογική κατάσταση (ευεξία ή άγχος , θυμός, κόπωση, πνευματική καθαρότητα και εγρήγορση κ.λπ.) και κατά συνέπεια τη ποιότητα της εργασίας που προσφέρουν οι μηχανικοί α/φων είναι οι ακόλουθοι:
4.1. Επίπεδο αμοιβών
4.2. Βεβαιότητα αναφορικά με τη διασφάλιση της σταθερότητας της εργασίας
4.3. Χρησιμοποιούμενες μέθοδοι διοίκησης-υποκίνησης που επικεντρώνουν στην παραγωγή-αποτέλεσμα ή στον άνθρωπο.
Ενδεικτικά:
4.3.1. Σεβασμός της προσωπικότητας του εργαζομένου-αποφυγή απορριπτικών, προσβλητικών συμπεριφορών από στελέχη της ιεραρχίας
4.3.2. Αναγνώριση της συμβολής του εργαζομένου στην ανάπτυξη του αερομεταφορέα μέσω των:
4.3.2.1. Ελευθερίας οργανωμένης διατύπωσης απόψε ων αναφορικά με τη βελτίωση των μεθόδων οργάνωσης εκτέλεσης κ.λ.π. των εργασιών
4.3.2.2. Αξιοκρατικής ανέλιξης σαν αποτέλεσμα αξιοκρατικής αξιολόγησης
4.3.2.3. Τοποθέτησης σε «ανώτερη» εργασία στο ίδιο επίπεδο ιεραρχίας
4.3.2.4. Καταβολής εφ’ άπαξ αμοιβής ή άδειας ή άλλου δώρου (π.χ. ταξίδι) ως αναγνώριση της συμβολής σε συγκεκριμένο επίτευγμα (εργασία, πρόταση κ.λπ.)
4.3.2.5. Έγγραφης αναγνώρισης (συγχαρητήρια, εύφημη μνεία κ.λπ.)

4.4. Συνθήκες εργασίας
4.4.1. Συνολικός χρόνος εργασίας
4.4.2. Συχνότητα και διάρκεια της νυκτερινής βάρδιας
4.4.3. Ασφάλεια στο χώρο της εργασίας και κατά την εκτέλεσή της
4.4.4. Κλιματολογικές συνθήκες χώρο της εργασίας και κατά την εκτέλεσή της
4.4.5. Επάρκεια – καθαριότητα χώρου επίπεδο φωτισμού, θορύβου – καθαρότητα του αέρα
4.4.6. Ύπαρξη επιβλαβών για τον οργανισμό χημικών κ.λπ. ουσιών και ακτινοβολιών
4.4.7. Επίπεδο εντατικοποίησης της εργασίας
4.4.8. Κατάλληλες στολές εργασίας

4.5. Αποτελεσματικότητα προγραμματισμού και οργάνωσης της εργασίας
4.5.1. Ο έγκαιρος προγραμματισμός επαρκούς και κατάλληλου για την προς εκτέλεση εργασίας προσωπικού
4.5.2. Η επάρκεια και η ποιότητα της προσφερόμενης από τον αερομεταφορέα εκπαίδευσης
4.5.3. Αποτελεσματικός προγραμματισμός
και οργάνωση της έγκαιρης και επαρκούς προμήθειας, διάθεσης και διακίνησης των αναγκαίων κάθε φορά μηχανημάτων, εργαλείων, ανταλλακτικών
4.6 Το κοινωνικό κύρος του αερομεταφορέα
4.7 Το επαγγελματικό και κοινωνικό κύρος της εκτελούμενης εργασίας
4.8 Η κατάσταση της υγείας, η φυσική κατάσταση (π.χ. κόπωση)

5. Οι λειτουργίες του management των εναερίων μεταφορών [19]
Στα πλαίσια της διερεύνησης του φορέα της ευθύνης για τη δημιουργία των παραγόντων του εσωτερικού περιβάλλοντος του αερομεταφορέα που επιδρούν στη συμπεριφορά του μηχανικού α/φων παραθέτουμε τις λειτουργίες του management καθώς και τους παράγοντες που προσδιορίζονται από αυτές. Οι λειτουργίες της διοίκησης κάθε επιχείρησης συνίστανται γενικά στο προγραμματισμό, την οργάνωση, τη διεύθυνση-συντονισμό, τη στελέχωση και τον έλεγχο. Το περιεχόμενο αυτών των λειτουργιών του management των εναερίων μεταφορών περιλαμβάνει γενικά:
5.1. Προγραμματισμό
5.1.1. Τον αριθμό των προορισμών, τον όγκο της ζήτησης κατά προορισμό, τη συχνότητα των πτήσεων ανά προορισμό, τις ώρες πτήσης κ.λπ..
5.1.2. Τη σύνθεση του στόλου
5.1.3. Την ετήσια ανάλωση καυσίμων-λιπαντικών
5.1.4. Την επάρκεια κτιρίων-εγκαταστάσεων
5.1.5. Την επάρκεια του προσωπικού λαμβάνοντας υπ’όψιν: α) τον συνολικό όγκο των εργασιών (ιδίων και προς τρίτους) β) τους συμφωνημένους με τα συνδικάτα όρους και συνθήκες εργασίας κ.λπ.
5.1.6. Την επάρκεια εργαλείων, μηχανημάτων, ανταλλακτικών
5.1.7. Το επίπεδο των αναγκαίων επενδύσεων σε όλους τους τομείς
5.1.8. Το αναγκαίο ύψος κεφαλαίων (για επενδύσεις και ταμιακή ρευστότητα-κίνησης)

5.2. Οργάνωση
Για την αποτελεσματική υλοποίηση των προγραμματισθέν- των στόχων:
5.5.1. Κατασκευή του οργανογράμματος
5.5.2. Προσδιορισμός του όγκου, του είδους της εργασίας κάθε θέσης εργασίας καθώς και των αναγκαίων προσόντων για τη κατάληψη της συγκεκριμένης θέσης
5.5.3. Προσδιορισμός της εξουσίας και της ευθύνης κάθε θέσης εργασίας
5.5.4. Προσδιορισμός των τυπικών σχέσεων κάθε θέσης εργασίας με τις ομοεπίπεδες ανώτερες και κατώτερες ιεραρχικά
5.3. Διεύθυνση -Συντονισμός
Την δημιουργία εκείνων των όρων και συνθηκών εργασίας στο εσωτερικό περιβάλλον του αερομεταφορέα μέσω της εφαρμογής των πλέον ενδεδειγμένων μεθόδων και συστημάτων διεύθυνσης-υποκίνησης –σαν αποτέλεσμα της κρατούσας φιλοσοφίας της διοίκησης- που θα έχουν σαν αποτέλεσμα την επίτευξη των ποσοτικών και ποιοτικών στόχων με βάση την οικονομική αρχή.
5.4. Στελέχωση
Συνίσταται στην επιλογή, εκπαίδευση, τοποθέτηση και προαγωγή του προσωπικού σύμφωνα με τις προγραμματισμένες ανάγκες του αερομεταφορέα (αριθμός εργαζομένων κατά ειδικότητα-προσόντα)
5.5. Έλεγχος
5.5.1. Σύγκριση των προγραμματισμένων προς επίτευξη στόχων και χρονικής περιόδου επίτευξης με τα πραγματοποιηθέντα
5.5.2. Προσδιορισμός των αποκλίσεων μεταξύ προγραμματισθέντων-επιτευχθέντων
5.5.3. Προσδιορισμός των αιτιών των αποκλίσεων μεταξύ προγραμματισθέντων-επιτευχθέντων
5.5.4. Προσδιορισμός και εισαγωγή των απαραίτητων αλλαγών για την επίτευξη και διασφάλιση της διαρκούς προσαρμογής του συστήματος στις επιδράσεις-αλλαγές του εσωτερικού και εξωτερικού περιβάλλοντος του αερομεταφορέα

6. Ποίος ο φορέας της ευθύνης για τη δημιουργία των παραγόντων του εσωτερικού περιβάλλοντος του αερομεταφορέα που επιδρούν στη διαμόρφωση της ποιότητας της εργασίας των μηχανικών α/φων

Τις προαναφερθείσες λειτουργίες υλοποιεί η διοίκηση μέσω και:
6.1. της κατανομής της εργασίας με βάση τον όγκο και το είδος, σε επίπεδα ιεραρχίας και θέσεις εργασίας
6.2. της εκχώρησης της απαραίτητης εξουσίας για την εκπλήρωση των ανατιθέμενων καθηκόντων σε κάθε επίπεδο ιεραρχίας και σε κάθε θέση εργασίας
6.3. του ενιαίου και της συνέχειας της διοίκησης της απόλυτης ευθύνης του κάθε προϊσταμένου για όλες τις ενέργειες ή παραλείψεις όλων των υφισταμένων του.
Η θέση ορισμένων συγγραφέων [28] ότι η ευθύνη για τα ατυχήματα σταματά στο μεσαίο ιεραρχικά επίπεδο του Διευθυντού φαίνεται ότι δεν λαμβάνει υπ’ όψη της τις προαναφερθείσες αρχές οργάνωσης και διοίκησης.
Από τη σύγκριση των παραγόντων του εσωτερικού περιβάλλοντος του αερομεταφορέα που καθορίζονται από τη διοίκηση και εκείνων που επιδρούν στη σωματική και ψυχολογική κατάσταση των εργαζομένων άρα και στη μη συνειδητή διαμόρφωση της ποιότητας της προσφερομένης εργασίας τους, καθίσταται σαφές ότι στο σύστημα της ελεύθερης οικονομίας της αγοράς τουλάχιστον στις χώρες της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης η δυνατότητα των εργαζομένων για παρέμβαση στη διαμόρφωση των προαναφερθέντων παραγόντων περιορίζεται στο επίπεδο της διαβούλευσης με τη διοίκηση και ενημέρωσής τους για τις αποφάσεις της. Σε καμία περίπτωση δεν έχουν δικαίωμα συναπόφασης ή αρνησικυρίας (veto) για την διαμόρφωση των παραγόντων αυτών, οπότε και θα ήταν δικαιολογημένη η αποδοχή ευθύνης από τους μηχανικούς. Τους παράγοντες αυτούς καθορίζει και τροποποιεί η ανωτάτη διοίκηση
7. Οι δύο θεωρήσεις της υπευθυνότητας κατά τη διερεύνηση ενός συμβάντος-ατυχήματος

7.1 Η θεώρηση του «αιτιώδους παράγοντα» [12-13]
1) Βήματα της έρευνας:
α) Τι συνέβη
β) Ποιος το έκανε
γ) Γιατί το έκανε
2) Τιμωρία του ένοχου-υπεύθυνου μηχανικού μέσω:
α) απόλυσης
β) επιβολή υποχρεωτικής αργίας άνευ αποδοχών
γ) Προσωρινή ανάκληση της ισχύος του πτυχίου του
δ) Έγγραφη ή προφορική επίπληξη
ε) Υποχρεωτική επανεκπαίδευση

7.2. Οι επιπτώσεις από τη θεώρηση του «αιτιώδους παράγοντα»
7.2.1. Επέλευση συμβάντος ατυχήματος
7.2.2. Η διερεύνηση καταλήγει στο συμπέρασμα ότι ευθύνεται ο μηχανικός
7.2.3. Ο μηχανικός θεωρείται λογικό άτομο
7.2.4. Το λογικό άτομο γνωρίζει να διακρίνει τη σωστή από τη λανθασμένη δραστηριότητα
7.2.5. Το λογικό άτομο επιλέγει τη σωστή δραστηριότητα – ενέργεια
7.2.6. Κατά συνέπεια και σύμφωνα με την προαναφερθείσα θεώρηση, ο μηχανικός οι επιλογές του οποίου οδήγησαν στο ατύχημα, συνειδητά επέλεξε να κάνει το λάθος που οδήγησε στο ατύχημα
7.2.7. Αφού το λάθος θεωρείται σαν αποτέλεσμα ελεύθερης επιλογής λογικού ατόμου γι’ αυτό ο μηχανικός υφίσταται τις κατηγορίες και τις μομφές των προϊσταμένων του
7.2.8. Ενέργειες της ιεραρχίας για να συνετίσουν το μηχανικό περιλαμβάνουν μέτρα όπως προειδοποίηση, τιμωρία, ενθάρρυνση για ένταση της προσοχής κ.λπ. με ταυτόχρονη κοινοποίησή τους στο σύνολο των εργαζομένων
7.2.9. Στη περίπτωση κατά την οποία ο μηχανικός θεωρεί ότι η ευθύνη του στην πρόκληση του συμβάντος-ατυχήματος ήταν υποδεέστερη αυτής του συστήματος λόγω συγκεκριμένων δυσλειτουργιών του οι οποίες προκάλεσαν τη εσφαλμένη συμπεριφορά του, τότε πιθανόν τα προαναφερθέντα μέτρα να μην αποδώσουν. Η αντίδρασή του μηχανικού για τη τιμωρία του δυνατόν να εκδηλωθεί μέσω συμπεριφορών όπως μελαγχολίας, επιθετικότητας η γενικότερης συνειδητής επικίνδυνης συμπεριφοράς.
7.2.10. Εάν τα συμβάντα-ατυχήματα από την ίδια αιτία εξακολουθούν να προκαλούνται στον ίδια αερομεταφορέα σημαίνει ότι τα ληφθέντα μέτρα δεν απέδωσαν.
Υπάρχουν τρεις εναλλακτικές επιλογές για την αντιμετώπιση από το management της αναποτελεσματικότητας των ληφθέντων μέτρων εναντίον του απείθαρχου μηχανικού:
Α) να διερευνήσει για πιο αποτελεσματικά μέτρα συμβατά με τη προσωπικότητα του συγκεκριμένου μηχανικού.
Β) να θεωρήσει ότι ο συγκεκριμένος μηχανικός δεν συνετίζεται από τις ποινές και τις παραινέσεις και δεν μεταμελείται λόγω των προβλημάτων της προσωπικότητας, του χαρακτήρα και τελικά της ψυχολογίας του. Στη περίπτωση αυτή όμως η διοίκηση πρέπει να παραδεχθεί ότι ο μηχανισμός επιλογής στελεχών της πάσχει από ουσιώδεις δυσλειτουργίες, αφού επέλεξε άτομο με ψυχολογικά προ- βλήματα για μια καίρια θέση στην ασφάλεια των πτήσεων.
Γ) Το management του αερομεταφορέα να θεωρήσει ότι η αναποτελεσματικότητα των ληφθέντων μέτρων οφείλεται στις αιτίες εναντίον των οποίων εφαρμόσθηκαν τα μέτρα αυτά και όχι στη μη συμβατότητά τους με την προσωπικότητα του κατηγορηθέντος μηχανικού ή τη συνειδητή αγνόησή τους από αυτόν. Αυτό σημαίνει την παραδοχή ότι οι αιτίες που οδήγησαν το μηχανικό στη εσφαλμένη συμπεριφορά που κατέληξε στο συμβάν-ατύχημα ήταν εκτός των ελεγκτικών δυνατοτήτων του αφού ήσαν αποτέλεσμα των επιλογών και της φιλοσοφίας της ίδιας της διοίκησης
7.2.11. Στη προαναφερθείσα περίπτωση, κριτήριο της αποτελεσματικότητας των μέτρων που θα επιλεγούν από τη διοίκηση είναι ο βαθμός επίδρασής τους στη κατάργηση εκεί- νων των δυσλειτουργιών του συστήματος που προκάλεσαν την εσφαλμένη συμπεριφορά του μηχανικού.

7.3. Η θεώρηση των “συνεισφερόντων παραγόντων”
7.3.1. Έρευνα και προσδιορισμός των παραγόντων που συνέβαλαν στην πρόκληση επέλευση του συμβάντος-ατυχήματος
7.3.2. Προσδιορισμός και επικέντρωση όχι μόνο και όχι κύρια στο μηχανικό που υπέπεσε στο λάθος που προκάλεσε το συμβάν-ατύχημα αλλά στις αιτίες που οδήγησαν το μηχανικό στη λανθασμένη ενέργεια-συμπεριφορά. Ισως αυτές οι αιτίες να μην είναι ορατές από μία πρώτη επιφανειακή προσέγκιση
7.3.3. Προσδιορισμός των παραγόντων οι οποίοι είναι δυνατόν να τύχουν άμεσης διαχείρισης
7.3.4. Απομάκρυνση-αντικατάσταση-βελτίωση (ανάλογα με τη περίπτωση) των εμπλακέντων παραγόντων
7.3.5. Αύξηση των πιθανοτήτων μελλοντικής αποφυγής αντίστοιχων συνθηκών υπό τις οποίες πραγματοποιήθηκε το λάθος το οποίο –προκάλεσε το συμβάν-ατύχημα
7.3.6. Βελτίωση της αποτελεσματικότητας της γενικότερης λειτουργίας του συστήματος
Δεν θεωρούμε ότι η προαναφερθείσα μάλλον αναποτελεσματική προσέγγιση των αιτιών του ατυχήματος από την οπτική γωνία “του αιτιώδους παράγοντα” οφείλεται σε ανικανότητα των υπευθύνων για αντικειμενική διάγνωση των πραγματικών αιτίων προφανών ή συγκεκαλυμμένων. Θεωρούμε ότι μία αντίστοιχου προσανατολισμού προσέγγιση με αυτή των “συνεισφερόντων παραγόντων” οδηγεί κατ’ ευθείαν σε δυσλειτουργίες τουλάχιστον του manage- ment του αερομεταφορέα αλλά και του ευρύτερου συστήματος των εναερίων μεταφορών (γενικότερων ελεγκτικών μηχανισμών κ.λπ.) και γι’ αυτό θα είχε πολλαπλές επιπτώσεις οικονομικές νομοθετικές και άλλες σε διαφορετικούς τομείς της παγκόσμιας οικονομίας (κατασκευαστές, αερομεταφορείς, ασφαλιστικές εταιρείες κ.λπ.)
Τα αρμόδια διεθνή νομοθετικά σώματα μετά από μακρόχρονες έρευνες τροποποίησαν το 1994 το θεσμικό πλαίσιο αναφορικά με την υπευθυνότητα πρόκλησης των ατυχημάτων από «αιτία του ατυχήματος» (causal factor) σε «παράγοντες που συνέβαλαν» στην πρόκληση του ατυχήματος (contributing factors) [23] Αλλά και πάλι δεν υπεισέρχονται στις ευθύνες της ανωτάτης διοίκησης που διαμορφώνει στους παράγοντες του εργασιακού περιβάλλοντος οι οποίοι καθορίζουν τη συγκεκριμένη εσφαλμένη συμπεριφορά του μηχανικού
8. Τομείς της συμπεριφοράς των μηχανικών α/φων στο χώρο της εργασίας τους που υφίστανται επιδράσεις από παράγοντες του εσωτερικού περιβάλλοντος του αερομεταφορέα [20-22]
8.1. Ταχύτητα ανταπόκρισης σε λαμβανόμενα ερεθίσματα
8.2. Ταχύτητα εκτέλεσης της εργασίας
8.3. Πληρότητα εκτέλεσης με βάση τα εγχειρίδια και τη συγκεκριμένη αναγκαιότητα
8.4. Επίπεδο έντασης της προσοχής -συγκέντρωσης- στην εκτελούμενη εργασία
8.5. Σφαιρικότητα προσέγγισης με βάση τα εγχειρίδια (συνδυαστική λογική)
8.6. Ιεράρχηση εργασιών με βάση τα εγχειρίδια προσαρμοσμένη στις απαιτήσεις της εκτελούμενης εργασίας

9. Ομαδοποίηση των αιτιών των διαπιστωθέντων λαθών επισκευής-συντήρησης [12,13]
9.1. Λανθασμένη τοποθέτηση των ανταλλακτικών
9.2. Τοποθέτηση λάθος ανταλλακτικών
9.3. Λανθασμένη συνδεσμολογία ηλεκτρικών καλωδίων
9.4. Αντικείμενα-εργαλεία κ.λπ,. που χρησιμοποιήθηκαν κατά τη
συντήρηση-επισκευή και ξεχάστηκαν μέσα στα
επισκευασθέντα-συντηρηθέντα τμήματα του α/φους
9.5. Ανεπαρκής λίπανση
9.6. Ανασφάλιστες θυρίδες καλύμματος κινητήρα
9.7. Ανασφάλιστα κλείστρα δεξαμενών λιπαντικών ελαίων
9.8. Πείροι ασφάλισης των συστημάτων προσγείωσης στο έδαφος, μη αφαιρεθέντες μετά τη συντήρηση και πριν την απογείωση

10. Η επίδραση της παγκοσμιοποίησης των εναερίων μεταφορών (1978-1997) στους μηχανικούς α/φων των αερομεταφορέων μελών της ΙΑΤΑ [5, 20, 22]
Η παγκοσμιοποίηση των αερομεταφορών και ο οξύτατος ανταγωνισμός που επέβαλε είχε άμεσες επιπτώσεις στους παράγοντες που επιδρούν στη διαμόρφωση της εργασιακής συμπεριφοράς των μηχανικών α/φων
10.1. Αριθμός εργαζομένων
Ο συνολικός αριθμός των εργαζομένων στους αερομεταφορείς μέλη της ΙΑΤΑ αυξήθηκε κατά 80% ενώ στο ίδιο χρονικό διάστημα ο αριθμός των μηχανικών α/φων αυξήθηκε μόνο 40%
10.2. Επίπεδο παραγωγής
Η τάση αύξησης του όγκου της παραγωγής των αερομεταφορέων μελών της ΙΑΤΑ στο χρονικό διάστημα 1978-1997 κυμάνθηκε στο 300%
10.3. Επίπεδο της παραγωγικότητας της εργασία των των μηχανικών α/φων
Η τάση αύξησης του επιπέδου της παραγωγικότητας της εργασίας των μηχανικών α/φων των αερομεταφορέων μελών της ΙΑΤΑ στο χρονικό διάστημα 1978-1997 κυμάνθηκε στο 100%
10.4. Όροι και συνθήκες εργασίας [5, 27]
Η κατά 80% αύξηση του αριθμού των μηχανικών α/φων των αερομεταφορέων μελών της ΙΑΤΑ κατά το χρονικό διάστημα 1978-1997 με κατά 300% ταυτόχρονη αύξηση της παραγωγής των αερομεταφορέων αυτών δεν αποδεικνύει per se την χειροτέρευση των όρων και των συνθηκών εργασίας των μηχανικών αφού σοβαρό ρόλο στην αύξηση της παραγωγικότητας διαδραματίζει η εισαγωγή της τεχνολογίας. Γι΄ αυτό και η έρευνά μας επικεντρώθηκε στην εξέλιξη συγκεκριμένων όρων και συνθηκών εργασίας των μηχανικών α/φων. Πέραν των δημοσιευμένων αποτελεσμάτων διεθνών ερευνών αναφορικά με την εξέλιξη των όρων και των συνθηκών εργασίας και δύο προσωπικές πρωτογενείς έρευνες κατέληξαν στα ακόλουθα κοινά συμπεράσματα αναφορικά με τους μηχανικούς α/φων
10.4.1. σχετική μείωση του βιοτικού επιπέδου
10.4.2. αύξηση του συνολικού χρόνου εργασίας
10.4.3. αύξηση του εργασιακού άγχους
10.4.4. αύξηση της αβεβαιότητας αναφορικά με τη διασφάλιση της
σταθερότητας της εργασίας
10.4.5. αύξηση της εντατικοποίησης της εργασίας
10.4.6. ένταση της χρήσης αυταρχικών μεθόδων διοίκησης

10.5 Η συμβολή της συντήρησης στο επίπεδο ασφαλείας των πτήσεων [12-13]
Ένα εντυπωσιακό γεγονός που πρέπει να διεγείρει τόσο τα συνδικάτα και τις διοικήσεις των αερομεταφορέων όσο και τις αρχές και τους άλλους εμπλεκόμενους, είναι το ότι στα πλαίσια της απελευθέρωσης η τάση αύξησης της παραγωγικότητας της εργασίας των μηχανικών α/φων αερομεταφορέων μελών της ΙΑΤΑ κυμάνθηκε στο 100%, ενώ η τάση αύξησης των αναφερθέντων συμβάντων-ατυχημάτων κυμάνθηκε στο 1200%

ΠΙΝΑΚΑΣ 1
Ετήσιος αριθμός των ατυχημάτων-συμβάντων
οφειλομένων σε λάθη συντήρησης
(1982-1996) (Επεξεργασμένα στοιχεία [13])

1982-1991..…………………..230
1992-1994……………………230
1995……………………240
1996 ……………………294

11. Οι επτά κυριότερες αιτίες πτώσης του α/φους οφειλόμενες σε σφάλματα επισκευής-συντήρησης [12-13]
11.1. Ανολοκλήρωτη εγκατάσταση… …………….….……. 33,0 %
11.2. Ζημίες κατά την εγκατάσταση.……………….………14,5 %
11.3. Εσφαλμένη εγκατάσταση……………………………….11,0 %
11.4. Εφόδια μη εγκατασταθέντα.……….…….……….…….11,0 %
11.5. Ζημία από ξένα αντικείμενα……..….….…………..…….6,5 %
11.6. Ακατάλληλες ή εσφαλμένες απομονώσεις καλωδίων
ή και δοκιμαστικοί έλεγχοι…………………..………..….6,0 %
11.7. Εφόδια μη ενεργοποιηθέντα ή απενεργοποιηθέντα .. .4,0 %

12. Συμπεράσματα
12.1. Η ασφάλεια των πτήσεων ξεκινά από το έδαφος
12.2. Η ποιότητα της εργασίας των μηχανικών α/φων (άλλά και των άλλων εργαζομένων) επηρεάζεται καθοριστικά από παράγοντες του εσωτερικού περιβάλλοντος της επιχείρησης εναερίων μεταφορών
12.3. Η δυνατότητα των μηχανικών α/φων για παρέμβαση στη διαμόρφωση των παραγόντων αυτών είναι ελάχιστη.
12.4. Οι παράγοντες αυτοί προσδιορίζονται καθοριστικά από τις αποφάσεις της ανώτατης ιεραρχίας (διοικητικό συμβούλιο, Διευθύνων Σύμβουλος Γενικοί και λοιποί Διευθυντές)
12.5. Κατά συνέπεια και χωρίς να παραγνωρίζεται η προσωπική ευθύνη, η μονομέρεια απόδοσης του συνόλου των ευθυνών στους μηχανικούς α/φων για ενέργειες ή παραλήψεις τους κατά τη διάρκεια εκτέλεσης της εργασίας τους, οι οποίες οδήγησαν σε συμβάν ή ατύχημα, δεν ανταποκρίνεται στη πραγματικότητα. Εμπεριέχει το στοιχείο της έντονης μεροληψίας και δεν βοηθά στην επικέντρωση και μελλοντική αποτροπή των πραγματικών γενεσιουργών αιτιών του ατυχήματος
12.6. Η διασφάλιση και βελτίωση του επιπέδου ασφαλείας των πτήσεων απαιτεί κατά τη διερεύνηση των ατυχημάτων να προσδιορίζεται όχι το ποιος εργαζόμενος έκανε το λάθος που προξένησε το ατύχημα αλλά ποια αιτία οδήγησε τον εργαζόμενο στο λάθος αυτό και ποιος είναι υπεύθυνος για την ύπαρξη της αιτίας
αυτής.
12.7. Τα ευρήματα των διερευνητών ατυχημάτων αναφορικά με ενέργειες ή παραλείψεις του management του αερομεταφορέα επιβάλλεται να καταγράφονται στο αντίστοιχο κεφάλαιο της έντυπης “Αναφοράς ατυχήματος”
12.8. Μόνο αυτή η φιλοσοφία και πρακτική διερεύνησης του αεροπορικού ατυχήματος, μπορεί να συμβάλλει στη διαρκή αναβάθμιση του επιπέδου ασφαλείας των πτήσεων.

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to Safety” SAFETY AND HEALTH V. 154

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Air Transport Research Society Conference Toulouse July 2003

THE IMPACT OF THE AIRLINE TOP MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
ON FLIGHT SAFETY IN A GLOBALIZE ENVIRONMENT
John S. Lainos Ph.D. in Air Transport Economics, Human factors Management

ABSTRACT
The intensity of international airlines’ competition due to globalization, forces their top management to make strong efforts for cost minimization, which affects the basic elements of the internal corporate environment (labor’s terms and conditions etc). On the other hand, as technology is becoming increasingly reliable, causal factors of accident/incident are more likely to be attributed to the human factor and the determinants of its activity in the company.
Recent studies have proved that the activity-behaviour of the staff at working place, during working time, is strongly, directly and indirectly affected by factors from the wider internal corporate environment (Αnderson-Kjellberg-Lindberg-Skoldstrom 1996, Beehr 1995, Bright-Mitchel-Rickman.1996, Kelley 1996, Biner .2000, Fingret.2000, Hendy 2003, Caldwell-Caldwell 2003) The introduction and preservation of these factors is ultimately determined, by the top management decisions (C.E.O., B.O.D.). ( Flight Safety Foundation. Flight Safety Digest Dec 1994, Shapell-Wiegmann 2003). This consideration is based on the fact that the top management has the authority to program, organize, administrate, staff and control the corporate operation and to apply its decisions-through the authorized members of the hierarchy. Even in case that some of the factors of the internal corporate environment that affect negatively the staff’s activity are not a result of application of the top management decisions, but a result of mismanagement by the members of the hierarchy at the various organizational levels, the ultimate responsibility still lies with the top management. The reason is that the top management has the ultimate responsibility of staffing. The goal of our research is not to allocate blame on the top management for any accident-incident that may occur.

The aim of the paper is the determination of:
a) the impact of the airline’s top management decisions and functions, on the air carrier’s internal environment factors that affect negatively on the employees’ activity. The present paper examines only errors that the employees commit unwillingly, as a result of the negative effect on their operation, of the factors of the internal air carrier’s environment.
b) the proper actions towards the minimization of the possibilities of causing accidents-incidents as a result of the negative effect of the internal airline’s environment factors on the employees activity

Key words: Aviation-accident-incident, internal-corporate-environment-factors-effect, Management-Functions-responsibility.

The author’s contribution is:
a) to prove that the top management decisions-applied through the managerial functions- determine, all the factors which compose the internal airline’s environment that affect, directly or indirectly, the employees’ behavior.
b) to propose the proper methods, measures and mechanisms, in order to prevent the errors caused by the negative impact of the airline’s internal
environment factors on the employees behavior-performance.
c) the methodology applied, which discriminates the symptoms from the primary causes of accidents-incidents occurrence, determining and focusing on the primary causes. The specific methodology can be applied efficiently to any similar case.

PART ONE

Brief theoretical approach

Parameters of the Aviation Safety Culture
“Organizational accidents may be truly accidental in the way in which the various contributing factors combine to cause the bad outcome, but there is nothing accidental about the existence of these precursors, nor in the conditions that created them.” (Reason 1997) The components of the aviation safety culture are : Just culture, Reporting culture, Flexible culture and Learning culture. (Reason 1997)
A basic determinant of the employee’s behavior is the existing corporate aviation safety culture. Aviation safety culture includes: (Ambrose 1996, Brown 1995, Deal-Kennedy 1999, Eckhardt 1996, Helmreich-Merritt 1998, Hofstede 1983 fall, 1991, Lainos-Nikolaidis 2003, Reason 1997, Weinstein 1996 ) (TABLE 1)

TABLE 1

1) Production methods
2) Skills and specialization,
3) Consideration of discipline and penalties,
4) Communication style with the colleagues, supervisors, clients, suppliers e.t.c.
5) Official αdministrative methods
a) Product-profit or human oriented management style (Mc Gregor x-y theories)
b) Application of motivation systems for upgrading Aviation Safety ( increasing productivity combined with job quality ),
c) Encouraging immunity based self reporting of the errors
d) Encouraging the submission of proposals about the introduction of measures, methods, mechanisms etc. for overcoming the causes of error commitment.
e) Efficiency and the orientation of the control style applied (self control or administrational, ex post or ex ante, feed back period etc.)
f) individualism or team spirit
6) values and traditions of the airline (degree of tolerance of behaviors: risky-aggressive- conflict-open criticism etc., reward criteria, seniority or efficiency in staff promotion e.t.c.) ,
7) the standing transactional practice of the Airline etc.

The most usual causes of the employees risky behavior
These causes may be attributed to the following groups: (Bright-Mitchel-Rickman 1996, Elo-Hinkanen 1986, EU foundation 1981, Hersey-Blanchard 1977, Kelley 1996, Reason 1997,) (TABLE 2)

TABLE 2

1) national culture that embodies and rewards risky behaviour
2) corporate culture and especially safety culture that tolerates and even promotes risky behaviour
3) administrational style (product-oriented motives set by the top management, that accepts and or rewards risky behaviour)
a) psychological needs such as self-assurance, acceptance by informal groups, revenge against superiors due to unsatisfied claims e.t.c.
b) attraction of the superiors’ favoritism in case of absence of meritocracy
4) insufficient training.
5) other stressors from the internal and external corporate environment

Performance Shaping Factors (PSF’s) from the internal airline environment
and management functions which mainly affect them
Even since the first quarter of the 20th century (Hawthorn etc.) up to recent times, research have proved that the activity-behaviour of every individual at his-her working place, during working time, is strongly, directly and indirectly affected by factors that compose the wider internal airline’s environment. (Andries-Kompier, -Smulders 1996, Beehr 1995, Bright-Mitchel.- Rickman 1996, Daniels-Harris 1998, MacDonald-Karasek-Punnett-Scharf 2001, Westfall 1998 )
However the results of this research were not correlated with the managerial decisions and functions, through which the top management would introduced the suggestions of the researchers in the internal corporate environment. “[…]Only now are safety practitioners realizing the complex nature of accident/incident causation and the role organizations play in the genesis and management of human error. In fact it is the emphasis that organizational models place on the fallible decisions of managers, supervisors and others in the organization that sets them apart from the other perspectives previously discussed” (Shapell-Wiegmann 2003 ) Although international bibliography categorizes the P.S.F.’s according to the employees’ behaviour stimulated by them, we categorize P.S.F.’s in the following basic homogeneous groups, according to the management functions which mainly determine them (TABLE 3)

Effects of the internal corporate environment Performance Shaping Factors on employees’ active failure
Some of the main negative effects of the P.S.F.’s on employees can lead them to the
following (TABLE 4) active failures which increase the possibility of the error commitment: (Caldwell-Caldwell 2003, Costa 1993, Hendy 2003, Mountstephen-Sharpe 1997, Fingret.2000, Geller 1996, Gregory 1996).

Determinants of the effects of the internal corporate environment PSF’s, on employees’ behavior-performance
The effects of the internal corporate environment P.S.F.’s on employees’ behaviour are not unified neither in every country nor in every company and organizational level, not even among the employees of the same company at the same organizational level. The reason is that the intensity and depth of the final impact of PSF’s on employee’s behaviour, are directly depending on the cumulative effect of interacting parameters such as: (TABLE 5)

TABLE 3
1. Wages level Programming-Administrating-Staffing
2. Hygiene and safety conditions
(warm-cold, light-dark, noise,
radiation, chemicals etc.) Programming-Administrating
3. Stress and fatigue due to workload Programming-Administrating- Controlling
4. Job security Administrating (motivating)- Staffing
5. Skills and training Administrating (motivating)- Staffing
6. Meritocracy or favoritism Administrating (corporate Culture)
7. The applied management style (human or
product oriented, motivation, virtual
recognition of the employees’ contribution
to the development of the airline,
the supervisors’ behavior e.t.c.) administrating
8. Corporate culture applied by the top Management administrating
9. Efficiency of the corporate labor
programming and organizing Programming-Organizing-controlling
10. Professional and social status
of a particular labor position Administrating- Staffing
11. Satisfaction from
achievement in work Administrating- Staffing –Controlling
12. Health and physical
situation of the employee Administrating- Staffing -Controlling
13. Social status of the airline Programming-Organizing administrating-
-Staffing-Controlling

TABLE 4

1) Intent Failure
2) Attention Failure
3) Sensory Failure
4) Knowledge (Perception) Failure
5) Perception Failure
6) Communication/Information Failure
7) Time Management Failure
8) Knowledge (Decision) Failure
9) Ability to Respond Failure
10) Action Selection Failure
11) Sleeps, Lapses and Mode Errors
12) Feedback Failure

 

 

 

TABLE 5

1) personal psycho-biological factors of each employee (genetic factors, physical
2) health, general psychological structure, instant psychological conditions etc.)
3) earlier environment influences – experiences
4) existing national and corporate culture,
5) economic and educational level of the employee,
6) organizational level the employee is appointed to,
7) priority of the employee’s needs,
8) company’s activity,
9) other factors from the external corporate environment e.t.c.

The aforementioned approach means that the result of the impact of the affecting factors on the employees behaviour is never the same, because never are the same:
a) the cumulative power of the affecting factors
b) the duration of the effect of these factors on the employees
c) the objective and subjective conditions under which the affecting factors acts.
The structure of the employees’ behavior-performance categories is shown in FIGURE 1

FIGURE 1

 

 

 

 

STRUCTURE OF THE EMPLOYEES’
BEHAVIOR-PERFORMANCE CATEGORIES

Approaches concerning the corporate organizational hierarchy level that is engaged with the main responsibility in case of error commitment
Concerning the corporate hierarchy and organizational level that is engaged with the main responsibility in case of an accident-incident due to error occurrence , the existing international bibliography includes the following approaches:
The first approach is the systematic approach (Shappell-Wiegman 2003 adopted from Reason 1990) FIGURE2 This considers that organizational factors, latent and active conditions of the internal corporate environment, are responsible for human error occurrence.

FIGURE 2

 

 

 

Our objections on the aforementioned model are categorized in two groups related to structural and methodological weaknesses:
1) Structural weakness
The structure of every research must reflect the existing relationships between ideas, information etc. that are examined in the research. The structure, combined with the methodology applied, affects decisively the objectivity of the conclusions
of the research. The number of possible structures depends on the number of the combinations of these information-ideas and the number of the criteria used by the researcher. Different structure-methodology leads to different conclusions. Efficient structure is the one that reflects the existing objective reality
The Reason and Shappell-Wiegman model’s includes four levels that have to be simultaneously violated for error’s occurrence.
The first defense level, called “Organizational Factor”, includes:
a) Resource management.(Human and monetary resources, equipment-facilities). We consider that -according to its analytical description- this concerns the management functions of programming administrating, staffing)
b) Climate (structure, policies, culture). We consider that -according to its analytical description- this concerns the management functions of programming,
organizing, administrating.
c) Process (Operations, procedures, oversight). We consider that -according to its analytical description, this concerns the management functions of programming, controlling)
It is obvious that the model does not take into account the five functions of the management to which the conclusions have to be adapted and substitutes them with the criteria “Resource management”, “Climate” and “Process”.
The second defense level called “Unsafe supervision”, includes the:
a) “Inadequate supervision” which, according to the model’s analytical description, we conclude that concerns the managerial functions of administrating, staffing and controlling.
b) “Planned inappropriate operations” which according to the model’s analytical description , we conclude that concern the managerial function of planning, administrating, staffing and controlling
c) Failed to correct problem” and
d) “Supervisory violations” which, according to the model’s analytical description, we conclude that concerns the managerial functions of administrating, staffing and controlling.
e) Furthermore, questions arise since the “promotion policies” are included in the first “Organizational Factor” defense level, while “Supervisory violations” is included in the second defense level, although it is a consequence of the criteria of promotion policy, which are included in the first defense shield..
The third defense level called “Preconditions for unsafe act, includes: “Conditions of operators” (personnel and environmental-physical and technological factors) which, according to the model’s analytical description, we conclude that includes both internal and external corporate environment factors. The internal corporate environment factors we consider that concern all of the five managerial functions
The fourth defense level called “Unsafe acts”, includes:
“Routine and Exceptional violations” which, according to the model’s analytical description , we conclude that concerns the managerial functions of planning administrating, staffing and controlling
2) Methodological weaknesses of the model
The application of the proper measures for overcoming the mismanagement results
requires the determination not only of the symptoms but also of the primary causes of the mismanagement. (FIGURE 3)
If the therapy is focused only on the symptoms, perhaps some improvement will be achieved, but this will be only temporary. It is absolutely certain that, since the
particular symptom is a manifestation of the existence of a primary cause(s), and
since this primary cause has not been removed, it will be manifested again in the near future, either through the same or through other symptoms, in the same or in other areas or levels of the internal corporate environment. For example, “unsafe supervisory” is not a primary cause of mismanagement, but just one of its manifestations. The primary cause(s) might be:

 

FIGURE 3

 

 

 

Relationship between symptoms and causes

– Inefficient-unsafe administrating (system, methods, criteria, corporate culture)
– Inefficient-unsafe staffing (criteria of hiring, promoting etc.)
– Inefficient-unsafe controlling (system, methods, criteria)
The second approach, related to the responsibility, is divided in three sub theories.
The first sub-theory considers that the responsibility rests with:
a) the employee who committed the error that resulted in an accident-incident and
b) his supervisor who was assigned by the management to control the quality of (Appendix 2 to JAR-OPS1.175 Section 2 Operator Certification And Supervision. Subpart C. The management organization of an A.O.C. holder 2. Responsibilities of management).
The second sub-theory considers that the responsibility for an error commitment lies with the members of the medium hierarchy’s level.
“If you agree that accident prevention requires change, then you must agree that the key player is not the aviation safety manager. It is some other manager with the power and authority to direct change. This is absolutely true and it puts the burden of accident prevention right where it belongs; in the line manager’s office; not the safety office.” (Wood 1991)
Our main argument regarding all approaches about the employees’ responsibility in case of accident-incident as a result of their action or omission, is that:
a) their will is decisively affected by factors of the internal corporate environment, which they do not control and
b) these factors lead their operation to unwilling results.
The third sub-theory-which we support-examines the responsibility of the hierarchy members of each organizational level, from the point of view of the authority assigned to them to determine the factors that decisively affect the behaviour–operation of the employees. The word “responsibility’ is not used here
under its legal meaning, but as a source of mismanagement, that produces unsafe results. Further more we consider that the main responsibility of all members of the hierarchy and of the simple employee is depending on :
a) the introduction and preservation and tolerance of factors that affect negatively the personnel’s behavior producing unsafe results
b) their negligence to act-within the institutional framework-towards the removal of the actions, omissions, conditions etc., which are results of the corporate culture and managerial functions, that jeopardize aviation safety
c) their omission to submit proposals for upgrading the existing corporate aviation safety culture.
However, a dilemma arises, when the aviation safety consideration-criteria of the personnel, differ from the official one, even when it concerns not the entire content but only the application of the already existing rules. Finally when the employee who committed the error that resulted in the accident-incident, is blamed, according to the first sub-theory, he is blamed as if he were responsible for the existence of all these factors of the entire internal corporate environment that decisively affected the quality of his activity.
We considered that the top management is responsible even when the error is a result of violation of the existing corporate safety culture by the authorized staff. In this case the responsibility of the top management is based on the mismanagement of staffing. “Responsibility for aviation safety begins at the very top of an airline company. History has demonstrated repeatedly that without the complete commitment of the highest management levels within a company, operational safety margins are seriously eroded. This does not suggest that a company will have an accident, but it does suggest that the risk of having an accident is high-the laws of probability will prevail. Management has great leverage in affecting operational safety within a company. Through its attitudes and actions management influences the attitudes and actions of all others within a company: Management defines the safety culture of an organization. This safety culture extends all the way to the maintenance shop floor, to the ramp to the cabin and to the cockpit. Further more the public and the government authorities are increasingly recognizing management’s role in air safety by holding management accountable for a serious incident or accident; this accountability is magnified many-fold if a company suffers several such incidents or accidents during a course of a few years.” Flight Safety Foundation. Flight Safety Digest Dec 1994 Special Report: FSF Icarus Committee Report: “The Dollars and Sense of Risk Management and Airline Safety
“The ultimate responsibility for safety rests with the directors and management of the Company. The Company’s attitude to safety—the Company’s safety culture—is established from the outset by the extent to which senior management accepts responsibility for safe operations, particularly the proactive management of risk. Regardless of the size, complexity, or type of operation, senior management deter- mines the Company’s safety culture. However, without the wholehearted commitment of all personnel, any safety programme is unlikely to be effective.”
Airbus Industry, “Flight Safety Manager’s Handbook” Section 2 – Organisation & Administration

Logical assumptions for blameworthiness approach
The blameworthiness against the employee(s), whose error resulted in the accident-incident, is based on the following logical assumptions: (TABLE 6)

Authorization-accountability-responsibility-blame-punishment
The fear of blame due to accountability-responsibility culture as a negative motive,
(Dekker 2003, Hendy 2003, Maddox-Watson 1998, Pierce 1996, Reason 1997, Simon 1996, Winn-Probert 1996, Wood 1991) it is based on the assumption that:
– the results of the employee’s behavior-operation are intentional.
TABLE 6

1) Accident – incident occurs
2) The investigation concludes that a particular employee committed the error.
3) The employee-like anybody else- is considered to be a rational human being.
4) A rational human being knows to distinguish right from wrong activity
5) A rational human being is able to chose the right thing to do
6) The employee’s will, is absolutely controlled by him.
7) Since the employee committed an error, this means-according to the aforementioned approach-that he willingly chose to do the wrong thing.
8) Since errors are faced as results of the employee’s free will absolutely con- trolled by him, he is blamed by his superiors as if he willingly chose to do the wrong thing In this case, however, we are talking about sabotage and not error
9) Warnings, punishments, exhortations, sanctions against the employee are intending to force him to operate safely and to make the right decisions in the future.
10) The reaction of the blamed employee may be manifested through melancholy, aggressiveness, risky behavior etc., in case that he considers the blame unjust, due to the existence of factors, which he can not control and for which he is not responsible, although they affect decisively negative his operation.
11) Experience proves that errors continue to occur and to cause incidents-accidents
12) This result means that the applied measures, punishment etc. are inefficient
13) There are three main categories of alternatives for the management to face the inefficient measures applied :
a) to search for more efficient measures compatible to the personality of the particular employee
b) to consider that the blamed employee deliberately ignores warnings, punishments, exhortations, sanctions, due to his character and psychology
c) to accept that:
• the results of the certain employee’s operation are not intentional
• the determinants of the certain employee’s behavior are beyond his control. Consequently the airline’s management must consider that the inefficiency of the applied measures is not due to their incompatibility with the personality of the blamed employee or due to their deliberate rejection by him, but due to wrong causes against which these measures were applied.
d) To accept that the particular risky behavior of the blamed employee was due to the existence of particular internal corporate environment factors, that decisively affected in a negative way the employee’s behavior. In this case efficient measures must focus mainly on removing the responsible factors rather than to blaming the employee.

– the employee controls absolutely his behaviour-activity.
Blame culture does not take into account the fact that the human being reflects automatically at stimulus from his environment. Consequently his behaviour is decisively affected by factors of the internal and external corporate environment which the employee cannot affect. However the factors of the internal corporate environment that affects the employees’ behavior, are determined by the decisions of the corporate top management which are applied by the authorized members of hierarchy. This approach does not argue that the coexistence of all these factors that have decisive negative impact on the employees’ behavior, will necessarily result to an accident. The accident-incident occurrence due to unwilling commitment of the error by an employee, requires the simultaneous coexistence of these factors at the certain time. Human error occurs when all of the aforementioned factors are in such a particular intensity, that they finally violate the defenses of the personality of the employee. On the other hand the blame against the employee who committed the error ignores that:
– the accident/incident is a result of organizational failure
– one of the main principles of the scientifically efficient organization, is that, every supervisor at any organizational level, is absolutely responsible for any action or omission of all his subordinates. Consequently the responsibility cannot stop at any level of the hierarchy members, except at the top of the organizational pyramid, from where the authorization started.
Weaknesses of the blame-culture.
The accident-incident is not a result of one or two employees error, but the outcome of corporate mismanagement at various levels of hierarchy, as well as various corporate operations and managerial functions.
1) The blame culture does not contribute to the determination of the real facts and their causes that resulted in the accident-incident occurrence since those who are considered responsible will try to defense themselves by hiding the real facts and factors that led them to the error. Their primary effort during their operation will be oriented to the avoidance of their responsibility in case of accident and not to their safe behavior-operation and to their contribution in establishing a safe internal corporate environment
2) Consequently the blame culture is only a negative motive-not the most effective -according to the existing experience-not urging the employee to maximize his efforts for safe results.
3) Furthermore responsibility is not a fixed consideration, but is subject to various interpretations related to culture, political, corporate and personal aims.
– The use of punishment of the “responsible employee” as a propaganda to influence public opinion does not contribute to the improvement of aviation safety .

PART TWO
The case study
The “causal factors” of the bellow mentioned maintenance related accident, according with the U.K. AAIB Accidents Report 3/96-EW/C95/2/3 were:
“ The investigation identified the following causal factors:
1) The aircraft was presented for service following Borescope Inspections of both engines which had been signed off as complete in the Aircraft Technical Log although the HP rotor drive covers had not been refitted.
2) During the Borescope Inspections, compliance with the quirements of the Aircraft Maintenance Manual was not achieved in a number of areas, most importantly the HP rotor drive covers were not refitted and ground idle engine runs were not conducted after the inspections.
3) The Operator’s Quality Assurance Department had not identified the non-procedural conduct of Borescope Inspections prevalent amongst Company engineers over a significant period of time.
4) The Civil Aviation Authority, during their reviews of the Company Procedures for JAR-145 approval, had detected limitations in some aspects of the Operators Quality Assurance system, including procedural monitoring, but had not withheld that approval, being satisfied that those limitations were being addressed.”
Published facts on accident report
1) “[…] Instead of the nominal shift complement of six, there were only four on duty that night, two of whom-including the shift leader, were doing extra nights to cover shortfalls[…]”
2) “[…] Although the Line Engineer was in charge of the shift, he knew that he had to do the Borescope Inspections himself as he was the only Line Maintenance engineer within the Company, at East Midlands Airport, with the necessary authorisation.[…]”
3) “[…] His normal supervisory and inspection staff on the night shift, in addition to himself and the Foreman should have consisted of four airframe and engine (A & C) Licensed Inspectors, supplemented by three Licensed Technicians. On his return from leave, however, in addition to the foreman, three of his Inspectors were also absent for various reasons, leaving himself and one Inspector, supported by the Licensed Technicians, to supervise the work of the shift […]”
4) “[…] Hangar T2 was not normally used for night Base Maintenance work and had not been included in operators JAR-145 approval. It was not equipped with the standard low voltage electrical socket outlets which would have been suitable to power the lead lamps available to Base Maintenance staff. The two
5) individuals who did the Borescope Inspections were aware of the deficiencies in the general lighting and electrical supply in T2 and so took torches with them for additional illumination.[…]”
6) “[…] The borescope equipment was kept in the tool store in the Base Maintenance hangar, about 200 yards across an apron from T2. […]”
7) “[…] The Base Maintenance Controller (night) had recently been on leave for a week and had returned to work on the night before (Tuesday). The length of his leave had been limited by the fact that his night shift Foreman was scheduled to go into hospital[…]
8) “[…] The Line Engineer gave a verbal brief to the Base Controller of where he had got to in the preparation of the engines for the inspection. This brief included the facts that the aircraft was ëdeadi (ie without electrical or hydraulic power and had no-one else working on it); that one engine (the No 1) had been fully prepared for inspection and the inspection paperwork pack was with the aircraft in T2. As the Line Engineer had not gone to the Base Hangar with any intention other than that of continuing the task he had started, there was no written statement or annotation of a work stage sheet of where he had got to in the inspection process. In fact, on the Line Maintenance paperwork provided, there was no suitable place to note it and, procedurally, additional paperwork should have been raised. The Base Maintenance Controller was, however, content with the verbal brief that he had received.[…]
9) “[…] Having taken on the inspection, the Controller then selected a fitter to assist him in the task. This fitter was not licensed but had been in the Company for three years and the Controller believed him to be reasonably competent and conscientious; he had also had some previous experience of assisting in this type of inspection[…]”
10) .“[…] The Controller had to use his own key to gain access to the borescope equipment, because the storeman was also absent that night. With the fitter, he drew, prepared and checked the equipment and gathered together the other tools needed for the task. The checking of the borescope equipment was a task which would normally have been done by the storeman. […]”
11) «[…] Maintenance shift patterns.
The Base and Line Maintenance staff worked on different shift patterns. Line Engineering staff were divided into four shift groups, each of nominally six personnel. However, one group had been under-strength by one for 18 months. The establishment for each group comprised a supervisor, his deputy and four licensed fitters, to cover airframe avionic and electrical trades. These groups worked 12 hour shifts on an eight day rotating cycle consisting of two day shifts, then two nights and then four days off. The shifts started at 0730 hrs and 1930 hrs. As a result of staff absences, due to leave, sickness or training etc, it was normal for most of the engineers to work more than the four allotted shifts over an eight day period. Consequently some juggling of the manpower was needed in an attempt to ensure that shifts were adequately manned for the expected workload. Frequently, however, shifts were worked with less than the full establishment of engineers. Unlike the Line, Base Maintenance operated a fixed shift system where staff were rostered permanently for either days or nights. Only in circumstances of short term exigency would staff be asked to work other than their allotted shift, although they could expect to be required to work overtime in an extended length shift, from time to time.[…]
11) […]1.18.4. Shift patterns – tiredness
The main problem in the management of shift work, is to cover the night-time hours when alertness is naturally low. […]The main body of evidence suggested that night shifts lasting for longer than 8 hours should be avoided when alertness is a critical issue and 12 hour shifts were found to be associated with a higher risk of accidents than 8 hour shifts.[…]At night, performance on most tasks is impaired, including particularly those which require sustained attention, monitoring, scanning, tracking and logical reasoning.[…]
12) “[…]1.17. Organisation and management information […]
Neither the inspection job card, which was included in the normal Line Maintenance work pack, nor the MAVIS card, available as part of a Base Maintenance work pack for this job, contained any mention of the restorative work requiring completion signatures. Furthermore, neither these documents nor the Boeing Task Card contained any intimation of the warnings, highlighted in the AMM references, that airworthiness would be jeopardised if correct procedures were not adhered to whilst executing the restorative tasks[…]”
Classifying the aforementioned findings
according to the managerial functions
Inadequate number of controllers
(Violation of the principles of the scientific management functions of Programming the airline’s needs for controllers-Staffing [hiring-training the adequate number of controllers]-Controlling [the existence of adequate number of controllers to meet safely the needs of the programmed workload]
Inadequate care of the controllers
(Violation of the principles of the scientific management functions of Administrating-Motivating, Staffing-(proper training, working conditions to avoid fatigue, [proper number a/c engineers per shift] Controlling)
Inadequate number of employees per shift
(Violation of the principles of the scientific management functions of Programming -Staffing-Controlling)
Use of uncertified hangar for a/c maintenance
(Violation the principles of the scientific management functions of Programming -Organizing)
Use of poor lighting (almost only 10% of the minimum necessary )
Use of unsuitable equipment
(Violation of the principles of the scientific management functions of Programming -Organising, Controlling)
Use of Poor trade practices-Inability of the Quality Assurance Department Personnel to understand their role: a) to observe tasks in progress b) to review Task Description Cards to ensure that procedures are applied.
Fatigue of engineers (continuous 8 days 12 hours night shift)
(Violation of the principles of the scientific management functions of Programming-Organizing-Administrating -Staffing-Controlling)
Stress of the supervising engineer due to workload, because he was obliged to work additionally as a simple engineer, as a result of inadequate number of engineers per shift (Violation of the principles of the scientific management functions of Programming -Organizing, Staffing, Controlling)
Local Management’s failure :
a) to observe the established procedures, b) to adhere to the company standards , c) to long term assure the proper number of certified employees per shift according to the shift’s task d) to detect the necessary standards of the available manpower
(Violation of the principles of the management functions of Programming -Organizing, Administrating, Staffing, Controlling)
Conclusions
1) Analyzing the J. Reason and the S. Shapell-D.Wiegman approach concerning the internal corporate environment barriers to an accident-incident concluded that:
a) The model is focused, from the psychological point of view, on the unsafe
results of actions or omissions that resulted due to factors and active or
latent conditions of the internal corporate environment and not at the
causes which provoked them.
b) this model presents four internal corporate environments levels-barriers, to
an accident that are “organizational” “unsafe supervision”, “preconditions
for unsafe acts”, “unsafe acts”.
The model does not determine the managerial malfunctions-decisions or applications- per category that caused these unsafe results consequently it does not determine the organizational level and managerial function that is responsible-as source of mismanagement- for these malfunctions.
Primary and secondary elements of all five managerial functions are mixed up in all four levels of the model. This means that if the error squeezes through holes of the level with the primary element, it would automatically violate its secondary elements or results in the following levels. Consequently there is room for improvement of the structure. We are afraid that the aforementioned applied structure and methodology of analysis may lead to the measures for overcoming perhaps the unsafe particular symptoms but not the primary causes which provoked them since for example the unsafe supervision is a result of more than one interacting functions of the management. Consequently if the primary causes remain untouched, they will “re-infect” the healthy factors, causing unsafe results.
Further more the last three factors are results of more than one managerial function consequently measures for overcoming the mismanagement of one of the aforementioned factors requires involvement of more than one managerial function. For example the improvement of the “supervisory” requires introduction of changes at the:
– managerial function of staffing that includes changes on the applied corporate criteria of hiring-training- promoting
– managerial function of administrating that includes changes on the applied corporate style of management, motivation, culture
– managerial function of controlling administrating that includes changes on the applied corporate systems, mechanisms, methods, measures of controlling and possibly
– managerial function of programming
– Under these circumstances, if the “medicine” for the “disease” for example of “unsafe supervision” is given for the treatment of the symptoms through which the disease is manifested and not for its causes, it is obvious that the patient and his environment sooner or later will be re-infected
The maximization of the employees’ efforts can be achieved when they believe that, fulfilling the aims of the airline they simultaneously fulfil their own.
Blame culture is based on the assumption that the employee controls absolutely his own will, consequently the results of his activity are those he wanted to achieve.
Research has proved that this assumption is an illusion.
The accountability using threat of punishment and punishment itself as a motive means that safe operation is pursued to be achieved through fear.
The maximization of the employees’ effort cannot be achieved through fear, but through other more efficient motives, compatible to the employee’s culture, needs etc.
Since human performance at any company is generally defined by factors determined by the corporate management functions of programming, organizing, administrating, staffing and controlling,
Since the corporate culture which decisively affects the employees’ operation is exclusively determined by the top management,
Since only the top management
– determines the strategic and tactic goals of the airline
– has the global overview of the needs of the company for fulfillment of the established goals,
– has the authority and the power to decide-at the end of the day-about the introduction of the necessary changes to the existing aviation safety culture,
– determines the corporate culture, the administrational style, motivation etc.,
Since all conditions and factors of the internal corporate environment which decisively affect the behavior-activity of all employees, are determined by the decisions of the airline top management through its functions,
it becomes obvious that the top management has the main ultimate responsibility for the results of all its decisions that are applied through the managerial functions.

PROPOSALS
Measures and methods to be applied by the top management for upgrading the aviation safety through maximization of the employees’ effort for safe operation-error avoidance
A) Contents of the corporate management functions that have embodied positive aviation safety culture
Managerial functions are not independent from one another, on the contrary they are interacting. Each function includes all the others. For example planning needs to be organized, administrated, staffed and controlled, exactly like e.g. organizing has to be planned, administrated, staffed and controlled and so on.
Positive safety culture must not be just one of the airline’s goals next to or even above every other. Efficient aviation safety culture requires safety to be embodied in all functions of the management, at all levels of the organizational structure and in all operations. It is a way of acting. It is a particular point of view of the airline’s operation. Safety as a “goal” has to be embodied in every stage of the airline’s operation, just as the economic principle is. Because if somebody thinks safety is expensive, let him try an accident!
Planning
• Core values include: Safety, health and the environment, ethical behaviour, valuing staff.
• Safety is not only a core business but a personal value as well.
• The safety of the airline employees, customers and suppliers is a corporate strategic issue.
• Safety is a source of the airline’s competitive advantage
• Senior leaders and line management demonstrate their continual commitment to safety
• Senior management is committed to the company safety programme
• Management elaborates emergency response planning
Organising
• Establishment of a safety management structure
• Appointment of a Flight Safety Officer reporting directly to the C.E.O.
Administrating
• Management believes that:
a) all accidents and incidents are preventable
b) business is strengthened by making safety excellence an integral part of all flight and ground activities
• Management:
a) clearly Communicates Expectations of Zero Incidents
b) encourages a positive safety culture
c) introduces a communications and motivation system in place to keep employees focused on the safety goal
d) is openly communicating information about safety incidents and is sharing the lessons with others
e) exchanges valuable “Lessons Learned” with manufacturers and with other airlines
f) applies hazard identification and risk management systems
g) is ensured that everyone has understood and accepted the established formal written safety goal
h) before any work is done, makes everyone aware of the safety rules and processes
i) recognizes and rewards every staff flight and ground safety performance
j) establishes each one of the employees’ opportunity to participate in developing safety standards and procedures
k) motivates the concern of each of the staff for the safety of others in the airline
l) introduces everyone in the immunity based reporting culture process.
Staffing
• Basic criterion for hiring is the acceptance by the candidate employee of the positive safety culture of the company and his capability to adapt his behaviour to its requirements.
• Safety training is embodied into the organisation’s training syllabi that provides the necessary training to build and maintain meaningful ground and flight safety leadership skills.
• Safety performance will be an important part of the corporate management/ employee evaluation system
• Human factors training, for all personnel
• Establish both leading and trailing performance indicators to help the evaluation of the corporate level of safety
Controlling
• Management supports the application of a self control system
• Management ensures regular conduct safety audits are conducted and that everyone participates in the process
• Audits have to be focused on the behaviour of people as well as on the conditions of the operating area
• On-going hazard reporting system
• Safety audits and assessment of quality or compliance
• Accident and incident reporting and investigation
• Documentation
• Immunity-based reporting systems
• Implementation of a Digital Flight Data Recorder information collection system
• Regular evaluation and ongoing fine tuning of the programme

A) The effective introduction of changes into the internal corporate environment (Lainos model) have to apply the following steps (TABLE 7)
B) Institutionalization of a corporate committee for psychological support of the employees, with authority to keep the employees out of work without salary cutting, in case of stress that might jeopardize safe operation.
C) Institutionalization of a committee (TABLE 8) to which every employee will be able to address anonymously to report violations of flight safety regulations or the existence of conditions that might jeopardize aviation safety. The airplane will not be released until the committee checks and corrects the effects of the reported violations on the a/c’s airworthiness.
TABLE 7
A) Determination of the strategic and tactic goals of the air-carrier
B) Determination and assessment of the current status of the air-carrier
1) Determination of the negative symptoms.
2) Determination of the problem(s) consisted of the aforementioned negative symptoms
3) Determination of the causes of these problems
4) Determination of the sources of the aforementioned causes
C) Research and determination of the necessary changes that must be introduced according to the strategic and tactic goals of the organization
D) Preparation of the members of hierarchy and th e simple employees
1) Building trust and certainty among the employees for the future goals-intentions of the company
2) Informing the employees about the existence of the problem(s).
3) Focusing on the current and the long-term negative effects of the existed problem(s) for the survival of the company.
4) Focusing on the negative future effects, on certain categories of the employees and even if possible on individuals. The successful result of the aforementioned process must be the existence of the certain problem(s) acceptance by the employees
5) Persuading the employees that for the solution of the problem(s) some changes are necessary to be introduced.
6) Inviting the employees to submit proposals concerning their opinion about the necessary changes that must be introduced.
7) Informing the employees about the effects of their proposals on the solution of the problems that the company faces.
8) Starting discussions with the employees to conclude to the mutual accepted proposals concerning:
a) The number of changes, the field and the time of application
b) The role of the different categories of the employees to the efficient application of these changes
9) The discussions must be continued concerning all the steps of the process.
E) Co-decision for the necessary changes that must be introduced according to the strategic and tactic goals of the organization.
F) Programming of the introduction of the selected changes (which, when, where, how).
G) Application of the introduction of the selected changes (fulfil all the agreements with the employees ). The methods that will be chosen are depended on:
– The emergency of the introduction
– The obligation due to legislate framework
– The existing corporate culture
H) Continuous control-with priority to the voluntary self-control-of the application of the introduction of the changes to each stage of introduction (not to the end) and to each organizational unit.
I) Assessment of the result of the introduced changes.
J) Stabilization of the introduced changes and of its results.
K) In case of failure a new effort must start as soon as the mistakes of the previous effort are being determined and the general circumstances are being matured. It is obvious that the wider alliances of the company’s leader with the formal leadership of the trade unions , and of labour associations together with the informal leaders of specialty-groups, facilitates the successful introduction of the changes essentially.

TABLE 8
Proposed composition of the Committee for Upgrading the Aviation Safety

1) Representative of the National Civil Aviation Authority
2) Representative of the National Union of Airline Owners
3) Representative of the National Union of Airline employees
4) Representative of the National Union of Passengers-consumers
5) Representative of the National Association of Aeronautical Engineers
6) Representative of the National Airline Pilots Association

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Aviation Management Education and Research Conference.
Mc Gill university
Montreal-Canada 21/22-7-2003

Introduction of changes to restructure
of an international scheduled flag carrier
in a liberalize international institutional environment
The case study of the Olympic Airways

By Yiannis S. Lainos

Abstract

The liberalization of the aviation international institutional environment (USA Deregulation Act 1978, E.U. Third Package of Liberalization 1993),:
a) intensified the international air carriers competition (Lainos 1994b)
b) forced their top management to make strong efforts to adapt the operational terms and conditions of the air carriers-including the efficiency of the ownership regime-to the international liberalized environment.
The financial results of the Olympic Airways (O.A.) since its nationalization and over a span of 20 years (1975-1994), reached an actual cumulative deficit of more than 558 billion GRD, (1.63 billion US$). The company was considered to be loss making by the state-shareholder, although the aforementioned accounting registered deficits were almost the two-third of the non-registered debts of the state-shareholder to the O.A. These debts were the result of the obligatory-free of charge-implementation of the governmental policies. In 1993 the conservative Greek Government conducted the first program for the O.A.’s restructure in collaboration with an external consultant. That program was rejected by the E.U. due to the low level of its reliability. The new recovery program that was conducted by the new socialistic Greek Government in collaboration with the previous consultant was approved by the E.U. in October 1994. This restructuring program was transformed by the Greek parliament into the Law 2271/1994-12-23 with validity the 1997-12-31. On the expiring date of the aforementioned law, when the board of directors and the Greek Government realized that they had failed to overcome the O.A.’s crisis, the new law 2602/1998-4-13 was passed with complementary measures and with expiring date 2001-12-31. However, six months after its passing by the parliament, the Greek government announced its decision to privatize the O.A. (its management first, the majority of its share capital thereinafter). After four unsuccessful efforts of the Greek government for privatization, the O.A. is still in crisis and being liable to prosecution by the E.U. (2003/4 and 2003/5) to the European court for illegal subsidization. In February 2003 the Greek government decided to dichotomize the O.A. to the New and the old, with the New O.A. free of deficits to include only the flight operations.

Keywords: Airline-changes-introduction, Airline-crisis-methodological-approach, Airline-crisis-symptoms-causes, Airline-economics, Airline-management, Airline- restructure-measures, Airline-State-aid, Airline-State-ownership, Olympic-Airways.

The aim of the present paper
is the determination of:
a) the real financial position of the Greek Flag carrier the O.A.
b) the causes of crisis manifestation in the O.A.
c) the causes that led to the failure of the efforts of the Greek Government as the O.A.’s exclusive shareholder, to introduce the proper changes for overcoming its current crisis

The contribution of the author is:
1) the determination (through a 28 years field research) and the evaluation of:
a) the causes and the symptoms concerning the O.A.’s crisis manifestation
b) the causes for which the restructuring efforts of the Greek government for the O.A., were inefficient
2) the implemented methodology (analysis and synthesis) which discriminates the symptoms from the causes of the crisis manifestation in the O.A. focusing on the primary causes. This method can be implemented efficiently to any similar case.

Introduction

The 1944 Chicago convention and those that followed, determined the regulations concerning the different activities of the domestic and international commercial Air Transport industry (Lainos 1995a). A basic regulation determined that for each country only one national air carrier was permitted to operate. Based on the aforementioned international institutional environment, the established convention of the O. A. between Onasis and the Greek State (Lainos1992a) determined among other terms, that the company would have the exclusive rights for every commercial air transport activity in the domestic network. These privileges combined with the article of the Chicago convention, which prohibited cabotage (Eight Freedom), gave to the O.A. a monopolistic power into the domestic network.
The O.A. was nationalized in 1975 (Lainos 1992) by the conservative government, because Onassis demanded 60 mil. US$ annual-for 1975- subsidization,. The same year the government acquired the airline by giving 69 mil US$. (Lainos 1992)
In 1993 the E.U. established a liberalized European institutional environment, applying the open skies policy. In this institutional framework state-aids to the airlines were not permitted (Third package of liberalization-Open skies policy). Despite its privileges, the annual financial results of the O.A. since 1975 first year of its nationalization in 1975 up to 1994, reached an actual cumulative accounting registered deficits of more than 558 bil. GRD, more than 1,64 bil. US$. (Lainos 1994a)

Brief theoretical approach
Efficient Introduction of changes

There is not any specific prescription for unified worldwide procedures, methods,
mechanisms, measures for effective introduction of changes. This happens due to the high complexity of the process. Based on the international literature (Burnes, 1996, 2000, Lewin 1947; Pettigrew 1985; Pettigrew & Whipp 1991, 1993; Kotter 1995;) and according to our more than a ten year experience in the O.A.’s effort at restructuring (Lainos 2001) we have constructed a specific number of steps concerning the efficient introduction of changes, which must be applied in the specific order that follows: (Lainos-Nikolaidis 2003, see TABLE 1)

The case study of the Olympic Airways restructure 1994-2003
In order to assess the process that the Greek government has followed to restructure the Greek flag carrier the O.A., we consider necessary to determine the symptoms of the crisis manifestation in the O.A. and to discriminate them from its causes. If symptoms and causes are confused, the measures that have to be applied will not be efficient. It must be pointed out that neither the political parties nor the E.U. discriminated the symptoms from the causes of the O.A.’s crisis manifestation.
The causes and the symptoms of the O.A.’s crisis manifestation
The Greek political parties consideration (Greece 1994a)
All the Greek political parties does not distinguish the causes from the symptoms of the O.A.’s crisis presenting them cumulatively as follows:
Lack of reliable programming, poor management, the obligatory free of charge implementation of the governmental policies (public services) that burdened the operational cost, interference of the state-shareholder and the governmental parties to the everyday management of the Greek flag carrier
The E.U. consideration (European Union 1994)
Nor the E.U. distinguishes the causes from the symptoms of the O.A.’s crisis presenting them cumulatively as follows:
The seasonal business, the low productivity level in comparison with the productivity level of other European air carriers, management errors, poor management quality, lack of system of internal control, imposition

TABLE 1 (Lainos model)
Steps for effective introduction of changes

A) Determination of the strategic and tactic goals of the air-carrier
B) Determination and assessment of the current status of the air-carrier
1) Determination of the negative symptoms.
2) Determination of the causes of these symptoms
3) Determination of the sources of the aforementioned causes
C) Research and determination of the necessary changes that must be introduced according to the strategic and tactic goals of the organization
D) Preparation of the members of hierarchy as well as of the simple employees
1) Building trust-certainty-confidence among the employees for the future goals-intentions of the company
2) Informing the employees of the existence of the problem(s).
3) Focusing on the current and the long-term negative effects of the existed problem(s) for the survival of the company.
4) Focusing on the negative future effects, on particular categories of the employees and even if possible on individuals. The successful result of the aforementioned process must be the acceptance by the employees of the certain problem(s) existence.
5) Persuading the employees that some changes are necessary to be introduced in order to solve the problem(s).
6) Inviting the employees to submit suggestions and opinions about the necessary changes that must be introduced.
7) Informing the employees for the effects of their suggestions concerning the solution of the problems that the company faces.
8) Starting discussions with the employees to conclude to the mutually accepted suggestions concerning:
a)The number of changes, the field and the time of its implementation
b)The role of different categories of employees in the efficient implementation of these changes The discussions must be continued concerning all steps of the process.
a)The number of changes, the field and the time of its implementation
b)The role of different categories of employees in the efficient implementation of these changes The discussions must be continued concerning all steps of the process.
E) Co-decision concerning the necessary changes that must be introduced according to the strategic and tactic goals of the top management of the airline. It is obvious that the wider alliances of the company’s leader(s) with the formal leadership of the unions, together with the informal leaders, facilitates essentially the successful introduction of changes.
F) Programming of the introduction of the selected changes (which, when, where, how).
G) Introduction of the selected changes (fulfillment of all the agreements between top management and employees, determining the role of each employee). The methods that must be implemented relatively with the efficient introduction should be depending on factors such as : 1) emergency situation or not (level of the time pressure), existence of obligatory institutional network
2) existing national and corporate culture
3) level and kind of the existing reactions by the employees
H) Continuous control (with priority to the voluntary self-control) of the introduction of the changes and its results in every stage of introduction and in every organizational unit.
I) Assessment of the results of the introduced changes.
J) Stabilization of the introduced changes and of its results.
K) In case of failure a new effort must be made as soon as the mistakes of the previous effort are determined and the general circumstances become mature.

of obligations concerning the rendering of public service without a financial compensation, insufficiency of the company’s share-capital, high deficits, high financial cost.
The author’s consideration (Lainos 1997, 2001)
An efficient analysis of the O.A.’s crisis manifestation requires the discrimination of the symptoms-phenomena form the causes.
The main symptoms through which the crisis was manifested in the O.A. (see TABLE 2)
TABLE 2

-The absence of a reliable development program (Lainos 1992, chapter 6 p 180-201;Lainos 1997; Lainos 1999,p 317-330).
-The high rate of loan dependence. (Lainos 1994a –see TABLE 3)
-The39 times in 27 years change of the composition of the board of directors (European Union 1994, Lainos 2001).
-The absence of efficient control mechanisms.
-The irrational composition of the fleet (Lainos 1992 chapter 5 p112-177; Lainos 1992 chapter 5 p 208).
-The over-pricing of the purchased aircrafts (Lainos 1992 chapter 11 p 244-247; Lainos 1992 chapter 11 p. 253-280).
-The irrational organizational structure (European Union 1994, Greece 1994b).
-The favoritism in staff promotion to the hierarchy (Greek Economic Chamber 1994; 1995; Scientists Union of the Olympic Airways 1995a; 1995b, Greece 1994b).
-The absence of efficient management methods (European Union 1994,OA’s Collective Labor Agreements 1985-1994).
-The low and declining trend of the productivity level in relation to the competitors airlines-I.A.T.A. members. (Lainos 2003).
-The low quality level of the offered product, with exception of flight safety.
-The high operational cost in relation with the low productivity’s level..
-The high accounting deficits

TABLE 3
PARTICIPATION OF THE FINANCIAL TO THE TOTAL ANNUAL COST OF THE O.A. (Olympic Airways 1975-1994)
YEAR %

1975 1.7
1976 1.4
1977 1.6
1978 2.1
1979 3,2
1980 13,6
1981 19,3
1982 24,0
1983 31,4
1984 25,3
1985 29,6
1986 17,1
1987 17,6
1988 19,3
1989 19,3
1990 18,7
1991 10,0
1992 10,9
1993 5,6
1994 9,2

The main causes that led to the crisis manifestation in O.A.
From the internal corporate environment point of view.
-The inadequate qualifications of the members of the board of directors (Lainos 1992 chapter 11, O.A.’s Air Transport Technicians Union 1995)
-The involvement of the State-shareholder in the O.A.’s management that burdened the O.A.’s results with expenses of the State Budget etc. (Lainos 1994a)
The State-shareholder did not fulfill the terms of the O.A.-State convention but in addition it burdened, after nationalization, the O.A.’s financial position with expenses of the State budget. Research-study, conducted by the O.A.’s Economic Researche and Studies division (Lainos 1994a) on behalf of the board of directors- after requirement of Mr A. Matutes-the E.U. commissioner of Transport-proved that the OA.’s financial results burdened from 1975 up to 1994-12-31 in 1994 prices with GRD 1,054,5 trill. or US$ 3,095 bil.(see TABLE 4) due to obligatory, free of charge, implementation of the State-shareholder policies.

TABLE 4
The non registered in the O.A.’s balance-sheets debts owed by the state, its exclusive shareholder, due to the obligatory- free of charge-fulfillment of the governmental policies
(Up to 1994-31-12 in 1994 prices)

1. Non deposit of the share capital……………………..….. ……137 bil.GRD
2. Discounts for some groups of passengers of the domestic network
due to obligatory implementation of governmental policy..….…140 bil.GRD
3. Burdened the economic results of the O.A. with the cost of the free ofcharge flights of Prime Ministers and Presidents of Greece….. 12 bil. GRD
4. Unpaid debts of Ministries and other state services from ticket fees
for official flights of public servants.……………………….. 14,5 bil GRD
5. 97% discount on the transportation fares of the daily and weekly press, transported by the O.A. in obligatory implementation of governmental policy……………………………………………………….……………40 bil. GRD
6. Under-pricing of the domestic network passenger fares in implementation of governmental policy in violation of the 11th article of the O.A.-State convention….587 bil. GRD
7. Lost revenues of the O.A. due to the refusal of the Greek Civil Aviation
Authorities to pay fees from incoming charter flights of foreign airlines to
the O.A. according to the State-O.A. conventi……..…………. 40 bil. GRD
8. Strains on the O.A. due to the debts of political parties, from air
transportation of their voters during the election periods …….4 bil.GRD
9. Burdened the O.A.’s cost with the payrolls of round 100 of its employees
transferred at the service of various political parties…..……….40 bil GRD
10. Subsidization of Olympic Aviation affiliated company……..….40 bil GRD
Total 1975-1994 debts to the O.A. by the state-shareholder not registered in its accounting books :……………..…………GRD 1,054,5 tril. -US$ 3,095 bill

The causes of the crisis manifestation in O.A.
from its external corporate environment point of view.
The external environment of the O.A. does not only concern the domestic and international institutional operational framework of the airline industry, but also the general economic and other conditions, by which the operation of the airline industry is affected.
-The financial and the other conditions of the O.A.’s nationalization that burdened its operational cost (Lainos 1992 chapter 2).
-The permanent involvement of the, Governmental, party and other mechanisms, in the O.A.’s management. (Lainos 1992 chapter 1; 1992 chapter 11, European Union 1994, Koutsoyiannos 1995, Economist 1995)
The aim of the permanent and suffocating involvement of the aforementioned
mechanisms on the O.A.’s management is the dictation of certain relationships
with certain suppliers, clients, competitors, employees etc.
-The intensified seasonality.
-The direct or indirect subsidization of the operational cost of some affiliated companies (Olympic Aviation, Olympic Catering, All sun)
-The burden of the O.A.’s operational cost with the payrolls of round 100 of its
employees transferred to the service of various political parties
-The International crisis in Air Transport Industry and the change of the International institutional framework.
The efforts of the Greek government to introduce changes towards the recovery of the O.A.
An objective approach of the Greek government’s efforts to recover the O.A., must be divided in five distinguished periods according to the criteria “Aims and Institutional environment of the recovery effort” as follows: (see TABLE 5)

TABLE 5
The first period concerns the years from 1994 to 1997, related with the preparation and the application of the restructure law 2271/1994-12-23.
The second period concerns the years 1998/4-1999/6, related with the preparation and the application of the measures of the restructure law 2602/1998-4-13.
The third period concerns the years 6/1999-6/2000 related with the privatization of the O.A.’s management
The fourth period concerns the efforts to privatize of the O.A.’s share capital.
The fifth period starts after February 2003, when the Greek government decided to dichotomize the O.A.

The first period of the restructure effort 1994-1997
A former (1990-1993) conservative Prime Minister had declared even since1991 that Greece could manage without the flag carrier Olympic Airways. At the same period the government privatized the “Olympic Catering”, affiliated company of the O. A..
In 1993, the Greek Government conducted the first program for the O.A. restructure in collaboration with an external consultant. That program was rejected by the E.U. due to the low level of its reliability. The new restructure program that was conducted by the newly (1993/10) elected socialistic Greek Government in collaboration with the previous consultant was approved by the E.U. in October 1994. The involvement of the E.U. by the Greek government into the O.A.’s restructure effort was based on the false, as it has been proved above, assumption of the need for state aid. That kind of aid is not permitted by the E.U.’s air transport policy (1993 third package of liberalization)
The main measures for the O.A.’s restructure that was included in the law 2271/1994 and the level of their fulfillment (see TABLE 6)
The second period of the restructure effort 1998/4 –1999/6
The preparation of the field for the introduction of changes of the law 2602/1998
At the beginning of 1998, a coordinated campaign, mainly through the press against the efficient operation and the prospects of the O.A., took place (Financial Times 1998, Eleftherotypia 1998, Eleftheros Typos 1998, Papandreou Vaso.1998) Protagonists in this campaign were mainly the first class ministers of the socialistic government and the O.A.’s president of the board of directors.
The content of this campaign was:
a) the failure of the O.A.’s restructure
b) the employees responsibility for the failure.
c) the weakness of the public sector to give viable solution at the O.A.’s crisis
d) the necessity of privatization
The results of this campaign were the defamation of the Greek flag carrier, the public sector and the engineering of a deep crisis profile for the O.A.
The main measures that were included in the complementary restructure law 2602/98 and the level of their fulfillment (see TABLE 7)
It must be pointed out that both the recovery laws 2271/1994 and 2602/1998 did not include any penalty in the case of their violation.

TABLE 6

1) Undertaking of almost 520 billion GRD (US$ 1.526 bil.) of O.A.’s debts by the State Shareholder. Fulfilled
2) The state aid was prohibited except a 378 mil US$ state warranty for fleet’s renewal Fulfilled
3) Prohibition of the involvement of the state shareholder, in the O.A.’s everyday management with respect to the determination of under-pricing fares of the passenger and press transportation on the domestic network, the hiring of the O.A.’s employees etc. Not Fulfilled
15% decrease in the number of O.A.’s employees Fulfilled
but the Greek state subsidized in 1995 their voluntary retirement with 11 bil. GRD. This subsidization violated the E.U.’s prohibition of state aid to the O.A.
4) Deposit by the State shareholder of the owed share capital of 54 bil GRD (round US$ 159 mil) partially in three years under the presupposition of the fulfillment of the goals of the recovery program. Not Fulfilled
Only the first deposit of 19 billion GRD was fulfilled by the Greek State shareholder from the total owed share capital of 54 bil. GRD The remaining two deposits of 35 bil.GRD were frozen by the E.U. when the E.U. controllers during their first annual regular inspection realized that the Greek State shareholder: a) violated the prohibition of state aid to the O.A. (subsidization of the voluntary retirement of the O.A.’s employees with 11 bil. GRD (US$ 32,3 mil) b) the board of directors maintained the fares of press transportation in the domestic network deeply (90%) under-priced.
5) Impose a three year freeze of the labor cost on 1994 levels. Not Fulfilled Instead of a three year freeze, the labor cost increased during the recovery period (1995-1997) up to 35%. We consider that the aforementioned increase was a result of a political competition of the candidate leaders of the socialistic party after the death of its traditional leader A. Papandreou..
6) Introduction of new labor regulations. Not Fulfilled
Re-determination of the labor relationships (increase in the total annual working hours, etc.) Partially Fulfilled
8) Organizational restructure up to 1995-6-30. Reducing of the number of organizational level from nine to four. Not Fulfilled
9) Reevaluation of all employees’ qualification up to 1995-7-31 from zero base for all hierarchy levels according to the principle “compatibility of the employees’ qualification to the job description of the job position of each level of hierarchy Not Fulfilled
As a result of this failure the responsibility for the implementation of the restructure program was appointed to the same members of hierarchy that had been the last fifteen years. Consequently they had substantial share of the responsibility for O.A.’s crisis manifestation. This means that they were appointed to overcome the negative results of their own personal management.
10) Reduction to four of the more than eight existing aircraft types Not Fulfilled
Introduction of efficient management methods and techniques especially in revenues control. Not Fulfilled
11) Increase of the productivity level of the O.A. Fulfilled
12) The O.A. had to be profitable. Not Fulfilled
The O.A.’s annual financial results were as follows:
1995 bil. GRD 9,3 profits instead of 14 (round US$ 27.3 mil instead of US$ 41mil.) that was the goal of the restructure program. It must be pointed out that the O.A. was subsidized in this year by the state-shareholder with 11 bil GRD (round US$ 32,3 mil) for financing the pensioners employees. Further more the state shareholder deposited the 19 billions GRD from the 54 billion GRD that was the total owed share capital
1996 bil.GRD 11.2 profits instead of profits bil.GRD 26 (US$ 32.9 mil. instead of 76.5 mil.)
1997 bil GRD 38,0 losses instead of bil GRD 30 profits (US$ 111.7 mil. losses instead of US$ 88.2 mil. profits)

The third period

The privatization process of the O.A.

The efforts of the government to privatize the O.A.’s management
On January 31st 1999, after a barrage of statements by first class ministers in favor of the O.A.’s privatization, the state-unique shareholder of the OA, through its authorized consultants Salomon Brothers International LTD, announced, an invitation to tenders in order to assign the management of the company to a private individual according to the L. 2000/1991.
The-announced-objectives of the Management Contract was:
a) the adaptation of the O.A.’s reorganization program to the needs of the market The Manager Contractor was obliged, first of all, to examine it carefully, to develop it and to adjust it, if needed, according to his professional judgment.
b) the operational and economic reorganization of the OA in a way that the company could become profit-making and its long-term preservation could be assured with the criteria of the private economy.
c) the introduction of those necessary conditions that would allow the O.A. to be a part of an appropriate “international alliance” of air carriers with the best possible terms and prospects
The Speedwing (affiliated of the B.A.) was selected officially on 19-6-1999. It was announced that this choice was based on its general and specific experience as well as on its reliability and the amplitude of the specific provided assignment. However the name of the Speedwing was announced through the lines of the daily gazette (Kathimerini 1999), in 10th of January 1999 that means 22 days earlier than the invitation to tenders and six months before the announcement of the result by the government. The American Airline Company “American”, candidate for the tendering, sent a letter complaining about the absence of transparency procedures that had been followed.
In the first paragraph of the invitation it is acknowledged, that after the ministerial Committee’s decision of 29-1-1999, the OA is liable to L. 2000/91. However, from a simple glance at the law’s title it becomes clear that it doesn’t regulate the matters concerning the reorganization of state owned companies as it is mentioned in the invitation to tenders for the OA, but concerns the:“[…] Denationalization and simplification of the liquidation procedures […] Consequently, it is obvious that the government, assigned the management of the O.A. to the Speedwing, that is to a private individual and in particular to a subsidiary company of its competitor (the British Airways) in order to privatize it and not to reorganize it within the framework of the existing state ownership as it was declared. The Prime Minister stated that, by assigning the management of the O.A. to the Speedwing, the government gave a solution to the O.A.’s problem (Simitis 1999). In the contract between the Greek government and the Speedwiing there wasn’t any term for the case of the non-fulfillment of the obligations of the Speedwing managers mentioned in the contract, while a very high compensation was agreed. For this reason the major opposition, the press and others called this contract “lion’s agreement”.
TABLE 7

1) Settlement in two annual deposits of the owed by the State shareholder share capital of 21 bil GRD (round US$ 62 mil) instead of the 35 remaining. The amount of fourteen billion GRD was deducted by the E.U. due to an equal amount state aid to the O.A. in 1995 against the restrictions of the recovery program. The state shareholder in 1998 deposited 14 bil GRD of the 21 owed
2) Immediate 10%-20% decrease of the monthly salary per employee and a three-year freeze of the labor cost on 1997 levels. The monthly salaries per employee have been decreased from April 1998 more than 20% and have been frozen since then
3) New regulation of labor relationships.
4) Application of the organizational restructuring. Decrease by four of the more than 9 levels of formal hierarchy. A new organizational chart was applied based on the proposals of the external consultant of the O.A. that it was not fulfilled
5) Reevaluation of every employee, including the members of the hierarchy. Each employee had to be appointed to each hierarchy position according to the principle “compatibility of the employees qualification to the job description of the job position” of each level of hierarchy. The board of directors deteriorated the reevaluation of the employees, only to the existing during the last fifteen years members of hierarchy. That practice violated the regulation of the law 2602/98 according to which all employees had to be evaluated and made the will of the board of directors clear that is to keep the composition of the members of the O.A.’s hierarchy generally unchanged although the law mentioned that they were appointed under criteria different than the requirements of their job description.
6) Decrease by four of the more than eight – existing then – aircraft types. Instead of being decreased by four, the number of airplanes type remained eight as it was before the commencement of even the first recovery effort.
7) Introduction of efficient management methods, especially control methods and techniques. Instead of the introduction of efficient management methods and practices during the period of the second restructure effort, the well known old-fashioned ineffective management methods and practices were applied.
8) Increase the labor’s productivity level . The labor productivity increased only due to the decrease of the number of the employees because of their retirement.
9) Profitability of the O.A. of 1,3 bil GRD (US$ 3,8 mil) profits were achieved in 1998

The results of OA’s management by the Speedwing

The financial results of the OA during the Speedwing management in 1999 and 2000 were in 1999 GDR. 39 bil (US$ 115 mil) deficits and in 2000 GRD 32 bil (US$ 94,1 mil) deficits.
– The British managers tried to abolish the trademark of the O.A. (six circles very similar to the Olympic Games symbol). It was suspended after the severe reaction of the employees. At this point, we would like to note that the government must have been aware of this attempt because in the declaration of privatization of the O.A. one year later, the government included a term concerning the preservation of O.A.’s trademark under private ownership, for only two years.
– The British managers tried to assign the route of Australia to the Airline Company, in which the British Airways, mother company of the Speedwing, was a participant as well. However, one year later ANSETT went into bankruptcy. That attempt – despite the personal visit of the O.A.’s C.E.O. Mr. Rod Linch to Australia – failed, because of the severe reaction of Greeks in Australia, the leaders of whom protested to the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs as well. It has to be pointed out that the Australian government was offered to finance a part of the operational cost of this airline so that it would continue operating.
On 21-7-2000 after the complete failure of the British managers, the government gave the Speedwing notice of the termination of the contract. The Prime Minister stated that within the following months the government would seek a reliable solution to the O.A.’s problem (Simitis 2000)

The fourth period

The efforts at the O.A.’s share-capital privatization 2000/8-2003/2

After the failure of the Speedwing, the government decided to sell the majority of the O.A.’s shares (Greece 2000)
On 28-11-2000, the Greek Prime Minister, in conference with the Minister of Transportation and Communication, announced the invitation to tenders in order to sell the 65% of the company’s stocks with the simultaneous assignment of the management. (Financial Times 2000) Credit Swiss First Boston was appointed consultant of the Greek government that would evaluate the tenders.
On 4-1-2001, the ministerial Committee approved the privatization program for the O.A. in which the selling of the 51% of the share capital for 34 bil.GDR (USD 100 mil) was included. It must be pointed out that this price is the cost of an airplane Airbus 340 or the cost of the newly constructed hangar of the O.A.’s technical base in the “El. Venizelos” airport in Athens The below mentioned tenders responded to the invitation of the Greek government concerning the repurchase of the majority of the O. A. shares by 18-6-2001, the last date-limit of the submission of the re-examined tenders after a few postponements (Credit Swiss First Boston 2001):
1) Golden Aviation Holdings of the ship-owner Mr. Restis
2) Integrated Airline Solutions Consortium (Australian)
3) Cyprus Airways Consortium
4) The Axon Airlines of Mr. Liakounakos commercial representative of BOEING military in Greece
Among the aforementioned tenders the government’s consultant approved the AXON Airlines. the proposal of which is included in TABLE 8.
During the six months that followed, the Greek government and the AXON started negotiations, which, however, didn’t have a positive result and in mid of October 2001 the Axon Airlines withdrew itself from the market completely. On 18/11/2001,
TABLE 8
1) Acquisition of the 51% of the Olympic Airways’ shares
2) Investment of 100 million ECU with simultaneous contribution of 96 million ECU from the Greek government.
3) If the government required of the AXON to make an additional investment of 100 millions ECU, the government would be obliged to contribute to that with an additional amount of 96 million ECU.
4) The privatized the OA could get a 135 million ECU loan with the guarantee of the Greek government. It would be paid off in 10,5 years. The first installment would be paid off, three years after its emission.
5) The permanent personnel would be reduced from 5700 to 4533 employees. (20,5% reduction) with the agreement on terms and working conditions of the AXON’s employees (round 30% decrease).
6) The Greek government would revise the terms of the use of the airport at Spata (this is obviously referring to the fee reduction).

the government announced that it was starting negotiating with the Integrated Airline Solutions Consortium, whose members were never introduced to Credit Swiss First Boston consultant
. The proposal of the Integrated Airline Solutions Consortium is included in TABLE 9. This effort resulted to failure as well. After the failure of the aforementioned efforts two others followed, that failed too-the last one on 5 February 2003. On April 2001 O.A. relocated at the new Athens “El. Venizelos” airport (Law 2338/1995-govermental gazette A202/14-9-1995) where its operational cost increased about 10% due to the essential higher airport fees.
On 12 September of 2002 the Greek government announced its decisions to sell the “Olympic Catering” an affiliated company of the O.A. at the “EVEREST” a food chain company introduced in the stock market. On 5 February 2003 the Greek government announced its decisions to privatize the “Galileo Hellas” another affiliated company of the O.A.

The fifth period

Dichotomization 2003/2

After the last failure of the O.A.’s privatization, the minister of Transport and Communication announced on 5 February 2003 that the government decided to implement the solution he had suggested on 31-8-2000 which was the dichotomization of the OA in two companies (To Vima 2003, Kathimerini 2003).

TABLE 9
1) Repurchase of the 100% of the O.A.’s share capital with the possibility of selling the 49% to the Greek government within 6 years at the price of 74 millions ECU.
2) Investment of 150 million ECU and investigation in order to find 50 million ECU more from capital investment.
3) Cooperation with eventual capital share of the Union of Pilots of Civil Aviation (The O.A.’s pilots’ union).
4) Expansion of the existing destination network of the OA.
5) Neither a reduction of personnel number nor a change in terms and working conditions were mentioned.

According to the study conducted by the O.A’s external consultant (Kantor 2003) the old O.A. would take over the liabilities while the New O.A. would be a regional one and would include, the flight operations of the old O.A. the Olympic Aviation and the Macedonian Airlines two affiliated companies of the O.A.. The network structure was not clear. In some pages long rage destinations were included in other pages were not. We consider that the will of the government is to be limited to destinations of western Europe, Balkans, Middle East and North Africa. The relation concerning the operational characteristics between the old O.A. and the New O.A. is shown in TABLE 10 (Kantor 2003). This choice is still in process.
Some comments on the “Kantor’s” study
– In various pages are mentioned different fleet’s composition and different number of destinations in different continents.
-The methodology and the criteria used for assets evaluation are neither fixed nor unified
-The criteria for the demand’s forecast are neither fixed nor unified
-Although the “poor management” is considered as one of the main causes of the O.A.’s crisis by the E.U. approved restructuring program (1994/10), there is no any reference to the upgrading of its effectiveness.
-Ambiguities arises for the compatibility of the terms of the dichotomization with the E.U.’s free competition rules. The vice president of the E.U. Committee Loyola de Palathio replied to the question of Mr Hadjidakis member of the European parliament on behalf of the New Democracy, major opposition of the Greek parliament, that every plan for the O.A. that is not compatible with the E.U. rules for the free competition will be rejected by the Commission (Kathimerini 2003 f author’s translation).
The Greek government intends to navigate a bill for the dichotomization of the O.A. through the parliament in June 2003.

TABLE 10
The old O.A. The New O.A.

Nr of Destinations: 90-100 50-70
Continents Africa (north-south) Western Europe-Balkans-Middle East
America (USA-Canada) North Africa-Russia
Asia
Europe

Fleet in service: 1 B 737-300 17 B 737-400
19 B 737-400 7 ATR 72 propeller
3 B 717-200 4 ATR 42 propeller
4 A 340-300 6 small propeller of 20 seats
3 A 300-600 3 A 340 (with many ambiguities)
7 ATR 72 propeller
4 ATR 42 propeller
Personnel
Pilots…………..633………….……………….400
Stewarts-Srewartresses….1.167…………….…………….650
Ground staff …… …. 716…………..……………….780
Technical base ………….1.210 Outsourcing from Group OA
Ground handling…………..710 Outsourcing from Group OA
TOTAL 4.436 1.830

How did the employees of the O.A. faced the efforts of its restructure

The law 2271/1994 was accepted by the employees and their unions as a compulsory need after the pressure they had suffered from the government, press etc. for the bankruptcy of the O.A. in case of the failure of its restructure.
The reaction of the majority of the employees to the introduction of the changes that were included in the new recovery law 2602/98, was determined by their three years previous negative experience acquired from the way of the implementation of the restructure law 2271/1994 and its results.
Despite the alliance among the government, the C.E.O., the board of directors and the majority of the leaders of the O.A.’s unions, the medium level leaders and the simple employees-the majority of whom supported the governmental socialistic party- reacted to the implementation of the regulations of the law 2602/ 1998 negatively. Their reaction was manifested by voting against the law at the union meetings, strikes, demonstrations etc. for twenty days. The main causes were:
a) the essential decrease, more than 20%, in the employees’ salaries
b) the worsen of the labor conditions
c) the increase in the deficits instead of profits despite the increase in the labor’s productivity and the decrease in the salaries.
d) The insecurity for the future of the O.A.
However it must be mentioned that the union of the O.A.’s pilots involved in its privatization process as partner of the last two tenders, pursuing in acquiring a part of O.A.’s share capital of about 6,5 bil DRG (US$ 20 mil)
In 12th of April 2002 during a debate among the members of the “economic transparency committee” of the Greek parliament concerning the results of the O.A.’s restructure, the minister of Transportation stated that the permanent vision of the government was the O.A.’s privatization. But as the conditions were not mature and the employees might stimulate negative reactions, this vision could not be communicated earlier. This is the reason, he stated, that sometimes the politicians are obliged to present a situation in two different versions. One version is presented for the parliament and the other version is presented during the employees’ negotiations.
However the Minister of Economics Mr Christodoulakis during a parliamentary debate of 2003-4th June stated that the Greek government denies the possibility to proceed to the O.A’s. privatization under the pressure of the current negative circumstances. (Gazette Kathimerini f).
Three days later (2003-7-7) the minister of transportation stated that “[…] the plan of restructure and privatization of O.A.’s group is compatible with the E.U. rules[…]” linking the dichotomization with the privatization of the O.A. group.
Concerning the dichotomization of the O.A.:
The only union, which agreed to the dichotomization, was the- mainly, tourboprop airplanes’- pilots of the Olympic Aviation (Gazette Kathimerini 2003 c)
The unions: cabin crew of the O.A. , cabin crew of the Olympic Aviation and the pilots of the O.A. either did not agreed with the government’s choice or disagreed directly (Olympic Airways and Olympic Aviation cabin crew 2003). Their opposition is related with the terms and conditions of dichotomization due to:
a) decrease of: the salaries level, the labor positions and the number of destinations,
b) worsening the labor conditions

Conclusions.

1) Despite the E.U.’s institutional framework, the Greek Government was not obliged to involve the E.U. in the O.A.’s restructure since the O.A. was actually profitable and not loss making as it appeared to be in its balance sheets. The profitable financial position comes, from the co-calculation of the debt of the State shareholder to the O.A., due to the free of charge obligatory implementation of the governmental policies. These debts either were not registered in the O.A.’s balance sheets or were deleted by its B.O.D. in 1991. This is the cause of the false impression that the O.A. was considered to be under bankruptcy. Consequently the O.A. did not need state aid for its restructuring as the government was argued.
2) The only explanation concerning the E.U.’s involvement in the restructure of the O.A. by the Greek government may be considered to be its pursuit to avoid burdening the political cost that comes from the implementation of unpopular measures necessary to achieve its perception of the O.A.’s restructure.
3) The introduction of changes in the O.A. for its restructure failed due to the following causes:
a) The goals were not clear (restructure under the current ownership regime or privatization).
b) Both of the restructure laws did not included penalties for the case of its violation
c) Those who were appointed and involved with analysis of the O.A. crisis (the hierarchy and the external consultant) not only they did not distinguish the causes from the symptoms of crisis manifestation, but they registered and presented them with an almost equal special weight.. Consequently due to this reason the measures for overcoming the causes and the symptoms were, ineffective
d) The implementation of both the restructure laws was assigned to the same members of the O.A. hierarchy, who were responsible for the O.A.’s crisis manifestation.
e) The government, the O.A.’s Board Of Directors and its members of hierarchy due to their unreliability, failed to persuade the employees for the necessity of introduction of the specific changes in the particular time period.
f) Those who were appointed and involved with the preparation of the field for the effective introduction of the changes, failed to make the employees to participate in the process and to avoid reactions, although they were in alliance with the leaders of the unions.
g) This happened because instead of building trust, certainty and confidence among the employees relative with the goals of the changes and the prospects of the company, those who were authorized and involved with the introduction of changes (board of directors and members of hierarchy), created among the employees conditions of uncertainty and lack of trust and confidence in their future vision for the O.A.
h) The board of directors avoided to discuss with the simple employees and explain to them :
– the problems that the company faced, the short and long term effects on the survival of the company.
– the effects of these problems on the existence of labor positions.
i) Nobody called the simple employee to submit his proposals concerning the causes of the crisis and the efficient solutions.
j) The “negotiations with the employees” were deteriorated by the board of directors to discussions with the leadership of the Federation and the unions. However, they had not unified considerations relatively with the restructure of the O.A. Further more these who agreed with the government had not the expected influence on the medium level members and on the base of the members of the unions.
Finally the failure of the O.A.’s restructuring was due to absent of :
a) certain goals-vision of the O.A.’s state shareholder and the top management
b) belief and trust of the hierarchy members to the fulfillment of the declared goals
c) capability of the authorized hierarchy members for the efficient introduction of changes.
4) The dichotomization process of the O.A.:
a) does not face the real, aforementioned, causes of its crisis manifestation
b) burdens the public budget with cost that the unified O.A. did not burdened
c) arises questions relatively to its compatibility with the E.U.’s policy of free competition.
d) increases the unemployment level
e) does not assure the viability of the new O.A. since-among other reasons-:
– the “Kantor”, the external consultant of the O.A., which conducted the study for its dichotomization, is the same one which in 1995 conducted the program for the O.A.’s restructure that failed.
– the conducted program is not based on fixed and unified criteria in assets evaluation, network structure, fleet composition etc.
– does not determine the sources of financing of the new O.A. although wide new investments are mentioned (new fleet etc.).

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World Conference on Transport RESEARCH 4-8/7/04 ISTANBUL. TURKEY

Yiannis S. Lainos
Ph.D. in Aviation Economics-Management Human factors

Presuppositions for upgrading of the reliability and the comparability
of the accident reports in order to upgrade aviation’s safety level

Abstract
ICAO’s exclusive objective for air accident investigation is the prevention of future accidents/incidents. For an effective and efficient contribution to the upgrading of the aviation’s safety level, the various accident reports have to be comparable. A reliable comparability of the various accident reports requires a unified perception of the examined environment by the investigators. A unified methodology and structure of the presentation of the findings, conclusions and recommendations is also required. Reading the various accident reports one realizes that in each one of them, the different fields of the same managerial function are allocated in different paragraphs of the given structure. In the institutional framework that the ICAO has established regarding the air accident investigation report, the following presuppositions are defined:
– for being an investigator (the general qualifications of the investigators)
– for making an accident investigation and
– for presenting the results in the accident report (the structure of the accident report and the titles of the contents)
The lack of detailed description in the aforementioned information leaves space for differentiation of the investigators’ perception-knowledge-qualifications. Consequently, this weakness does not contribute positively to the maximization of the effectiveness and efficiency of the accident reports and finally to the upgrading of aviation’s safety level. (C2 Safety Analysis and Policy)
Key words
Aviation-accident-incident-final report, aviation-accident-investigation, aviation-safety, Air-carrier-management-functions, determinants of human perception.
Aim of the paper
Aim of the paper is to determine:
a) the vagueness of some sectors of the general framework, that the ICAO has established in order to set the presuppositions for being an investigator, making an accident investigation and presenting the results in an accident report. and
b) the consequences of this vagueness on the reliability and comparability of the accident reports
The author’s contribution is:
1) The determination of the existing vagueness at some sectors of the general institutional framework, that the ICAO has established, for the presuppositions of an accident investigation, and its negative consequences on the reliability and comparability of accident reports
2) The proposals for overcoming the aforementioned vagueness and its negative consequences on the reliability and comparability of the accident reports and
3) The methodology applied, that is the dialectic analysis and synthesis, which discriminates the symptoms from the causes, focusing on the primary causes. The specific methodology can be implemented efficiently to any similar case.
Introduction
For an effective and efficient contribution to the upgrading of the aviation’s safety level, the various accident reports have to be comparable. A reliable comparability of the various accident reports requires a unified perception and comprehension of the examined environment by the investigators and a unified methodology and structure of the presentation of the findings, the conclusions and the recommendations. .
Reading the various accident reports one realizes that in each one of them the same issues are included in different paragraphs of the given structure.
Of course the absolute unification of the objectivity-reliability level of the perception of each investigator is not possible due to:
– the existence of factors that cannot be determined,
– the infinity of the stimuli by the environment towards the human organism
– the fact that the biological and mental abilities of the human organism are limited.
Among the determinants of the investigators’ perception, the ICAO mentions their general job specialty (doctors, pilots etc) and the minimum level of their knowledge (titles of the issues of the investigators training syllabus)
However it does not determine:
a) the specific job specialty of the doctor (pathologist, psychiatrist etc), or the specific job specialty of the pilot (jet, tourboprop etc) and the specific aircraft type they have to be certified at, the duration and the field of their experience. This weakness has a negative impact on the unification of the investigators’ level of knowledge
b) the content of each title of the syllabus, consequently the uniformity of the investigators’ level of knowledge
c) the qualifications of the investigators’ trainers (the science the sector and the level of their knowledge and experience)
d) the investigators’ psychological and physical health
The a, b, c, weaknesses contribute negatively to the uniformity of the investigators’ level of knowledge although, knowledge is a basic determinant of the quality of the investigators’ perception. The d weakness determines the objectivity-reliability of the investigator’s perception.
The problem of the ability, of the process and the determinants of the perception and comprehension of the environment by the human being, is one of the first and main issues that ancient Greek philosophy (Andriopoulos 2003) had faced. (Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Plato, Aristotle etc.)
Two main aspects were posed from the beginning:
a) the ability or the inability of the human being to have access to the cognition of the physical environment and
b) the predominance either of the human senses or the human spirit as to their contribution to the cognition of the physical environment (Andriopoulos 2003).
Since then, the aforementioned problems that compose knowledge theory,
have been an integral part of any philosophical theory or system.
(Windelband & Heimsoeth 1976). Research during the last (20th) century
has concluded that: (Goleman 1995, Hayes 1994, Louria 1978,
Papadopoulos 2003, Scharfetter 1976, Steanberg 1996)
– Perception is one of the mental processes of the human being
– The human’s mental processes involve: consciousness, attention, perception, memory, thinking, emotion, intelligence, learning, orientation etc,
– The parameters of the human mental processes are in a continuous interaction
– The senses are the gates through which the stimuli from the environment are transferred to the relative brain centers through the nervous system.
Consequently the identification of the causes of a particular level of perception requires the analysis into its parameters and the examination of each of these parameters separately. It is obvious that, due to the interaction of the various parameters of mental processes, a disorder in one of them, may cause the disorder of all the others in a different level and intensity This is the reason for our decision to make a brief presentation about: a) mental processes, b) the presuppositions of their regular function, and c) the determinants and the consequences of their disorder.
The present paper is focused on the determinants of the investigators’ perception-comprehension, including their level and areas of knowledge as well as the structure of the accident report, using as case study the paragraph 1.17. Organizational and Management information

PART ONE
Brief theoretical approach
1. Definitions
“Investigation”. (ICAO 2001) Α process conducted for the purpose of accident prevention which includes the gathering and analysis of information, the drawing of conclusions, including the determination of causes and, when appropriate, the making of safety recommendations.
Investigator-in-charge. (ICAO 2001) Α person charged, on the basis of his or her qualifications, with the responsibility for the organization, conduct and control of an investigation
”Qualifications” are defined as the totality of capabilities, theoretical knowledge and practical experience upon a particular cognitive field. The qualifications of every employee are basic determinants of his-her quality and of the quantity of the employees’ product in a particular period of time.

2. The necessary presuppositions for the comparability of all accident
reports
The necessary presuppositions for the fulfillment of ICAO’s goal regarding the accident investigation- prevention of future accidents/incidents- is the comparability of all accident reports filled in by every investigator all over the world. This reliable comparability of accident reports, requires the unification of the level of reliability for every region of the world, regarding the:
1) perception-comprehension of the environment by the accident investigators
2) qualifications of the accident investigators (job specialty, knowledge, experience)
3) structure of the accident report
4) titles of the chapters of the accident report
5) content of the chapters of the accident report
6) methodology of filling in the accident report.
We must make clear that an absolute unification of the level of the aforementioned factors cannot be achieved, due to the differentiation and limitation of the capabilities of human nature. However we consider that the existing difficulties should not stop us from continuing the effort to achieve the higher level of uniformity which contributes to a higher level of aviation safety.

3 The mental processes as determinants of perception (Goleman 1995, Hayes 1994, Louria 1978, Papadopoulos 2003, Scharfetter 1976, Steanberg 1996)
Human perception is the resultant, the unified expression of a totality of components of mental processes, which are in continuous interaction. To specify the causes of a particular perception’s level, this perception should be analyzed into its components and each component should be examined separately.
The mental processes that form each component of perception are: consciousness, attention, memory, thought, emotion, intelligence, learning, orientation etc.
It is obvious that, because of this interaction, the disordered function of one of them causes disorder to the others, in different levels and intensity.
Perception
Perception, like any other mental process, doesn’t function independently. The quality of its function is in relation with the function quality of all other interacting mental processes. Perception is the mental process, which, along with other mental processes, gives an individual the ability to be aware of external or internal objects, by means of stimuli, which are received by the sensory organs, transmitted to the brain and processed by it. In psychiatry an “object” is defined as anything that can stimulate emotions in a human being. e.g. an idea, a fantasy, a person, a material object, a situation, one’s own self etc. The process of perceiving an object is composed by the phases of: observation-attention (stimulus), sensation, transmission of the stimulus to the corresponding brain centers through the nervous system, encoding of the stimuli (characteristics and qualities of the object) within the consciousness, processing, understanding and interpretation according past knowledge and experience, and finally transmission of the conclusions to those brain centers that will then give our nervous system the orders for the various reactions of the organism. Consequently, perception is not a static process of a given quantity and quality, but it evolves dynamically through development (learning etc).
Only one part of objective reality is possible to be perceived. Full perception of objective reality cannot be achieved by a human being, because our senses are not aroused by a series of visual, auditory stimuli, vibrations, movements of particles, atoms, electrons etc. On the other hand, human brain has the capacity of processing a limited quantity and quality of information. Consequently, the limited ability of our senses to be aroused by the totality of stimuli from the environment, correlates with the ability of our brain to process them, in the context of the defense mechanisms of our organism.
Factors influencing the functional level of perception (Scharfetter 1976)
The following factors influence the process of perception:
a) the subjective factor (emotional state, previous experience, level of knowledge, level of intelligence etc) and
b) the objective factor (intensity, simplicity or complexity of the object).
Disorders of perception
Perception disorders may be caused by conditions such as:
A) Organic disorders
1) of the receptive capacity of the sensory organs,
2) of the various brain centers (e.g. the individual can see or hear, but cannot recognize)
B) Psychological disorders
1) Hallucination (perception of a non-existing object),
2) Illusion (distorted perception of an existing object).
Consciousness
“Consciousness” in psychiatry is described as the level of alertness of the individual and it is analyzed in two parts:
a) the sensory part, which involves the ability of the individual to process the stimuli provided by the external environment and
b) the kinetic part, which involves the ability of the individual to process stimuli of the external environment, to select the answer and finally give it.
In the course of this process, defense mechanisms are also involved. They act as a filter and decide which stimuli from the external environment will be kept in consciousness and which will pass into the subconscious. It is obvious that consciousness disorders affect every other mental process.
Consciousness disorders may be the result of:
a) psychological causes (stress, fear, psychiatric personality disorders etc)
b) organic causes (injuries, brain tumors, toxic and infectious causes etc)
c) biochemical causes (medications, alcohol, other toxic substances, drugs etc).
The consequences of consciousness disorders are a decline in other mental processes, such as perception of objective reality, attention, judgment and association processes.
Attention
By the term “attention” is specified the mental process through which the individual classifies by time and space in his memory an internal or external stimulus.
The causes of attention disorders are head trauma or injury, physical and psychological burnout, anxiety, normal phobias, stressful situations, intense emotions (anger, sadness etc), medications, alcohol, other toxic substances, drugs etc).
The consequences of attention disorders are: exhaustion, easy fatigue,
fixation, short attention span, destructiveness, selective and non-selective inattentiveness. In the context of the above-mentioned disorders, the individual is incapable of performing the process of attention :
a) concentrates on one or a few objects,
b) is incapable of concentrating in general,
c) is incapable of evaluating external or internal stimuli
d) is not able to concentrate on one or more stress-inducing objects (defense mechanism of repression).
Memory
Memory is the mental process that gives an individual the ability to store past experience, to recall it and motivate it (recognition, recall, constructive memory) each time this is considered to be necessary. All these facts make memory a basic component of the quality of perception and normal behavior. Memory, along with thinking and learning, is a cognitive mental process.
Factors affecting the function of memory are: function level of consciousness-alertness, lapse of time between encoding and storing of the information, function level of perception, function level of attention, motivation and interest of the individual, emotional investment on the information to be stored, various rules of memory techniques for organising information.
As consequences of the memory disorders are reported:
a) amnesias (incapability of storing information due to e.g. chronic alcoholism, brain injury and incapability of recalling the information because of recent emotional disorder, intense anxiety, fear etc, permanent or temporary brain damage)
b) hypermnesia, panoramic revival of experience, hyperactivity of constructive memory, exceptionally vivid memory
c) paramnesias-delusional memory: recalling events or situations that never occurred
d) confabulation: the “making up” of memories in order to justify specific situations or just to show off, to the point that the individual comes to believe them as reality.
Emotion
Emotion is a mental process that charges pleasantly or unpleasantly every human activity, determining our disposition regarding the activity’s intensity and duration, as well as communication with the environment. It is a strictly subjective situation, and for this reason it is rather experienced than described. Emotions can motivate the individual positively or negatively towards a situation or an object.
Factors affecting the function level of an emotion are: the normal function of the brain (central nervous system), which may be disrupted by injuries, tumors, functional disorders, the peripheral nervous system the endocrinal system.
Disorders in the above-mentioned systems cause emotional disorders, like:
a) ambivalence (simultaneous appearance of positive and negative affect regarding a choice),
b) euphoria (permanent and unjustified),
c) depression and melancholy,
e) shallowness of affect (incapability of expressing strong emotions),
e) incapability of experiencing any feelings at all,
f) emotional rigidity – inflexibility (incapability of differentiating a feeling
according to different stimuli from the environment),
g) instability (rapid change of emotions even as a result of unimportant stimuli),
h) incapability of controlling feelings,
i) inappropriate affect (the manifestation of emotions that do not correspond to the stimulus)
It is obvious that the emotional state of a person (fear, anger, happiness, anxiety, jealousy etc) invariably affects the function of perception.
Learning
It is a complicated process that affects the behavior of a person, and has to do (Skinner) with: “alteration of the probability of a response under the same conditions in which the conjunction between stimuli and response takes place.
Factors affecting the function level of learning are:
A) Factors related to the person:
1) function level of the central nervous system,
2) motivation for learning
3) emotional interest towards the object of learning,
4) degree of a person’s maturity
5) previous experiences,
6) level of intelligence.
The above-mentioned factors, in combination, form the conditions for faster and more complete learning. We underline the word combination, because for example, a high level of intelligence without emotional interest, or, even worse, with emotional aversion does not promote learning process.
B) Factors related to the environment:
Personality and environment are in a constant interacting process. The quality (clarity, intensity etc), the quantity and coherence of the stimuli contribute positively or negatively to the learning process. As long as the environment is conducive to the emotional investment on the object of learning, or furthermore to the satisfaction of essential needs of the individual as the result of learning, the learning process is facilitated.
Functional disorders of learning are due to:
a) disorders of the central nervous system
b) psychological disorders that block emotional investment on the object of learning.
c) the quality (clarity, intensity etc) and the quantity of external stimuli.
Thought – Reasoning
Thought-reasoning can be defined as the mental process which is related to the dynamic evolving process of problem-solving through which the classification of material and non material objects concerning the self and the environment is performed. (Scharfetter 1976) Through thinking, meaning and importance is attached to these objects, they are understood and their causal relations are explained, meanings are connected to each other, decisions are taken, judgments are made.
Thought-reasoning as a process is wider than perception, having as a basis the brain (central nervous phenomena).
It is activated when the man seeks the solution of a problem, the satisfaction of a need. It is the expression of a man’s personality, that’s why thought disorders initiate disorders of the personality. Action is the primary manifestation of thought and a crucial criterion for its rightfulness.
Factors affecting the function level of thought-reasoning are:
A) Psychological and biological conditions, such as:
1) consciousness state 2) state and level of memory, 3) level of intelligence, which is defined by biological and social parameters, 4) emotional state, 5) level of the organic function of the brain.
B) Social and cultural factors
Thought-reasoning disorders are divided in: disorders of thought process and disorders of thought content.
a) Disorders of process
1) the simple, temporary, frequent or constant blocking of thinking, 2) slowness of thinking, 3) flight of thought (distraction into many objects, incapability of concentrating on something specific), 4) verbiage, trifle talk, pedantic thinking (concentration on the examination of a single object in depth, focusing on details, on the insignificant aspects, which results in the incapability of perceiving the general essence), 5) incoherent, chaotic thinking (combination or differentiation of things, situations etc, without specific criteria) persistent repetition of particular words or sentences, with or without meaning, 6) incoherence -loose associations (articulated thoughts without any reasonable or emotional coherence)
b) Disorders of the content of thinking
1) compulsive thoughts against the will of the person
2) paranoid or unreasonable thoughts
Consequently the necessary conditions of a minimum level of objective-reliable perception and comprehension of the environment by the investigator is his-her physiological function of:
a) all the senses,
b) the nervous system that transfers the external stimulus from the senses at the proper cerebral centers,
c) the cerebral centers that process the stimulus,
d) all the mental processes since they affect perception and
e) the level of knowledge and experience upon the investigated environment (which is included in the determinant of mental processes)

4. Κnowledge-experience as a basic determinant of perception (Paries Ashleigh 1998, Marsh 2000, Lainos & Nikolaidis 2003,)
Κnowledge (theoretical and practical-experience) that is, the characteristics, the properties, the theoretical principles of evolution – the actual evolution during a particular period of time, the relationships-interactions-consequences of the environment (objects, events, situations) is a basic determinant of perception’s-comprehension’s quality. Consequently it affects decisively the quality of decision-making and therefore effectiveness of action. But knowledge is useful only if it can facilitate the understanding of the environment (close and wider) by a human being who, based on that, may then proceed to decision-making and action towards the fulfillment of a goal.
The optimum quantity of information relative to a particular environment is what the user can perceive, understand and process according to his-her biological, psychological and cognitive abilities. The support provided by the available machinery and electronic means enlarges these abilities. Excessive, unnecessary information especially if it is irrelevant, may cause additional ambiguities to the user, affecting the objectivity of his-her perception and also causing further delay to decision making. Consequently it results to a lower quality of situation awareness instead of a higher one, to a further delay of decision making and acting, due to the user’s inability to process the available quantity and quality of information. This can be described as “analysis-paralysis”.
Comprehension-understanding, is the result of a very complicated process. It concerns the correlation between information perceived and stored in the user’s memory. This information is relative to objects, events, situations perceived (developing a mental picture) from the environment through the senses. Perception includes the characteristics, properties, theoretical evolution principles-actual evolution during a particular period of time, relationships-interactions-consequences of the objects, events, situations.
For example when, during an aerobatic air-show an airplane dives with its nose vertical to the ground, the watcher considers this to be an aerobatic maneuver.
If however the same watcher sees a commercial airplane at the same position, he-she rather considers that it is going to crash. These two different considerations are a result of the correlation between the position of each airplane and its characteristics, properties etc., that the watcher has stored in his-her memory.
The reliability-objectivity of human understanding is based-apart from physical and mental functions- on the determination of the percentage of the understanding. This is based: on known information, on assumed information, on known ignorance and on unknown ignorance. It must be noticed that the absolute perception of the objective reality is impossible for every individual due to
– the infinity of external stimuli to the human organism
– the limited capabilities:
a) of the human senses to recognize these stimuli,
b) of the nervous system to transfer these stimuli to the proper brain centers
c) of the brain centers to process these stimuli
.
5. The role of the management functions on the accident occurrence
Even since the first quarter of the 20th century (Hawthorn etc.) up to recent times research has proved that the activity-behavior of every individual at his-her working place, during working time, is strongly, directly and indirectly affected by factors that compose the wider internal airline’s environment. (Andries-Kompier, -Smulders 1996, Beehr 1995, Bright-Mitchel.- Rickman 1996, Daniels-Harris 1998, MacDonald-Karasek-Punnett-Scharf 2001, Westfall 1998 )
“However the results of this research were not correlated with the managerial decisions and functions, through which the top management introduces the suggestions of the researchers in the internal corporate environment”. (Lainos 2003)
“[…]Only now are safety practitioners realizing the complex nature of accident/incident causation and the role organizations play in the genesis and management of human error. In fact it is the emphasis that organizational models place on the fallible decisions of managers, supervisors and others in the organization that sets them apart from the other perspectives previously discussed[…]” (Shapell-Wiegmann 2003 )
“[…] Organizational accidents may be truly accidental in the way in which the various contributing factors combine to cause the bad outcome, but there is nothing accidental about the existence of these precursors, nor in the conditions that created them.[…]” (Reason 1997)
Recent studies have proved that the activity-behaviour of the staff at working place, during working time, is strongly, directly and indirectly affected by factors from the wider internal corporate environment (Αnderson-Kjellberg-Lindberg-Skoldstrom 1996, Beehr 1995, Bright-Mitchel-Rickman 1996, Kelley 1996, Biner 2000,Fingret 2000, Hendy 2003, Caldwell-Caldwell 2003)
The introduction and preservation of these factors is ultimately determined by the top management decisions (C.E.O., B.O.D.). (Lainos 2003)
“[…] Responsibility for aviation safety begins at the very top of an airline company. History has demonstrated repeatedly that without the complete commitment of the highest management levels within a company, operational safety margins are seriously eroded. This does not suggest that a company will have an accident, but it does suggest that the risk of having an accident is high-the laws of probability will prevail. Management has great leverage in affecting operational safety within a company. Through its attitudes and actions management influences the attitudes and actions of all others within a company: Management defines the safety culture of an organization. This safety culture extends all the way to the maintenance shop floor, to the ramp to the cabin and to the cockpit. Further more the public and the government authorities are increasingly recognizing management’s role in air safety by holding management accountable for a serious incident or accident; this accountability is magnified many-fold if a company suffers several such incidents or accidents during a course of a few years […].” (Flight Safety Foundation 1994)
“[…]The ultimate responsibility for safety rests with the directors and management of the Company. The Company’s attitude to safety—the Company’s safety culture—is established from the outset by the extent to which senior management accepts responsibility for safe operations, particularly the proactive management of risk. Regardless of the size, complexity, or type of operation, senior management deter- mines the Company’s safety culture. However, without the wholehearted commitment of all personnel, any safety programme is unlikely to be effective[…].” (Airbus
Industry 1999),
This consideration is based on the fact that the top management has the authority to program, organize, administrate, staff and control the corporate operation and to apply its decisions in the internal corporate environment, through the authorized members of the hierarchy (Lainos 2003). Even in the case that some of the factors of the internal corporate environment that affect negatively the staff’s activity are not the result of top management decisions, but the result of mismanagement by the members of the hierarchy at the various organizational levels, the ultimate responsibility still rests with the top management. The cause is that the top management has the ultimate responsibility of staffing. (Lainos 2003).

6. The functions of the organizations’ management and their content
The knowledge of the functions of the corporate management, its content, its consequences on the influenced areas of the internal corporate environment and the impact of these functions on the employees’ will is a basic determinant of the investigator’s opinion about the primary cause(s) and contributing factors of the accident incident (Lainos 2003)
The functions of the corporate management are: Planning, Organizing, Administrating, Staffing, and Controlling. These functions pursue the achievement of corporate goals based on the economic principle, which is the maximization of the profits. The corporate areas and operations that are affected by these functions are showed in TABLE 1.
TABLE 1

 

In order to create a more clear perception of the managerial functions’ impact, on the employees will, the internal corporate factors which affect the employees will are mentioned bellow (see TABLE 2)
TABLE 2
14. Wages level Programming-Administrating-Staffing
15. Hygiene and safety conditions (warm-cold,
light-dark, noise, radiation, chemicals etc.) Programming-Administrating
16. Stress and fatigue due to workload Programming-Administrating- Controlling
17. Job security Programming-Administrating (motivating)- Staffing
18. Skills and training Administrating (motivating)- Staffing
19. Meritocracy or favoritism Administrating (Culture)
20. The applied management style (human or product
oriented, motivation’s efficiency, virtual recognition
of the employees’ contribution to the development
of the airline, the superiors’ behavior etc) Administrating
21. Corporate culture applied by the top Management Administrating
22. Efficiency of the corporate labor
programming and organizing Programming-Organizing-controlling
23. Professional and social status
of a particular labor position Administrating- Staffing
24. Satisfaction from
achievement in work Administrating- Staffing –Controlling
25. Health and physical
situation of the employee Administrating- Staffing -Controlling
26. Social status of the airline Programming-Organizing-Administrating-Staffing-
Controlling

PART TWO
The case study of the ICAO’s manuals regarding accident and incident investigation

7. The qualifications of the accident investigators
Assuming that all aforementioned presuppositions are fulfilled, job specialty, knowledge and experience play a decisive role in the process which shapes the objective perception.
The qualifications of the accident investigators are described in the ICAO’s Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation 1-2-2 Paragraph 2.4.3.
7.1. “ Qualifications of the Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigator
“ It is essential that accident investigators have a practical background in aviation as a foundation on which to develop investigation skills. The experience can be acquired by working as a professional pilot, as an aeronautical engineer or as an aircraft maintenance engineer. Other specialized areas of aviation which could also provide useful experience include management, operations, airworthiness, air traffic services, meteorology and human factors. Since accident investigations will often involve all of these specialized areas, it is important that investigators understand the aviation infrastructure and are able to relate to each of these different areas. It is also beneficial for investigators to leave some piloting experience in addition to their other experience”
In the aforementioned paragraph, ICAO, describes as qualifications of the air accident investigators the required areas of their general job specialty (doctors, pilots, aeronautical engineers, aircraft maintenance engineers) and the required areas of their experience (management, operations, airworthiness, air traffic services, meteorology and human factors). As a basic job specialty and experience is considered to be piloting, a basic knowledge which is required by every investigator. However the investigator during the investigation is obliged to get involved in areas of knowledge different than his-her own job specialty. This is the reason why the ICAO considers necessary for every investigator to have a wider knowledge –regardless of his-her job specialty- in areas such as management, operations, airworthiness, air traffic services, meteorology and human factors. The titles of the chapters that the investigators have to be trained in are mentioned by the ICAO in the description of the information that has to be included in each paragraph of the accident report.
We consider that this system appears to have certain weaknesses, because it does not determine:
a) the specific job specialty of the doctor (pathologist psychiatrist etc), or of the pilot (jet, tourboprop etc) and the aircraft type the pilots had to be certified at.
b) the duration of the required experience of every investigator,
c) the content of each title of the syllabus to which each investigator has to be trained.
d) the qualifications of the investigators’ trainers: sector, science, level of
knowledge, duration of experience)
e) the physical and mental health of the investigator, although it is a necessary presupposition for an acceptable level of the investigator’s perception.
This vagueness causes ambiguities regarding which exact characteristics, properties, knowledge, experience etc., ICAO wants the air accident investigators to be armed with.
Consequently we consider that the system under these circumstances does not ensure the unified level of knowledge of the investigator although this unity is considered to be a necessary presupposition for the comparability of accident reports findings, conclusions and recommendations.
However, the investigators’ qualifications – like any other employees’- generally determine the quality of their perception. It is obvious that any differentiation in the qualifications differentiates-ceteris paribus- the quality of perception. This differentiation has a negative impact on the effort of ICAO: a) to focus on upgrading the unification of the perception’s level of the investigators per involved job specialty, during the accident investigation and b) to achieve a higher level comparability of the various accident reports.

8. Criteria of the structure of an accident report
According to ICAO Annex 13 the structure of an accident report must be as shown in the table 3 below.
From the structure of accident reports it becomes obvious that ICAO uses both operational and managerial criteria indiscriminately and without prioritization (special weight). The operational criteria are related rather to the organizational functions while the managerial are related to the management functions
As a consequence, various fields of the same managerial function for example “staffing” are mentioned in more than two chapters, paragraphs etc. that is: 1.5. personnel
TABLE 3
1. FACTUAL INFORMATION
1. History of Flight
2. Injuries to persons
3. Damage to Airplane
4. Other damage
5. Personnel information
6. Airplane information
7. Meteorological Information
8. Aids to Navigation
9. Communications
10. Airport Information
11. Flight Recorders
12. Wreckage and Impact Information
13. Medical and Pathological Information
14. Fire
15. Survival Aspects
16. Tests and Research
17. Organizational and Management information
18. Additional Information
g) ANALYSIS
1. General
2. Weather Factors on the approach
3. Accident Sequence
4. Flight Crew Performance
5. Pilot Training
6. Air Traffic Control Factors
7. Emergency Response
8. Controlled Flight Into Terrain
9. Oversight Issues
10. Flight Data Recorder Documentation
h) CONCLUSIONS
1. Findings
2. Probable Cause
i) RECOMMENDATIONS
j) APPENDIXES

Information, 1.17. Organizational and Management information, 2.4. Flight Crew Performance, 2.5. Pilot Training 2.7. Emergency Response.
We consider that the mixing up of two completely different criteria and the mentioning of different fields of the same managerial function (e.g. staffing) in different paragraphs of the accident report, is more probable to confuse, and consequently to put barriers to the investigators’ perception (recognition-comprehension) rather than assist them to focus on the main, primary cause(s) and contributing factors.

9. Content of the section “1.17. Organizational and Management information” of the accident report
Regarding the criteria of “ the content of the chapters of the accident report” this paper focuses on Section 1 paragraph 17 “Organizational and Management information”
The content of this section according to ICAO’s instructions (ICAO ANNEX 13) is described as follows:
[…]1.17.1. Provide pertinent information on the organizations involved in influencing the operation of the aircraft, if such influence had a bearing on the accident. The organizations to be reported upon in this section could include, but need not to be limited to the following: the operator; the maintenance organization; the air traffic services, aerodrome administration, weather service agencies, the aircraft manufacturer, the certification of listening authority, and the regulatory authority. The information could include, but need not be limited to the following: organizational structure and functions, safety culture; resources; financial viability status; management decisions, policies and practices, internal and external communications and relationships, certification, monitoring, and regulatory framework when these had a bearing on the accident or whose actions, or lack thereof, was related to, or influenced the accident”
1.17.2. Provide pertinent information concerning the operator, such as type and date of issuance of air operator certificate, types of operations authorized, types and number of aircraft authorized for use, and authorized areas of operation and routes. Also include relevant information concerning the operator’s company operations manual”[…]
A first indication from the comparison of accident reports of United States of
America National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002) and United Kingdom Air Accidents Investigation Branch (UK AAIB 1988,1990,2000a,b, 2001a,b) is that the “Management and organization” chapter of the NTSB reports is filled in more often and in a more detailed way than those of the UK ΑΑΙΒ.
From the aforementioned approach it becomes obvious that the NTSB investigators have wider and more accurate knowledge on issues such as:
– the meaning and content of the management functions,
– the impact from the introduction and preservation in the internal corporate environment of factors which affect decisively the employees’ will,
This knowledge is a basic presupposition for an objective classification and assessment of the findings during an accident investigation, because apart from others it contributes to the discrimination between the initial and the secondary cause(s)-contributing factors.
Error is the result of systemic and not of personal failure. The system of the commercial air transport industry is consisted of organizations such as manufacturers airlines, maintenance centers, airports, civil aviation authorities, airport authorities, weather forecasting service, air traffic controllers etc. That is the reason why ICAO changed its philosophy regarding the responsibility for an accident-incident, from causal factor to contributing factors. Consequently the investigator who wants to contribute positively to the upgrading of aviation safety is obliged to determine the initial cause(s), the actions or omissions of the managerial functions which affected the employee’s will and resulted in the accident-incident occurrence.
This consideration of the role of the investigator is for the benefit of:
a) the shareholders and the top management of the air-carrier, because it determines the causes of probable future errors, and consequently it contributes positively to the upgrading of the quality of their functions (safer, cheaper, more competitive, wider market share, higher long term profits etc.)
b) the passengers (safer and cheaper flights)
c) the insurance companies (fewer accidents-less claims)
d) the employees (safer work)
Consequently:
a) if the investigators want to determine all the contributing factors of an accident/incident and make an objective assessment of these factors, they must be able to know the source of every error committed by any employee
b) they must be aware of the functions of the top management, their content and the affected areas of the internal corporate environment.
Regarding the content of the chapter of the accident report :
“1.17.organization-management”.
Based on a number of recent accident reports, we noted that the implementation of the aforementioned process presents certain difficulties related to the presentation of the findings-facts. These difficulties refer to either the avoidance by the accident investigators to fill in the particular chapter “Organization and Management information” or to report findings that are the results of management functions under the proper chapter. These difficulties are considered to be the result of the classification weaknesses by the investigators. Perhaps due to ignorance of the meaning and role of the two different groups of criteria used in final reports: the operational which rather reflects the results of the organizational functions, and the managerial which concerns the results of the managerial functions.

10. The ICAO’s Training guidelines for Aircraft Accident investigators
In the ICAO’s Training guidelines for Aircraft Accident investigators Chapter 2 “Background Experience For Investigators” Cir 298 AN 172 June 2003, it is mentioned:
“[…] 2.2. Potential accident investigators must have considerable practical experience in aviation as a foundation on which to build their investigation skills. The experience can be acquired from civil or military qualification as […] aviation related management might also be suitable for accident investigator training […]”
In the chapter 3 Training Guidelines in the paragraph 3.1.3. in the qualifications required for accident investigators’ trainers are included “[…] experienced investigators, aviation medicine physicians, psychologists, aeronautical engineers and manufacturers’ representatives[…]”
In the aforementioned description of the experience required for a potential accident investigator, the following remarks may be made
1) As background experience for investigators, the verb “might” is used for aviation related management, while for the pilots, aeronautical engineers and aircraft maintenance engineers the verb “must” is used.
2) Concerning the aviation related management qualification of the investigators, only the criterion of experience is mentioned and not for theoretical knowledge, while the job specialty of the pilots, aeronautical engineers and aircraft maintenance engineers includes the necessary theoretical knowledge as well.
3) For the trainers, managerial knowledge and experience is not required. The omission of determining the trainers’ level of knowledge and specific field of experience in the air transport management, creates a wide vacuum in the investigators’ knowledge regarding the content and impact of the air transport management functions on the internal corporate environment factors which influence the employees’ will
4) The accident investigators’ initial training syllabus (Chapter 3.2.) does not include any issue regarding the goal, content, areas of authority, impact etc. of the aviation management.
The aforementioned formulations might create the impression that the ICAO underestimates the knowledge and experience on the field of air transport management, although the investigators are appointed to investigate the negative impact resulting from the implementation of managerial functions on aviation safety.
In the Chapter 4.1.2.20. Organizational information of ICAO’s Training Guidelines For Aircraft Accident investigators, it is mentioned:
“[…] Conducting a review of the organizational structure and functions as well as the management policies and practices of the agencies, authorities and aircraft operator involved is a subject that should be covered. For example, an investigator should have the competence to review an aircraft operator’s management functions, policies and practice in their entirety. There are many aspects of the supervisory process which may have a direct bearing on the accident, such as acceptance of inadequate flight crew qualifications; deficient guidance material; maintenance shortcuts; improper crew rostering; failure to provide proper training in aircraft type; shortcomings in crew resource management; and unreasonable pressure to complete schedules on time. The methods of investigating management and organizational aspects of an organization to determine the presence of any risk factors or other shortcomings is a requirement of a well rounded accident investigation course. An examination of the means of supervision is very important and will include a review of orders regulations, manuals and independent audits as well as the performance of supervisors, instructors and company management
4.1.2.21. Human performance […]”
4.1.2.22. Determination of the flight crews suitability for the flight […]”
Remarks on ICAO’s Training guidelines for Aircraft Accident investigators
Our consideration, regarding the content of the Chapter 4.1.2.20. “Organizational information”, ICAO’s Training Guidelines for Aircraft Accident investigators, is:
1) There are certain ambiguities regarding the meaning under which the terms “ organizational function” and “managerial function” are used, since their content is entirely distinguished in the science of management nowadays.
2) Issues that belong to different managerial functions are mentioned without any differentiation e.g. inadequate flight crew qualifications; failure to provide proper training in aircraft type (staffing), supervision (controlling), improper crew rostering (programming), administrating etc.
3) The issues described in paragraphs 4.1.2.21. “Human performance” and 4.1.2.22. “Determination of the flight crews suitability for the flight”, mainly refer to the content of the managerial function of staffing. The isolated reference in these two different paragraphs of issues which are included in the previous 4.1.2.20. “Organizational information” paragraph, might create the wrong impression that these issues are independent from the managerial function of staffing which is included in the previous paragraph.
The aforementioned approach might generate areas of possible ambiguity , concerning the ICAO’s consideration of :
a) the content and impact of the management functions in the life of the organization
b) the need for implementation by the investigators of scientific criteria in order to assess the top management’s involvement in the accident/incident occurrence,
c) the level of the hierarchy members that are burdened with the main responsibility in case of error commitment
These facts might give the impression that aviation related management is not considered to be a basic necessary experience of accident investigators.
However, from the analysis of the aforementioned chapters the crucial role of knowledge-experience in situation awareness (recognition-comprehension) of the environment, the decision making and action became clear. How could the investigators recognize and understand the impact of the managerial functions on an accident occurrence, if they do not have adequate and proper theoretical knowledge combined with practical experience upon aviation management issues?
The investigators lack of knowledge regarding the content and the areas of internal corporate environment affected by the management functions, combined with ICAO’s approach of operational and managerial criteria , might create obstacles in the objectivity and the unity of the investigators’ perception.
A higher unification of the investigator’s perception is necessary because leads to:
a) a higher level of recognition and understanding of the various parts of the investigated environment
b) it contributes positively to the unified categorization of the findings according to their sources, which leads to the identification and objective prioritizing of the contributing factors.
c) it contributes positively to the unified assessment of the findings according to unified criteria and knowledge, based on unified methodology
d) it helps the investigators to identify the source(s) of each contributing factor of the accident and consequently to suggest the appropriate safety recommendations
e) it helps the readers to assess whether the conclusions and the safety recommendations reflect the source(s) of the identified contributing factors since they are presented under the appropriate chapter of the accident report
f) it facilitates the unified understanding by the readers who belong to different cultures with different values, different considerations etc.
The obvious incompatibility between ICAO’s aim of upgrading the aviation’s safety level and the measures applied for achieving this aim, exists because it does not determine and ensure:
a) a minimum level of the normal function of the investigators’ senses and mental processes which are decisive determinants of the investigators’ perception-comprehension
b) a unified content of the syllabus of investigators’ training .
c) the field and level of knowledge, as well as field, level and duration of the experience of the trainers
d) the identification of the exact qualifications of the investigators; specific job specialty of the doctor -pathologist psychiatrist etc-, or the pilot –jet, tourboprop etc- the aircraft type they had to be certified at, and how long experience must each investigator have at his-her job specialty. These are necessary presuppositions for the unification of the investigators’ knowledge.
e) the unification of criteria of the accident report structure (managerial and operational criteria are used indiscriminately)
f) the obligatory filling in by the investigators of the accident report’s chapters with information compatible with the content of the particular chapter

11. Conclusions
1) The existing ICAO’s institutional framework which determines the presuppositions and the conditions of the accident investigation, has successfully contributed for decades years to the aviation safety .
For the achievement of the ICAO’s objective to upgrade the aviation’s safety level, the particular institutional framework needs restructuring in order to improve its efficiency and effectiveness in the near and distant future.
2) The purpose of this restructuring has to be the achievement of a reliable comparability between various accident reports. The achievement of this goal requires:
– unification of the perception and comprehension of the examined environment by the investigators
– unified methodology of the presentation of findings, conclusions and recommendations,
– restructuring of the accident report based on the differentiation of the use of the managerial and operational criteria. .
3) Regarding the reliability-objectivity of the investigators’ perception, any disorder of their mental processes may result to:
a) selective attention or selective inattentiveness
b) over generalization of a single negative fact, relation, condition etc
c) evaluation of the –objective-environment with subjective criteria
d) maximization or minimization of the negative impact of some contributing factors
e) minimization of positive impact of some factors
4) Comparing the ICAO’s consideration about its exclusive objective in an accident investigation and the tools that the ICAO uses for the accomplishment of this goal we consider that there is an incompatibility between the goal and the measures.
12. Proposals
1) Introduction of tests to access the functional status of the senses and mental processes of each investigator
2) Determination the specific:
a) job specialty of every accident investigator
b) field and duration of the required experience
c) content of the syllabus-field and level of knowledge (not only the titles) in which the investigators are trained, which must reflect the current global scientific knowledge on the particular cognitive field.
d) field of knowledge, level of knowledge, field and duration of the investigators trainers experience.
3) Separation of the managerial from the operational criteria is imperative.
The managerial criteria must be used in the chapters-paragraphs concerning the investigation of the sources of the contributing factors, while the operational criteria must be used in the chapters-paragraphs concerning the investigation of the conditions of the accident/incident.
5) To make a clear distinction between organizational and managerial functions and
their impact on the internal corporate environment
5) To introduce as obligatory in the investigator’s qualifications the theoretical
knowledge and practical experience on air transport organizational and managerial
functions and their impact on the internal corporate environment.
6) Obviously the same qualifications must be required from the investigators’ trainers as well.
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Write University
Dayton, Ohio USA April 23-26, 2007
14nth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology

Yiannis S. Lainos
Ph.D. in Aviation Economics- Management Human factors
Technological Educational Institution of Chalkis-Greece
Aircraft Technology Department.

The causes of failure of Olympic Airways’ s restructuring efforts applied by the Greek state

Abstract
Olympic Airways (O.A.), the former Greek flag carrier, was nationalized in 1975. For the period 1975-1994 its cumulative deficits had mounted to 455 billion GRD, (1.63 billion US$).
However, at the same time all governments enforced on O.A. the implementation of their various policies, always at the company’s expense. The state debts to O.A.- due to the aforementioned reason were in 1993 (E.U. involvement) almost three times higher than O.A.’s operational deficits. These state debts have not been permitted to O.A. to register in their accounting books.
Since 1993 the Greek state, O.A.’s exclusive shareholder, has attempted to introduce changes which were considered to be appropriate in order for O.A.’s crisis to be overcome, by passing two laws; one in 1994 and a supplementary one in 1998. These efforts, as well as the five efforts for O.A.’s privatization which followed, have failed to date.

Keywords: Airline-changes-introduction, Airline-crisis-methodological-approach, Airline-crisis-symptoms-causes, Airline-economics, Airline-management, Airline-restructure-measures-methods, Airline-State-aid, Airline-State-ownership, Olympic-Airways.

The aim of the present paper
is the determination of the causes which have led to failure of the Greek government’s efforts as O.A.’s exclusive shareholder to introduce appropriate changes for overcoming the crisis.

The contribution of the author is:
7) the determination of the causes due to which the Greek government’s efforts of O. A. restructuring have been inefficient
2) the proposal regarding the general steps which must be followed for effective introduction of changes in an organisation
3) the implemented methodology (analysis and synthesis) which distinguishes the symptoms from the causes of the crisis manifestation in O.A., focusing on the primary causes. This methodology can be implemented efficiently to any similar case.

Introduction
The efficient introduction of changes in an organization is essential in order for its operation to be compatible to the alterations in its internal and external environment. There is no specific international formula of introdu- cing changes, according to which procedures, methods, mechanisms or measures could be decided and effectively employed. This is due to the diverse factors which differentiate the measures and the methods needed for each organization and the high complexity of the implementation process due mainly to the differentiation of cultures (Burnes, 1996, 2000, Kotter 1995; Lainos 2001 Lewin 1947; Petti- grew 1985; Pettigrew & Whipp 1991, 1993;).

The case study of the Greek state’s efforts 1994-2003 to restructure Olympic Airways
The Greek flag carrier Olympic Airways (O.A.) was nationalized in 1975, because its former owner, Onassis, demanded a state subsi dization of 60 mil. US $ for the year 1975. In the same year, the government acquired the airline by paying 69 mil. US $. (Lainos 1992) O.A.’s cumulative deficits since its nationalization up to 1994 have reached 455 billion GRD, (1.63 billion US$).(Lainos 2001).
Since the implementation of any recovery program required state aid which is not authorized by the E.U., the Greek Government in 1993 conducted the first program for O.A.’s restructuring in collaboration with the private consultant “AVMARK”. That program was submitted to the E.U. but it was rejected due to its low reliability standard. (E.U.1994). The second recovery program was conducted by the then newly elected Greek Government (1993-10) in collaboration with the aforementioned consultant. .(E.U. 1994). Then Olympic Airways’ B.O.D. assigned to the author the conduction of a research-study regarding the debts of the state-shareholder to O.A. (TABLE 1) according to the E.U. Commissioner’s requirements. These debts had been the result of the Greek state implementation on the O.A. of the various policies mentioned below at the company’s expense. These debts have not been permitted to O.A. to register in their accounting books. (Lainos 2006)
TABLE 1
1. Non deposit of the share capital
2. Discounts offered to certain passenger groups in the domestic network
due to obligatory application of the governmental policy
3. Burdening the O.A.’s economics with the cost of Prime Ministerial and Presidential air travels by enforcing the governmental policy
6. Unpaid debts of Ministries and other state services from ticket fees for public servants official flights 97% discount on the fares of the daily and weekly press, transported daily by O.A. in obligatory application of governmental policy
7. Under-pricing of passenger fares in domestic flights in obligatory application of governmental policy resulting to violation of the 11th article of O.A.-State convention
7. Refusal of the Greek Civil Aviation Authorities to pay some conventional fees to Olympic Airways.
8. Strains on O.A. due to the debts of political parties offering their voters free air transport during election periods
9) The cost of the compulsory covering of the loss making domestic itineraries with small frontier airports (Public Service Obligation according to the E.U.’s legislation)
10) Obligatory annual subsidization of the affiliated companies by O. A.
11) Inclusion in O.A.’s payroll of about one hundred O.A.’s employees appointed to the offices of various politicians
12) Loss of O.A.’s annual revenue from the interest of the aforementioned state debts. It must be pointed out that the operational convention of Olympic Airways which was signed in 1956 between Onassis and the Greek state which became state law, mentioned that the state was compelled to cover the aforementioned costs. Onassis, during his ownership regime used to force the state fulfill its conventional obligations. However, since O.A..’s nationalization in 1975 the state-shareholder ceased fulfilling its conventional obligations to O.A.
The results of this study prove that the cumulative (1975-1992) debts of the state-shareholder to O.A. had been almost three times higher than its operational deficits.
The same rapport between state debts and O.A.’s operational deficits remained in 1994 as well.
A great part of the aforementioned results of our research-study (state debts to the O.A.) has been included in the restructuring program which the Greek state submitted to the E.U. on 20th May 1994. This program was approved by the E.U. in October 1994 and it was transformed by the Greek parliament into state law 2271/1994-12-23 with validity from the 1997-12-31 on.
The majority of the employees (more than 80%), supported via their unions this program, which required, inter alia, deterioration of the terms and conditions of their labor (reduction in their salaries etc)
During O.A.’s first recovery period (1994-1997) none of the administrational measures which had been included in the law was applied. However, a great part of the measures resulting in deterioration of the working terms and conditions was fulfilled.
When, on the expiring date of the aforementioned law, the board of directors and the Greek Government realized that they had failed to implement the measures towards overcoming O.A.’s crisis, a new law 2602/ 1998-4-13 was passed with complementary recovery measures and with expiring date 2001-12-31.
The majority of the employees (more than 65%) after their negative experience from the application of the first restructuring program (worsening their labor terms and conditions without application of recovery measures) rejected the application of the second one and went on strike.
Six months after law 2602/1998 with expiring date the 2001-12-31 had been enacted, the Greek government announced their decision to privatize O.A. (firstly its management and subsequently the majority of its share capital).
After five unsuccessful attempts of the Greek governments for O.A.’s privatisation, the Greek flag carrier was liable to prosecution by the European Committee (2003/4, 2003/5, 2006/10) in the European Court for 540 million euros illegal state subsidization. Questions arose for the intentions of the E.U., because, since 1994 they had been aware of the huge debts of the Greek state to O.A. with no intention of taking any legal actions against the Greek state enforcing the debts repayment.
The E. U. relegated Greece to the European Court in 2003 based on the imprecise statement of the Greek Minister of Transport that the Greek state owed to OA the amount of 43,5 million euros, while the E. U. claimed that OA had been illegally subsidized by the state, with 161 million euros.
In February 2003 the Greek govern- ment decided to dichotomize O.A. in two companies : Olympic Airlines which included only the flight operations and Olympic Airways-Services. This dichotomization was completed in December 2003.
In their letter to the E.U. the Greek government presented potential facilitation of the company’s privatization as the reason for O.A.’s dichotomization. When addressing the Greek press at the same time, they stated that the reason for dichotomization was the facilitation of O.A.’s recovery.
On 3rd July 2005, the Greek government, (elected in April 2004) with a letter to the E.U. promised to cease the operation of Olympic Airways and its affiliated Olympic Aviation.
In September 2005 after the failure of another two attempts of O.A.’s privatization the shareholder announced (Greek Prime Minister 2005) that the government had decided that O.A. had to cease operation within the following two months (end of October 2005) because O.A.’s operation has been a burden to Greek taxpayers. The day after the Greek Prime Minister had announced his decision for O.A.’s operation recess, the B.O.D. of the Aegean Airlines – O.A.’s sole private domestic competitor – announced that they had ordered 12 Airbus-320 aircrafts, eight confirmed and four optional.
The statement of the Prime Minister in September 2005 regarding the cease of O.A.’s operation, was followed by a wide media campaign (in which the author contributed decisively) in order to inform society that O.A.’s real financial position was not loss making – as it appeared to be according to its accounting books – but profitable as our 1994 study had proved and as the O.A.’s B.O.D. and the state-shareholder have already accepted since then.
It is underlined that after 1994 ( first year of application of O.A.’s restructuring program) until today, the state has never stopped burdening O.A.’s operating cost with the cost of the obligatory fulfillment of the various governmental policies, although this has been prohibited by the E.U. The majority of these new state debts is still not registered in O.A.’s accounting books. In 2006 the rapport between O.A.’s cumulative deficits and the states debts has been increased to one tenth.
The aforementioned campaign towards informing public opinion with regard to the profitable O.A operation resulted in the
negative reaction of a 73% of the population against O.A.’s cease of operation.
On 3rd October 2005 the vice president of Lufthansa – ally of Aegean Airli- nes – stated that after O.A.’s cease of operation its Greek domestic routes will be served by Aegean Airlines while the international ones will be covered by Lufthansa.
Besides the social reactions, the Greek government on 22nd November 2005 enacted a law according to which the “PANTHEON”, a new air-carrier, would substitute O.A. services up to May 2006 after the latter had ceased operation.
The establishment of “PANTHEON” and O.A.’s cease of operation were never materialized.
On the other hand, between December 2005 and March 2006, for the first time in OA’s history, O.A-Services B.O.D. prosecuted its exclusive shareholder the Greek state, in the Supreme Court, demanding the return of almost a billion Euros from these debts.
In September 2006 the shareholder (Greek Prime Minister 2006) announced his decision regarding the extension of O.A.’s operation at least for two more years.
The inconstancy of the Greek government regarding its vision about the prospects of O.A. is obvious.
We consider that this inconstancy is not due to incapability of the governmental dignitaries but it is an expression of an internal governmental struggle regarding the prospects of O.A., which were:
a) immediate cease of O.A.’s operation on the benefit of its sole domestic private competitor Aegean Airways and its Giga European ally Lufthansa.
b) escalated privatization to be maintained at least a typical competition
On October 18th 2006, the European Committee impeached Greece to the European Court on the grounds of illegal state subsidisation to O.A. of up to 540 million euros. However on 2006-12-21 the minister of transport announced that O.A.’s exclusive shareholder, meaning the Greek state, had been sentenced by the Supreme Court to return to O.A. only a part of its debts to the company reaching the amount of 586 mil Euros, while there have been legal demands of O.A. against the Greek state amounting to 340 million euros. Further more the minister encouraged the B.O.D. of the airline to prosecute its exclusive shareholder the Greek state, to the Supreme Court, demanding to return a greater part of its debts.
Corresponding to this encouragement the B.O.D. of Olympic Airlines announced in January 26 2007 that it had prosecuted its exclusive shareholder the Greek state, in the Court, demanding the return of the amount of 340 millions
Euros from its debts.
It must be emphasized that both the Greek Prime Minister and the leader of the major opposition had stated that the two main reasons for the manifestation of the crisis in O.A. are wrong political decisions and mismanagement by O.A.’s B.O.D. and hierarchy members. However, no politician has resigned due to the aforementioned wrong political decisions and none has accused any members of the O.A.’s B.O.D. to date.

Conclusions.
1) Taking into account the E.U.’s legislation which prohibits illegal state aid, the Greek Government was not obliged to involve the E.U. in O.A.’s restructure since O.A. was actually profitable and not loss making as it appeared to be in its balance sheets.
2) The profitable financial position comes, from the co-calculation of the debt of the State shareholder to O.A., due to the free of charge obligatory implementation of the various governmental policies. The Greek state never returned its debts to O.A.. Further more the registration in the O.A.’s accounting books, of these state debts was not permitted. These facts may lead one to the conclusion that the state-shareholder had deliberately oriented O.A.’s operation into loss making. This is the cause of the false impression that the O.A. was considered to be under bankruptcy.
3) Consequently the financing of the O.A.’s restructuring program (overcoming the administrational malfunctions, rationalisation of its fleet composition e.t.c.) did not need state aid as the government had argued. The return of only a part of the huge state debts to O.A. was enough.
4) The only rational explanation regarding the involvement of the E.U. by the Greek government, in O.A.’s restructuring may be considered to be its pursuit to avoid burdening the political cost caused by the implementation of unpopular measures essential to achieve its hidden vision for O.A.’s privatization.
5) The reason why the E.U agreed to participate in this manipulation, although they knew from the beginning (recovery program submitted by the Greek state in May 1994) that O.A. was not loss making, is considered to be its policy which aims at the deduction of the total number of the E.U.’s air-carriers from 27 to three, maximum five.
6) The introduction of appropriate changes in O.A.’s internal environment for its restructuring failed due to the following reasons:
a) The perspective-vision, had not been clear from the start (restructure and development under the current state ownership regime or privatization).
b) Those who were appointed and involved in the analysis of the O.A. crisis (the hierarchy and the private consultant) not only did they fail to distinguish the causes from the symptoms of the crisis manife- station, but they registered and presented them with an almost equal special weight. Consequently, due to this reason the measures for overcoming the causes and the symptoms had been ineffective
c) The implementation of the laws for O.A.’s restructuring was assigned to the same members of the O.A. hierarchy, who were responsible for the O.A.’s crisis manifestation.
d) The government, the O.A.’s B.O.D. and its hierarchy members due to their unreliability, failed to persuade the employees for the necessity to introduce specific changes in the specific period of time.
e) Those who were appointed and involved in the preparation of the field for the effective introduction of the changes, failed to make the employees to participate in the process and to avoid reactions, although they were in alliance with the union leaders.
f) This occurred because, instead of building trust and confidence among the employees relevant to the goals of the changes and the prospects of the company, those who were authorized and involved in the introduction of changes (B.O.D. and members of hierarchy), created among the employees conditions of uncertainty and lack of trust and confidence in their future vision for the O.A.
g) The B.O.D. avoided to discuss with employees and explain to them: 1) what the problems that the company faced were 2) the short and long term effects of these problems on the viability of their positions and finally on the survival of the company.
h) Nobody called the employees to submit their proposals concerning the causes of the crisis and the efficient solutions.
i) The “negotiations with the employees” were deteriorated by the B.O.D. to discussions with the leadership of the Federation and the unions. However, they had not unified considerations relevant to the O.A.’s restructure. Further more those who agreed with the government had not the expected influence on the medium level and base members of the unions.
j) None of the members of O.A.’s B.O.D. or hierarchy’s were prosecuted for their failure to apply the two laws for the O.A.’s restructuring

7) In its letter to the E.U. the Greek government presented as the reason for O.A.’s dichotomization the facilitation of its private- zation when, at the same time, they stated to the Greek press that the reason for dichotomy- zation was the facilitation of O.A.’s recovery.
8) The cause of this manipulation as well as the continuous change,
from 2004 to 2006, of the state-shareholder’s vision regarding the future of O.A., is considered to be an attempt of the Greek government to avoid the political cost from its firm decision towards O.A.’s privatization, since the 73% of the Greek population opposed to this prospect.
9) Finally it was not any failure of the Greek government to introduce into the O.A.’s internal environment the proper changes towards its recovery and competitive development under state ownership regime.
The following facts stand as testimony to the
above mentioned assessment:
a) The former Prime Minister (1990-1993) stated in 1991 that Greece could manage without the flag carrier Olympic Airways.
b) On 12th April 2002 during a debate
among the members of the “Economic and Transparency Committee” of the Greek parliament, concerning the results of the O.A.’s re- structuring, the minister of Transports (political supervisor of the O.A.) stated that the permanent vision of the government since 1994 had been the O.A.’s privatization. But as the circumstances had not been the desired ones, and the employees might stimulate negative reactions, this vision could not be communicated earlier. This is the reason, he stated, why sometimes the politicians are obliged to present a situation in two different versions. One version is presented to the members of the parliament and the other version is presented during negotiations with the employees.

Proposals
Based on the international literature (Burnes, B. 2000, Clarke Liz 1994, Harvard Business Review 1998, Kotter J. 1995, Mabey C- Mayon- White B. 1993, Senge P-Kleiner A., Ross R Roberts C. Smith B Roth G 1999, Senior B. 1997) and according to our more than ten years experience in O.A.’s restructuring efforts, we have conceived a specific number of steps concerning the efficient introduction of changes, which must be applied in the order specified: (TABLE 2)

TABLE 2
General stages for effective introduction of changes in an air-carrier
L) Determination of the strategic and tactic goals of the air-carrier
M) Determination and assessment of the current status of the air-carrier
1) Determination of the negative symptoms.
2) Determination of the causes of these symptoms
3) Determination of the sources of the aforementioned causes
N) Research and determination of the necessary changes that must be introduced according to the strategic and tactic goals of the air-carrier
O) Suitable preparation of the members of hierarchy as well as of the employees
1) Building trust-certainty-confidence among the employees for the future goals-intentions of the company
2) Informing the employees of the existing problem(s).
3) Focusing on the current and the long-term negative effects of the existing problem(s) on the company’s survival.
4) Focusing on the negative future effects on particular categories of employees and if possible on individuals. The success of the aforementioned process relies on the acceptance by employees of the certain problem(s) existence.
5) Persuading the employees that some changes are necessary to be introduced in order to resolve the problem(s).
6) Inviting the employees to submit suggestions and opinions about the necessary changes that should be introduced.
7) Informing the employees about the effects of their suggestions concerning the solution of the problems that the company faces.
8) Starting discussions with the employees to conclude to mutually accepted suggestions concerning:
a)The number of changes, the field and the time of their implementation
b) The role of different categories of employees in the efficient implementation of these changes. The
discussions concerning all steps of the process should be constant.
P) Co-decision concerning the necessary changes that must be introduced according to the strategic and tactic goals of the higher ranks of the airline’s management. It is obvious that alliances of the company’s leader(s) with the official union leadership, together with the unofficial one, facilitate the successful introduction of changes significantly.
Q) Scheduling the introduction of the selected changes (what, when, where, how).
R) Implementation of the introduction of selected changes (fulfillment of all the agreements between management and employees, determining the individual role of every employee). The methods that must be implemented should depend on factors such as :
a) emergency situation or not (time pressure),
b) existence of relevant institutional framework
c) existence of national and corporate culture
d) employees reactions and attitude
S) Continuous supervision-control of the implementation of the introduced changes (giving priority to individual self-control) and its effects, in every stage of the process and in every organizational level and unit.
T) Assessment of the results of the introduced changes.
U) Stabilization of the introduced changes and of their results.
V) In case of failure a new effort should be attempted as soon as the mistakes of the previous effort are determined and the general circumstances are appropriate.
Indicated Bibliography
Burnes, B. (2000) Managing Change: a strategic approach to organisational dynamics, 3rd edition, London: FT Prentice Hall
Clarke Liz (1994) The essence of change” Prentice Hall Europe
E.U. (1994) Official gazette L 273/23.
E.U.C. (2005) Decision 2706 Final. Brussels
Greek Prime Minister (2005) Speech at Salonica (Greece) in 9/10.
—————(2006) Speech at Salonica (Greece) in 10th of September
Harvard Business Review (1998) On Change. Harvard Business School
Press. USA
Kotter J. (1995 March-April) Leading Change Why Transformation Efforts Fail.
Harvard Business Review on Change (pp 1-20)
Lainos J.S. (1992) Is privatization the only way? The file of Olympic Airways
S.A. Editions Stahy”. Athens -GREECE.
————(2001) The results of the reorganization policy applied by the Greek
governments in O.A. (1994-2001) International Conference on Air
Transport and Airport. Evolutions in the 21rst century. University
of Patras. Transport and Traffic Engineers Study Unit 12/3-4
———–(2006) The hidden truth for the crisis in Olympic Airways. Editor
Papazisis. Athens. Greece
Lewin, K. (1947). Frontiers in Group Dynamics, In: Cartwright, D. (ed.) 1952:
Field Theory in Social Science, London: Social Science
Mabey C- Mayon- White B. (1993) “Managing change” Editions. N.Y. 6th
edition Published in association with the open university Paul
Chapman Publishing LTD London
Pettigrew, A. and Whipp R. (1993). Managing the Twin Processes of
Competition and Change: The Role of Intangible Assets.
Implementing Strategic Processes: Change, Learning and
Cooperation. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Senge P-Kleiner A., Ross R Roberts C. Smith B Roth G (1999) The dance of
change. The challenges sustaining momentum in learning
organizations N.Brealey Publishing.
Senior B. (1997) Organisational Change. PITMAN Publishing. London-Hong
Kong-Johannesburg
12th Conference of Air Transport Research Society (ATRS)
8-10 July 2008 Athens-Greece

The causes of failure of the Greek State’s efforts to introduce changes
into the Olympic Airways internal environment towards overcoming of its crisis
By Yiannis S. Lainos Ph.D. in Aviation Economics-Human Factors Management

Contents
• Abstract
• Keywords
• The aim of the present paper
• The contribution of the author
PART 1 Brief theoretical approach
• Definitions: Business Continuity Plan, Change, Corporate crisis, Corporate crisis management, Corporate environment, culture national and corporate.
• Causes of corporate crisis’ manifestation
• Categories of corporate crisis
• Stages of corporate crisis manifestation
• Parameters of an effective crisis management
• The factors which create the need for constant introduction of changes into the internal corporate environment
• Criteria for selecting the methods for efficient introduction of changes
• Causes and categories of the employees’ resistance against the introduction of changes. Coping with the employees’ reactions against the introduction of changes
• General procedures for effective introduction of changes into an internal corporate environment under normal conditions – escalating
• Procedures for introduction of changes into an internal corporate environment under normal conditions – escalating
• 10 Steps allocated in 4 Phases for effective introduction of changes in the internal environment of an air-carrier under normal conditions-escalated- TABLE 1
• Procedures for introduction of changes into an internal corporate environment under emergency conditions
PART 2 The case study of Olympic Airways (O.A.) S.A.
• Introduction: Changes at the commercial Air Transport international institutional environment
• Olympic Airways history-profile
• Methodology for approaching the attitude of the Greek State to O.A.
* Facts regarding the attitude of the Greek state as to O.A.’s exclusive shareholder since its nationalization in 1975 on the fields of:
A) Economy (TABLE 2)
B) Efficiency of O.A’s management
C) O.A.’s ownership regime
D) Reputation of O.A.
E) Relationships with O.A.’s solid domestic competitor
F) Relationships with the E.U.
• The change of the O.A.’s profile between 1994 and 2007 (TABLE 3)
• The attitude of the O.A.’s union leadership (1994-2008)
• Conclusions

Abstract
Introduction of operational, organisational, administrational, technological, personnel etc. changes in an airline is considered to be necessary in order, for the operation of the corporation, to be adapted to the requirements of the wider swift changes of its internal and external environment.
In 1993 E.U. liberalised the, since 1944, regulated international air transport institutional environment. Consequently all the member States’ air carriers were obliged to adapt their operation to the requirements of the liberalized institutional network.
Olympic Airways (O.A.), the former Greek flag carrier, was founded in 1956, by Onassis. It was nationalized by the Greek Government in 1975.
In 1993 the State (exclusive shareholder) considered O.A. as being under crisis. Based on the requirements of the liberalized international institutional network the State has attempted to introduce the considered, as necessary and appropriate, changes into the O.A.’s internal environment in order to overcome the crisis.
The State considered that its attempts of introduction of these changes would stimulate very strong reactions from the:
a) O.A.’s powerful unions and
b) the Hellenic society.
For avoiding or at least minimizing the expected reactions, the State chose to create corporate crisis as a method of introducing the decided changes.
As a matter of fact the crisis was successfully engineered but the State’s efforts to introduce the decided changes, have failed up to date, therefore the Government is orientated towards OA’s privatization or ceasing its operation.
Keywords: Airline-crisis-management, E.U.-Air-Transport-Liberalisation, Introduction of changes, Olympic-Airways, Olympic Airlines.
The aim of the present paper is the determination of the:
a) methods applied by the Greek State for the successful introduction of the decided changes into the O. A.’s internal environment and its impact on the O.A.’s viability.
b) causes which have led to the failure of the Greek Government’s efforts to
introduce the appropriate changes into O.A.’s internal environment for overcoming
its crisis.
The contribution of the author is the:
1) implemented methodology (analysis and synthesis – from the specific to the general and vice versa). This methodology may be efficiently implemented at any similar case.
2) constructed general model of 10 steps allocated in 4 phases for effective introduction of changes in the internal corporate environment of an airline which may be efficiently implemented at any similar case.

PART 1 Brief theoretical approach
The Greek materialist philosopher Heraclites, c.535–c.475 B.C. taught that: matter is in endless change, the only permanent reality is the reality of change; permanence is an illusion of the senses. No one can step in the same river twice, nor touch mortal substance twice in the same condition. By the speed of its change, it scatters and gathers again.
Definition
Business Continuity Plan: is defined as the alternative scenarios of corporate plan regarding:
a) the forecast of the contingent causes of crisis manifestation
b) the forecast of the contingent phenomena through which the crisis may be manifested
c) the forecast of the contingent operational and organisational corporate field(s) that may be affected
d) the forecast of the contingent consequences on the affected operational and organisational corporate field(s)
e) the determination of the measures, methods and means which should be implemented for overcoming the consequences as well the causes of the manifested crisis
f) the determination of the human factors that will implement the existing Business Continuity Plan (leadership, coordination by the Crisis Management Team) in case of manifestation of actual crisis, towards overcoming the crisis in an effective, timely manner, with the goal of avoiding or minimizing the corporate damage to its profitability, reputation, or ability to operate.

Change in the internal corporate environment is defined as an adaptation of one or more of the corporate subsets or subsystems (philosophy, goals, organization, managerial methods, technology and the structure of production means), as a reaction to stimulus of its internal and external environment. Factors which impose the need of introduction of changes in an internal corporate environment can be mentioned mainly the rapid technological evolution, the intensified competition, the change of the customers and or shareholders demand, the political and economic conditions of the wider external corporate environment e.t.c. (Burnes 1996, Clarke 1994, Goodstein & Burke 1993, Hussey 2000, Kotter 1998, Senior 2001, Senge et al 1999,)
Corporate crisis is defined the inability of the corporate subsystems (managerial, product tampering, applied technology, human factors etc) to operate normally towards applying efficiently of the corporate strategic and tactic goals. (Boin et al 2005, Curtin and al. 2006, Meena 2006),
Corporate crisis management is defined as the systematic attempt of the corporate B.O.D’s planned and coordinated steps, based on skills and techniques required either to avoid the manifestation of contingent corporate crises and/or to manage effectively those crises, events that are manifested, in a timely manner, with the goal of avoiding or minimizing damage to the airline’s profitability, reputation, or ability to operate (Pearson & Clair, 1998). Includes fields such as Planning, Decision Making, Problem Solving, & Strategy, Disaster-Planning & Risk Management, Entrepreneurship, Management, & Leadership and Planning & Scheduling . (Boin 2005, Curtin et al 2006, Meena 2006)
Corporate environment is defined as the totality of its constituted subsystems. It is divided in the internal and the external corporate environment.
The internal corporate environment is consisted mainly of the:
1) ownership regime
2) operational strategic and tactic goals
3) applied technology and the composition of the productive means.
4) applied productive methods.
5) corporate organizational structure.
6) managerial-corporate culture,
7) employees (number, job specialty, content and level of corporate training and
labor terms and conditions).
The external corporate environment is consisted mainly of the:
1) competitors,
2) clients,
3) purchasers,
4) domestic and international institutional framework.
5) domestic and international political, economic etc. conditions .
(Argyris 1996, Hunt 1997, Clarke 1994, Montana & Charkov. 2000, Pettigrew & Whip 1993)
Culture National is defined as the number of systems the perceived symbols and meanings of which determine the individuals’ behaviour. The content of the culture comprises the characteristic features of everyday existence; the way of life of an entire society, which includes: codes of manners, dress, language, religion, rituals, norms of behaviour (such as law and morality), customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial, religious, or social group the set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices. These parameters which are constantly in flux, interact and compete with each other, determine and shape the individuals’ behaviour. These issues are taught to (learned by) the individuals, passing from generation to generation through the socialisation procedures and mechanisms of every society. (Hofstede 1980a,b, 1983,1991, Triandis (Ed). 1980)
Culture corporate is defined the: 1) Production methods 2) Skills and specialization, 3) Consideration of discipline and appropriate disciplinary sanctions, 4) Style of communication among colleagues, members of hierarchy, clients, suppliers, etc. 5) Dominant and acceptable administrative methods a) Applied Management practice (Goal or human oriented) b) Applied motivation systems for upgrading the corporate efficiency (increasing the productivity simultaneously with the quality of the product and decreasing the cost),
c) Encouraging proposals for introduction of innovations etc. d) Efficiency of the applied control style (administrative or participating, ex post or ex ante) e) Individuality or team spirit 6) Values and traditions of the company (degree of tolerance of aggressive, risky, disputatious and openly censorious behaviour, reward criteria, seniority or efficiency in promotion etc.), 7) Standing transactional practice of the Airline (Deal & Kennedy 1999, Helmreich & Merritt 1998, Johnston 1993, Maurino 1994)
Causes of corporate crisis’ manifestation
The corporate crisis is manifested through various malfunctions (negative phenomena) in the corporate subsystems operation, such as high deficits, low productivity, and generally inefficient management. (Boin and al. 2005, Clark 1994, Curtin and al 2006, Meena 2006).
The causes of every corporate crisis can be conditions or facts from the internal or external corporate environment or from a combination of both.
Conditions from the external corporate environment that may trigger the manifestation of corporate crisis can be mentioned political and/or economic (domestic and or international) instability, information warfare, natural destructions, fuel prices, epidemic deceases etc.
Crisis triggered events derived from the internal corporate environment include corporate scandals, workplace violence, environmental contamination, hostile takeovers, aircraft crash etc. These facts and conditions disturb violently the normal corporate operation jeopardizing the viability of the company.
Regarding the internal corporate environment we consider that the main cause of a crisis manifestation in any case is the ineffective application of one or more management’s functions. We have come to this conclusion because the managerial functions cover the whole number of fields of the corporate operation. The management functions are: Planning, organising, staffing, administrating-coordinating-motivating, and controlling.
Finally the responsibility lies with the corporate B.O.D. and the shareholders who appoint and control it.
It is obvious that every failure of the corporate management to respond properly to the stimuli from the external and/or internal corporate environment, will provoke manifestation of a corporate crisis. Effective corporate management introduces the proper changes during a “crisis incubation” phase, preventing the manifestation of any potential crisis. (see FIGURE 1)

Categories of corporate crisis
Based on the criterion of “how fast the crisis is manifested” two categories of crisis can be mentioned : a) The incubating or “smouldering” crises due to long term inability of the corporate B.O.D. for immediate and efficient introduction of the proper changes towards adaptation of the corporate subsystems operation to the requirements of the continuous changes of its internal and external corporate environment
b) A sudden destruction due to Product defects, Aircraft crash, Rumours/scandals, workplace safety, Bribery, Sexual harassment, Consumer activism, Whistle blowing, Class action lawsuits and Labour disputes.
c) A special subcategory of the causes of corporate crisis manifestation, which concerns our case study, concerns the case in which the shareholder manufactures a sudden or “smouldering” artificial crisis, in order to achieve the introduction of changes aiming at the effective application of their hidden goals, which, however, are not accepted by employees and/or society.

Stages of corporate crisis manifestation (see FIGURE 1)
Corporate crisis very rarely is due to a sole cause. It is not manifested without warning events with the exception of certain natural disasters. The “warning” events-even regarding to an “unexpected” or “unforeseen” aircraft crash, have been manifested and escalated long ago in many of the corporate subsystems, affecting negatively its operation.
We consider that the crisis manifestation follows the below mentioned stages:
The “crisis causes-roots” stage concerns the various corporate managerial malfunctions which through its negative quantitative impact initially on some corporate operation fields create the preconditions for crisis incubation.
The “crisis incubation” stage during which accumulation of harmful internal conditions is observed which in turn results in peripheral managerial malfunctions. The potentiality for crisis manifestation is dramatically amplified by various internal organisational, human, or technological factors the quantitative malfunctions of which, if not faced on time, are transformed into quantitative. The manifestation of the warning events is a consequence of application of ineffective management, in one or more of the managerial functions. As a result, the corporate B.O.D. and hierarchy members fail to adapt the operation of the various corporate subsystems to the stimuli –signals of the internal and external corporate environment that are results of changes in its own subsystems. The consequences may be manifested immediately or with a time lag, time not being the only determinant of the transformation of the managerial malfunctions effects from quantitative to qualitative. Some other factors pre-existing-dormant-or not, from the entire internal or external corporate environment like culture, applied leadership and motivation methods, wider economic crisis etc. may as well interfere. These facts affect negatively the operation of some subsystems of the internal corporate environment and provoke the transformation of managerial malfunctions effects from quantitative to qualitative.
The “Crisis manifestation” stage. If the –latent or obvious- cause(s) which have provoked the manifestation of the warning events and its negative results on some corporate subsystems-fields are not faced immediately and effectively, through the on time introduction of the proper changes, its negative impact will be expanded on the entire corporate operation and its escalation will be wider and more profound resulting in the manifestation of corporate crisis.
In the “Crisis Therapy” stage the management attempts-through introduction of the proper changes- to eliminate the causes and their negative impact on the corporate operation.
Corporate learning is a basic function of crisis management because the failure of the management to learn the proper lessons from the causes-manifestation-impact-therapy of a corporate crisis provides fertile ground for the incubation of future crises.

 

FIGURE 1
Stages of corporate crisis’ manifestation

 

 

 

 

 

LEARNING-EXPERIENCE

Parameters of an effective crisis management The most effective crisis management, occurs when potential crises are detected and dealt with quickly, before maximization of their distractive impact on the corporate business. In crisis management Business Continuity Plan plays a determinant role.
Corporations the management of which has elaborated business continuity plans will have a basic advantage to minimize the negative impact of a crisis on its activities. On top of that, executives may find that the process of developing these plans also has an indirect benefit. Their Corporations are more sensitive to possible crisis situations that could disrupt the business and affect its operating expenses, profits and overall growth. As a result their managers respond more rapidly and effectively to head them off.
Crisis management is challenging for all corporations, but those operating in a global context like international scheduled airlines, face additional complexities. Globalisation can make it more difficult to prepare for crises when responses must be stretched across countries and time zones. Differences among stakeholders can intensify a global vulnerability of the corporation if cultural differences cause unpredicted responses and other problematic permutations. Despite broad-reaching markets, widely dispersed suppliers or worldwide recognition, any weaknesses among business components can exacerbate vulnerability. Even crises that threaten the most remote links can jeopardize the viability of a corporation.
Crisis management preparations, yield organizational benefits including early detection of warning signals, pre-emptive spotting of failures, continuous corporation’s learning and agile decision-making. In the best-prepared settings, representative members engage in on-going preparations. They discuss how specific crises could affect their corporation; they plan for contingencies that these crises would impose; and they align resources for containment. Through crisis management efforts, leaders and followers learn how to make decisions and take actions when pressed by time, uncertainty, and incomplete information.
None of the leaders can prepare their corporations to face effectively every bizarre event that might happen which could result in a crisis. This happens due to the very high number of crisis determinants, and the unaffordable-by the corporation-cost, compared with the benefits from elaboration of a high number of Business Continuity Plans. But the best-prepared corporations support an open and transparent approach in anticipating, preparing for, and responding to manifestation of contingent crises.

The factors which stimulate the need for constant introduction of changes
into the internal corporate environment
The main objective of the introduction of changes is the achievement of strategic and tactic corporate goals within the framework of the “economic principle” realization. The motive for the introduction of changes into the internal corporate environment is the Board of Directors’ (B.O.D.) effort, to adapt all the corporate subsystems’ operation to the stimuli (changes) of the internal and external environment’s diverse components.
Consequently, a change rarely derives from a single cause. It is often the outcome of multiple interactions among numerous subsystems. As a result, the introduction of an internal corporate environment’s changes constitutes a multidimentional problem that is closely connected to the interactions of its subsystems. One should never forget that due to the interactions among the subsystems of the internal environment the principal changes in a subsystem create the necessity for other changes in other subsystems e.g. change in a management unit often creates by reaction the need of management reconstruction as well in other units of the corporation. (Burnes 1996, Hussey 2000, Senior 1997).
Criteria for selecting the methods for efficient introduction of changes
The introduction of changes is a constant procedure of political maneuvers.
This procedure includes the alternative implementation of power tactics, of placatory negotiations, employees’ participation in decision making, “skillful” manipulation of the human factor, hinted-menacing or applied coercion. The selection of any of these tactics or a combination of them, from an experienced manager, depends on a) the combination of forces the manager deals with, b) on the specific time in relevance with the forces the manager has at his-her disposal, and c) the intended outcome within the framework of an effective realization of the strategic corporate goal.
The implementation of a centralized administration may have positive results at the peak of a crisis. It is generally accepted that in case of emergency there is no time for democratic procedures. This is the moment when a leader can introduce and promote the pre-selected changes by the method of applying shock. This shock is known in the international literature as the first step in the Lewis Change Model unfreezing-movement-Refreezing.
The selection of reasons that may substantiate the necessity of specific changes introduction should be made with great care. Reasons that have been used in the past should not be used again. (Senge and al. 1999, Senior 1997, Kotter 1998 )

Causes and categories of the employees’ resistance against the introduction of changes. Coping with the employees’ reactions against the introduction of changes (Clark 1994, Senior 1997, Hussey 2000)
People do not like changes. Consequently, every effort towards an introduction of changes into an internal corporate environment is considered by the majority as threatening. As a result the introduction of changes is reasonably expected to face reactions from at least some hierarchy members, some employees and some times even from few members of the corporate B.O.D. The causes, the content, the intensity and the duration of these reactions are not identical neither among the employees of different job specialties nor among the members of different levels of hierarchy and job specialty nor from the members of the B.O.D. Crucial role plays the existing national and corporate culture,
The employees resist against changes due to high anxiety-stress provoked from:
A) Threat to self-esteem needs: Threat to the acquired status, Threat to established skills, Threat to power base,
B) Threat to social acceptance needs : Lost of team relationships, Fear of looking stupid, Fear of failure
C) Threat to security needs : Fear of the unknown, Low-trust corporate climate, History of previous custom, Fear of failure, Reluctance to let go, Fear of losing the control of own destiny, Lack of information, Feeling vulnerable and exposed.
D) Threat to Natural needs : Lack of perceived benefits,
The categories of employees’ reactions against the introduction of changes are :
1) aggressiveness, cycklothymic behaviour, absences, resignations, request for removal, decrease of productivity-performance, main occupation the construction of argues to prove the inappropriateness of the change, apathy, disobedience.
Four alternatives are available to the top management in order to reverse the reactions climate:
a) efforts to change the attitude of the subordinates using a combination of positive and negative motives taking into account the existed national and corporate culture
b) removal of the subordinate in case there is a personal conflict with the leader c) replacement of the leader in case the displeasure of his/her subordinates is generalized
d) change of the leadership style, that is change of a basic determinant of the existed corporate culture.
General procedures for effective introduction of changes into an internal corporate environment under normal conditions – escalating
Many models can be applied for effective introduction of changes in an internal corporate environment. The content of these models concerns the rules, the methods the mechanisms, the techniques the procedures etc., that have to be applied and the proper timing which must be selected for a successful introduction of changes. This is due to the different factors involved at every different case such as the corporate aims, the specific problems and its tension, the existing culture (national and corporate), the conditions of the internal and external corporate environment well as other category of challenges that every company faces at every time. (Senior 1997)
However we consider that the effective introduction of changes into an internal corporate environment at every case must follow a specific number of steps-stages, of a precise content, under a specific sequence-regardless of the rules, methods, mechanisms, techniques, procedures etc., that have to be applied.
According to our opinion in case of selecting to introduce a change in the
internal corporate environment, under normal conditions, persuasion plays a major role. Persuasion of the stakeholders involved, in order to accept the necessity of introducing changes and their voluntary participation for the realization of this introduction.
This option permits:
– The most precise calculation possible of allied and opponent forces that may
activate the introduction of the specific changes
– The formation of coalitions
– Preparation of debates and “persuasion” or neutralization of those opposing to the introduction of those changes. (Duck 1998, Strebel 1998)
– Concerning the efficient introduction of changes in an internal corporate environment, under normal conditions we have constructed a model of 10 steps allocating in 4 phases which must be applied in the order specified: (see TABLE 1)
TABLE 1
10 Steps in 4 Phases for effective introduction of changes
into the internal corporate environment an air-carrier under normal conditions
DETERMINATION
A) Determination of the strategic and tactic goals of the air-carrier
B) Determination and assessment of the current status of the air-carrier
1) Determination of the negative symptoms.
2) Determination of the causes of these symptoms
3) Determination of the sources of the aforementioned causes
C) Research and determination of the necessary changes that must be introduced according to the strategic and tactic goals of the air-carrier
PREPARATION
D) Suitable preparation of the members of hierarchy as well as of the employees
1) Building trust-certainty-confidence among the employees for the future goals-intentions of the company. Develop a change culture.
2) Informing the employees of the existing problems
3) Focusing on the current and the long-term negative effects of the existing problem(s) on the company’s survival.
4) Focusing on the negative future effects on particular categories of employees and if possible on individuals. The success of the aforementioned process relies on the acceptance by employees of the certain problem(s) existence.
5) Persuading the employees that some changes are necessary to be introduced in order to resolve the problem(s).
6) Inviting the employees to submit suggestions and opinions about the necessary changes that should be introduced.
7) Informing the employees about the effects of their suggestions concerning the solution of the problems that the company faces
8) Starting discussions with the employees to conclude to mutually accepted suggestions concerning:
a) The number of changes, the field and the time of their implementation
b) The role of different categories of employees in the efficient implementation of these changes. The discussions concerning all steps of the process should be constant.
E) Co-decision concerning the necessary changes that must be introduced according to the “co-decided” strategic and tactic goals. It is obvious that alliances of the company’s leader(s) with the formal union leadership, together with the informal one, facilitate the successful introduction of changes significantly.
F) Scheduling the introduction of the selected changes (what, when, where, how).
INTRODUCTION
G) Implementation of the introduction of selected changes (fulfillment of all the
agreements between management and employees, determining the individual role
of every employee).
Simultaneous and continuous supervision-control of the implementation of the changes introduction process (giving priority to individual self-control) and its effects, in every stage of the process and in every organizational level and unit.
The methods that must be implemented should depend on factors such as:
1) time pressure,
2) existence of relevant institutional framework
3) the content of the existed national and corporate culture
4) the attitude of the employees and the expected reactions)
STABILIZATION
H) Continuous assessment of the results of the introduced changes and application of the proper adaptations.
I) Promotion at the hierarchy of those employees who accepted the change culture and contributed at the successful introduction and application of the changes.
J) Continuous communication of the positive impact of the introduced changes on the corporate status and if possible on the status of various groups of employees.
In case of failure a new effort should be attempted under another leader as soon as the mistakes of the previous effort are determined and the general circumstances are the opportune ones.

The structure and the methodology of this model are based on:
a) our more than fifteen years experience on the efforts of the Greek State to introduce changes into Olympic Airways’ internal environment. (Lainos 2006).
b) the experience of conduction and application of recovery programs by some E.U. flag carriers during 90’s
c) the existing international literature (Burnes, 2000, Clarke 1994, Kotter 1998, Mabey and al 1993, Senge and al 1999, Senior 1997 e.t.c.)

Procedures for introduction of changes under emergency conditions
We consider important the mention of change introduction in the internal corporate environment under emergency conditions, as it demands the structural modification of the procedures followed under normal conditions. It is necessary for these procedures to be adapted to the demands of the implemented “unorthodox” methods and practices.
A specific category of introduction of changes model under emergency conditions is creating an artificial crisis.
The practice of creating an artificial crisis is used when (indicatively):
– There is an immediate need of introduction of changes – consequently there is no time available for gradual changes introduction. Such circumstances are privatization, immediate abolition of productive activities and jobs, a serious and unexpected calamity.
– A serious opposition of the employees and or society is anticipated and it is
considered possible to lead the whole effort to failure.
It is obvious that for a successful introduction of changes into the internal environment of an air carrier, the B.O.D. should have pre-determined a specific vision-final goal (obvious-communicated or hidden-secret). The corporate vision, which is communicated to the employees-society by the B.O.D., is not necessary identical with the actually applied by the B.O.D. and hidden from the public. In this case a corporate vision is imperative to be propagated, a vision, the necessity of whose realization will meet with the consensus of the majority of the employees and society. As a result a majority higher than 75% of the managers must be convinced that the publicized vision of the administration and the potential financial collapse of the corporation are both real facts. Consequently, their turnover after the change introduction recommended by the administration constitutes the main instigating factor for the managers. (Clark 1994 , Hussey 2000 , Senior 1997)
Within the framework of introduction of changes under critical conditions some of the aforementioned “preparation” and “introduction” stages under normal conditions, are modified. The “preparation” procedure starts with a number of scheduled successive storming actions the goal of which is a psychological blackmailing of the employees in order to shock them and to curb any attempt of reaction against the change introduction, either by the employees themselves or by society in general.
The successful, application of the hidden vision of an air carrier’s B.O.D. might include a number of measures that are mentioned below (indicatively and not imperatively).
– For the realization of the hidden corporate vision it is imperative for the employees and the hierarchy as well to be convinced that :
a) the fulfillment of the communicated vision is necessary for the survival of the company.
b) the changes introduced for the successful application of the hidden corporate goals, is necessary to be considered by the employees and the society that aim at the successful application of the communicated corporate goals.
– Only a small trustworthy leading group will be aware of the hidden final goal and would process the stages for its realization
– It is pointed out that in the case of introduction of changes in the internal corporate environment through creation of artificial crisis the most important thing is not to convince the employees to accept the change introduction, but to enforce the changes through a psychological coercion.
– The creation of an artificial crisis through the use of some or all of the following techniques is a vital stage of such a policy
– Creation of high deficit in the air carrier, either by the use of creative logistics or through stock market manipulations by the B.O.D. in expense of the air carrier
– While under different circumstances there would be an effort to avoid publicity regarding the deficit, in this specific case the B.O.D. tries to make the deficit known publicly while at the same time communicates pessimistic predictions
regarding the future of the air carrier.
– An “independent” private consultant, preferably of an international reputation, is employed by the air carrier, to provide the B.O.D. with the information necessary to facilitate the achievement of B.O.D.’s hidden goal. This information bear the prestige of the independent consultant and therefore it is difficult to be contradicted by the opposing view.
– A case has been reported where the corporate B.O.D. after causing their clients maximum dissatisfaction – through wrong actions or emissions – hired a consultant to perform a market research regarding the satisfaction level of their clientele. The dramatic for the corporation results of the research have been publicly known due to the contribution of the corporate B.O.D. (Clark 1994)
– The B.O.D. “approaches” journalists of the press and electronic mass media of high readability and viewing percentages, politicians, trade unionists, consumer organizations in prestigious organizations and people who may influence the public opinion and the air carrier employees and who cooperate with the administration to further its viewpoints. For this effort to be effective, the cooperation of the aforementioned agents and the B.O.D. should be subtle and those who express the B.O.D.’s viewpoints should make them appear as their own and “freely” formed and offered.
– Provocation by the B.O.D. through trade unionists of a hard and long-term strike which might include rioting resulting even in damages of the corporation premises, which will result in:
a) an interruption of the productive procedure
b) an extra accumulation of damages for the corporation
c) defamation of the corporation
The maximum publicity regarding these events is intended in view to provoke social discontentment against the employees or even the corporation as a whole so that the necessity for the introduction of changes proposed by the corporate B.O.D. is considered evident.
– It should be underlined that for the success of this precarious endeavor, a competent and decisive leader is needed, who would be surrounded by a determined and discreet leading group that is not afraid of being accused of creating an artificial crisis in the corporation.
– Decisiveness and discreetness are basic factors for the success of this endeavor. If the plan should be divulged to the public, not only would the whole effort be condemned to fail but the B.O.D. and their team, would be obliged to resign. Moreover, the future B.O.D. would face difficulties in their effort to introduce changes, since both managers and employees would be apprehensive.

PART 2 The case study of Olympic Airways S.A.
Introduction
Changes at the commercial Air Transport international institutional environment
Since the 1970s the economic thought of the grate western nations (which had established the system of free market) was gradually ruled by the neoliberal ideals (Mises L.v., Hayek F., Friedman M.). These ideas profess the absolute absence of the State from entrepreneurship. The State ownership of enterprises in the market system (J.M. Keynes social oriented development model), in the context of an elemental capitalistic management of the social production, has never been accepted by the followers of neoliberalism. The postwar established commercial air transport international institutional environment (Chicago Convention 1944) was State regulated. The establishment of the State regulation (capitalistic central programming) selected as the more efficient to face on one hand the enormous destructive consequences of the World War II and on the other hand the competition with the so called “System of Existed Socialism”. In 1993, both of the aforementioned causes which had imposed the State regulation were not existed any more. Then E.U. following 15 years after the example of the United States (Deregulation Act 1978) decided to substitute the State regulation of the air transport institutional environment with a liberalized one, based on the global free competition. In this E.U. liberalized network, the State aid to the airlines was prohibited. (Lainos 1995a, 1999)

Olympic Airways history-profile
Olympic Airways (O.A.) the former Greek Flag carrier was established in 1956 by Onasis. O.A. was nationalized by the Greek Government in 1975, because its former private ownership, demanded 60 million US $ as state subsidization for the year 1975 while in the same year, the Government acquired the airline by paying 69 million US $. (Lainos 1992)
Structure of the groups’ companies
Olympic Airways (up to 10-12-2003)
Olympic Airways-Services (after 11-12-2003)
Olympic Airlines
Olympic Aviation
Olympic Fuel Company
Former subsidiaries companies privatized
Olympic Catering
Galileo Hellas
Former subsidiaries ceased its operation after decision of O.A’s. B.O.D
Olympic Air-Tours All Sun (tourist)
Operational
In 2003 Olympic Airways was dichotomised in the Olympic Airways-Services (Economics, Technical and commercial handling etc) and Olympic Airlines (flight operations) (O.A.’s Web Site) Olympic Airlines flies today in 35 domestic and to 39 international destinations world-wide. Its main base is Athens International Airport.
In 2007, Olympic Airlines transported about six million passengers.
Economics
For the period 1975-1994 the economic results of O.A showed a cumulative deficit amounting to 1.3 billion euros.
For the period 1995-2007 the economic results of the former O.A. (Olympic Airways, Olympic Airways-Services, and Olympic Airlines) showed a cumulative deficit of about 2.2 billion euros.

Methodology for approaching the attitude of the Greek State to O.A.
The criteria according to which the attitude of the Greek State to O.A. is examined, are the affected corporate fields. As these fields are considered to be: economic efficiency, management’s efficiency, ownership regime, corporate public relations-reputation, relations with the sole domestic competitor, and relations with E.U.
According to this methodology there is no distinction between the attitude of the State-shareholder from the attitude of O.A.’s B.O.D. because a) the latter is appointed by the State shareholder b) the State-shareholder always approves all the transactions fulfilled by the O.A.’s B.O.D., during each annual assembly of the shareholders.

Facts regarding the attitude of the Greek State-as to O.A.’s exclusive shareholder- since its nationalization in 1975
A) The attitude of the State-shareholder regarding the O.A.’s Economic efficiency
a) The State shareholder in cooperation with O.A.’s B.O.D. burdened O.A.,’s operational cost with the cost of the obligatory -free of charge- fulfilment of various Governmental policies. Since O.A.’s nationalization in 1975 until now, all Greek Governments have burdened the financial status of OA – against the existing convention between the two parties – with the compulsory materialization on the company’s part of certain Governmental politics (economic, social, developmental, foreign etc (see TABLE 2).
TABLE 2
The sources of the State debts to O.A. (O.A.-Lainos 1994)
1. Non deposit of the share capital which was decided by the general assembly of the shareholders
2. Under cost pricing policy (selling passenger fares below the cost) in the domestic network (an obligatory fulfillment of the Price and Income State Committee’s constant order in violation of the 11th article of O.A-State convention. This has been applied by all of the O.A.’s B.O.D.s. from 1975 to 2002.)
3. Discounts offered to certain passenger groups in the domestic network due to obligatory application of the Governmental policy
4. Burdening the O.A.’s operational cost with the cost of Prime Ministerial and Presidential air transportation by enforcing the Governmental Policy
5. Unpaid debts of Ministries and other State services from tickets used by Governmental servants traveling on official duty.
6) 97% discount on the fares of the daily and weekly press, transported daily by O.A. in obligatory application of the Governmental policy.
7. Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority not paying some conventional fees to O.A.
8. Strains on O.A. due to the debts of political parties offering their voters free air transport during election periods
9. Non deposit of the excess cost of the compulsory covering of the loss making domestic itineraries with small frontier airports. This practice violates a) the existing convention between Ο.Α. Onassis and the State and b) the relative article for the Public Service Obligation according to the E.U.’s legislation-of the Third Package of liberalization of the EU air transports (E.U. 1993, Decision of the Greek Arbitrate Court 7/2006)
10. Obligatory annual subsidization of the O. A.’s subsidiaries
11. Inclusion in O.A.’s payroll of about one hundred O.A.’s employees appointed to the offices of various politicians
12. Loss of O.A.’s annual revenue from the interest of the aforementioned state debts.
13. Interest loss due to Government decisions making compulsory the deposit of large amounts of OA’s cash in the Bank of Greece with an interest rate of 0%, when the annual monetary cost for O.A. run into 36% on the grounds of a 25% inflation.
14. Non payment by the State and lack of demand by OA’s B.O.D. of the cost subsidization for flights to and from small frontier airports of the domestic network, a provision included in the contract between OA and the Greek State and the institutional framework of EU
The cost of the compulsory fulfilment by O.A. of the particular Governmental politics has never been repaid to the company. (O.A.-Lainos 1994, Lainos 2001, 2006 b, 2007 b, e)
15) Undue eviction of the OA in 2001 from “Helleniko” airport and compulsory
16) relocation to the newly built “El. Venizelos” airport resulting in an annual increase of “airport expenses” up to 1400% -around 88 million euros. (Greek Arbitration Court. Decision of 12/2006). It is underlined that according to the existed then convention between OA – State, O.A. had the privilege to use the “Hellinikon” airport up to October of 2006 expired date of the convention
17) Obligation of OA and its affiliated company “Olympic Airlines” imposed by the State-shareholder (convention Greek State-Hohtief 1995) to build on their own expenses but on land owned by the airport company, the hangar of its aircraft maintenance repair organisation on “El. Venizelos” airport. (Greek Arbitration Court. Decision of 12/2006)
18) The aforementioned Greek State’s debts to O.A. have not been permitted to be recorded in the company’s ledgers. (Angelopoulos 2006). On the contrary, the State debts were recorded in the company’s ledgers as O.A.’s cost, consequently as its own deficits. (O.A. 1994, Greek Arbitrate Court 2006, Lainos 2006 b, 2007 b, c, d. e) This practice resulted in O.A.’s high rate of loan dependence and high level of annual interest, fines and penalties paid as consequence of non repayment of the huge State debts. (Lainos 1994, 2007 a,b,d,f)
19) The 82% of the recorded in O.A.’s books as its operational deficits from 1989 to 1993, is artificial increase by the O.A.’s B.O.D. under instructions of the State-shareholder (EU 1994). This factitious increase of O.A.’s deficits is accorded to fines and overcharges enforced on O.A. by the State-shareholder and State owned organizations due to the inability of OA to respond to its financial obligations. This inability however was the outcome of repudiation of the debt by the State. The artificial increase deficits of O.A. did not cease after 1993 but continued, reaching 46% of O.A.s cumulative deficit during the period 1995-2007 (Lainos 2007 a, f)
During the debate by the Greek parliament (9-12/12/1994) of the law 2271 concerning operational, organizational, administrational and labor terms and conditions changes towards the recovery of Olympic Airways, all the Greek parties resorted to the data and the conclusions of the Olympic Airways research-study (O.A.-5/1994 b, Lainos 5/1994) pointing out that the enormous debts of the State to O.A were three times higher than the company’s deficits. But in the end, instead of voting for the reimbursement of the company by the state, they accepted (with the exception of the Greek Communist Party) E.U’s program considering O.A. on the brink of bankruptcy. (Greek Parliament 1994).
A Member of the Greek Parliament of a minor opposition’s party submitted a question to the Greek Parliament regarding the research-studies upon which the O.A.’s B.O.D. based O.A.’s claims in justice (2005-2006) against the State shareholder for its unpaid debts to O.A. (Synaspismos 2008).
The Parliamentary representative of the major opposition (Greek Parliament 2007 b Mrs. Xenoyiannakopoulou) as well as the chairman of O.A.’s B.O.D. (O.A. 2008) stated that the Arbitrate Court decisions regarding O.A.’s claims in the period 2005-2006 were based on research-studies which O.A. had conducted….in the past!!!
This statement may include one of the two following alternatives:
a) either the conductor of the studies – calculated the debts which the State would create towards O.A. from 1995 to 2005 years ago before 2005 (the December 2005 is the initial date of O.A.’s claims in justice). In this case the conductor of these research-studies applied a method to calculate the future State debts to O.A., the reliability of which is unknown as yet at the scientific community.
b) simply the O.A.’s claims in justice against the State-shareholder were not based on any reliable study.
It is obvious that since 1994 there has never been conducted any official reliable (actual) study concerning the assessment of the total sum of the state debts to the company.
h) Consequently there has never been a legal claim of the totality of the State debts towards Olympic Airways and Olympic Airlines, debts that according to one of our recent research-studies amount to tenfold its cumulative deficits.
i) The State-shareholder passed a law that imposes a five years period after which the State debts to the State owned companies are prescribed. (Governmental Gazette 1995) It must also be noted that according to commercial law, the prescription period for Greek citizens’ and companies’ debts fluctuates from 15 to 20 years.
j) The O.A.’s B.O.D. has gradually left to expire the legally provisioned statute limiting time for the State debts (five years) and then they resort to the same prescription. In 2006, the Greek justice in the solid relevant claim by OA’s B.O.D., declared this same prescription of the State debts before 2000.
k) During the audit of OA’s financial condition by the E.U. in 2002, the State-shareholder and the company’s B.O.D. withheld from the EU inspectors the huge State debts to OA. (EU 2005)
The implementation of the aforementioned methods from the State-shareholder in respect OA’s management, means that, since the company’s nationalization in 1975, the State-shareholder has intended for the company to operate showing a deficit by being burdened with the application of certain Governmental policies and it has augmented the company’s deficit artificially. Regarding the implementation of the aforementioned methods a former chairman of O.A.’s B.O.D. and former minister of the socialist government, stated “We did not consider it as wrong because State and Olympic Airways was considered to be the same pocket” (Akrivakis 2006)
B) The attitude of the State-shareholder regarding the efficiency of O.A.’s management
The State, as O.A.’s exclusive shareholder, either mismanaged itself various O.A.’s affairs or/and tolerated the mismanagement of various O.A.’s affairs during its application, by the members of its B.O.D. and of the corporate hierarchy. In any case the State always gave its “ex post” approval to the Ο.Α. results of mismanagement during the annual general assembly of the shareholder.
Although high ranking officials of the State-shareholder (e.g Prime Ministers) denounce OA’s mismanagement, none politician resigned due to this cause and only two C.E.O.’s have been prosecuted by the State for secondary level cases of personnel mismanagement. Following we cite some indicated cases of OA’s mismanagement
1) The absence of a reliable development program due to unrealistic operational assumptions upon which the data of each corporate development program is based. Not a single program of the ones developed and approved by the OA’s B.O.D. and the State-shareholder has ever been materialized (Greek Parliament 1994 PM Kanelopoulos, Lainos 1992, 1999, 2007d,f, ).
2) Permanent lack of efficient management reported in all the relevant studies and EU decisions (E U 1994, 1998), namely:
a) absence of reliable developmental planning and violation of the existing one by management and hierarchy
b) The staff hiring, appointing and promoting to the hierarchy’s positions is based on favoritism (Greek Parliament-Kanellopoulos 1994, Greek Parliament 2002). Mass staff hiring has taken place regarding party members and political friends, outside the procedure of national assessment examinations and without being provisioned by the corporate plan of OA.
c) Under the aforementioned circumstances it is not peculiar to see members of
hierarchy, after audit by the authorized corporate auditing bodies, to be found out as liable for “mismanagement” of the corporate-public money. After that not only the majority of them were not prosecuted (indicated cases of, O.A.’s cargo agency 1996, O.A.’s agency at Beograd-Serbia 2006, Athens airport, defalcation of the passengers compensation due to overbooking 2008), but some of them were further promoted in hierarchy (case of O.A.’s Salonica agent 1996).
d) OA’s B.O.D. with the tolerance of the State-shareholder, has violated provisions of the laws 2271/1994 and 2602/1998 that enforced the assessment of all potential employees before their appointment in positions of the corporate hierarchy. The O.A.’s B.O.D. decided to assess only the members of hierarchy that had already three years of experience in a managerial position even though the preamble stated that these persons had been hired with the use of criteria different from the ones regarding the required qualifications for every particular labor position. As a result, the same members of the corporate hierarchy bearing – de facto – the responsibility for the crisis in O.A. remained in hierarchy positions.
OA’s technical unions have repeatedly denounced (EPTAOA – a/c engineers’ union) 2004 and Technical Unions 2007) OA’s management neglect to provide the company’s technical base with the essential – in number and specialty – personnel, resulting in the company’s incapacity to accept proposals by foreign air carriers for aircraft maintenance at OA’s technical base. This managerial maneuver has resulted in an annual loss of revenues for both OA and the national economy amounting to 10 million euros.
d) Absence of effective strategic policy regarding administration, coordination and motivation of the employees (Greek Parliament 1994)
e) The absence of efficient control mechanisms resulting in unknown OA transactions with clients and suppliers (EU 1994).
3) The irrational composition of the fleet (high capacity and long range aircrafts being employed in short distance and low demand itineraries) this specific case of mismanagement was pointed out by EU (EU 1994) and it has been impeached by OA’s high ranking officials to the Greek Parliament. (Lainos 1992, 1998, 2007, Greek Parliament 2002b, 2007) The irrational composition of the fleet results in a dramatic overcharge of the OA’s fleet operational cost.
4) The irrational scheduling of the proper aircraft number and type acquisition to perform at the scheduled summer itineraries
Every October, at least the last six years a schedule of a specific number of summer flights for each destination is formed for the following year, without the in parallel scheduling and acquisition of aircrafts and crews that are essential for the realization of the specific itineraries. This choice results in OA being obliged to lease for a short term aircrafts and crews, paying prices – as it has been repeatedly reported by the press – three or even five times higher than the ones paid during a more efficient fleet planning. Moreover, some of these aircrafts suffered unexpected failures resulting in flight delays. The aforementioned mismanagement causes the last five years, to O.A. an annual loss of 15 million euros. (Newspaper Imerisia 2008) Furthermore, there have appeared doubts and apprehension concerning the most powerful advantage of OA, namely flight safety, resulting in OA’s defamation. (Lainos 2007 g)
5) The over-pricing of the purchased aircrafts The acquisition of aircrafts at prices higher than the ones in the current market, resulting in detrimental operation of the aircrafts and lowering of OA’s competitive standard (denounced by OA’s former president Fthenakis: Oikonomikos Tahidromos 2/1998, Parliament debate 14-12-07 Minister of Transportation) and by company managers (Greek Government 1994, Lainos 1992, 1998, 2007f).
6) The irrational organizational structure (European Union 1994, 1998, Greek Government 1994). The hierarchy’s levels are more than eight while are not required maximum four (Law 2271/1994). The operational content of many of O.A.’s organizational units does not reflect the requirements of O.A.’s current operational needs. The aforementioned malfunctions are considered as a result of the implemented criteria in OA’s management by the State-shareholder that puts the party’s interest over and above O.A.’s corporate one.
7) The low and declining trend of labor’s productivity level. The labor’s productivity level in O.A. fluctuated round the 50% from the respective average of the competitor airlines-I.A.T.A. members. (Lainos 2004).
8) The low quality standard of the offered passengers services, with exception of flight safety in which O.A. has been awarded. (Lainos 2006 b)
9) The non application of the laws 2271/1994 και 2602/1998 for OA’s reforming under a State ownership. (E.U. 2005)
10) Spending 72 million euros during the period of the so-called reformation (1993-2001) on remunerations and expenses of consultants elaborating studies of dubious usefulness that have never been materialized. (Lainos 2008)
11) The applied at the domestic network fares policy (fare prices) below cost,
resulting in high revenue loss for the company. (Greek Government 1994, Greek Parliament 2002)
12) The Greek State-shareholder from August to October 2007 counterbalanced the 825 billion euros that it had been sentenced by the Greek courts to return to O.A., with respective debts of O.A. to the Social Insurance Institute (IKA) and other state organizations. These debts of OA towards State owned organizations are overcharged by 46% with fines due to the repayment delay on behalf of O.A. The repayment delay of O.A. has been the result of the State’s negation to repay its own debts to the company. And so, O.A. paid fines and interest to the State for the States debts to O.A..
13) Realizing the responsibility for mismanagement of the State-owned companies B.O.D.’s members, and since their majority have been politically active people and high ranking party dignitaries all of the involved Governmental parties, the Greek State-socialist Government-in 2/2002 passed a law that acquitted of every responsibility all C.E.O.s and members of B.O.D. of all of the public Companies and Organizations-including O.A.’s since 1982.
It must be pointed out that the State shareholder changed 43 times in 33
years (since 1975) the composition of the board of directors (E.U.1994, Lainos 2008).
This attitude of the State –shareholder to O.A. resulted in the manifestation of crisis (Greek Parliament 1994, Newspaper To Vima 15-4-2004 Press Conference of the Minister of Transportation)

C) The efforts of the State-shareholder to change O.A.’s public ownership regime
The State shareholder attempted repeatedly some times violating the existed law, however inefficiently, to change O.A.’s public ownership regime to private. Following we cite certain action indicative of the shareholders intentions.
1) In 1989, the central-right candidate Prime Minister stated that the State owned organizations whose operation proves financially injurious for the Greek taxpayers should be privatized or closed down. He included O.A. in the category of financially injurious public companies (Oikonomikos Tahydromos 1989) even though the company has never been such.
2) In 1991, after he had become Prime Minister (1990-1993) he stated in the Greek Parliament that Greece could manage without the flag carrier Olympic Airways repeating his accusations of a financially injurious operation.
3) In 1997 the leader of major opposition visited the Prime Minister and they discussed about “Olympic Airways” «Mr Prime Minister relates tragically the plight of the Greek flag carrier, its huge deficits, the co-management with the unions’ leaders. «Why don’t you shut it down, then?” asked the leader of the major opposition. The answer of the Prime Minister impressed the leader of the major opposition: «It is a matter of society’s maturity». (Newspaper Κathimerini 2007)
4) In December 1998 the Greek Government announced its decision to privatize O.A. (firstly its management and subsequently the majority of its share capital). (Newspaper Κathimerini 1999). This measure was not included in the valid-then-law 2602/1998 which had been enacted just six months earlier the expiring date of which was the 31-12-2001. On the contrary the law aimed at overcoming O.A.’s crisis under the existing state ownership regime. This efforts for O.A.’s privatisation failed because the private managers that were appointed in O.A.’s B.O.D. from July 1999 up to June 2000, came from SPEEDWING a British Airways subsidiary that was a competitor of O.A.. These managers instead of achieving O.A.’s recovery managed to burden O.A. with deficits of almost 117 million euros in one year (O.A.’s Balance sheets 1999-2000, Lainos 2001, 2005 2006 a, b).
5) During a debate among the members of the “Economic and Transparency Committee” of the Greek parliament, concerning the results of the O.A.’s reforming, the Minister of Transport (political supervisor of the O.A.) stated that the constant vision of the Government since 1994 had been O.A.’s privatization. But as the circumstances had not been the desirable ones, and the employees might stimulate negative reactions, this vision could not be communicated earlier. This is the reason, he stated, why sometimes the politicians are obliged to present two different versions of the same situation. One version is presented to the members of the parliament and the other version is presented during negotiations with the employees. (Greek Parliament Transparency Committee 2002)
6) Three more unsuccessful efforts followed by the same Government for O.A.’s privatisation up to March 2004. (Lainos 2001, 2003, 2006 b, Vasilakis 2006 )
7) In February 2003, the Greek Government decided to dichotomize O.A. in two companies: Olympic Airlines which included only the flight operations and Olympic Airways-Services. This dichotomization was completed in December 2003. (Greek Government 2003). In their letter to the E.U. the Greek Government presented potential facilitation of the company’s privatization as the reason for O.A.’s dichotomization. (EU 2005) When addressing the Greek press at the same time, they stated that the reason for dichotomization was the facilitation of O.A.’s recovery. (Newspaper Kathimerini 2003)
8) On 3rd July 2005, the central right Greek Government, (elected in April 2004) with a letter to the E.U. promised to cease the operation of Olympic Airways and its affiliated Olympic Aviation (E.U. 2005).
9) After the failure of another two attempts of O.A.’s privatization the State-shareholder announced in 9-9-2005 that the Government had decided that O.A. had to cease operation within the following two months (end of October 2005) because O.A.’s operation had been a burden to Greek taxpayers (Greek Prime Minister 2005, Parliamentary Proceedings 23-11-2005). Two days after the Greek Prime Minister had announced his decision for O.A.’s operation recess, the B.O.D. of the Aegean Airlines – O.A.’s sole private domestic competitor – announced that they had ordered 12 Airbus-320 aircrafts, eight confirmed and four optional. (Aegean Airlines’ Press release 11-9-2005)
10) The statement of the Prime Minister in September 2005 regarding the cease of O.A.’s operation, was followed by a wide media campaign (in which the author contributed decisively) in order to inform society that O.A.’s real financial position was not loss making – as it appeared to be according to its accounting books – but profitable as our 1994 research-study had already as well proved and as the O.A.’s B.O.D. and the State-shareholder have admitted then. The aforementioned campaign resulted in the negative reaction of a 73% of the population against O.A.’s cease of operation. (Lainos 2006 b)
11) On October 3rd 2005 the vice president of Lufthansa – ally of Aegean Airlines the exclusive private competitor of O.A. at the domestic network- stated in Greek Press that after O.A.’s cease of operation its Greek domestic routes will be served by Aegean Airlines while the international ones will be covered by Lufthansa (Lainos 2006 b).
12) Besides the social reactions, on 22nd November 2005 the Greek Government enacted a law according to which the “PANTHEON”, a new air-carrier, would substitute O.A. up to May 2006 after the latter had ceased operation. (Greek Parliament 2005, Lainos 2006 b) The operation of “PANTHEON” and O.A.’s cease of operation were never materialized.
13) On the other hand, between December 2005 and March 2006, for the first
time in OA’s history, O.A-Services B.O.D. prosecuted its exclusive shareholder the Greek State, in the Arbitrate Court, demanding the return of almost a billion Euros from the huge State debts to it (Lainos 2006 a, b).
14) In September 2006, the State-shareholder announced its decision for prolongation of O.A.’s operation at least for two more years (Greek Prime Minister 2006).
15) In their respective policy speeches in the Parliament right after the national elections of September 2007 regarding the future of OA:
a) the newly elected president of the central-right wing Government stated that OA could not continue operating because its function was injurious and burdened the Greek tax payers.
b) The opposition leader of the socialist party stated that OA should continue its function and the majority of its shares and management should be assigned to private investors.
16) After the impeachment of RYAN AIR against E.U. in 22-11-2007 for the cases of O.A., Air France, Alitalia and Lufthansa-the Greek Minister of Transportation stated that since O.A. had deficits and burdened the Greek tax payers, the SABENA model would be implemented. (Greek Parliament 2007a,b) It is reminded that SABENA closed down and opened up later as a smaller private airline with domestic and regional flights only. For this impeachment of Ryan Air, Air France had a different reaction. It brought Ryan Air forward to the Justice for slanderous defamation.
17) the Greek Minister of Transportation stated that a specific plan for the future of Olympic Airways exists…in his mind. (Greek Parliament 2007a,b) while during the same week the Governmental representative stated that it is not possible to lay out any specific plan for the future of O.A. “because all the determinants are not known” (Newspaper ETHNOS 2007, Newspaper Kathimerini 2007)

D) Defamation-slander of O.A., by the State its exclusive shareholder
The defamation of OA by high ranking officials of the Sate shareholder (Greek Prime Ministers and Ministers) has never stopped since its nationalization in 1975. It went through periods of intensity and subsidence.
The intensive and mass defamation of OA directly from higher political dignitaries of the State-shareholder began in 1989 during a period of political instability in Greece. After remaining in the opposition for a decade, the central-right wing party faced the potentiality of regaining power. A great number of its members supported neoliberalism.
Three were the main features of the defamation campaign: (Lainos 2006b)
a) The first one concerned the burdening of Greek tax payers with huge deficits resulting from OA’s operation.
b) The second concerned OA’s overcharged operational cost due to several cases of mismanagement.
c) The third one, concerned the hiring, employment and rising in the hierarchy of the company, against the existing legislation, of persons whose qualifications were inferior to the requisite ones.
The next period of defamation culmination was in 1993 and “coexisted” with the beginning of the policy of air transport liberalization applied by E.U. and the ability it provided for creation of private air carriers for the first time after World War II. (E.U. 1993 Third Package of liberalization)
Αt the beginning of 1998, a coordinated extensive and raging mass campaign took place, mainly through the press, against the efficient operation and the prospects of the O.A.. Protagonists in this campaign were mainly the Prime Minister and first class Ministers of the socialist Government and the O.A.’s president of the board of directors. This campaign focused mainly on the:
– failure of the O.A.’s reforming efforts
– employees’ responsibility for this failure
– inefficiency of the public sector to give a viable solution to the O.A.’s crisis
– necessity of privatization.
In this context, the socialist Prime Minister in response to a question of the president of a party of minor opposition, stated “There have been some unfortunate mishandlings and the company has not reacted efficiently to several matters such as the one of last year’s financial policy” (Greek Parliament Debate, 18-2-1998).
The Greek Minister of Finance gave a press conference during his visit in London in which he stated that the O.A’s union (is to say, members and cadres of the Governmental party) held the main responsibility for the enormous salary raises and the infringement of the Governmental financial policy in 1997. He also stated that if the Government could win over them, then this victory could be compared to the one of Margaret Thatcher against the coalminers (Financial Times 1998).
The Minister of Transportation and Communication stated in a press conference, among other things, that O.A. was due to closing down till the Easter of the same year, if measures were not to be taken, pointing the finger to the employees: “… due to high salary raises that have been given… because these raises caused the company’s predicament” (Newspaper Eleftheros Typos” 1998/3/9)
The Minister of Internal Affairs stated in press conferences on 5/5/1998 that O.A. was either to be handed over to a strategic investor or to cease operation. (Sky radio station, 5-5-1998, Newspaper “Kalimera” 1998/5/6 and Flash radio station 1998/5/6)
The Minister of National Economy in his press conference stated that he did not believe in the success of O.A. reformation and that the only solution was to be provided by selling the company, in case O.A. failed to be profitable (Newspaper “Eleftherotypia tis Kyriakis” 1998).
The Minister of Foreign Affairs and former minister of Transportation during his press conference gave the opinion that O.A. had to close down and that no sensible person would choose to fly with Olympic Airways (Newspaper “Eleftherotypia” 1998).
However, a former minister of Transportation of the socialist Government commented on the aforementioned opinions stated that the defamation campaign launched by certain cadres in socialist Government against O.A.’s employees had as a goal to create “false impressions”. He also pointed out that the accusation of infringement of the Government’s financial policy was ostensible. The Collective Labor Bargaining of 1997, he said, bears the signature of the present employees’ accuser, the Minister of Finance, who was aware of the negotiations and the content of the collective agreement before it was signed. “The real aim is for the case to reach a dead end because of the potential future buyers of Olympic Airways” (Aegeo FM radio Station 1998, Newspaper Athinaiki 1998)
In 30-9-2000 the Federation of Civil Aviation Authorities unions (airports Control Tower e.t.c.) went on strike, causing inconvenience at the passengers all of the airlines which used the Greek airports. In its every half hour News broadcast the State own Radio Station informed the public that the Federation of Olympic Airways Unions is on strike and causes inconvenience at O.A.’s passengers.
A former Minister of Transportation of the socialist government during an interview to radio station «FLASH» in 20-1-2004 stated that: “Olympic Airways could not be saved. We should have made our decisions long ago” (Greek Parliament 2007 a,b)
The central-right Prime Minister stated that O.A. must cease its operation because it is not acceptable to burden the Greek tax payers with its deficits. (Greek Prime Minister 2005)
A week later the leader of the major socialist opposition stated that O.A. must be privatized due to its deficits. (Greek leader of the major opposition 2005)
They both expressed those same viewpoints during their policy speeches in the Parliament, in September 2007, after the elections.
The Minister of Transportation of the current central-right Government who represents, the State-shareholder, stated that the operation of O.A. under the current conditions is devaluate its status, burdening the Greek taxpayers with its operational deficits (Greek Parliament 2007 a, b). This Minister since his election in September 2007, made the same statements in about 6 debates in the Parliament, in 55 publications in various newspapers and in his more than 12 television interviews and talk shows.
Two surveys of the public opinion in September and October 2005 showed that 75% of the Greek population supports the operation of OA under state ownership. The same results had other surveys in December 2007 after the Transportation minister’s announcement of OA’s cease of operation and another one in 18 May 2008.
In the period 1989-2008 there were more than 3500 publications against OA and more than 1200 negative references in TV shows and broadcasts. At the same time, the positive references to the truly profitable financial situation of OA in the press and on television are below 2% of the above.
The results of this campaign were the defamation of the Greek flag carrier,
the public sector and the engineering and preserving of a deep crisis profile for the O.A.
It is characteristic that even today even a simple incident meets with a different attitude by the mass media when it happens in OA than when it happens in its domestic private competitor. In the case of OA, the consequences are maximized while in the case of the private competitor – if the incident becomes known – the consequences are minimized. It should be underlined that both OA and its Aircraft Maintenance Base have been presented with international awards for the level of flight safety.
E) The policy of the State-shareholder and O.A.’s B.O.D.
to its exclusive domestic private competitor
1) In 2000, Aegean Airlines, the exclusive domestic competitor of O.A., participated in one of the Sate efforts for public sale of OA. One should be reminded that during the same period the effort of the State-shareholder for OA’s privatization transgressed the existing law for O.A.’s reforming until 2001 under a State ownership. Aegean Airlines was selected by the State from a short list of the five candidates, in 2000, and so the company gained access to O.A. confidential information. This means that the company had the ability to know, among other things, the existence of the huge State debts to O.A. that had been recorded in O.A.’s accounting ledgers in the form of O.A.’s operational cost.
After obtaining this confidential knowledge, Aegean Airlines withdrew their interest. In 2001, Aegean Airlines impeached O.A. to E.U. under the accusation of accepting illegal State subsidization that had consequently to a disturbance in the competition market. (EU 9/2005, Vasilakis 2006).
It is underlined that European Union considers the use of information against any corporation that has been obtained from an internal source, as illegal.
2) Since 2001 and on, after a decision of its B.O.D. O.A. has gradually abolished flights towards specific domestic and international destinations under the pretext of their being unprofitable. Aegean Airlines have replaced OA’s flights proving that they were anything but unprofitable.
3) A Former Minister of Employment of the central-right Government stated that O.A, is devaluated by its B.O.D. that abandoned profitable activities in favor of its domestic private competitor Aegean Airlines. (Greek Parliament 2007 b)
However, none of the accused members of B.O.D. for O.A.’s devaluation in favor of its domestic private competitor has been prosecuted up to date.
In relevance to the aforementioned scheme against O.A., by the State-shareholder and its B.O.D. with the participation of representatives of the employees on the benefit of its domestic private competitor, the former president of Olympic Airlines for the period 2004-2006, wrote in his article (Newspaper “Kathimerini”, 2005):
[…] Competitors who act and prosper based on the shortcomings of the state company, due to lack of planning and development. They enjoy the privileges of action freedom all private companies have whose shareholders can finance parties and political candidates and wait by the “till” to cash in the several benefits. They are in a position to undermine the state company from inside and much more powerful means of denouncing the company for accepting subsidization and affecting the… Healthy Competition. Their main desire is for the company to cease operating or to be subjugated to the article 46a, namely “to a reconstruction under operation” so that they can buy selectively and in low price its assets, such as the trademark, the reputation and the clientele of the state company […]”
Referring to the same phenomenon, the President of the Greek Republic has recently stated:
“[…] The clash between power and justice is always in the background of the all time international phenomenon of corruption, whether it is about “black” money in politics, or the transactions of the financial with the political elite […].” (Statements of the Greek Republic President on 8-2-08)

F) Cooperation of the State-shareholder with E.U. towards O.A.’s privatization
1) Since its nationalization in 1975 up to 31-12-1992 O.A.’s cumulative deficits had reached the amount of 275 billion GRD or 807 million euros (Greek State 1994). Consequently it seemed that the continuation of the company’s operation demanded State subsidization Since State aid is not authorized by the E.U.’s institutional framework (E.U.1993) – in 1993 the Greek Government assigned to the members of O.A.’s economic hierarchy to conduct the first program for O.A.’s restructuring in collaboration with a private consultant. That program was submitted to the E.U. in July 1993 but it was rejected due to its low reliability standard (E.U. 1994).
2) The newly elected Greek Government (10/1993) decided that the conduction of a second reliable recovery program for O.A. was necessary. For this reason according to the then E.U. Commissioner’s requirements (Matutes 1994), the Olympic Airways’ B.O.D. on behalf of the Greek Government assigned to the author as staff of the O.A.’s Research-Study division, the conduction of a research-study regarding the economic relationships between the State-shareholder and O.A. (Olympic Airways 1994). According to this research-study, the cumulative state debts to O.A. for the period 1975-1992, were 680,5 billion Gdr or 1,997 billion euros that is almost 2.5 times higher than O.A.’s cumulative operational deficits for the same period (Lainos 1994, Greek Government 1994). A great part of the State debts to the O.A -determined by our research-study- about 480 billion Gdr or 1.408,7 billion euros, has been included in the restructuring program which the Greek State submitted to the E.U. on 20th May 1994 (Greek Government 1994).
3) This fact means that the Greek State not only knew but had accepted that up to 1992 O.A. was not loss-making but it was a very profitable airline. Nevertheless, they turned to the E.U. claiming that the airline was on the brink of bankruptcy and in serious need of State subsidization.
4) The European Union in order to legalize the impeachment of the Greek State in 1994 and make O.A. appear as bankrupt (although they knew that O.A. was profitable)
a) calculated the company’s deficits from 1975 to 1992 -18 years- but the State debts to OA from 1989 to 1992-4 years (E.U. 1994)
b) Any repayment of the State debts towards O.A. has been considered since “State subsidization”
We consider that the European Union’s motive was the realization of its air transport policies that aimed at the reduction of national air carriers of the country-members to three or five to maximum (Maastricht Convention 1986)
5) The restructuring program for Ο.Α. which the Greek State submitted to the E.U. on 20th May 1994 was approved by the E.U. in 7 October 1994 and it was transformed by the Greek parliament into the law 2271/23-12-1994 with validity up to 31-12-1997. The law included means for operational, organizational, managerial and labor terms and conditions restructuring.
6) In 2002 after the impeachment of Aegean Airlines against O.A. to the E,U, in 2001 – the European Committee proceeded to a thorough investigation in O.A.’s accounting books for illegal State aid (E.U. Decision 2005) Based on the results of its thorough investigation the E.U. prosecuted Greece in the European Court in 2003/4, 2003/5, 2006/10, because the Greek State failed to collect from O.A. the 750 million euros which the E.U. considers to be illegal State subsidization (Barrot 2007, E.U.C. 2005).
7) During the inspection of OA’s accounting books by E.U. inspectors in 2002, they were not able to locate the huge State debts. Nevertheless, E.U. has been based on the false presentation of OA’s financial status to prosecute Greece in the European Court three times. Questions arose for the intentions of the E.U., because, since 1994 they had been aware of the huge debts of the Greek State to O.A. with no intention of taking any legal actions against the Greek State enforcing the debts repayment (EU 1994/10, Palacio 2003, Lainos 2006 b, c, 2007 b, c, d, e f,).
8) However, the Greek Arbitration Court with three decisions in 2006 sentenced the Greek State as O.A.’s exclusive shareholder, to return to O.A. a part of its debts to the company, reaching the amount of about 825 mil Euros, (Greek Supreme Arbitrate Court July and December 2006). After that there had been pending legal demands of Olympic Airways and Olympic Airlines against the Greek state amounting to 680 million euros.
9) The Greek State decided to be absent during the 2003 European Court trial, to which had been impeached by EU for illegal State subsidization of OA. The Greek state in this trial was convicted (E.U.C.2005, Lainos 2007 d, e).
10) The State-shareholder has never referred while at the European Court to the huge State debts to OA, although it was sentenced in 2006 by the Greek Courts to repay a portion of these debts. These debts had been settled by the state up to 10 October 2007 meanwhile before the hearing procedure by the European Court in November 2007.
11) Regarding the three final decisions of the Greek Arbitrate Court in 2006 concerning the huge state debts to OA, the former (up to June 2008) European Commissioner for transportation Mr. J.Barrot had stated that those debts constitute “a new piece of information” for the EU. This means that Mr. Barrot had been aware that the inspectors who under E.U. orders had inspected OA’s finances had not been able to locate not a single euro from the huge State debts to OA, even though these debts had been recorded in OA’s accounting books. In his effort to excuse the faux pas of the E.U., Commissioner Barrot stated, answering to a Greek European MP: “The question is not if the Arbitration Court has made the right decision, the question is if the conventional relations on which the Court has been based are compatible with EU law” The Greek Arbitrate Court relied its decisions on the terms of the existed convention between the former owner Onasis and the Greek State in 1956. This convention determines up to date the terms and conditions under which O.A. operates since 1956.
12) In one of his many illegal (Greek Parliament 2007 b) interventions against O.A.’s interests, the former E.U. Commissioner of Air Transportation Mr J. Barrot stated that only a solution along the SABENA model line could permit O.A. to keep on flying at the Greek sky using its logo – the Olympic circles –. (Newspaper Eleftheros Typos 2007)
13) In another illegal intervention against O.A.’s interests, the former E.U. Commissioner of Air Transportation Mr J. Barrot stated that 60% of the current activities of O.A. must be transferred to its private domestic competitor that all those years struggles to survive without any State support (Newspaper TA NEA 2007, Newspaper Εthnos 2007)
14 It is pointed out that:
a)The E.U. legislation does not authorize European Commission to impose ownership regime such as privatization is for example. . (Cerkone 2007)
b) The implementation of the final court decision of the national courts of the State-members regarding the State subsidization, according to valid E.U. legislation, is compulsory both for the Greek State and the E.C. (EU 1999)
c) No article in the institutional framework of E.U. proclaims the Commissioner as the legality regulator of the irrevocable court decisions of the State-members concerning State subsidizations.
The intervention of Commissioner Mr Barrot and the E.U. and their disputing the irrevocable decisions of the Greek Justice, turns illegally against O.A.’s interests and constitutes a serious infringement of the European law and of the national sovereignty of a country member (Greek Parliament 2007 b).

The change of the O.A.’s operational profile between 1994 and 2007
Some of the main indicators according to which the operational profile of an airline is assessed are: Number of flights, Number of flight hours, Number of carried passengers, Length of Scheduled Rout Network, Economic Results.
For an assessment of the repercussions of OA’s operational ability from the aforementioned State attitude towards the company from 1994 to 2007 we cite the following table (see TABLE 3)

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE 3 ( IATA 1994 & 2001, O.A 2007)
1995-2007 1995-2001 2001-2007
Int’l Dom Total Int’l Dom Total Int’l Dom Total
Number of flights (1)
(9,8)% (3,0)% (5,2)% 7,4% 3,5 % 4,8% (15,0)% (6,3)% (9,6)%
Number of flight hours (1)
.. 3,0 % 5,8 % 4,0 % 20,2% 5, 8% 14,5% (14,3)% 0,0% (9,2)%
Number of carried passengers (2)
12,0% (6,1)% 1,7% 16,0% (3,0)% 5,1% (3,5)% (3,2)% (3,3)%
L.O.S.R..N. (kms) (3)
(32,8)% 68,3% (21,9)% 47,3% 55,4 % 48,2% (54,4)% 8,3% (47,4)%
Number of Employees (1)
(18,5)% (31,0)% 18,4 %
Number of aircrafts 59…………………………………….60
Deficits (4) 13.251% 2.283% 332%

(1) Thousands, (2) Millions, (3) Length of Scheduled Rout Network (4) About 46% are interests and fines
We have divided the years 1994-2007 into two separate time periods:
The first period 31/12/ 1994-31/12/2001 is determined by the laws 2271/1994 and 2602/1998 as O.A.’s recovery period under State ownership regime.
The second period 2002-2007 is the period of manifested and proclaimed legal efforts of the State to privatize, lead to dwindling or close OA down.

The attitude of the O.A.’s union leadership towards O.A.’s mismanagement
1) The union’s leadership does not defend the State ownership regime of O.A.-against the permanent decisions of the supreme union’s body. Further more during the validity of the law 2602/1998 for reconstructing of O.A. under a State ownership regime, cooperated with potential buyers determining the number of employees to be dismissed after OA’s privatization and the terms and conditions of labor for those who remain (Newspaper Kathimerini 2001).
2) The O.A.’s union leadership tolerated if not consented to various mismanaging cases such as the overburdening of OA’s operational cost with the cost of the realization of certain Governmental policies and the factitious augmentation by 82% of the deficits of the company for the period 1994 which has been pointed out by E.U. and by 46% from 1995 to 2007 even if they knew “[…] the insidious policy the state has pursued making the company show a deficit to the public opinion […]”(Federation of O.A.’s unions Press Release 2007)
3) The unions leadership has never demanded the repayment of the huge state debts to OA, but they have tolerated if not consented to the policy followed by OA’s administration after 1994 for their prescription. When in 2006 the courts sentenced irrevocably the state to repay to OA a part of the debts to the sum of 825 million euros during a period of 18 months, the trade union leadership had not demanded the repayment of the state debts to OA.
4) to the counterbalance of OA’s deficits factitiously overcharged by 46% by the irrevocably adjudicated part of the state debts to OA, in August and October 2007.
5) The trade union leadership tolerated if not consented to:
a) the privatization of OA management in 1999 with its assignment to the British company Speedwing, affiliated company of OA’s competitor, British Airways even though the law 2602/1998 valid until 31-12-2001 did not include OA’s privatization but its reformation under a state ownership regime.
b) the five attempts of OA’s privatization that have been performed since, although the Federation of Civil Aviation Unions (OSPA) convention had decided over a whole and public OA.
6) the dichotomization of OA by the state shareholder in December 2003 with the establishment of OA- Services and Olympic Airlines under the pretext of overcoming the existing crisis. The civil supervisor of OA, minister of Transportation, in a letter to EU in 2003 stated that the dichotomization had been decided to facilitate OA’s public sale.
7) They did not react effectively to the announcement by the shareholder on 30-11-2007 of the closing down of OA, due to deficits although they knew the truth concerning the huge state debts to OA as well as the company’s mismanagement by the state-shareholder and members of the BOD (appointed by the state-shareholder).

Which are the causes of the unions leadership attitude
detrimental for OA and its employees?
There is no plausible interpretation of the detrimental to O.A. attitude of the O.A.’s unions leadership if a well-known capacity of its members is not pointed out. Their capacity as members of the political parties. Given that every member of unions cannot rise in unions’ hierarchy without the consent of the party mechanisms, one is involved in, it is made obvious that the unions members’ attitude about any issue is determined or rather subjugated to the various party viewpoints for the issue in question.
In their policy speeches in September 2007, the leaders of the major political parties, as the higher ranking representatives of the state-shareholder in OA, consented to OA’s privatization, while one of them did not eliminated the possibility of its closing down.
Same were the viewpoints expressed by the two higher political representatives of the State-exclusive shareholder of O.A., in their speeches at the International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki in September 2005. They both supported O.A.’s potential privatization. In December 2007 the civil supervisor of OA, minister of Transportation and Communication emphasized the company’s impending closing down.
Regarding the aforementioned described cases of OA’s mismanagement the unions leaders have stated : “[…] for the profitability of the company which has been lost due the insidious policy the State has pursued making the company show a deficit to the public opinion […]” (Federation of O.A.’s unions Press Release 2007)
This is an unconstrained admission of the unions leadership that they knew, consented with their attitude to the mismanagement of the Greek people’s property and covered the vitiation of the State company accounting books.
The denouncement a posteriori by the unions’ leadership of OA’s mismanagement, although they had been aware of the facts but allowed them to take place without taking any measures to alleviate the detrimental consequences for OA, signifies even under the applied legislation, tolerance if not consent to the aforementioned mismanagement. It is certain that it substantiates complicity.
In the long run the unions’ leadership avoids the application of effective methods for OA’s protection:
a) to inform society about scientific studies conclusions known to them which prove the connivance between the State-shareholder and the European Union with the aim of OA’s bankruptcy.
b) to proceed to the conduction of scientific surveys concerning who, why and how lead OA to bankruptcy.

Conclusions
1) The attitude of the Greek State as O.A.’s exclusive shareholder in cooperation with O.A.’s B.O.D. since its nationalization in 1975 briefly consists of the following facts:
a) Burdened the O.A.’s operational cost with the cost of the obligatory -free of charge- fulfilment of various Governmental policies. This cost was recorded in O.A.’s books as O.A.’s cost and consequently as its own deficits
b) Tolerated during its fulfillment and approved a posteriori of the destructive results of various mismanagement cases of O.A.’s affairs from the members of the B.O.D. and of the corporate hierarchy
c) Defamed O.A. by high ranking political representatives of the State shareholder based on the results of the aforementioned mismanagement
d) the State’s appeal to E.U. with the false accusation of the unprofitable operation of O.A. and the need for State subsidization
e) conviction of the State by the European Court for illegal State subsidization to OA . These convictions were called upon by the State shareholder either by its absence during the hearings, or by withholding from E.U. and the European Court the huge State debts to OA which had been located by the Greek Justice with three decisions in 2006 after relevant appeals of O.A.’s B.O.D in 2005 and 2006.
2) The aforementioned facts prove that the efforts of the State-shareholder were oriented to create in O.A. artificial crisis
3) From citation of the aforementioned facts concerning the attitude of the Greek State against O.A any well-intentioned person can reach the following conclusion: The State-shareholder of OA had never had as a true aim the reforming and development of OA under a State-ownership regime as provisioned by the relevant legislation passed by the Greek parliament in 1994 and 1998. On the contrary the true but hidden goal(s) of the State-shareholder had been:
a) Ο.Α’s privatization or
b) Ο.Α’s cease of operation or.
c) its dwindling from major to regional Airline
4) What appears to be a failure of achievement of the publicly communicated goal by the State-shareholder for the reformation and development of O.A. under a State ownership regime – as provisioned by the relevant laws passed in 1994 and 1998 – is the result of the effort of the State-shareholder to fulfill its hidden goal which was either O.A.’s privatization or its bankruptcy . The State-shareholder considered that the culmination of the crisis in OA and the supposed failure of its publicly communicated goal for the reformation and development of OA under a State ownership regime would facilitate the fulfillment of its subtle goals.
5) From 1993-1994 until today, EU deliberately and being aware of the huge State debts to OA and consequently of the profitable financial status of OA (Greece 1994, Commissioner Palaccio 2003):
a) accepted in 1994 the untruthful viewpoint of the State-shareholder concerning huge deficits in O.A. and therefore the necessity for OA’s state subsidization.
b) considers the partial repayments of a small proportion of the State debts to OA as illegal State subsidizations.
c) by transgression of the E.U. legislation for State subsidizations, European Commission disputes the legality of the irrevocable decisions of the Greek Courts concerning the huge State debts to OA.
6) Aim of the aforementioned illegal attitude of E.U. towards OA is the fulfillment of the Maastricht policy, concerning the number minimization of scheduled flag carriers of the E.U.’s State members to three maximum five groups. The same policy was followed for the Belgian flag carrier SABENA in 2001.
7) These objectives of the State-shareholder and the E.U. have had the long term tolerance if not consent of O.A.’s unions’ leadership.
8) Aegean Airlines, the domestic competitor of O.A, its European ally Lufthansa and other groups of interests lurking to grab some of the most profitable activities of OA group are benefited from the fulfillment of the State shareholder’s and E.U.’s policy concerning OA.
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