1) Η επίδραση της προσφοράς και της ζήτησης Αεροπορικών υπηρεσιών στην εμφάνιση της τρέχουσας κρίσης στη διεθνή εμπορική αεροπορική βιομηχανία. May 1994. International Conference on the “Modernisation of Railway and Airway transport. The impact of Liberalisation” Democritus University of Thrace. Xanthi.

2) The efficient pricing policy of a port container terminal (P.C.T.): The case study of the port of Piraeus. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MARITIME ECONOMISTS 1996 International Conference Vancouver, B.C., Canada June 26 – 28 1996.

3) The contribution of the Hellenic Air Transport industry to the touristic development of the Hellenic islands. The case study of islands : Chios, Kastelorizo, Rhodes, Skiathos. International Scientific convention : “Tourism at insular areas and special destinations” Aegean University. School of management sciences 1997.

4) Twenty years (1978-1997) of Globalisation-Deregulation-Liberalisation The impact on world commercial air transport industry. Annual Convention of aircraft engineers international (A.E.I.) Athens-Hellas 28-29/9/2001.

5) Particularities of labor productivity in an international scheduled airline. THE CASE STUDY : The comparative change of the average labor’s productivity trend between the ΟLYMPIC AIRWAYS’s S.A. (Greece) and the average Ι.Α.Τ.Α.’s Airline (1975-2000) Air Transport Research Society Istanbul. Turkey 2004. 10) Presuppositions for upgrading of the reliability and the comparability of the accident reports in order to upgrade aviation’s safety level. World Conference on Transport RESEARCH SOCIETY. 4-8/7/04 ISTANBUL. TURKEY.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

International Conference on the “Modernisation of Railway and Airway transport. The impact of Liberalisation”
May 1994 Democritus University of Thrace. Xanthi.

Η επίδραση της προσφοράς και της ζήτησης
Αεροπορικών υπηρεσιών ¬ στην εμφάνιση της τρέχουσας κρίσης στη διεθνή εμπορική αεροπορική βιομηχανία

Ιωάννη Σ. Λαϊνου
[Διδάκτορα Οικονομίας, Διοίκησης Aνθρωπίνου παράγοντα Εναερίων Μεταφορών
Επιστημονικού Συνεργάτη του ΤΕΙ Αθηνών.
Τομέας Ερευνών & Οικονομικών Μελετών Ολυμπιακής Αεροπορίας]

Περιεχόμενα
Περίληψη
Λέξεις κλειδιά
Σκοπός του άρθρου
Συνεισφορά του συγγραφέα
Εισαγωγή
¬Συνοπτική θεωρητική προσέγγιση
A) Ορισμός εννοιών:
1) Οικονομική κρίση.
2) Εμπορική Αεροπορική Βιομηχανία.
3) Αεροπορικό προϊόν.
Β) Φαινόμενα εκδήλωσης της τρέχουσας κρίσης στην Εμπορική Αεροπορική Βιομηχανία :
1) υπερπροσφορά χωρητικότητας,
2) μείωση της ζήτησης,
3) μείωση των κόμιστρων,
4) πτώση των εσόδων, εμφάνιση ζημιών.
5) ανορθολογική διάρθρωση του κόστους,
6) αύξηση του λειτουργικού κόστους,
Γ) Μέτρα που λαμβάνουν οι Αεροπορικές Επιχειρήσεις για την υπέρβαση της κρίσης.
Δ) Συμπεράσματα.
Ε) Προτάσεις.

Περίληψη
Η καπιταλιστική παραγωγική διαδικασία-γενικά-χαρακτηρίζεται από την κυκλικότητά της (ανάκαμψη-ύφεση) η οποία είναι συνέπεια του αυθορμήτου-μη προγραμματισμένου χαρακτήρα της. Η αεροπορική βιομηχανία είναι ιδιαίτερα ευαίσθητη στις φάσεις του οικονομικού κύκλου λόγω της υψηλής-γενικά-ελαστικότητας της ζήτησης που παρουσιάζει τόσο λόγω οικονομικών όσο και ψυχολογικών παραγόντων. Πέραν των επιπτώσεων του οικονομικού κύκλου στην εμφάνιση των υφέσεων σοβαρότατη επίδραση ασκούν και οι πολιτικές αναταράξεις-περιφερειακοί πόλεμοι κ.λπ. Η επιτυχής πρόγνωση της διάρκειας της ύφεσης του οικονομικού κύκλου σε κάθε οικονομικό κλάδο πέραν των άλλων επιστημονικών γνώσεων, απαιτεί και το σωστό προσδιορισμό των αιτίων που την προκάλεσαν έτσι ώστε να καταστεί δυνατός ο επιτυχής προσδιορισμός και η εφαρμογή των μέτρων που απαιτούνται για την υπέρβαση της κρίσης. Τα μελετητικά ινστιτούτα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης ισχυρίζονται ότι η παρούσα κρίση λήγει εντός του τρέχοντος έτους (1994). Βασιζόμενοι στις παραδοχές της οικονομικής επιστήμης και στα επίσημα στοιχεία της Ι.Α.Τ.Α. προχωρήσαμε στην ανάλυση των δεδομένων και των χαρακτηριστικών της τρέχουσας κρίσης της βιομηχανίας εναερίων μεταφορών και καταλήξαμε στο συμπέρασμα η ανάκαμψη θα εμφανισθεί κατά το τέλος του 1996 ή τις αρχές του 1997 και όχι στα τέλος του τρέχοντος έτους (1994) όπως ισχυρίζονται τα μελετητικά κέντρα της Ε.Ε..

Λέξεις κλειδιά
Αεροπορική βιομηχανία, Ανάκαμψη, Ζήτηση, Προσφορά, Ύφεση.

Σκοπός της παρούσης εργασίας είναι:
α) ο προσδιορισμός των φαινομένων εκδήλωσης της κρίσης στη διεθνή βιομηχανία εναερίων μεταφορών, και των αιτιών που τα προκάλεσαν
β) ο προσδιορισμός του χρόνου λήξης της κρίσης και έλευσης της ανάκαμψης.

Συνεισφορά του συγγραφέα
Είναι η μεθοδολογία που εφαρμόζει (ανάλυση-σύνθεση, συγκεκριμένο-αφηρημένο) με βάση τη γνώση των οικονομικών θεωριών και εργαλείων:
α) για τον προσδιορισμό των φαινομένων και των αιτίων εκδήλωσης της κρίσης στη διεθνή αεροπορική βιομηχανία
β) για τον προσδιορισμό του χρόνου λήξης της τρέχουσας κρίσης και έλευσης της ανάκαμψης στη διεθνή βιομηχανία εναερίων μεταφορών

Εισαγωγή
Από το 1991, μια έντονη ύφεση πλήττει την διεθνή βιομηχανία των εναερίων μεταφορών. Αν η κύρια αιτία της κρίσης αυτής ήσαν οι συνέπειες του πολέμου εναντίον του Ιράκ, του οποίου την ιδιαίτερη συμβολή στη ύφεση ουδείς αμφισβητεί, η κρίση αυτή θα είχε ξεπερασθεί προ πολλού. Η διάρκεια, η ένταση και το εύρος της τρέχουσας κρίσης στην διεθνή βιομηχανία των εναερίων μεταφορών, υποχρεώνει τους ερευνητές να σκύψουν με προσοχή τόσο στα φαινόμενα με τα οποία η ύφεση εκδηλώνεται στους διαφόρους αερομεταφορείς όσο και στις γενικότερες αιτίες της. Η αναγκαιότητα διαχωρισμού των φαινομένων εκδήλωσης από τις αιτίες πρόκλησης της τρέχουσας ύφεσης είναι απολύτως αναγκαία. Επιβάλλεται από την αναγκαιότητα επιλογής εκείνων των κατάλληλων μέτρων από το οπλοστάσιο της πολιτικής οικονομίας, τα οποία αντιμετωπίζουν αποτελεσματικά την πηγή του κακού. Εάν από λάθος των ερευνητών σαν πηγή θεωρηθούν τα φαινόμενα και όχι οι αιτίες τότε τα μέτρα που θα επιλεγούν για την αντιμετώπιση των φαινομένων ενδεχομένων βραχυχρόνια να είναι σχετικά αποτελεσματικά. Όμως επειδή τα μέτρα αυτά δεν θα αντιμετωπίζουν τις αιτίες, η ύφεση θα συνεχίζεται και η παρουσία της θα επιμηκύνεται. Πολύ φοβούμεθα ότι έχουν υποπέσει σε σφάλμα τα μελετητικά κέντρα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης που έχουν ήδη ανακοινώσει τη λήξη της ύφεσης τα τέλη του τρέχοντος έτους. Από την άλλη πλευρά τα μέτρα που επιλέγονται για να ληφθούν θα είναι αποτελεσματικά όχι μόνο αν πραγματικά αποτελούν θεραπεία για τις δυσλειτουργίες της οικονομίας που καλούνται να αντιμετωπίσουν, αλλά και αν η θεραπεία αυτή είναι η ενδεικνυόμενη για τη συγκεκριμένη φάση που διέρχεται η ασθένεια της οικονομίας.
Αν από λάθος διάγνωση των οικονομολόγων-ερευνητών,
α) θεωρηθούν τα φαινόμενα εκδήλωσης της κρίσης ως αιτίες ή
β) αν επιλεγούν μέτρα που δεν αντιμετωπίζουν τις δυσλειτουργίες, ή
γ) αν εφαρμοσθούν σε λάθος χρονική περίοδο
καθίσταται προφανές ότι δεν θα επιτύχουν το στόχο της υπέρβασης της κρίσης.
Με βάση:
1) τις αναγκαίες θεωρητικές γνώσεις της πολιτικής οικονομίας και των εργαλείων ανάλυσης που προσφέρει, αναφορικά με τις αιτίες προέλευσης των υφέσεων γενικά, και ιδιαίτερα της τρέχουσας κρίσης στις διεθνείς αερομεταφορές,
2) την μακρόχρονη εμπειρία μας από την εκπόνηση οικονομοτεχνικών μελετών σε θέματα της βιομηχανίας των εναερίων μεταφορών που αποκτήσαμε εργαζόμενοι στον Τομέα Οικονομικών Μελετών και Ερευνών της Ο.Α. προχωρήσαμε στην ανάλυση των επίσημων στοιχείων της Ι.Α.Τ.Α. (ζήτησης, προσφοράς των προϊόντων εναερίων μεταφορών και των οικονομικών αποτελεσμάτων των αερομεταφορέων).
Πριν όμως προχωρήσουμε στην ανάλυση θεωρούμε αναγκαίο τον προσδιορισμό του θεωρητικού πλαισίου επί του οποίου εδράζεται η ανάλυσή μας αυτή.

Συνοπτική θεωρητική προσέγγιση
Ορισμός των εννοιών:
1.1. κυκλική καπιταλιστική οικονομική “κρίση” γενικά (1).
Η έννοια της κυκλικής καπιταλιστικής οικονομικής κρίσης ως ενδογενούς – έμφυτης – αποκαθαρτικής λειτουργίας του κεφαλαιοκρατικού συστήματος, αφορά στην διακοπή της ανάπτυξης, σαν αποτέλεσμα της παραβίασης της – ιδεατής και γι’ αυτό ενυπάρχουσας μέσω της ανυπαρξίας της-τάσης ισορροπίας¬ ανάμεσα στην προσφορά και την ζήτηση, την παραγωγή και την κατανάλωση, τις αποταμιεύσεις και τις επενδύσεις.
1.2. Αιτίες της κυκλικής οικονομικής κρίσης γενικά.
Μέχρι σήμερα στην προσπάθεια ερμηνείας των αιτίων της περιοδικής εμφάνισης του φαινόμενου των κυκλικών καπιταλιστικών κρίσεων έχουν εμφανισθεί περί τις 150 θεωρίες ή παραλλαγές τους.
Οι κυριότερες από τις θεωρίες αυτές είναι:
α) ¬η νομισματική¬ (Hawtrey-Friedman κ.α.) που αποδίδει την επέλευση των κύκλων στην ποσότητα του προσφερόμενου χρήματος – και των πιστώσεων -.
β) η των επαναστατικών τεχνολογικών εφευρέσεων (Shumpeter, Hensen) που αποδίδει την εμφάνιση των κύκλων σε καθοριστικές για την παραγωγική διαδικασία τεχνολογικές καινοτομίες.
γ) η ψυχολογική (Pigou, Bagehot) που αποδίδει τους κύκλους στις προσδοκίες των ατόμων που είναι αποτέλεσμα της ψυχολογικής αισιοδοξίας ή απαισιοδοξίας τους.
δ) η θεωρία της υποκατανάλωσης (Hobson, Louxembourg, Sweezy, Foster, Catchings) που αποδίδει την εμφάνιση των κύκλων στην συγκέντρωση του μεγαλύτερου μέρους του κοινωνικού εισοδήματος σε κοινωνικές τάξεις και στρώματα πλουσίων με αποτέλεσμα να μην καταναλώνεται αλλά να αποταμιεύεται με συνέπεια να μην υπάρχουν διαθέσιμοι πόροι για επένδυση στην οικονομία.
ε) η θεωρία της υπερεπένδυσης (von Mises, Hayek,) που αποδίδει τους κύκλους στις υπερβολικές επενδύσεις.
στ) η θεωρία των ηλιακών κηλίδων (Jevons, H.L. Moore) που συναρτά την εμφάνιση των κύκλων από την εμφάνιση των ηλιακών κηλίδων !!!.
Μοναδική – κατά την άποψή μας – αιτία των καπιταλιστικών κυκλικών κρίσεων είναι η στοιχειακή – απρογραμμάτιστη παραγωγή για μιά άγνωστη αγορά έτσι ώστε να μην είναι γνωστό στον παραγωγό απο πριν το αν σε κάθε στιγμή η παραγωγή των συγκεκριμένων εμπορευμάτων στην συγκεκριμένη ποσότητα και στο συγκεκριμένο κόστος, ανταποκρίνονται στις ανάγκες της αγοράς άρα μπορούν να πουληθούν σε μια τιμή που να καλύπτει το κόστος και να αφήνει το απαιτούμενο από την ανάγκη για επιβίωση και ανάπτυξη κέρδος.
Βέβαια οι επί μέρους κάθε φορά κύριες αφορμές μπορεί να είναι διαφορετικές όπως:
α) η εμφάνιση τεχνολογικών καινοτομιών,
β) οι προβλέψεις των παραγωγών,
γ) πολιτικές κρίσεις κ.λπ.
¬
2. Φαινόμενα εκδήλωσης της σύγχρονης κρίσης στην εμπορική αεροπορική βιομηχανία (1)
¬2.1. “εμπορική αεροπορική βιομηχανία”.
Με τον όρο “Εμπορική Αεροπορική Βιομηχανία” στην την πλατιά του έννοια εννοούμε όλες εκείνες τις επιχειρήσεις που εμπλέκονται στην διαδικασία παραγωγής του αεροπορικού προϊόντος ήτοι:
1) τις επιχειρήσεις κατασκευής πολιτικών αεροσκαφών και τις 80.000 -150.000 περίπου υπεργολαβικές δορυφόρους επιχειρήσεις των κατασκευαστριών επιχειρήσεων,
2) τις εμπορικές αερομεταφορικές επιχειρήσεις επιβατών και φορτίου,
3) τις επιχειρήσεις που ασχολούνται- κατά κύριο λόγο-με την προμήθεια των αναγκαίων υπηρεσιών καθαρισμού, ασφάλειας, επισκευών κ.λπ. ή και προϊόντων στις αεροπορικές επιχειρήσεις είτε αυτά είναι καταναλωτικά όπως π.χ. επιχειρήσεις τροφοδοσίας (catering) είτε είναι διαρκή επενδυτικά όπως ανταλλακτικά α/φ και εργαλεία επισκευής α/φ.
Στην παρούσα προσέγγιση με το όρο αυτό αναφερόμαστε στις επιχειρήσεις προγραμματισμένης μεταφοράς επιβατών και φορτίου.
¬2.2. “αεροπορικό προϊόν”.
Σαν αεροπορικό προϊόν με την στενή έννοια του όρου ορίζεται η αερομεταφορά επιβατών και εμπορευμάτων με προγραμματισμένες (scheduled) ή έκτακτες (charters) πτήσεις.
Με την πλατιά και πιο ολοκληρωμένη έννοια του όρου σαν αεροπορικό προϊόν ορίζεται το σύνολο των επι μέρους υπηρεσιών και παροχών που προσφέρει η αεροπορική επιχείρηση στον επιβάτη και το φορτίο από την διαμόρφωση του προγράμματος πτήσεων και την κοινοποίησή του μέχρι την αποζημίωση του επιβάτη σε περιπτώσεις απωλειών ή ζημιών με ευθύνη της εταιρίας.
2.3. Τα φαινόμενα εκδήλωσης της κρίσης.
Τα φαινόμενα εκδήλωσης της τρέχουσας κυκλικής κρίσης 1989 – 1994 των παγκόσμιων εμπορικών αερομεταφορών σαν ύποτομέα του παγκόσμιου τομέα των μεταφορών, δεν μπορεί να είναι – γενικά – διαφορετικά από τα φαινόμενα εκδήλωσης των γενικών κυκλικών κρίσεων του παγκόσμιου συστήματος της “ελεύθερης” αγοράς. Στην βιομηχανία των προγραμματισμένων πτήσεων εμφανίσθηκε με τα ακόλουθα φαινόμενα:
2.3.1. Υπερπροσφορά χωρητικότητας.
2.3.2. Μείωση του ρυθμού αύξησης μέχρι και απόλυτη μείωση της ζήτησης, λόγω της μείωσης του διαθέσιμου εισοδήματος ενώ σε ορισμένες γραμμές στην μείωση συνέβαλαν και τα TGV.
2.3.3. Πτώση των ναύλων, με ταυτόχρονη πτώση των εσόδων.
2.3.4. Αύξηση του λειτουργικού κόστους σαν αποτέλεσμα της αύξησης των τόκων αλλά και λόγω της συμφόρησης των εναέριων και επίγειων (αεροδρομιακών) slots.
2.3.5. Ζημίες.
Αναλυτικότερα:
¬2.3.1. Η υπερπροσφορά χωρητικότητας.
¬Η φιλελευθεροποίηση- η κατάργηση δηλαδή των υφιστάμενων μέχρι τότε εξωοικονομικών – διοικητικών φραγμών για:
1) είσοδο και αποχώρηση από την αγορά,
2) άσκηση τιμολογιακής πολιτικής κ.λπ.
3) προσφορά χωρητικότητας στην κάθε γραμμή (τύπος α/φ, συχνότητα δρομολογίων) που άρχισε στις Η.Π.Α. με το deregulation act το 1978 και συνεχίζεται στην ΕΟΚ με τη εφαρμογή του τρίτου πακέτου φιλελευθεροποίησης, είχε σαν αποτέλεσμα την ¬όξυνση του ανταγωνισμού¬ ανάμεσα στις αεροπορικές επιχειρήσεις με συνέπεια στην πρώτη χρονική περίοδο της εφαρμογής της-ανάμεσα στα άλλα-και την πτώση των ναύλων.
Αυτή η πτώση των ναύλων είχε σαν αποτέλεσμα την¬ αύξηση της ζήτησης και πιέσεις για μια νέα ισορροπία της με την προσφορά στο νεοδιαμορφωθέν συγκεκριμένο επίπεδο τιμών. Η αύξηση αυτή της ζήτησης δημιούργησε μια ευφορία στους επενδυτές. Για να μην εξωσθούν από την έντονα πια ανταγωνιστική αγορά οι αεροπορικές επιχειρήσεις επεδίωξαν να καλύψουν την αυξημένη-λόγω πτώσης των ναύλων-ζήτηση με αύξηση της προσφερόμενης χωρητικότητας.
3) Οι εξελίξεις αυτές είχαν σαν αποτέλεσμα την δημιουργία στη δεκαετία του 1980 μιάς ψυχολογικής ευφορίας:
α) και στους αναλυτές που μετά από έρευνα όλων των προσδιοριστικών παραγόντων της ζήτησης αερομεταφορικών υπηρεσιών εκτίμησαν -στηριζόμενοι στο πλέον αισιόδοξο σενάριο – ότι η ζήτηση αυτή θα συνεχίσει να αυξάνεται και στη δεκαετία του 1990 με ετήσιους ρυθμούς 6 – 7 % έτσι που στο 2.000 να έχει διπλασιασθεί.
β) και στους επενδυτές που στηριζόμενοι στα κέρδη και στις προβλέψεις προέβησαν για την παραγωγικότερη και αποδοτικότερη- για την κάθε επί μέρους αεροπορική επιχείρηση – κάλυψή της ζήτησης σε μαζικές παραγγελίες α/φ στις κατασκευάστριες επιχειρήσεις α/φ BOEING, McDONNELL DOUGLAS (ΗΠΑ), και AEROSPACIALE (AIR BUS – Ε.Ε.) ενός υπερβολικού αριθμού παραγγελιών για α/φη διαφόρων τύπων
Επειδή όμως δεν υπήρχαν ετοιμοπαράδοτα α/φ που να καλύψουν την τρέχουσα αυξημένη ζήτηση γι’ αυτό σε πρώτη φάση οι επενδυτές πραγματοποίησαν την άμεση αύξηση αυτή της προσφοράς χωρητικότητας:
1) ¬με την μετατροπή των υφιστάμενων εταιριών έκτακτων πτήσεων – charter flights – σε εταιρίες προγραμματισμένων πτήσεων – scheduled flights σαν συνέπεια της δυνατότητας που έδινε η φιλελευθεροποίηση, για ελευθερία πρόσβασης στην αγορά.
2) ¬με την ένταση της χρησιμοποίησης των υφιστάμενων α/φ ήτοι με αύξηση των συχνοτήτων και με ανασχεδιασμό τόσο των ωρών των δρομολογίων όσο και της σύνθεσής και της δομής τους.
3) με την επαναφορά στην ενεργό δραστηριότητα παροπλισμένων α/φ από τα λεγόμενα “νεκροταφεία” α/φ.¬
Σημειώνουμε ότι εμφανίσθηκαν τοπικού χαρακτήρα αεροπορικές επιχειρήσεις με στόλο εξ’ ολοκλήρου από α/φ αυτής της κατηγορίας.(αφορά κυρίως στις Η.Π.Α.)
Όταν επί πλέον άρχισε να ολοκληρώνεται η παράδοση των νέο-παραγγελθέντων α/φ και δεν επαληθεύτηκε η πρόβλεψη της εξέλιξης της ζήτησης η αυξημένη σε σχέση με το παρελθόν προσφορά υπερκάλυπτε τις ανάγκες της ζήτησης επήλθε δηλαδή μια υπερπροσφορά μία ανισορροπία ανάμεσα στην προσφορά και την ζήτηση.
Aυτή η υπερπροσφορά είχε σαν αποτέλεσμα την πτώση της τιμής των κομίστρων άρα πτώση των εσόδων και εμφάνιση ζημιών. Οι αρνητικές οικονομικές συνέπειες είχαν σαν αποτέλεσμα την ακύρωση το 160 βεβαιωμένων παραγγελιών α/φ το 1992 ενώ μέχρι το 2.000 οι ακυρώσεις βεβαιωμένων παραγγελιών υπολογίζεται ότι θα ανέλθουν στα 1.000 α/φ. – παραδόσεις α/φ – βεβαιωμένες παραγγελίες α/φ – οψιόν παραγγελίες α/φ

IΣΤΟΓΡΑΜΜΑ 1

2.3.2. Η μείωση της ζήτησης.
Προσδιοριστικοί παράγοντες της ζήτησης είναι:
1) Η τιμή.
2) Η εξέλιξη του Α.Ε.Π.
3) Η εξέλιξη του πληθωρισμού.
4) Η εξέλιξη του διαθέσιμου εισοδήματος.
Σε αντίθεση με τις πλέον αισιόδοξες προβλέψεις των αναλυτών παρατηρήθηκε από το 1989 μια υστέρηση – συγκριτικά με τις προβλέψεις -των ρυθμών αύξησης της επιβατικής κίνησης αλλά και των εσόδων που είχε σαν συνέπεια την εμφάνιση ζημιών στην παγκόσμια εμπορική αεροπορική βιομηχανία .
Το φαινόμενο συνεχίσθηκε και το 1990 χωρίς να παρθούν ριζικά μέτρα – λόγω της δύναμης της αδράνειας (έλλειψης επαγρύπνησης) αλλά και λόγω αντικειμενικών αδυναμιών (ο απαιτούμενος χρόνος για μελέτες – επιλογή και υλοποίηση των μέτρων).
Μια από τις επιπτώσεις της παγκόσμιας γενικής κυκλικής ύφεσης που προηγήθηκε χρονικά της κρίσης στις αερομεταφορές, ήταν και η μείωση όχι μόνο του συντελεστή επιβατικής πληρότητας (PL/F) της οικονομικής θέσης λόγω μείωσης του διαθέσιμου εισοδήματος αλλά και λόγω της
μείωσης των ταξιδιών των επιχειρηματιών και
των στελεχών αλλά παρατηρήθηκε μείωση του L/F και του Μέσου Εσόδου ανά χιλιομετρικό Επιβάτη (yield) της μόνιμα μέχρι τότε κερδοφόρας bussines class αφού για να διατηρήσουν οι αεροπορικές επιχειρήσεις της πελατεία τους προώθησαν διάφορες προσφορές μείωσης των ναύλων. Ενδεικτικά για την εξέλιξη του εισοδήματος των καταναλωτών – βασικού προσδιοριστικού παράγοντα της ζήτησης – είναι τα στοιχεία που προκύπτουν από τη συγκριτική εξέλιξη των δεικτών μέσου Α.Ε.Π. και του πληθωρισμού των χωρών μελών της Ε.Ο.Κ. την τελευταία πενταετία φαίνεται στον ακόλουθο πίνακα:
¬
ΠΙΝΑΚΑΣ 1
ΣΥΓΚΡΙΤΙΚΗ ΔΙΑΧΡΟΝΙΚΗ ΕΞΕΛΙΞΗ Α.Ε.Π.- ΠΛΗΘΩΡΙΣΜΟΥ ΤΗΣ Ε.Ε. (4)
% Ε ξ έ λ ι ξ η
Α.Ε.Π. Πληθωρισμού Διαφορά
1989 3,4 4,4 + 1,0
1990 2,4 4,4 + 2,0
1991 0,8 4,3 + 3,5
1992 1,5 3,5 + 2,0
1993 1,9 3,2 + 1,4
1994 2,9 2,8 – 0,1

Ήδη όμως από το 1990 έχει αρχίσει η ένταση του ανταγωνισμού των Ευρωπαϊκών από τις αεροπορικές επιχειρήσεις των Η.Π.Α. ενώ φιλελευθεροποιείται σταδιακά και το Ευρωπαϊκό αεροπολιτικό περιβάλλον.
Ο πόλεμος του κόλπου, ένα εξωοικονομικό – για τις αερομεταφορές – πολιτικό γεγονός το 1991, δεν δημιούργησε μεν, ανέδειξε όμως την υποβόσκουσα κρίση στις παγκόσμιες εμπορικές αερομεταφορές σε όλη της την οξύτητα.
Η συνολική κίνηση στις επιχειρήσεις της Α.Ε.Α. μειώθηκε σε ποσοστό 5% περίπου. Η κατά 10 % περίπου αύξησή της το 1992 το μόνο που πέτυχε ήταν να επαναφέρει την ζήτηση στα επίπεδα του 1990 δημιουργώντας μια διετή υστέρηση της αύξησης της ζήτησης.
Παρόλο που το 1992 εμφανίσθηκε μια κατά 10% σε σχέση με το 1991 αύξηση της ζήτησης και πάλι έκλεισε με ζημιές για την παγκόσμια εμπορική αεροπορική βιομηχανία σε τέτοιο επίπεδο που¬ οι συνολικές ζημιές 10 δισ. US$ περίπου την τριετία 1989-1992 να έχουν σαν αποτέλεσμα να απωλεσθούν τα κέρδη που είχε πετύχει ο κλάδος κατά την δεκαετία 1980 – 1989.
H πτώση του εισοδήματος των καταναλωτών -παρά την μείωση των ναύλων -είχε σαν αποτέλεσμα την μείωση της ζήτησης σε σχέση με την προσφορά για υπηρεσίες αερομεταφορών προϊόντος με υψηλή
ελαστικότητας ζήτησης.

 

ΙΣΤΟΓΡΑΜΜΑ 2

 

Η ποσοστιαία υπέρβαση της ζήτησης από την προσφορά είχε σαν αποτέλεσμα την πτώση του επίπεδου του συντελεστή πληρότητας (ως προς το βάρος) των α/φ της μέσης αεροπορικής επιχείρησης της Ι.Α.Τ.Α.
Η πτώση του επίπεδου πληρότητας στα πλαίσια της Α.Ε.Α. έφθασε σε τέτοια επίπεδα που το επιτυγχανόμενο επίπεδο πληρότητας να ισοσκελίζεται για το 1989 με το νεκρό σημείο ενώ από το 1990 μέχρι και σήμερα (1994) να είναι κάτω ακόμα και του νεκρού σημείου πληρότητας με αποτέλεσμα την εμφάνιση ζημιών.
¬2.3.3. Απόλυτη ή σχετική πτώση της τιμής των κομίστρων
Ένα από τα φαινόμενα της κρίσης είναι και η εμφανισθείσα μείωση του μέσου εσόδου ανά χιλιομετρικό επιβάτη (yield).
H πτωτική τάση του yield από το 1960 είναι ένα γεγονός αναμφισβήτητο. Όμως παρά την τάση αυτή οι αεροπορικές επιχειρήσεις παρουσίαζαν κέρδη αντισταθμίζοντάς την με συνεχή μείωση του κόστους τους.
Ο ανταγωνισμός όμως επέφερε μια δραματική μείωση των ναύλων που με δεδομένες τις συνθήκες στα πλαίσια των οποίων πραγματοποιήθηκε δεν κατέστη δυνατή η αναπλήρωσή της από αντίστοιχη μείωση του κόστους.
2.3.4. Η αύξηση του λειτουργικού κόστους.
H φιλελευθεροποίηση του θεσμικού πλαισίου των εμπορικών αερομεταφορών είχε σοβαρή επίδραση στην διάρθρωση του κόστους με κύριο στοιχείο την αύξηση της παραγωγικότητας της εργασίας που ένα μέρος της οφείλεται στην εξάπλωση της μηχανοργάνωσης και στον τεχνολογικό εκσυγχρονισμό των
επενδύσεων αλλά ένα σοβαρό μέρος της οφείλεται στην εντατικοποίηση της εργασίας στην τροποποίηση σε βάρος των εργαζόμενων των υφιστάμενων εργασιακών σχέσεων με σχετική μέχρι και απόλυτη μείωση της αγοραστικής δύναμης και κατάργηση άλλων θεσμικών κατακτήσεων. Χαρακτηριστικό παράδειγμα αποτελεί η εξέλιξη στον τομέα αυτό το 1992. ¬ Έτσι η μέση “παραγωγικότητα” αυξήθηκε κατά 9 % ο αριθμός των εργαζόμενων αυξήθηκε κατά 1,1 % ενώ οι δαπάνες για μισθούς ανά εργαζόμενο αυξήθηκαν σε τοπικό νόμισμα μόλις κατά 1,1 % και με μέσο πληθωρισμό 3,3 %. Αποτέλεσμα αυτών των εξελίξεων ήταν να μειωθεί η ποσοστιαία συμμετοχή του κόστους εργασίας στο συνολικό κόστος κατά 10 % κυμαινόμενη στο 33,7 % περίπου των συνολικών ετήσιων λειτουργικών δαπανών.

 

ΣΥΓΚΡΙΤΙΚΗ ΠΟΣΟΣΤΙΑΙΑ % ΕΞΕΛΙΞΗ 1984 – 1993
ΤΗΣ ZHTHΘΕΙΣΑΣ (ΠΩΛΗΘΕΙΣΑΣ)
KAI TΗΣ ΠΡΟΣΦΕΡΘΕΙΣΑΣ ΧΩΡΗΤΙΚΟΤΗΤΑΣ (3)
ΠΙΝΑΚΑΣ 2
ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ %
ΕΞΕΛΙΞΗ. ΕΞΕΛΙΞΗΣ WEIGHT PASSENGER
RTK ATK ΑΤΚ L/F L/F
1983 59,5
1984 10,5 6,3 – 4,2 61,8
1985 4,6 7,7 + 3,1 60,3
1986 3,4 4,5 + 1,1 59,5
1987 13,0 7,2 – 5,8 62,8
1988 9,6 8,8 – 0,8 63,9
1989 6,7 7,1 + 0,4 64,2
1990 6,5 9,2 + 2,7 62,0 68,6
1991 -3,0 0,0 + 3,0 60,8 65,9
1992 * 10,8 13,4 + 2,6 59,2 66,0
1993 ** 8,9 6,7 – 3,2

 

ΙΣΤΟΓΡΑΜΜΑ 3 ΙΣΤΟΓΡΑΜΜΑ 4

 

2.3.4.1. ΔΙΑΡΘΡΩΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΚΟΣΤΟΥΣ.
H ευφορία αυτή όμως των επιχειρηματιών και των ανώτατων διοικητικών στελεχών την δεκαετία του 1980 πέρα και από την δημιουργία υπερ-επενδύσεων είχε αρνητικές επιπτώσεις και στην μέριμνα τους για ορθολογικοποίηση της διαχείρισης με αποτέλεσμα την υστέρηση στην εισαγωγή πλήρους μηχανοργάνωσης των εργασιών με σύγχρονη τεχνολογία, την υστέρηση στην εισαγωγή σύγχρονων οργανωτικών δομών και διοικητικών συστημάτων κ.λπ. με συνέπεια την υστέρηση στην αύξηση της παραγωγικότητας της εργασίας, την εμφάνιση υπεράριθμου προσωπικού.
Σαν αποτέλεσμα αυτών των επιλογών εμφανίσθηκε μια αδικαιολόγητη αύξηση του λειτουργικού κόστους.
H διάρθρωση του κόστους των αεροπορικών επιχειρήσεων που απέστειλαν στοιχεία στην I.A.T.A. Cost Ccommittee το 1992 ήταν η ακόλουθη : (ΠΙΝΑΚΑΣ 3)

ΚΟΣΤΟΛΟΓΙΚΗ ΔΙΑΡΘΡΩΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΜΕΣΟΥ ΑΕΡΟΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΕΑ ΤΗΣ Ι.Α.Τ.Α.
ΠΙΝΑΚΑΣ 3
1) ΕΙΣΙΤΗΡΙΑ ΠΩΛΗΣΕΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΟΩΘΗΣΗ ΠΩΛΗΣΕΩΝ …….9,2 %
2) ΣΤΑΘΜΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΔΑΦΟΥΣ……………………………………12,1 %
3) ΚΑΥΣΙΜΑ ΚΑΙ ΛΙΠΑΝΤΙΚΑ …………..……………………….11,9 %
4) ΣΥΝΤΗΡΗΣΗ…………………………………………………….9,9 %
5) ΠΛΗΡΩΜΑ ΠΙΛΟΤΗΡΙΟΥ ……………………………………..7,6 %
6) ΠΛΗΡΩΜΑ ΚΑΜΠΙΝΑΣ…………………………………………7,3 %
7) ΑΠΟΣΒΕΣΕΙΣ ……………………………………………………7,2 %
8) ΓΕΝΙΚΕΣ ΔΑΠΑΝΕΣ ΔΙΟΙΚΗΣΗΣ……..………………………6,4 %
9) ΕΞΥΠΗΡΕΤΗΣΗ ΕΠΙΒΑΤΩΝ………..…………………………6,3 %
10) ΠΡΟΣΓΕΙΩΣΕΙΣ……………………..………………………….4,8 %
11) ΕΝΟΙΚΙΑ …………………………..…………………………….3,8 %
12) ΤΕΛΗ ΥΠΕΡΠΤΗΣΕΩΝ………..………………………………3,4 %
13) AΣΦΑΛΙΣΤΡΑ ………………..…………………………………0,2 %
Το μέσο κόστος ανά προσφερόμενο χιλιομετρικό τόνο ανήλθε σε 49,8 USC.
¬ Πέρα από την δραστική μείωση του κόστους εργασίας μια δομική αλλαγή στην σύνθεση του κόστους της εμπορικής αεροπορικής βιομηχανίας υπήρξε η δραστική αύξηση της συμμετοχής των τόκων στις συνολικές δαπάνες. ¬ Αυτή η αύξηση οφείλεται στο ότι για την χρηματοδότηση των τεράστιων αυτών επενδύσεων οι αεροπορικές επιχειρήσεις προέβησαν σε δυσβάστακτους δανεισμούς και σε σοβαρή επιβάρυνση του κόστους κεφαλαίου που από μέσο όρο 2,5% έφθασε στο 7% των συνολικών ετήσιων δαπανών παρουσιάζοντας αύξηση της τάξης του 280% Αυτή η εξέλιξη είχε σαν αποτέλεσμα την χειροτέρευση της σχέσης των ιδίων με τα ξένα κεφάλαια.
To ήδη αυξημένο κόστος θα συνεχίσει να επιβαρύνεται με τα μέτρα προστασίας του περιβάλλοντος που προτίθεται να πάρει η Ε.Ο.Κ. για την βιομηχανία αερομεταφορών όπως :
α) η αντικατάσταση των παλαιάς τεχνολογίας κινητήρων που κάνουν υπερβολικές εκπομπές θορύβου και καυσαερίων με άλλους σύγχρονης τεχνολογίας, έχει σαν αποτέλεσμα την βελτίωση βέβαια της ποιότητας ζωής με ταυτόχρονη αύξηση του
επίπεδου ασφάλειας των πτήσεων αλλά παράλληλα επιβαρύνει το κόστος απόσβεσης.
β) ο περιορισμός μέχρι απαγόρευση των πτήσεων μετά τις 11 μ.μ. σε αεροδρόμια που είναι κοντά σε κατοικημένες περιοχές κ.λπ. έχει σαν συνέπεια:
1) την μείωση του ημερήσιου χρόνου χρησιμοποίησης των α/φ την μείωση των εσόδων και την αύξηση του κόστους από αποσβέσεις .
2) την αύξηση του κόστους των ιπτάμενων πληρωμάτων τόσο από την αναγκαιότητα για αύξηση του αριθμού τους όσο και από την αύξηση του κόστους παραμονής τους εκτός έδρας (ξενοδοχεία μετακινήσεις έκτακτες αμοιβές κ.λπ.) στις περιπτώσεις που λόγω των περιορισμών δεν είναι δυνατόν να επιστρέψουν στη βάση τους. Οι κοστολογικές αυτές επιβαρύνσεις στο βαθμό που δεν αντισταθμίζονται από άλλες βελτιώσεις μειώνουν βαθμιαία το επίπεδο της ανταγωνιστικότητας των Ευρωπαϊκών αερομεταφορέων σε σχέση με τις αντίστοιχες κύρια των Η.Π.Α. και της Ασίας που δεν υπόκεινται σε τέτοιους περιορισμούς.

 

ΙΣΤΟΓΡΑΜΜΑ 5

 

2.3.5. Ζημίες. Η όξυνση του ανταγωνισμού, οδήγησε στην πτώση των ναύλων και σε απώλειες εσόδων, χωρίς όμως οι απώλειες αυτές να αναπληρωθούν από αντίστοιχη τουλάχιστον μείωση του κόστους λόγω της αδράνειας των διοικούντων. Αυτό είχε σαν συνέπεια την εμφάνιση ζημιών. (ΠΙΝΑΚΑΣ 4)

ΣΥΝΟΛΙΚΑ ΕΤΗΣΙΑ OIKONOMIKA AΠOTEΛEΣMATA TΩN ETAIΡIΩN MEΛΩN THΣ ΙΑΤΑ 1986-1993 (δισ. US$) (5 & 11)

ΠΙΝΑΚΑΣ 4
ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΜΑΤΑ
Λειτουργικά Τελικά

1986 1,2 – 0,3
1987 2,5 0,9
1988 3,4 1,6
1989 2,6 0,3
1990 0,5 -2,7
1991 -0,6 -4,0
1992 -1,1 -4,8
1993 ** -3,9
1994 ** -2,8
** πρόβλεψη, το απαισιόδοξο σενάριο.

OIKONOMIKA AΠOTEΛEΣMATA ΤΩΝ
ΕΤΑΙΡΙΩΝ ΜΕΛΩΝ ΤΗΣ Ι.Α.Τ.Α. 1987-1992 (ΣΕ ΔΙΣ.US$ ) (5 & 11)
ΠΙΝΑΚΑΣ 5
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
1) ΛΕΙΤΟΥΡΓΙΚΑ ΕΣΟΔΑ 53,6 60,9 70,7 91,0 91,7 103,5
2) ΛΕΙΤΟΥΡΓΙΚΕΣ ΔΑΠΑΝΕΣ 51,2 57,5 68,1 90,5 92,3 104,5
3) ΛΕΙΤΟΥΡΓΙΚΑ
ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΜΑΤΑ 2,4 3,4 2,6 0,5 (0,6) (1,0)
4) ΤΟΚΟΙ 1,6 1,8 2,3 3,2 3,4 3,8
5) ΚΕΡΔΗ – ΖΗΜΙΕΣ 0,8 1,6 0,3 (2,7) (4,0) (4,8)

ΔΕΙΚΤΕΣ
ΛΕΙΤΟΥΡΓΙΚΑ ΕΣΟΔΑ ΠΡΟΣ
ΛΕΙΤΟΥΡΓΙΚΕΣ ΔΑΠΑΝΕΣ 104,7 105,9 103,8 100,6 99,3 99,0
ΤΟΚΟΙ ΠΡΟΣ
ΛΕΙΤΟΥΡΓΙΚΕΣ ΔΑΠΑΝΕΣ 3,1 3,1 3,4 3,5 3,7 3,6
ΚΕΡΔΗ – ΖΗΜΙΕΣ ΠΡΟΣ
ΛΕΙΤΟΥΡΓΙΚΑ ΕΣΟΔΑ 1,5 2,6 0,4 (3,0) (4,4) (4,6)

 

ΙΣΤΟΓΡΑΜΜΑ 6

 

 

ΣΧΕΣΗ ΞΕΝΩΝ-ΙΔΙΩΝ ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΑΕΡΟΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΕΩΝ ΜΕΛΩΝ ΤΗΣ Ι.Α.Τ.Α.1988 – 1992
ΠΙΝΑΚΑΣ 6

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΑ
ΞΕΝΑ% ΙΔΙΑ%
1988 63 37
1989 59 41
1990 64 36
1991 66 34
1992 72 28

 

 

ΙΣΤΟΓΡΑΜΜΑ 7

¬3 Μέτρα που έλαβαν οι επενδυτές και μέσα που χρησιμοποίησαν για την υπέρβαση της κρίσης στην πολιτική αεροπορική βιομηχανία. (6,7,12,13).
Με δεδομένα:
α) τις αιτίες πρόκλησής της κυκλικής οικονομικής κρίσης,
β) ότι σε περίοδο κρίσης και στα πλαίσια της όξυνσης του ανταγωνισμού, δεν μπορεί κανείς να επιδιώκει αύξηση εσόδων μέσα απο την αύξηση των τιμών, η πολιτική οικονομία έχει θέσει σήμερα στην διάθεση των ενδιαφερόμενων για την αντιμετώπιση της κρίσης στις επιχειρήσεις εμπορικών αερομεταφορών – με επί μέρους ή συνδυασμένη εφαρμογή τους το ακόλουθο οπλοστάσιο:
Α) Μείωση του κόστους με:
1) Τεχνολογική αναβάθμιση του παραγωγικού δυναμικού και της υποδομής.
2) εκμηχάνιση των χειρωνακτικών εργασιών.
3) τεχνολογικός εκσυγχρονισμός a/φων και αυτοματοποίηση των συστημάτων κρατήσεων θέσεων – Computer Reservations Systems.
4) εμπορικές συμφωνίες, (εμπορική τεχνικά και λοιπή εξυπηρέτηση, code sharing κ.λπ).
5) συμμαχίες, συγχωνεύσεις. (17)
6) Απαλλαγή από ζημιογόνες μη αεροπορικές δραστηριότητες.

ΣΥΓΚΡΙΤΙΚΗ ΠΟΣΟΣΤΙΑΙΑ ΔΙΑΧΡΟΝΙΚΗ ΕΞΕΛΙΞΗ (1984 – 1992)
TOY ΜΕΣΟΥ ΕΣΟΔΟΥ ΑΝΑ ΜΕΤΑΦΕΡΘΕΝΤΑ ΧΙΛΙΟΜΕΤΡΙΚΟ ΕΠΙΒΑΤΗ
ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΜΕΣΟΥ ΚΟΣΤΟΥΣ ΑΝΑ ΠΡΟΣΦΕΡΘΕΙΣΑ ΧΙΛΙΟΜΕΤΡΙΚΗ ΘΕΣΗ, ΤΟΥ ΜΕΣΟΥ ΑΕΡΟΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΕΑ ΤΗΣ ΙΑΤΑ (5)

ΠΙΝΑΚΑΣ 7
ΜΕΣΟ ΕΣΟΔΟ ΜΕΣΟ ΚΟΣΤΟΣ
1984 – 5,9 – 4,7
1985 – 2,0 – 3,0
1986 6,8 6,9
1987 5,0 8,8
1988 3,0 3,0
1989 1,0 4,9
1990 6,3 7,7
1991 3,9 1,8
1992 0,7 -1,2

7) συμμετοχή σε επιχειρήσεις ιδιοκτησίας ή διαχείρισης κορεσμένων αεροδρομίων για βέβαιη εξασφάλιση φτηνών slots σ’ αυτά.(18)
8) αναδιοργάνωση.
9) Εκσυγχρονισμός των συστημάτων διοίκησης.(15)
10) Εκσυγχρονισμός των συστημάτων και ένταση της έρευνας για διεύρυνση του μεριδίου σε υφιστάμενες και διείσδυσης σε νέες αγορές.
11) Μείωση προσφερόμενης χωρητικότητας με απόσυρση των παλαιών και αποσβεσμένων α/φών (16).
12) Μείωση συχνοτήτων γενικά μέχρι και κατάργηση δρομολογίων ιδιαίτερα κοντινών αποστάσεων λόγω του επιτυγχανόμενου εκεί χαμηλότερου ποσοστού κέρδους.
13) Βελτίωση της ποιότητας του παρεχόμενου προϊόντος.
14) μείωση των μισθών.
15) αλλαγή των εργασιακών σχέσεων με κατάργηση κεκτημένων.
α) κατάργηση ή συγχώνευση των ειδικοτήτων.
β) εντατικοποίηση της εργασίας.
γ) κατάργηση της μονιμότητας και μαζική εισαγωγή του
θεσμού των εποχιακών και ωρομίσθιων.
δ) σύνδεση της αμοιβής με την παραγωγικότητα.
ε) μειώσεις θέσεων εργασίας (απολύσεις – πρόωρες συνταξιοδοτήσεις).
Εκτιμούμε ότι έχει ενδιαφέρον να γνωρίσουμε τα μέτρα στα οποία προχώρησαν την τελευταία δεκαετία,- στα πλαίσια της επιδίωξής τους για εξυγίανση και εκσυγχρονισμό τους – ορισμένες αεροπορικές επιχειρήσεις καθώς και τα αποτελέσματα που πέτυχαν με τα μέτρα αυτά.
1) απολύσεις όπως :
α) η Βritish Αirways απέλυσε με την ιδιωτικοποίηση της απο το 1979 μέχρι το 1984 τις 27.000 ή το 52% των εργαζομένων.
β) η PAN AM απέλυσε το 10%
γ) η BRANIFF τo 10% (πριν την πτώχευση)
δ) η ΡΙΑ τo 13%
ε) η EL AL το 13%
στ) η Loufthansa 7.000 ή το 15%.
ζ) η KLM και η SAS.
2) μείωση (άμεση ή έμμεση) των αποδοχών.
α) η ΡΑΝ ΑΜ μείωση των αμοιβών κατά 10% και πάγωμά τους για δυο χρόνια
β) η BRANIFF μείωση αμοιβών κατά 10%
γ) η ΡΙΑ μείωση υπερωριών
δ) η EL AL μείωση αποδοχών κατά 15%
ε) η Loufthansa κατά 8%.
στ) η ΚLM κατά 10%.
ζ) η SAS κατά 10 %.
3) χειροτέρευση των όρων εργασίας (κατάργηση της μονιμότητας, του πενθημέρου, των κοινωνικών κατακτήσεων, εφαρμογή του ωρομισθίου, της μερικής και εποχιακής απασχόλησης, των συμβάσεων ορισμένου χρόνου κ.λ.π.)
4) χειροτέρευση των συνθηκων εργασίας (εντατικοποίηση, αυταρχισμός, κατάργηση του θεσμού της ειδικότητας κ.λ.π.).
Αφού πήραν τα μέτρα αυτά η Braniff και η PAN AM και η EASTERN πτώχευσαν, η TWA βρίσκεται υπό αναγκαστική διαχείριση (άρθρο 11), η ΕL AL έκλεισε και επαναλειτούργησε οι άλλες αεροπορικές επιχειρήσεις εξακολουθούν να έχουν ζημίες εκτός της Β.Α..
¬
Συμπεράσματα
1) Αιτία της οικονομικής κυκλικής κρίσης είναι γενικά:
α) ο αυθόρμητος χαρακτήρας της κεφαλαιοκρατικής παραγωγής που παράγει εμπορεύματα για άγνωστη αγορά χωρίς να γνωρίζει άν το συγκεκριμένης ποιότητας και ποσότητας προϊόν καλύπτει κοινωνικές ανάγκες άρα θα καταναλωθεί στην δοσμένη τιμή που εκτιμά ο παραγωγός σαν κερδοφόρα. Η συγκεκριμένη διαπίστωση πραγματοποιείται μόνο με την απόρριψη (μη απορρόφηση) του προϊόντος από την αγορά – αφού όμως έχει παραχθεί – οπότε και η κρίση – η απόρριψη από την κοινωνία της συγκεκριμένης παραγωγής -εμφανίζεται με το φαινόμενο της απούλητης παραγωγής άρα της υπερπαραγωγής.
β) οι τεχνολογικές, τεχνικές, οργανωτικές, και διοικητικές καινοτομίες που έχουν σαν αποτέλεσμα την αύξηση της παραγωγής, την μείωση του κόστους αλλά και την μείωση των θέσεων εργασίας με συνέπεια την μείωση της διαθέσιμης αγοραστικής δύναμης με αποτέλεσμα την μείωση της ενεργού ζήτησης.
γ) η ανορθολογική κατανομή του παραγόμενου προϊόντος στους συντελεστές της παραγωγής με αποτέλεσμα την συγκέντρωση υπερκερδών από τους ιδιοκτήτες των συντελεστών κεφάλαιο, επιχείρηση και γη σε βάρος του συντελεστή εργασία. Αυτή η ανορθολογική κατανομή έχει σαν αποτέλεσμα την μείωση της ενεργού ζήτησης που σαν αποτέλεσμα έχει την αδυναμία των συγκεκριμένων καταναλωτών να απορροφήσουν την παραγωγή οπότε και πάλι η κρίση εμφανίζεται με υπερπαραγωγή λόγω μείωσης των ρυθμών ανάπτυξης ή ακόμα και απόλυτης πτώσης της ενεργού ζήτησης.
2) Το περιεχόμενο της λειτουργίας του μηχανισμού της οικονομικής κυκλικής κρίσης είναι ο εκσυγχρονισμός του παραγωγικού δυναμικού της κοινωνίας με την βίαιη απομάκρυνση απο την παραγωγική διαδικασία (αγορά) των λιγότερο παραγωγικών επιχειρήσεων.
3) Οι αερομεταφορές είναι ένας πολύ ευαίσθητος δείκτης της γενικότερης οικονομικής ύφεσης.
4) Μετά το δεύτερο πόλεμο επικράτησε η Κεϋνσιανή αντίληψη περί διαρκούς παρέμβασης του κράτους με την αντι-κυκλική πολιτική του στην διαμόρφωση τόσο των μικρο-οικονομικών όσο και των μακρο-οικονομικών μεγεθών, όχι βέβαια για την κατάργηση της κρίσης αλλά για μείωση της οξύτητας των κρισιακών φαινόμενων και κραδασμών που προκαλεί.
5) Διαπιστώνουμε ότι τις πολιτικές αερομεταφορές η κρίση εμφανίσθηκε-για προφανείς λόγους – με μια υστέρηση από τους άλλους τομείς της οικονομίας – και- όπως και στους άλλους τομείς της οικονομίας – και σε διαφορετικές χρονικές περιόδους στις διαφορετικές περιοχές της γης και με διαφορετική ένταση στην κάθε περιοχή (νόμος της ανισόμετρης ανάπτυξης).
6) Ο τρέχων κύκλος στις εμπορικές αερομεταφορές ακολουθεί την κυκλικότητα της γενικότερης οικονομικής κρίσης με διάρκεια των τεσσάρων φάσεων της άνθησης, ύφεσης, κρίσης και ανάκαμψης επτά έως οκτώ χρόνια (1989 – 1996 ή 1997). Σήμερα οι αερομεταφορές βρίσκονται στην έναρξη του σταδίου της ανάκαμψης. Ανάκαμψη δεν αναμένεται πριν το 1997.
7) Τα κρισιακά φαινόμενα εμφανίζονται με χρονική διαφορετικότητα στις αεροπορικές επιχειρήσεις διαφορετικών κρατών σαν αποτέλεσμα της γενικότερης οικονομικής ιδιομορφίας των οικονομιών αυτών. Η διαφορετικότητα αυτή όμως δεν επηρεάζει την γενική εικόνα.
8) Tα αποτελέσματα των λαμβανόμενων αντι-κρισιακών μέτρων από την κάθε επιχείρηση, ακόμα και αν τα μέτρα αυτά είναι συναφή, δεν έχουν τα ίδια αποτελέσματα για όλες τις επιχειρήσεις που τα παίρνουν. Άλλες ανακάμπτουν αργότερα ή γρηγορότερα, ενώ άλλες αναγκάζονται να εγκαταλείψουν την αγορά.
¬ Προτάσεις
Δεν πιστεύουμε ότι μπορεί να υπάρξει ακόμα και για τις επιχειρήσεις του
ίδιου κλάδου ακόμα και ίδιου μεγέθους – μια ενιαία συνταγή αντιμετώπισης
της κρίσης.
Η άποψή μας αυτή στηρίζεται στο ότι πέρα από τις γενικές αιτίες εμφάνισης της κρίσης, που είναι ίδιες για όλες τις επιχειρήσεις, οι ιδιομορφίες που εμφανίζονται στην κάθε επιχείρηση είναι τέτοιες που να την καθιστούν μοναδική. Η μοναδικότητα αυτή είναι αντίστοιχη με εκείνη των δακτυλικών αποτυπωμάτων του ανθρώπου.
Σ’ αυτή την μοναδικότητα στηρίζεται η άποψή μας για ανάγκη λεπτομερούς και συγκεκριμένης μελέτης της κάθε επιχείρησης ξεχωριστά πριν την απόφαση για λήψη αναπτυξιακών μέτρων.
Σαν παράγοντες που πρέπει να μελετηθούν θεωρούμε – ενδεικτικά και όχι περιοριστικά – τους ακόλουθους:
1) το θεσμικό πλαίσιο λειτουργίας της επιχείρησης.
2) ο ρόλος που επιδιώκει να διαδραματίσει η συγκεκριμένη αεροπορική επιχείρηση.
3) οι στόχοι και η η αξιοπιστία του αναπτυξιακού προγραμματισμού της,
4) η σύνθεση και το επίπεδο χρησιμοποίησης του στόλου της,
5) η δομή του δικτύου της,
6) η κεφαλαιακή της δομή, (σχέση κεφαλαίων ίδιων – ξένων, πάγιων – κυκλοφορούντων – διαθέσιμων.)
7) το επίπεδο της μηχανοργάνωσης των εργασιών της,
8) το επίπεδο και ο βαθμός χρησιμοποίησης της υφιστάμενης τεχνολογίας,
9) ο αριθμός, η ποιότητα, η σύνθεση και η κατανομή των εργαζόμενων και η σύνθεση του κόστους τους.
10) η οργανωτική δομή της επιχείρησης.
11) τα συστήματα διοίκησης, κ.λπ.
Αυτή η μελέτη θα οδηγήσει τους διευθύνοντες στην λήψη των αναγκαίων μέτρων.
Ως μεθοδολογία για εκπόνηση της μελέτης αυτής προτείνουμε την ακόλουθη:
1) Προσδιορισμός των κρισιακών φαινόμενων της επιχείρησης και διαχωρισμός τους από τις αιτίες που τα προκαλούν.
2) προσδιορισμός και αξιολόγηση του ειδικού βάρους των φαινόμενων εκδήλωσης της επιχειρησιακής κρίσης.
3) Με βάση τον προσδιορισμό των κρισιακών φαινόμενων και την γνώση της οικονομικής θεωρίας αλλά και των ιδιομορφιών της συγκεκριμένης επιχείρησης προσδιορισμός των αιτίων που προκαλούν την κρίση.
4) Επικέντρωση των αντικρισιακών μέτρων στην απάλειψη κύρια των αιτίων που προκαλούν την συγκεκριμένη κρίση και όχι στα φαινόμενα εκδήλωσης της.
Αυτό δεν σημαίνει ότι δεν θα παρθούν αν κριθούν αναγκαία, βραχυπρόθεσμα μέτρα αντιμετώπισης ορισμένων οξυμένων κρισιακών φαινόμενων.
5) Για την επιλογή των κατάλληλης ποσότητας και ποιότητας και της
χρονικής στιγμής εφαρμογής των μέτρων απάλειψης των γενεσιουργών αιτιών της συγκεκριμένης κρίσης στην επιχείρηση απαιτείται η αξιολόγηση του πραγματικού ειδικού βάρους της κάθε μιάς αιτίας στην ζωή της επιχείρησης.
6) Η επιτυχής αντιμετώπιση της κρίσης εξαρτάται από την αντικειμενική διάγνωση των αιτίων που την προκαλούν, του ακριβούς προσδιορισμού του ειδικού βάρους της κάθε μιας στην ζωή της επιχείρησης και από την λήψη εκείνου του συνδυασμού των διαθέσιμων μέτρων που εξαλείφουν τις αιτίες αυτές.
7) Για να είναι αποτελεσματικός ο συνδυασμός των μέτρων αυτών για να μπορέσουν δηλαδή να βγάλουν την επιχείρηση από την δίνη της κρίσης πρέπει η επιχείρηση να έχει:
α) σαφείς στόχους που να λαμβάνουν υπ’ όψη τους καθοριστικά τις δυνατότητες και αδυναμίες της επιχείρησης σε σχέση με το ευρύτερο θεσμικό διεθνές πλαίσιο δράσης της επιχείρησης καθώς και τις επιδιώξεις των ανταγωνιστών.
β) τα ευρισκόμενα στην διάθεσή της μέσα να έχουν την ικανότητα επίτευξης του στόχου για τον οποίον διατίθενται.
8) Η εμφάνιση ακόμα και ταυτόσημων κρισιακών φαινόμενων π.χ. ψηλό κόστος χρήματος, μεταξύ επιχειρήσεων του ίδιου κλάδου π.χ. αερομεταφορών, δεν σημαίνει κατ’ ανάγκη ότι προέρχονται απο τις ίδιες αιτίες ούτε ότι οι αιτίες αυτές έχουν το ίδιο ειδικό βάρος στο σύνολο των αιτιών που προκάλεσαν την κρίση στην κάθε επιχείρηση.
Κατά συνέπεια η λήψη από μία επιχείρηση αντικρισιακών μέτρων μόνο και μόνο επειδή τα πήρε και κάποια άλλη επιχείρηση που αντιμετώπιζε τα ίδια φαινόμενα όχι μόνο δεν αντιμετωπίζει τις αιτίες της κρίσης αλλά όπως συνάγεται και από την διεθνή εμπειρία είναι δυνατόν να βάλει την επιχείρηση αυτή σε επικίνδυνες περιπέτειες που πιθανόν και να άπτονται ακόμα και της επιβίωσής της.
9) Για την επίτευξη της μέγιστης αποτελεσματικότητας των μέτρων εκτιμούμε ότι η προσοχή των διοικούντων πρέπει να επικεντρωθεί:
α) στην σύνθεση των λαμβανόμενων μέτρων ήτοι το ποια από τα διαθέσιμα μέτρα θα χρησιμοποιηθούν,
β) στην χρονική στιγμή που θα εφαρμοσθούν,
γ) στην ένταση της εφαρμογής τους,
δ) στο αν θα εφαρμοσθούν για την απάλειψη των κρισιακών φαινoμένων
ή των αιτίων που τα προκάλεσαν ή σε κάποιο συνδυασμό τους.
10) Για την έξοδο από την κρίση μιας αεροπορικής επιχείρησης απαραίτητη προϋπόθεση – λαμβανόμενης υπ’ όψη της αρνητικής εμπειρίας της Ο.Α. – είναι η καταβολή στην αεροπορική επιχείρηση από το κράτος των επιβαρύνσεων που προκύπτουν από την υλοποίηση από την αεροπορική επιχείρηση της κυβερνητικής πολιτικής σε διάφορους τομείς. Το ύψος των καταβολών θα περιλαμβάνει το πλήρες κόστος των παρεχόμενων από την αεροπορική επιχείρηση προς το κράτος υπηρεσιών πλέον κάποιου κέρδους
11) Επειδή πιστεύουμε ότι η έξοδος από την κρίση κάθε Εθνικού αερομεταφορέα καθώς και κάθε οικονομικού μικρόκοσμου (επιχείρησης) δεν μπορεί να επιτευχθεί με την μεταβίβαση του μικροοικονομικού κόστους στην κοινωνία γι’ αυτό θεωρούμε ότι κατά την λήψη των αντι-κρισιακών μέτρων πρέπει να ληφθεί σοβαρά υπ’ όψη ο παράγοντας αυτός ώστε να μην μετατρέπεται το μικροοικονομικό κέρδος σε μακροοικονομικό κόστος.
12) Καταλήγοντας επισημαίνουμε ότι κανένα μέτρο όσο ρεαλιστικό και επιστημονικά τεκμηριωμένο και αν είναι, δεν έχει την παραμικρή πιθανότητα επιτυχίας, αν δεν στηρίζεται στην συνειδητή και ελεύθερα εκφρασμένη βούληση των εργαζόμενων που καλούνται να υλοποιήσουν τα μέτρα αυτά και επί πλέον υφίστανται σε μεγάλο βαθμό το κόστος από την υλοποίηση της αντικρισιακής πολιτικής.
Διότι όπως τόνιζε και ο μεγάλος Θρακιώτης φιλόσοφος Πρωταγόρας του οποίου ταπεινός θαυμαστής είναι ο γράφων:
” ΧΡΗΜΑΤΩΝ ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΜΕΤΡΟΝ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ ”

ΕΝΔΕΙΚΤΙΚΗ ΒΙΒΛΙΟΓΡΑΦΙΑ
1) P. Samuelson (1974) “Οικονομική”. Εκδόσεις Παπαζήση. Αθήνα.
2) Λ.Τσακίρη (1981) “Η θεωρία των κρίσεων. Η Ελληνική εμπειρία”.
Εκδόσεις Α.Τ.Ε. Αθήνα
3) WATS/QFS/MIS. IATA INT’L SCHEDULED FLIGHTS.
4) OECD (1992) (μέσος όρος 24 χωρών). Τα χρόνια 1993 και 1994 κατ’ εκτίμηση.
5) WATS/QFS. IATA INT’L SCHEDULE FLIGHTS.
6) Air Transport World : “Survival in Europe”
7) Air Transport World : “Lean and Mean”.
8) ΑVMARK (9/1993) NEWSLETTER.
9) Ι. Σ. Λαϊνου (1990) “Διοικητική αναδιοργάνωση του Δημόσιου φορέα των Ελληνικών πολιτικών αερομεταφορών με γνώμονα την συμμετοχή των εργαζόμενων στα κέντρα λήψης αποφάσεων”. Διδακτορική Διατριβή. Πάντειο Πανεπιστήμιο
10) Μ. Κάτσικα Δ/τη Τομέα Εμπορικής έρευνας και Προγραμματισμού της Ο.Α. (16-17/1/1993) Ομιλία στο ετήσιο Συνέδριο της Ο.Α. .
11) IATA COST COMMITTEE (8/1993.) SUMMARY AND REPORT.
12) Finantial Times (25-1-1994) ” Stenberg to pilot loss-making SAS.”.
13) Finantial Times (11-2-1994) “SAS to axe 2,900 jobs i9n shake up”.
14) Finantial Times 1(8-2-1994) Alliances still in the wind mat revamped SAS.
15) Finantial Times (27-1-1994) “KLM in staff pension fund deal.”.
16) Finantial Times (25-1-1994) “BOEING sees no sign of early upturn as deliveries decline”.
17) Finantial Times (25-1-1994) “US Air5 and B.A. in delivery venture”.
18) Finantial Times (21-1-1994) “Βritain buys time/ on HK Airport funding”.

 

 

 

 

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MARITIME ECONOMISTS
1996 International Conference
Vancouver, B.C., Canada June 26 – 28 1996

THE EFFICIENT PRICING POLICY OF A PORT CONTAINER TERMINAL (P.C.T.): THE CASE STUDY OF THE PORT OF PIRAEUS
BY
Y.S. LAINOS AND A. PARDALIS
UNIVERSITY OF PIRAEUS. DEPARTMENT OF MARITIME STUDIES

The participation of the authors at the conference was financially supported by the Research Center of the University of Piraeus

Abstract
Due to rapid technological change, the cost of a container terminal infrastructure has today dramatically increased and it covers a substantial part of the total operational cost. The subject related to that cost and the pricing policy applied by the port authorities, affects not only the microeconomic index of the port’s profitability, but also simultaneously the macroeconomic indices.
Moreover it affects the cost of container terminal services for the domestic customers (users) and the port’s international competitiveness. The question “who will pay” arises nowdays as a crucial one. The Port of Piraeus (P.O.P.) is a “comprehensive port” and one of the major ports of the Eastern Mediterranean. Its container terminal (C.T.) traffic covers today 76% of the total container traffic in Greek ports. This traffic gives the port a monopolistic position for its hinterland market. The remaining 24% of its traffic concerns the competitive Mediterranean market of transhipment. The construction of P.O.P.C.T. (Ikonion) started basicaly in 1981 and its extension is still under construction.
The period of our study, therefore, starts in 1981 and terminates in 1994; it is the period for which the Port Authorities provide data. Up to 1994 and according to its published balance sheet, P.O.P. was profitable. Its investments were self financed.
However, our research detected an irrational cost structure and a pricing policy which does not corresponds to the cost.
The authors’ contribution is :
a) The investigation whether the implemented pricing policy fulfilled the objectives of the P.O.P.C.T. based on “the economic principle”.
b) The approach with regard to the cost of the P.O.P.C.T., although there is no cost accounting system at P.O.P.
c) The proposals for a P.O.P.C.T. pricing policy orientated towards an efficient fulfilment of the objectives under the existing conditions.
Our proposals can be used accordingly by any Container Terminal which faces similar problems as those of the P.O.P.C.T.

1. Introduction
Pricing policy is one of the management’s tools for an efficient fulfilling of the objectives of the business plan. According to the theory, the price strategies are distinguished into two main categories (1 – 9) (Figure 1):
1) Those which are based on demand. These are subdivided to:
a) Competition pricing. The port prices are formed equal to or lower than the competitive port(s). These prices are based on the demand price elasticity.
b) Users benefits.
c) The ability of users to pay.
2) Those which are based on cost. These are subdevised to the:
a) Average long term cost. It is applied when the objective of the port is the revenue-expenses equalization.
b) Marginal cost. When the objective of the port’s management is the maximization of the profits, then the price is equalized with the marginal revenue. When the objective of the port is the optimum allocation of the productive factors, then the marginal cost is equalized with the price.
c) Average variable cost.
d) Congestion cost.
FIGURE 1
Our research is orientated:
a) to the examination whether the applied pricing policy, fulfilled efficiently the objectives of the P.O.P.C.T.,
b) to the determination of the relationship between the applied pricing policy and the cost of production of the container terminal services  especially taking into account the infrastructure’s share in the total cost.
c) to the presentation of an efficient pricing policy in a port container terminal like the major Greek port of Piraeus.
Although one of the main objectives of the pricing policy applied by the P.O.P., was the port’s investments self financing, during our investigation it was found that the depreciation of the investments for the quay, berths and buildings especially those of the container terminal, are not included in the official P.O.P.’s accounting data.
Another element that affects the objectivity of the P.O.P.’s financial position is that its profits have been exempted from taxation by law. It is obvious that this choice is an indirect state subsidization of the P.O.P. According to international bibliography, subsidization is not desirable any more, mainly for two reasons: “The first is that it involves emloying a nation’s resources where their marginal social productivity is lower instead of where it is higher, and second is that an unknown part of the benefits will go to people who live elsewhere”.(10,11,12)
The lack of a cost accounting system at P.O.P. must be pointed out.
2.Port of Piraeus. The existing situation.
2.1 Ownership status.
The Port of Piraeus (P.O.P.) is basically a “comprehensive port” (13,14 ) and one of the major ports of the Eastern Mediterranean. It consists of three zones: the main port (passengers and grains), the commercial port (general cargo) and the container terminal. As an individual organization, the P.O.P. has been established by law since 1930 and it is subject to the control of the Ministry of shipping. Its administration and management has been exclusively assigned to the Piraeus Port Authorities.
The president and the general manager are appointed by the government. The composition of the members of the Board of Directors includes representatives from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of shipping, the users, the Athens and Piraeus Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the shippers, the shipowners, the Piraeus Unions Council, the employees of the port, the chief of the Piraeus Port Police etc.
The composition of the P.O.P.’s Board of Directors gives finally to the government, the privilege of controlling the management of the port.

2.2 A Brief approach to the Financial Position.
2.2.1 Results.
For a wider understanding of P.O.P.C.T.’s pricing policy, we consider that a brief approach to it’s financial position is necessary. According to the official annual reports (1981-1994), P.O.P. is permanent profitable.
However it must be underlined that during our investigation it was found that :
a) according to the established law, P.O.P. has been exempted from the income taxes.
b) the depreciation of the investments for the quays, berths and buildings mainly of the container terminal, are not included even in the published P.O.P.’s accounting data.
The aforementioned choices give a financial position of the port quite different than the official one. We calculated that if taxes and nfrastructure’s depreciation were included in the P.O.P.’s official annual financial results, then the decrease of these results fluctuates from 16. 8% to 1,855%.
Since 1993, a decrease in the P.O.P.’s annual revenues appears. This is due to the loss of a great portion of warehouse revenues for goods imported from the European Union (E.U.) due to the complete abolition of tariffs between Greece and E.U. That decrease of P.O.P.’s revenues has not been substituted so far. (Figure 2)

FIGURE 2

 

2.2.2 Own and total capital
The relationship between own and total capital of P.O.P. shows a port’s level of dependence on its creditors, the degree of healthiness of its capital structure. During the period studied, that relationship fluctuates from 81% to
87% which is a quite satisfactory level (Figure 3).

 

FIGURE 3

 

2.2.3 Return on Capital.
According to the P.O.P.’s published balance sheet, the capital return was fluctuated from 22% to 0.3 % following a declining trend. If, however, the infrastructure’s depreciation were included in these results, then the return on capital would fluctuate from 18.50% to 5.31% following a declining trend. Furthermore, if the proper taxes were included in these results, then the return on capital would fluctuate from 9.43 % to 5.31 % (Figure 4).

 

FIGURE 4

 

Primarily, the main cause of the aforementioned low level and declining trend of capital return, is due to the absence of the applied pricing policy the objective of maximization of return on capital.

2.3 Source of investment’s financing.
Up to 1994, the financing sources for the port’s investments, were:
a) a port’s reserve account in the Greek Central Bank. In this account which was established by law in 1954 and 1955, the Piraeus port authorirties are still obliged to deposit a percentage of the port’s annual revenues. The exclusive purpose of this account is financing the port’s investments. It must be pointed out that, up to 1987, this account was legally kept by the Central Bank without any interest. This regulation caused a substantial loss to the port of Piraeus.
b) Since 1987, interest accrued from the port’s deposits in the Greek Central Bank.
c) the port’s annual profits.

3. Port of Piraeus’s Container Terminal (P.O.P.C.T.)
3.1. Demand – Supply. Market structure.
3.1.1 Demand.
From 1981 to 1994, the container traffic of P.O.P.C.T. has increased by 275%. This impressive increase had been achieved from 1986 to 1992. Then, a stability appeared. A first cause of this stability is the intergration of the conversion of the conventional general cargo to containerized cargo. A second cause is the stability of the Greek economy (stability of imports and exports).
In 1994, a 80% of its traffic, concerns the country’s imports-exports volume. The remaining 20% of this traffic concerns the competitive international market of transhipment. (Fingure 5).

FIGURE 5

 

 

Today, the P.O.P.C.T. traffic covers a 76% of the total container traffic of Greece. The remaining 24% is covered by Salonika’s port.That traffic gives the P.O.P.C.T. a monopolistic position in its hinterland market (Figure 6).

FIGURE 6

 

3.1.2 Supply.
3.1.2.1. P.O.P.C.T.’s infrastructure.
Up to 1994 the container traffic at P.O.P. was covered by two different terminals located at two different areas. The older one, called “Vassiliadis” terminal, was located at the central port and was well organized. It was covering a 25% of the total P.O.P.’s container traffic with almost 100% occupancy of its infrastructure capacity.
But its inadequate depth and it’s inefficient connection with the land transport network, forced the port authorities, in 1994, to transfer this terminal to “Ikonion” area where the second under expansion new terminal is located.
3.1.2.2.Dimensions.
The construction of the new P.O.P.C.T. (Ikonion) started basically at 1981 and it is still under expansion. This is the reason that the period of our research started in 1981.Today, the dimensions of the Piraeus port containers terminal are:

a) quays length 700 meters
b) depth 12.5 – 16.5 meters
b) total area 700,000 square meters
c) covered area 20,000 square meters
d) gantry cranes 6
e) straddle carriers 50

Number and age of cranes
1 22 years old
2 16 years old
2  7 years old
1  5 years old
4 expected in 1996 post panamax)
All are 40 tones Cranes
With the commencement of the first discussions in the early 70’s, the problem which arised for the Port Authorities with regard to their orientation, was whether the P.O.P. container terminal development would be extensive or intensive. The basic consideration and the final choice of the P.O.P. authorities (members of P.O.P.’s board of directors including the represenatives of some users) was the extensive instead of intensive developement. It is obvious that the invesments for the land, berths, quays, cranes, surface transportation media and necessary personnel were orientated and planned according to that option.
The argument of the port authorirties for their choice was that P.O.P.C.T. needed to have an adequate infrastructure even for ships of the fifth generation (16.5 meters depth) to attract transhipment traffic from the other Mediterranean ports. It must be pointed out that such ships have never approached as yet P.O.P.C.T.
The P.O.P.C.T.’s occupancy has fluctuated (1981-1994) from 38% to 72%.
3.2. Brief approach to P.O.P.C.T. cost. An elementary P.O.P.’s cost analysis was carried out in 1973. Since then, a cost accounting system (cost centers, cost allocation methods etc.). has not been introduced as yet. Consequently, there is no official cost accounting data available for the container terminal. Under these circumstances and for the approach with regard to the cost accounting of the container terminal, we constructed an adequate cost accounting system based on the existing financial accounting data. Our cost allocation methods are based on the existing operational structure and activities of the container terminal, as they have been recorded by the authors’ research.
3.2.1. Cost structure.
3.2.1.1. Labour cost.
The labour cost covers the greater portion of the total terminal’s cost.
It fluctuates from 45.73% to 67.35% of the total terminal’s annual cost. This higt share of labour cost is due to the high cost of dockers and to the inefficient organization and management systems, that forces the port authorities to employ more employees and workers than needed.
The high cost of the dockers is due to the existing institutional framework which is based on labour relations of the past, when dockers were paid according to the weight they carried. That weight now is basically carried by the cranes although the number of the dockers per crane and per shift remains almost stable, nine dockers and two foremen.
The proportion of the employees and dockers to the total number of personnel was 45% and 55% respectively in 1981, and 56% and 44% respectively in 1994. The total number of employees and workers has decreased by 48.74%. This is due to a decrease in the number of employees by 37% when the number of the dockers decreased by 59%.
The ratio between the average yearly expenses per docker and per clerk is two to one (2:1) with an increasing trend, (Figure 7).

 

FIGURE 7

 

An authors questionnaire among the P.O.P.C.T. employees showed that only a 5% of them believe that the job qualification is objective (Fingure 8).
3.2.1.2. Depreciation cost
As mentioned above, the depreciation of the P.O.P.’s infrastructure (mainly that of the container terminal) is not included in the official balance sheet. The authors calculated this depreciation cost and included it in the terminal’s cost. The share of depreciation (including the terminal’s infrastructure as it was calculated by the authors) in the total annual cost of the container terminal was fluctuated from 21.72% to 37.78% (Figure 8).
3.2.1.3. Overhead cost
The share of overhead expenses to the total annual cost of the container terminal was fluctuated from 1.18% to 10.28% (Figure 8).
3.2.1.4. Maintenance and overhaul
The share of maintenance and overhaul to the total annual cost of the container terminal was fluctuated from 6.35% to 10.39% (Figure 8).

 

FIGURE 8

 

3.3. P.O.P.C.T. cost – revenue – results.
Although our study period starts from 1981, the P.O.P.C.T. cost – revenue – results comparison starts from 1987, because there are no revenues data available from 1981 to 1986.
From 1987 to 1994 the terminal’s cost increased by 432%, the revenues were increased by 444% and the results (profits) by 170%. The declining trend of the profits is due to an increasing trend of the cost and an decreasing trend of the revenues since 1993 (Figure 9).

 

FIGURE 9

 

The share of the annual cost of the containers terminal (as it has been elaborated and calculated by the authors) to the total port’s annual cost has fluctuated from 19.4% to 36.8% (Figure 10).
The share of the annual revenues from the containers terminal to the total port’s revenues has fluctuated from 18.6% to 46.6%. From the aforementioned Figures, it is obvious that, in general, the container terminal
subsidizes the other activities of the port, (Figure 10).

 

FIGURE 10

 

3.4. Source of financing
As mentioned above, the P.O.P.’s investments were self financed until 1994. But in 1995, due to the high level of the container’s terminal investments and the declining trend of its revenues, the port authorities decided to have a loan of about US$ 60 million, which means that, from 1996, there will be an additional cost for paying out the loan’s annual interests. In this respect, two crucial problems arise for the port authorities:
• Firstly, the cost of financing the investments for the container’s terminal infrastructure.
• Secondly, “who will pay” for the cost of the container’s terminal infrastructure.
The problem of the method as well as the duration for the depreciation of the infrastructure is included here. The solution that the Piraeus Port Authorirties will choose has now become a crucial one, because it directly affects the cost of the imported and exported products of the country (hinterland) and, generally, it affects the port’s containers terminal competitivenes in the wider area.
3.5. The pricing policy implemented.
The pricing policy implemented was not based on a P.O.P.’s actual cost analysis, since a cost accounting system has not been as yet introduced. The applied pricing policy was based on the budgetary estimated increase of the annual cost. The annual increase of the prices was calculated with the aim of covering this increase.
It is obvious that the applied policy in the P.O.P. container terminal was based partly on the average long term cost with the exception of taxes and the depreciation of the quays and the buildings.
The applied by the P.O.P.C.T.’s authorities pricing policy for the period 1981-1994 had the following objectives:
a) to support the country’s exports (support the development of the national economy);
b) to atract transhipment traffic;
c) to have the port’s investment self financed;
d) to support employment in the area and contribute to the area’s development.
The final annual increase of the prices of the P.O.P.C.T. services is subject to the approval of the State “Income and Prices” Committee. This Committee argues that it controls the increases of the prices in order to protect the National Economy from an undesirable increase in the inflation rate.
The applied pricing policy of P.O.P.C.T. during the period 1981-1994 is a differentiated one. The differentiation criteria used are:
• imported containers;
• exported containers;
• loaded containers;
• empty containers;
• 20 TEU’S, 40 TEU’S container;
• congestion cost.
In order to support the country’s export commerce (support the national economy’s development), the Port Authorities give discounts of about 35% to exported containers. In order attract an adequate transhipement traffic for sufficient occupancy of the existing investments, a discriminating pricing policy is implemented with regard to transhipment containers, through discounts from 30% to 60% according to the traffic volume per company.
It is obvious that the implemented pricing policy for both the aforementioned cases is below the cost. The loss, however, that is caused to the terminal from this undercosting pricing policy with regard to the exported containers is not substantial, because the share of export to the total traffic volume of P.O.P.C.T. is small.
On the contrary, the loss that is caused from the under cost pricing policy with regard to transhipment containers, can be considered as substantial, because the transhipment traffic volume fluctuates at more than 20% of the P.O.P.C.T. total traffic volume.
Despite the undercost pricing policy implemented in transhipment, the objective of the Port Authorities for attracting adequate transhipment traffic for a satisfactory occupancy of the infrastructure is not achieved. The reason for this is that the main criteria of the liner companies for selecting a port for their mother ships in the Mediterranean sea is not the prices of the port services but the distance of the particular port from their main routing. Piraeus Port is 175 km far from the main Mediterranean routing when Damietta, Algeciras and Malta lies on the main routing. This is the reason why the greater portion (up to 90%) of their traffic is transhipment (16) (Figure 11).

FIGURE 11

 

It is obvious that  concerning the P.O.P. the deviation cost for the fourh and fifth generation container ships is greater than any benefit coming from the port’s pricing policy implemented (discounts). In order to cover the losses from the under cost pricing policy at the transhipement, the Port Authorities relied on the port’s monopolistic position, applied an over cost pricing policy burden the imported containers and through them the Greek consumers of the particular goods.

3.6. P.O.P.C.T. Competitiveness.
3.6.1. Level of prices.
Despite its operational weaknesses, through its aforementioned great discounts the P.O.P.C.T. has achieved to become one of the cheapest terminals in the Mediterranean market of transhipment.
3.6.2. Productivity.
The average productivity of the P.O.P.C.T. fluctuates at about 140 containers per shift per crane. This level of productivity classifies the P.O.P.C.T. in the second position together with four other ports, among the twelve Mediterranean ports examined.
3.6.3. Quality of services.
The users evaluate the quality of the services rendered by the P.O.P.C.T. as unsatisfactory. Their complaints are mainly centered on the delays. The main causes for the delays are the bureaucracy and the inadequate maintenance and overhaul of the cranes due to which they are often out of order.

4. Conclusions.
1) The Port of Piraeus has not applied any cost accounting system (cost centers, cost allocation methods etc.). Consequently, the Port Authorities cannot have any information about cost per operational activity or organizational unit. This ignorance prevents the Port Authorities from elaborating an effective pricing policy.
2) The Port Authorities argue that the pricing policy implemented with regard to the containers terminal, is based on the average long-term cost. Our research proved that the annual depreciation of the container terminal infrastructure is not included in the official annual cost. Moreover, if the Port Authorities decide to depreciate these investments according to the Greek law, then the P.O.P.C.T.’s average annual cost will appear substantially increased.
Furthermore, the P.O.P.’s profits have been exempted from taxation, which is an indirect state subsidy. It is obvious that, besides its monopolistic position, the P.O.P.C.T. applies a under cost pricing policy to the benefit of the users of the P.O.P.C.T. and the consumers of the particular goods.
3) The P.O.P.C.T. cost is burdened by the high labour cost due to the high cost of dockers and to the inefficient management which forces the Port Authorities to employ more clerks and dockers than needed.
4) The implementation of a pricing policy relied basically, on average cost (with the exception of taxation and infrastructures depreciation) combined with the absence of decision-making control mechanisms, burden the users with the cost of any decisions, efficient or not, taken by the port administration. The efforts of the top executives appointed by the government are not completely orientated to the port’s affairs but, at the same time, the executives are interested in their political career. This orientation affects the efficiency of their decisions on the developement of the Port.
5) The orientation of the Port Authorities, investment policy, is determined by the fact that they consider the P.O.P. can be transformed into a great transhipment center in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, the adaption of P.O.P.C.T. infrastructure to standards of fourth and fifth generation ships, does not correspond to any present or future demand, because of the port’s long distance from the main Mediterranean route from Gibraltar to Suez. Consequently, this orientation in the P.O.P.C.T. development, caused a substantial increase in its operational cost in all sectors (land, berths, quays, cranes, etc.) due to over-invesment. This cost is allocated to the present users of the terminal’s services (feeder ships) through a higher level of prices.
6) Finally, the pricing policy implemented in the P.O.P.C.T. is not effective since its objectives were not achieved:
a) Despite the great discounts to the prices, the transhipment traffic has not and, we think, cannot be increased substantially, because the main motive for the mother ships, is not the level of the prices, but the port’s distance from their main routing. Through the discounts applied by the port Authorities, the Greek consumer subsidizes the liner shipping and the consumers in the countries of the final destination of the transhipment containers.
b) The discounts concerning the exports do not have a substantial effect on their increase due to the monopolistic position of the port and the very low share of the transportation to the total cost.
c) The surplus clerks and highly paid dockers adsord sosial resources ineffectively.

5. PROPOSALS

1. Pricing policy is one of the tools of the management for the achievement of the objectives of the business plan.

2. Efficient port pricing policy is the one that fulfills these objectives based on the economic principle. However a pricing policy cannot be efficient if it is based on an ineffective operation as a result of ineffective management, or when it is called to achieve arbitrary objectives and targets.
Consequently the necessary presupposition for an efficient pricing policy of the P.O.P.C.T. is it’s efficient operation. We present below the necessary measures for an effective operational framework of the P.O.P.C.T.

3. The objectives of P.O.P.C.T. are determined by the ownership status and the monopolistic position to the hinderland (76% of the total Greek traffic).
Since the quality of P.O.P.C.T. management is directly affected by it’s ownership status, it could be argued that the change of this status is a neccesary presupposition for implementation of an effective management and for achieve efficient operation of the terminal.

4. Efficient operation of the terminal is when the objectives and targets of it’s business plan are achieved within certain time limits based on the economic principle.

5. A necessary presupposition for the achievement of the efficient operation of the P.O.P.C.T. avoiding the weaknesses of the traditional port, is it’s operational and managerial independence from the P.O.P. It could be P.O.P.’s affiliated company.

6. The question arose is which ownership status can achieve effective management and efficient operation of the P.O.P.C.T. Both ownership status, the existing state monopoly and the private monopoly have weaknesses and strengths. We consider that the total privatization of the P.O.P.C.T. will have a positive affection on the effectiveness of terminal’s management. Simultaneusly however it will provoke the known undesirable negative results of the private monopoly because of the port’s monopolistic position to the hinderland. We think that the most effective ownership status for the P.O.P.C.T. is an interim.

7. If we want to avoid labour turbulances, effective management can be introduced at the P.O.P.C.T. escalated.

8. Under the existing ownership status is necessary the change of the institutional framework to be orientated to the:
• Implementation of an efficient cost accounting system,
• Implementation of Managerial Information System,
• The evaluation of the members of the board of directors and the other managerial structure has to be relied on achievement of the objectives and targets. The appointment of a person to a managerial position has to be based on his qualifications according to the job description,
• Introduction and implementation of mechanisms and procedures for evaluation of the efficiency of the choices of the board of Directors and of the Directors.
• For avoiding arbitrariness and subjective approaches of the terminals operation by the board of directors, the objectives of the port must be determined by a body in which the main participants would be the government the users and the employees.
• Rationalization of organizational structure adopting it to the operational needs of the P.O.P.C.T..
• Introduction and implementation of effective human resources management system based on Total Quality Management including the proper motivation system.
• Introduction of a flexible labour relations network. Decrease the number of dockers per crane and per shift (to 4 instead of 11 per crane per shift they are now).
• Adoption of the P.O.P.C.T. infrastructure investments to the estimated traffic (according to the market research and not to the arbitrary estimations).
• Intensive and not extensive development’ s orientation.
• Revision of pricing policy adopting it to the efficient achievement of the objectives and targets of the terminal.
An efficient however pricing policy has to be subject to the following restrictions:
• The objectives and targets must relied on the knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of the port, and on the conclusions of the market research.
• Cross subsidization among Port’s facilities are not accepted because it transfers the cost of a certain facility to the user of another.
• Direct or indirect state subsidization to the Port’s facilities are not accepted because it employs social resources in sectors of which the productivity is lower than another sector they could be used.
• Consequently efficient pricing policy of a container terminal is the one which is mainly based on it’s cost production.
• Under the existing circumstances of the terminal operation, we think that the immediate introduction of all the aforementioned changes simultaneously will be not possible.
• In order to achieve an accelerated introduction of the changes, the private sector will have the possibility to be assigned the management of those terminal’s operations that it can supply them under better conditions (lower cost higher quality).
• The main criteria of the success of the management will be the level of fulfillment of the mutual agreed objectives based on the economic principle, into the agreed time limits.

 

 

References
1. Bennathan E., Walters A.A,(1979) “ Port Pricing and Investment Policy for Developing Countries”, Oxford University Press.
2. Down T.J and Fleming D.,K. (1994) “Port Pricing” Maritime Policy and Management, Vol 21, No 1,p. 29-36
3. Frankel E.. (1987) “Port Planning and Development” , p.57-80, Jon Wiley and Sons, New York.
4. Goulielmos A. (1991) “Port Pricing Policies” Piraeus, (In Greek).
5. Jansson O. J. and Shneerson D.,(1982) “Port Economics”, England.
6 Talley W. K., (1994) “Port pricing: a coct axiomatic approach”. Maritime Policy and Management, Vol 21, No 1 p.61-76
7. Wilking D.,(1991), “ Port tariff structure and pricing”, Port Management Textbook Volume 3 p,191 -212 , ISL, Bremen.
8.World Bank, (1980), “Port Pricing: Principles and Practical Guidelines” Transportation, Water and Telecommunications Dept. memo.
9. Heaver T.D., (1995), “ The implications of increased competition among ports for port policy and management”, Maritime Policy and Management” Vol 22, No 2 p.125
10. Goss R.O.,(1986) “Seaports should not be subsidized” Maritime Policy and Management” Vol 13, No 2 p.83
Graillot A. (1986) “Public subsidy of seaports” Maritime Policy and Management”, Vol 13, No 2 p.155.
11.Klaassen L.H.,(1986) “ Subsidies to seaports” Maritime Policy and Management”, Vol 13, No 2 p.169.
12. Farrell S., (1986) “The subsidization of seaports: an alternative approach” Maritime Policy and Management”, Vol 13, No 2 p.177.
13.Goss R. (1990) “Economic Policies and Seaports 2: The diversity of Port Policies ”, Maritime Policy and Management, Vol 17, No 3, p 221- 234.
14.Goss R. (1990) “Economic Policies and Seaports 3: Are port Authorities necessary?” Maritime Policy and Management, Vol 17, No 4, p 257-271.
15. P.O.P Tariffs (1992)
16.Pardali-Lainou A. (1996), “Container traffic and port competition in the Mediterranean: The case of transhipment”, 1st Conference on Combined Transport and Transit Flows of Southeast Europe. Thessaloniki, Greece.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE HELLENIC AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY ΤO THE TOURISTIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE HELLENIC ISLANDS.
The case study of islands :
CHIOS
KASTELORIZO
RHODES
SKIATHOS

PART ONE
1. ABSTRACT

The majority of the incoming and outgoing international tourists to Hellenic islands with international airports, uses charter flights .
This fact proves that the air transport industry dominates the touristic transportation of the Hellenic islands covered by airport (incoming and outgoing) .
Almost all of these flights are served by non Hellenic air carriers.
Although the transportation is included in a touristic package, the aforementioned fact discriminates the service supplied on board the airplane from the touristic product supplied by the Hellenic islands
The two aforementioned facts explain why the participation of the Hellenic air transport industry to the touristic service supplied by the Hellenic islands, has been limited only to the services supplied by the airport of those islands
The importance of the quality of services supplied at an airport, compared with the final touristic product supplied by the Hellenic island, is that this quality is the first and last impression created to the tourists.
The contribution of the air transport industry to the touristic development of the Hellenic islands is not only quantitative but also qualitative, because the existence of an airport on an island :
a) orientates the touristic development of this island to a certain model
b) affects the model of touristic development of the satellite islands (the islands of the wider area that is influenced by the airport of the dominant island).
c) affects the number of the population
d) Forces the transformation of the infra and over structure of the local societies to a certain orientation.

2. AIM

The aim of the present paper is the definition of the quality level of services supplied by the Hellenic insular airports and its impact on the touristic development of the Hellenic islands.

3. AUTHOR’S CONTRIBUTION

The author’s contribution is focused on:
a) the definition of the quality determinants of the services provided by the airport
b) the determination of the malfunctions of the Hellenic insular airports
c) the determination of the impact that the quality level of the services supplied at the Hellenic insular airports has on the touristic development of the wider region
d) the methodology used that may also be applied on any other similar case
PART TWO

4. Brief theoretical approach

4.1. Introduction

– From the hundreds of islands of the Hellenic seas, 28 of them have airports as well as ports for short sea vessels. Almost half of these airports are international.
– The government, to support the regional and especially the touristic developmental model applied for the certain islands during the last four decades, constructed these international airports.
– The service of transportation is included –among others- in a touristic package
– Almost 85%- of the incoming and outgoing international tourists to and from Hellenic islands having international airports, uses the airplane charter flights (AIR EUROPE, AIR HOLLAND, AIR MONARCH, AIR TOURS, AIR 2000, BRITANIA, HAPAC LLOYD, LTU, MAERSK, PREMIER.e.t.c).
– Almost all of the charter flights to and from Hellenic Islands are served by non Hellenic air carriers.
– This is the reason why the product supplied on board the airplane is not included in the touristic product offered by the Hellenic islands.

 

 

 

– Consequently the contribution of the Hellenic air transport industry to the touristic product offered by the Hellenic islands to the incoming foreign tourists,is reduced only to the services offered by the insular airports

4.2. Productive process of the airport services supplied to passengers and airplanes

There are numerous services supplied to airplanes and passengers at the airport. These services are divided in two categories.
Those supplied by the airport authorities and those supplied by the ground handling companies.
However, the aforementioned categorization is not uniform for all the airports. The differentiation is due to the level of deregulation-liberalization of the airline industry applied by the government of the country where the airport belongs, which affects the ownership regime of the airport (state or private)
.
The Hellenic air transport industry is presently in a process of liberalization, during which the old and the new coexist.
All Hellenic airports are state owned with the exemption of the new Athens airport. Consequently the Air Traffic Control System services are provided by the airport authorities, which belong to the Ministry of Transportation.
In the majority of the insular airports, the main or the unique supplier of ground handling services (to passengers and airplane) is Olympic Airways, the Hellenic national carrier according to Chicago convention
The stages of arrival and departure of passengers and airplanes as well as the services supplied are presented below.

 

4.2.1. DEPARTURE
1
TEMPORARILY PARKING- DISEMBARKATION OF THE TRANSPORTATION MEDIA
2
PERMANENT PARKING OF THE TRANSPORTATION MEDIA
3
WAY TO NON SUBJECT WAITING LOUNGE.
ACCESSIBILITY TO THE SERVICES OF :
INFORMATION OFFICE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, POST OFFICE,
BANKS, RESTAURANTS, BARS, RENT CARS, RESERVATION OF HOTEL ROOMS, SEATS TO THE TRANSPORTATION MEDIA, THEATERS ETC
4
ANNOUNCEMENT OF CHECK IN COMMENCEMENT.
CHECK IN SERVICES INCLUDE:
a) CONTROL OF RESERVATION, TICKET, VISA, VACCINATION, PASSPORT
b) BOARDING PASS ISSUANCE
c) TAG ISSUANCE AND STICKING IT ON THE LUGGAGE AND ON THE TICKET
d) LUGGAGE WEIGHT CONTROL
e) ISSUANCE OF MISCELLANEOUS CHARGES ORDER GOOD FOR EXCESS (to pay for the excess weight of the luggage)
f) LUGGAGE, CARGO SECURITY CONTROL
5
ANNOUNCEMENT FOR THE NUMBER OF BOARDING GATE
6
CONTROL OF PASSENGERS BY THE STATE AUTHORITIES, ON THEIR WAY TO THE WAITING LOUNGE (SUBJECTED AREA):
PASSPORT CONTROL
EXCHANGE CONTROL (for destinations other than E.U. countries)
BODY CONTROL (including hand-bags)
7
PASSENGERS ACCESSIBILITY AT DUTY FREE SHOPS USE (for destinations other than E.U. countries)
8
ANNOUNCEMENT FOR STARTING BOARDING
9
BOARDING PASS AND HAND BAGS DIMENSIONS CONTROL ON THE EXIT GATE
10
PASSENGERS TRANSFER TO THE AIRPLANE BY EITHER RAMP BUS OR AIR BRIDGE
11
PASSENGERS BOARDING PASS CONTROL BEFORE BOARDING
12
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CLEARANCE FOR:
ENGINE START
TAXIING
TAKE OFF

4.2.2. ARRIVAL
1
GUIDELINES TO THE AIRPLANE FROM AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
FOR SAFE APPROACH TO THE AIRPORT
2
CLEARANCE TO THE AIRPLANE FROM CONTROL TOWER FOR SAFE LANDING
3
LANDING-TAXIING-PARKING OF THE AIRPLANE
4
PASSENGERS DISEMBARKATION AND TRANSFER TO THE ARRIVAL LOUNGE WITH RAMP BUS OR THROUGH AIR BRIDGE
5
PASSPORTS CONTROL (only for non SENGEN passengers)
6
IMPORT EXCHANGE CONTROL PROCEDURES (optionally for E.U. passengers)
7
ANNOUNCEMENT FOR THE NUMBER OF LUGGAGE BELT IN ORDER
8
LUGGAGE TAKING OVER
9
REQUEST FOR COMPENSATION BY THE PASSENGER AGAINST THE AIR CARRIER DUE TO LOST OR DAMAGE LUGGAGE
10
CUSTOM CONTROL (indicated for non E.U. passengers, obligatory for others)
11
SETTLEMENT OF THE TAXES (in case of relatively charge from custom control)
12
DEPARTURE FOR THE FINAL DESTINATION WITH THE AVAILABLE
PUBLIC, PRIVATE OR AIR CARRIERS TRANSPORTATION MEDIA
NOTE
ALL SERVICES-FACILITIES OFFERED AT THE AIRPORT TO THE DEPARTING PASSENGERS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE ARRIVING AS WELL WITH EXCEPTION OF DUTY FREE

4.3. Services supplied to airplane and passengers at the airport

4.3.1. Services supplied to airplane
Safety, control tower, runway, “follow me”, parking lots, fire brigade,
ground handling commercial-technical
stairs, refueling, rewatering, cleaning, catering, loading – unloading, luggage delivery, technical inspection
4.3.2. Services supplied to passengers
Safety, custom office, check in, transfer, security, toilets, telecommunication, post office, bank, duty free shops (for non E.U. Citizens), car rent, hotel reservation, medical, transportation media, parking area for transportation media (out of the airport), accessibility to the airport (roads)

4.4. Concerning the quality of services supplied by an airport
4.4.1. Definition of quality
The characteristics or properties of the product that satisfy every ascertained or assumed (through market research) need of the consumer

4.4.2. Criteria determining the quality of services supplied by the airport
1) Environmental determinants (the usual weather conditions, mountains etc.)
2) The technology and size of the airplanes (existing and forecasted)
3) The technology (existing and forecasted) of the airport facilities
4) The developmental model of the wider region
5) The volume and the allocation of the passengers demand (existing and forecasted)
6) The market segment of the passengers on whom the developmental model of the region is applied
7) The seasonality of the demand traffic (existing and forecasted)
8) The social reactions
9) The construction and the operational cost, the financing sources–abilities and the expected revenues – depreciation.

4.4.3. Analytical Quality criteria of the services supplied by an airport
1) Safety operational level of the airport
2) Daily working hours
3) Adequacy level of Air Transport Control services
4) Dimensions and operational condition of runway
5) Adequacy level of parking lots for a/c (peak season)
6) Adequacy of the number, technological level and operational condition of the ground handling media -peak season- (stairs, tractors, loading-unloading media, bowzers e..t.c.)
7) Adequacy of the available space for passengers service of the terminal buildings
8) Adequacy of the airport information systems (TV monitors, megaphones etc.)
9) Operational and technical conditions of the terminal buildings
10) Innovation and cleaning level of the terminal buildings
11) Facilities offered to passengers in the terminal buildings
12) Adequacy of the number and training level of the employees
13) Politeness, willingness and cleanliness level of the employees
14) Adequacy of permanent and long time parking place for ground transportation media out of the airport
15) Availability level of ground transportation media connecting airport with the town
16) Number, dimensions and conditions of the roads connecting airport with the town

PART THREE
5. The Hellenic reality
5.1. The airplane domination on passenger transport of certain islands
The airplane dominates on the transportation of the incoming tourists to the Hellenic touristic islands due to:
– the geographical structure between Europe, origin of 76% of the total
incoming tourists and Hellenic islands, that makes impossible the use of other fast transportation media (p.e. TGV).
– the time needed for an “allez-retour” transportation by car or bus on a ferry boat through Italy and from Piraeus to the islands , is approximately six days for tourists originating from Europe.
– The political circumstances which made the route through Yugoslavia impossible although this route would decrease the above transportation time only for 25%.
– The cost of a charter round trip by airplane is significantly less than the
cost of a six days travel by car. It is very impressive that the cost of a six days trip by bus including ticket, food, hotel and other expenses per person is almost equal to the price of a package of
ten half board overnight stays in a Hellenic island including the cost of charter flight.
– Tourists with origin other than Europe have no other alternative than the airplane.
These are the reasons why the majority-more than the 85%- of the (incoming and outgoing) international tourists to and from the Hellenic islands having international airports, uses the airplane (charter flights)
The domination of the aircraft on the transportation of some Hellenic islands and, through that, the orientation of these economies to the touristic development brought the following essential changes to the local societies:
1) Increased the population number
2) Increased the G.D.P.
3) forced many members of local population to abandon their traditional occupations (agriculture etc.) and orientated them to professions relative to tourism
4) introduced a modern life style undermining the traditional life style and society structure, the customs and finally the human relations among the members of these societies starting from those in the family.
5) Changed the utilisation of the land and generally deteriorated and burdened the natural environment

5.2. Approaching the operational particularities of a Hellenic insular airport

1) The Hellenic government selects the islands on which an airport will be constructed, using as criteria its contribution to the touristic development of the wider area
2) Consequently these airports enjoy a quasi-monopolistic position
3) Due to the state ownership regime and the quasi-monopolistic position that enjoy the insular Hellenic airports, the following problems arise concerning :
a) the evaluation criteria used for the operational efficiency,
b) the pricing policy applied
c) the evaluation criteria used for the quality level of the services supplied at the airport
4) The majority of the incoming tourists participates on a tour operator package
5) The airport handling cost –for airplane and passengers -is part of the touristic package cost
6) Since the cost of the package is a basic determinant of the demand level, the government applies an airport pricing policy to attract the touristic demand. These are the reasons for which the ground handling charges at insular airports especially for charter flights, usually does not reflect the total cost of these airports (not only the variable but the standard cost as well, including investments depreciation).
7) Consequently the operation of the insular airports and the island’s touristic development linked with it are often subsidised by the tax payers and not by the users of its services, that is by those that take advantage of the incoming through the airport tourism.
8) Of course the existence of the airport contributes decisively to the touristic development of the island with all the micro and macroeconomic advantages (foreign exchange, employment etc)
But. According to our investigation there does not exist any research-study concerning the economic results (final global cost, revenues) from the airports operation and the contribution of the airport to the touristic development of the wider region.

5.3. Evaluating the quality of services supplied by the Hellenic insular airports

Sources-Assumptions

The operational problems of the Hellenic insular airports are not the same for all of them, because the operational conditions are different
The present operational evaluation of the quality level and the adequacy of the services supplied by the Hellenic insular airports, is based on the opinions of:
– the pilots users of these airports
– the passengers users of these airports
– the local society (mayors, professional organizations, mainly of the hotel owners and the Tour Agents and tour Operators users of these airports)
– staff members of the Hellenic Civil Aviation Authorities
– staff members of Olympic Airways
Furthermore the current evaluation is based on the demand during peak season, when more than 50% of the annual traffic of the island is transported
Some remarks upon the aforementioned evaluation.
1) When local society requests expansion of the capacity of the existing airport, this does not necessarily represent the opinion of all citizens. For example opposition is expressed by those who will lose their land because of the expansion of the runway or by those who are disturbed by the noise of the aircrafts especially during night flights
2) Furthermore the local society does not want to participate to the cost of the construction or the expansion of the airport arguing that this will burden the cost of their product and finally their competitiveness will be decreased. Similar reactions appear on the tour operators’ side.
3) The background of the passengers expressing their opinion upon the quality of services offered by a certain Hellenic island airport is not uniform because they do not come from the same market segment. The same airport is used by upper income level passengers (individuals with an average of US$ 300 expenses per
diem) as well as by medium and lower level (members of groups with an average of US$ 30 expenses per diem).
4) For the purpose of the present paper the problems are considered cumulatively which means that perhaps there is not any Hellenic insular airport that faces all these malfunctions simultaneously.

5.4. Problems concerning the quality of services supplied by the Hellenic insular airports

The main problems of the Hellenic insular airports are focused generally on the capacity of the airport, ground handling quantity and quality services to airplanes and passengers, capacity and cleanliness of the terminal buildings, technological level and operational conditions of the media used, quality of services offered by the employees, accessibility to the airport and parking space.
The problems mentioned below do not refer neither to all insular airports nor to all employees. They are indicative problems that have appeared in all insular Hellenic airports during the last decade.
The aforementioned general problems can be analysed as follows:

1) Although the new technology Air Traffic Control System has been installed, it has not operated as yet system-wide.
2) Inadequate dimensions of runway.
3) Inadequate number of airplane parking lots
4) Inadequate preparation for successfully preventing and handling incidents-accidents (number and operational conditions of the available media organisation and training of the employees etc)
5) Inadequate number of ground handling media used in inefficient operational conditions and technologically old fashioned (stairs, tractors, loading-unloading media, bowzers -refueling etc)
6) Inadequate space available for passengers’ service at terminal buildings
7) Inadequate number of employees for passengers’ service at terminal buildings and for ground handling
8) Inadequate number, training level and knowledge by the employees of their working object.
9) Inadequate knowledge by the employees of the rules of efficient communication.
10) Inadequate level of politeness, willingness and cleanliness of the employees
11) Negative impression from the condition of airport furniture, buildings etc
12) Inadequate cleanliness level generally.
13) Inadequate number, facilities and cleanliness level of the airport toilets
14) Inadequate level of services at the airport medical center
15) Inadequate and inefficient passenger information system (sound and visual units)
16) Inadequate level of telecommunication services offered at the airport
17) Inadequate number and operational level of the media used (luggage belt, trolleys etc)
18) Inadequate space for permanent and temporary car parking outside the airport
19) Inadequate number, dimensions and conditions of the roads connecting the airport with the town.
20) Inadequate provision for persons with special abilities
We must underline that many users have been protesting repeatedly in the recent past against the aforementioned problems not only to the authorised public services but even through the Hellenic and foreign press.
We consider the presentation of the operational problems of the Hellenic insular airports, our main contribution towards overcoming these malfunctions, for the benefit of the development of the Hellenic tourism and towards upgrading the international reputation of Hellas.

PART FOUR

6. The case study of islands: CHIOS, KASTELORIZO, RHODES SKIATHOS

6.1. Selection criteria of these islands

6.1.1. Assumptions
As sources for the data of the present research have been used the Statistic Departments of:
a) The Hellenic Civil Aviation Authorities
b) The Hellenic Ministry of Mercantile Marine
e) Personal field research at the local societies, mainly municipal and professional
Organisations (hotel owners, travel agents)
Searched period :
– for the airports and ports, the decade 1989-1998
– for the development of the population and the economic structure of local societies
the decades 1971-1991
The evaluation of the quality of services supplied by each insular island is based on the opinions of the local municipal and professional organisations of the hotel owners and travel agents.

6.2. Profile of the selected islands

6.2.1. Chios
– The island has int’l airport. The contribution of the airplane to the touristic development compared to that of the short sea ship is weak. 49% of the total annual number of airport passengers concerns domestic scheduled flights, while the rest 51% concerns international charter flights. ( FIGURE 1)
– The dimensions of the runway are 1.500 m Χ 30m. The local society considers them inadequate for the touristic development. of the island.
– The area of the terminal building is 980 m2.
– The airplane passengers traffic follows a downward tendency (from 37% at 1989 to 31% at 1998) of the total annual island traffic while the short sea ship passen- gers traffic follows an upward trend – from 63% to 68% during the forementioned period. ( FIGURE 2)
– During the four months of peak season, from June to September the island has about 47% of its total annual airport passengers traffic, which represents only 60% of the airport traffic of other touristic islands during the same period. ( FIGURE 3)
– The total annual airport passengers traffic is equally divided (50%-50%) between domestic scheduled and international charter flights.
– The population number of the island follows a downward tendency – 6,7 % from 1971 to 1991
– The structure of the economy during the examined period has developed as follows
1971 1981 1991

PRIMARY SECTOR 41,69% 32,15% 16,3%
SECONDARY SECTOR 19,75% 21,05% 17,7%
TERTIARY SECTOR 38,56% 46,80% 66,0%

Although the touristic development of Chios island is essentially lower than that of Rhodes island, the tertiary sector in Chios is almost at the same level as that of Rhodes,
The reason for that enlargement is, according to our research, due to the fact that a great percentage of the population is orientated to sea professions (sailors etc)

FIGURE 1

FIGURE 2

FIGURE 3

6.2.2. Kastelorizo :

– It is a small island near Rhodes. (satellite of Rhodes)
– It has a small domestic airport
– The dimensions of the runway are 799m Χ 25m
– The area of the terminal building is 1.463 m2
– The air transport industry has minor contribution to the touristic development compared to the short sea ship The airplane (mainly scheduled domestic flights) covers round 40% of the total annual passengers traffic, while the short sea ship covers round 60% ( FIGURE 4)
– The airport passengers traffic concerns only domestic flights . 65% of the total annual airport passengers traffic concerns the four months of peak season from June to September. ( FIGURE 5)
– The population number of the island follows from 1971 to 1991 an upward tendency +2,5 %
– There are not available data concerning the structure of the economy during the examined period.

 

FIGURE 4

 

 

FIGURE 5

 

 

6.2.3. Rhodes
– The island has int’l airport with dominant contribution of the airplane to the touristic development compared to that of the short sea ship
– The dimensions of the runway are 3250m X 45m
– The dimensions of the terminal building are 24500 m2
– The airplane covers more than 80% of the total annual passengers traffic while the short sea ships cover less than 20% ( FIGURE 6)
– A percentage of round 80% of the aforementioned airport passengers traffic is covered by int’l charter flights. ( FIGURE 7)
– 65% of the total annual airport passengers traffic concerns the four months of peak season from June to September. (FIGURE 8)
– The population of the island follows an impressively upward tendency + 47 % from 1971 to 1991

RHODES ISLAND AIRPORT

– The structure of the economy during the examined period was developed as follows

1971 1981 1991

PRIMARY SECTOR 29,80% 9,66% 5,5%
SECONDARY SECTOR 25,96% 23,30% 20,0%
TERTIARY SECTOR 44,26% 67,03% 64,6%

From the aforementioned data it becomes obvious that the specific model of touristic development, forces (economically) the population to abandon the primary sector of economy and orientates it towards the tertiary sector (services).

FIGURE 6

FIGURE 7

 

 

FIGURE 8

 

 

 

6.2.4. Skiathos

– Has int’l airport with dominant contribution of the short sea ship to the touristic
development compared to that of the airplane
– The dimensions of the runway are 1570mx30m
– The dimensions of the terminal building are 2000 m2
– The airplane covers round 40% of the total annual island passengers traffic while
the short sea ship covers round 60% ( FIGURE 9)
– The participation of the domestic scheduled flights has been following a downward tendency – from more than 20% in 1989 to less than 10% in 1998, while a percentage floating from 80% in 1989 to more than 90% in 1998 of the aforementioned airport passengers traffic is covered by int’l charter flights. ( FI- GURE 10)
– 80% of the total annual airport passengers traffic concerns the four months of peak season from June to September. FIGURE 11)
– The population of the island follows from 1971 to 1991 an impressively upward tendency + 31 %
SKIATHOS ISLAND AIRPORT

 

– The structure of the economy during the examined period has developed as follows

1981 1991

PRIMARY SECTOR 19,0 % 7,9%
SECONDARY SECTOR 21,7 % 29,4%
TERTIARY SECTOR 59,3 % 62,7%

 

 

FIGURE 9

 

FIGURE 10

 

 

 

 

 

7. Conclusions

1) There are three categories of Hellenic touristic islands according to the criteria of contribution of the air transport industry to their touristic development
a) islands with international airport with domination of the airplane on the incoming tourism. Their development is based mainly on foreign tourism.
b) islands with international airports with domination of the short sea ship on the incoming tourism. Their development is based mainly on domestic tourism.
c) satellite islands, the touristic development of which is based on the touristic development of a bigger neighboring island (regional metropolis)

2) The contribution of the Hellenic air transport industry to the touristic product supplied by the Hellenic islands to the incoming foreign tourists, is limited only to services supplied by the insular airports.

3) The quality of services supplied by the Hellenic insular airports is non-compatible with the advanced needs of the incoming passengers belonging to those market segments to which the developmental model of the touristic islands is applied.

4) The government has constructed the airports of the Hellenic islands, whose development was planned to be based on the incoming international tourism, in order to support that developmental target. This is why their operation is subsidised by the taxpayers and not by the users.

5) The state ownership and the operational criteria (the airports used as a tool of application of the governmental regional policy) are some of the causes of the aforementioned malfunctions of these airports.

6) The airport traffic of the touristic islands is strongly seasonal. During the four months of peak season, from June to September, it fluctuates round the 65 % of the total annual airport traffic, while the traffic at the non-touristic insular international airports represents only 45%.

7) The existence of these airports has the same impact on the local societies as the domination of the tourism :
a) Accelerated the upgrading of the life quality level
b) Orientated the population to the tertiary sector of economy (services) mainly abandoning the primary sector
c) replaced traditional occupations with those related to tourism,
d) burdened the utilization of the natural environment

Bibliography

1) Hellenic Civil Aviation Authorities Statistic service
2) Hellenic Civil Aviation Authorities Technical Department
3) Hellenic Ministry of Mercantile Marine Statistic service
*4) Hellenic Statistic Service
5) Lainos J.S. “Air Transport Economics in an International Competitive Environment” Editions STAMOULIS Athens 1995 B! Edition 1999.
6) Lainos J.S “The impact of Air Transport on the development of the Hellenic Tourism” Article in the volume “Hellenic Tourism. Myths and Reality” Editions ANUBIS Athens 1996
7) I.A.T.A. A.H.M. .Annex A 4/1984

ANNUAL CONVENTION
OF AIRCRAFT ENGINEERS INTERNATIONAL (A.E.I.)
Athens-Hellas 28-29/9/2001

 

 

Twenty years (1978-1997) of Globalisation-Deregulation-Liberalisation The impact on world commercial air transport industry

By
Dr Yiannis S. Lainos
University of Thessaly-Traffic Engineers Department

1) What is the globalisation generally

The permanent trend of the current free market system from its first appearance for its aggressive expansion to new markets is something trivial.
Is the basic economic principle of the system that guides to the unstopped conquest of new markets (of other countries) for (depends on the development level of the system):
a) selling the national product
b) purchasing row materials that these markets (countries) are produced
c) exporting capital
d) investing to the markets with low labor cost or with high expectation of profits
The current phase of globalisation is a multidimentional contradictory procedure.
Concerns the economy the politiques the civilisation-culture, every part of human life
Causes of the current globalisation is mainly the rapid technological evolution especially at telecommunications and the transport especially the air transport.
Consequently air transport is the subject and the object of the current globalisation.
From the other hand the political dimension of the current globalisation is that the collapse of the former system of the existed socialism accommodated the procedure of globalisation

2) The Causes of globalisation at world commercial air transport industry
On September of 1944 nine months before of the end of the world war two, at Chicago of USA, 52 countries members of “Alliances” except USSR and Argentina were concentrated to determine the future institutional framework for the int’l flights
In that meeting were deposit two completely opposite stances (point of
views):
1) the USA which supported the complete abolition of the barriers at int’l flights.
2) the other participants a part of which was still under German occupation for example French e.t.c. supported the introduction of certain limitations –regulations- at int’l commercial air transport environment
The leadership of that effort had the U.K. with its former colonies-countries of commonwealth-Australia, Canada e.t.c.
We consider that the causes of globalisation (deregulation-liberalisation) of int’l commercial air transport industry is almost impossible to be understood if previously would not understood the causes of the aforementioned opposite point of view.
The supporters of a regulated Int’l institutional frame work for the word commercial air transport industry were the countries with their economy destroyed due to war
And they were afraid of domination of the USA the economy of which not only was untouchable from the war’s destruction but it had been stronger as well.
The arguments of the leader of the French representation about the necessity of regulation at int’l commercial air transport environment is very indicated:
“ We do not underestimate the benefits of emulation. However to be quite sound, the emulation must be actuated by forces between which equilibrium is and remains possible; the overwhelming superiority of a competitor, if he is an absolutely fair partner, might provoke protective reflexes in smaller nations, the aerial sovereignty of which is unquestioned.”
These regulated measures were decided by the majority of participants countries despite the strongly opposition of the USA
The main categories of terms of Chicago Convention of 1944-09 that regulated the environment of the world Commercial air transport industry were :
1) Each country would have one National air carrier
2) In each line (destination) between two countries could involve only the two national air carriers of these two countries
3) Each national air carrier could claim up to 50% of the market of each line
4) The fares of each line (city pairs) were determined (co-decided) between the two national air carriers that were involved in the certain line
It is obvious that under the aforementioned circumstances –regulations- the competition between the two involved in each city pair air carriers was focused on the quality of the offered services
However during the decades that followed the Chicago convention, the European countries overcome the destructive consequences of the world war II and some of the national air carriers strengthened so match that the barriers of the regulated int’l institutional environment of commercial air transport of Chicago convention started being barrier to their development. This is the main reason for which the former supporters of regulation such as U.K. transformed to the supporters of deregulation

3) The impact of Globalisation at world Commercial air transport industry

1) Globalisation on word commercial air transport industry took two different names and was fulfilled with different stages.
a) In USA was called deregulation (Presidents Democratic Carter and Republican Reigan and was applied with immediate abolition
of any barrier (market access, destination access, applied pricing policy) of any state interference even for assurance the flight safety
b) in E.U was called liberalisation (open skies policy). That policy taking into account:
– the negative experience of the USA deregulation especially the very negative impact on Aviation safety
– the essentially different conditions in Europe (many different states) is applied escalated (three packages of liberalisation ( ,1987,1993)

The main categories of rules of the Third package of liberalisation 1993 that determined the new rules for E.E. int’l commercial air transport industry, superseded the Chicago Convention included :
:
a) Abolition of the -Chicago Convention barriers of market entrance (abolition of the national carrier institution. Airline is the owner of one airplane and can enter into any market-city pairs-under the presuppositions of third package)

b) Abolition of the -Chicago Convention barriers of market allocation- destination selection (since the free entrance is the rule the determinant of market allocation is the competition)

c) Abolition of the -Chicago Convention barriers of pricing policy (introduction of free for every air carrier pricing policy)

The affected sectors and the impacts were briefly:

1) Abolition of the State control on flight safety

2) Tense of competition not only among the traditional air carriers but between the traditional and the new entrants low cost air carriers as well.

3) Due to tended competition efforts of the air carriers for increasing their productivity and decreasing their cost. A marginal example is value jet which a year before its obligatory by FAA destruction of its operation it was the most profitable airline in USA
a) deunionisation
b) decrease the salaries
c) increase the occupation time
d) abolition of permanency introducing flexible labor relationships
e) Completely or partial abolition of days off, allowances, annual leave,

4) In a decade after deregulation changed the air transport market environment Some survived became major and latter giga air carriers increasing their market share not only through direct competition or alliances-mergers-acquisitions, but establishing low cost-charter or regional scheduled affiliated airline companies to penetrate into markets where the competitor was dominant (British Airways in Germany, Vergin Atlantic-Vergin Express e.t.c.)

5) Finally Strong oligopoly trends

In 1978 first year of deregulation:
– were operated 112 air carriers at 48 states of USA.
– In 1986 were remained only 26 of these.
– In 1978 first year of deregulation
– 18 major air carriers of USA were covered 94% of the market share.
– In 1987 the same market share was covered by only 8 of the 18.

6) Initially increased the number of flights, the frequency and the destinations but finally-in no more than a decade-decreased all the aforementioned parameters especially the lower profitable lines

7) Initially decreased but finally-in almost seven years increased the fares level over inflation level as a result of oligopolistic trend (decrease the number of airlines-decreased the tense of competition))

8) Increased the number of employees but round one third of the increased of product

9) The Average Productivity IATA member air carriers increased about the double

10) Worsened the terms and conditions of labor

11) Redetermined of the State involvement in the economy and especially interstate organisations

12) Appeared a strong trend for Privatisation of the state owned airlines (the role of the ownership regime as a tool for the management of the society see the chapter Globalisation-Nationalisation-Privatisation)

13) Rapid technological evolution

14) Initially deceased the flight safety level (for more than a decade)

 

ALLIANCES
OF WORLD COMMERCIAL IATA MEMBERS AIR CARRIERS

NAME OF ALLIANCE : WINGS (established 1989)
MEMBERS
KLM NORTHWEST

NAME OF ALLIANCE : STAR (established 1997)
MEMBERS
AIR CANADA – AIR NEW ZEALAND –ALL NIPPON AIRWAYS-ANSETT AUSTRALIA-AUSTRIAN- BRITISH MIDLAND-LAUDA AIR-LUFHANSA – MEXICANA -SINGAPORE AIRLINES – VARIG

 

NAME OF ALLIANCE: QUALIFLYER (established 1998)
MEMBERS
AIR PORTUGAL (TAP) -AOM-CROSSAIR-SABENA-SWISSAIR-
TURKISH AIRLINES

 

NAME OF ALLIANCE: ONE WORLD (established 1998/10)
MEMBERS
AER LINGUS- AMERICAN AIRLINES – BRITISH AIRWAYS – CATHAY PACIFIC – FINNAIR – IBERIA -LAN CHILE- QUANTAS

 

NAME OF ALLIANCE: SKY TEAM (established 2000-06)
MEMBERS
AEROMEXICO – AIR FRANCE – ALITALIA – DELTA – COREAN

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

JET FLEET (Source: World Air Transport Statistics -WATS)

The average increase of this index during the examined two decades of deregulation was about 180 %

Air carrier’s PRODUCT indices (supplied and demanded)

There is a number of indices to determine the volume of an air carrier’s product.
Supplied and demanded.
For the purposes of the present approach some of the main indices are considered:

A) Supplied product

1) Available Seat Kilometers

Is the sum of the offered number of seats of eatch aircraft type at eatch flight- destination, multiplied with the distance of this flight and the frequency of flights.
The determinants of this index are :
– Programmed Fleet’s size.
– Programmed Fleet’s composition.
– Programmed Fleet’s utilisation.
– Programmed Average stage length,
– Programmed Number of the flights.
– Programmed Aircrafts configuration (the number of offered seats per aircraft).

2) Available number of a/cs departures
Programmed Fleet’s size.
Programmed Number of destinations.
Programmed Frequency of flights.

3) Available number of a/cs flight hours
Programmed Fleet’s size.
Programmed Number of destinations.
Programmed Frequency of flights.
Programmed turn around time.
Programmed Average Aircraft’s speed.
Average stage length.

B) Demanded product

4) Revenue Passengers Kilometers
Is the sum of the demanded (sold) capacity (passengers) of the produced-offered of each aircraft type at each flight multiplied with the distance of this flight. The determinants are :
Average stage length
Number of the flights
Actual passengers carried

5) Passengers carried
Fleet’s size.
Number of destinations.
Frequency of flights.

6) Actual a/c departures
Fleet’s size.
Number of destinations.
Frequency of flights.

7) Actual a/cs hours flown
Fleet’s size.
Number of destinations.
Frequency of flights.
Average stage length.
Slots and airport’s congestion.
Average Aircraft’s speed.

 

INDEX : Available Seat Kilometers (Source: WATS)

The average increase of this product index during the examined two decades of deregulation was about 250 %

 

INDEX : Revenue Passengers Kilometers (Source: WATS)

The average increase of this product index during the examined two decades of deregulation was about 280 %

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

INDEX : Passengers Carried (Source: WATS)

The average increase of this product index during the examined two decades of deregulation was about 240 %

 

 

 

 

INDEX : Number of Aircraft Departures (Source: WATS)

The average increase of this product index during the examined two decades of deregulation was about 250 %

 

 

 

 

 

INDEX : Number of Hours Flown (Source: WATS)
The average increase of this product index during the examined two decades of deregulation was about 200 %

 

 

 

 

 

PRODUCTIVITY

A brief theoretical approach about the essence of airline productivity will be presented during our tomorrow lecture. However for the needs of our current presentation we consider necessary a definition.
With the term productivity is defined a certain quantity and quality of production per involved employee in a time unit. This is resultant of many determinants the main of which are:

A) External environment

1) The weather conditions
2) Slot congestion
3) Airport congestion
4) The turn-around time (ground time between two continuous flights) of the a/cs
5) Political conditions of the countries of departures and arrivals

B) Internal environment

1) the automation’s level of the jobs included the used softwear and hardwear,
2) The aircraft’s design
3) the efficiency of the organizational structur,
4) the efficiency of the managerial (motivation etc), system-methods applied
5) the technological innovation introduced
6) the rational composition of the fleet of the Airline company,
7) the quality of the used materials,
8) the experience, the education and the training level of the employees.

Some of the main indices of airline productivity are:

B) Offered product
1) Available Seat Kilometers per employee
2) Programmed a/cs departures per employee
3) Programmed a/cs flight hours per employee

C) Demanded product
7) Revenue Passengers Kilometers per employee
8) Passengers carried per employee
9) Actual a/c departures per employee
10) Actual a/cs hours flown per employee

 

 

INDEX: Number of Employees (Source: Elaborated data from WATS)

The average increase of this index during the examined two decades of deregulation was about 90 %

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

INDEX: Available Seat Kilometers per average employee
(Source: Elaborated data from WATS)

The average increase of the certain productivity index during 1978-1997 twenty years of deregulation was about 80 %

 

 

 

 

 

INDEX: Revenue Passengers Kilometers per average employee
(Source: Elaborated data from WATS)

The average increase of the certain productivity index during 1978-1997 twenty years of deregulation was about 100 %

 

 

 

 

 

 

INDEX: Passengers Carried per average employee
(Source: Elaborated data from WATS)

The average increase of the certain productivity index during the 1978-1997 twenty years of deregulation was about 80 %

 

 

 

 

 

 

INDEX: Aircraft Departures per average employee
(Source: Elaborated data from WATS)

The average increase of the certain productivity index during the 1978-1997 twenty years of deregulation was about 40 %

 

 

 

 

 

 

INDEX: Hours Flown per average employee
(Source: Elaborated data from WATS)

The average increase of the certain productivity index during the 1978-1997 twenty years of deregulation was about 60 %

 

 

 

 

 

FLIGHT SAFETY LEVEL (Source ICAO)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A BRIEF THEORETICAL APPROACH OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GLOBALISATION AND PRIVATISATION

We consider that the understanding of the causes and the contain of privatisation is not possible without the understanding of the causes and the contain of nationalisation.
In order to be understood the of the causes and the contain of nationalisation.
it must be understood the essence of the state’s involvement into social economic affairs and especially the state’s enterprise activity.
The role of the state as institution of the social organisation- from its establishment (slavery social-economic system)- was the management of the social affairs.
From that role of the state comes the word politics that in Greek language means the affairs of the “polis” when “polis” was the first form of the state in the Greek territory
The contemporary civil state -that was first established in U.K. after two revolutions- expresses the economic power and the interests mainly of the dominant economic forces meanwhile of the owners of the productive media and the merchants especially the top of their pyramid.
Consequently the interference of the state to social affairs, the guidance of the social forces to certain orientation and the determination of certain solutions, is one of the state’s main duty
Specifically the involvement of the civil state on economy was for some time periods its main duty.
That involvement was firstly expressed through the institutional framework that determined :
– the export-import policy
– the pricing policy
– the salary policy
– the national production policy
– the regional development

Another expression of the state’s involvement on economy was the state’s enterprise activity.
The phenomenon of the state enterprise activity is not a contemporary one and in none case concerns the activity of the civil state only.
In Greek economic history there are evidences about the ownership of Athens “polis”-state of the silver mines at Lavrion area
But the state enterprise activity as a main tool of social management was applied after world war II by the European countries that remained under the free market system.
It was based on the anti-crises theory of the ‘30’s decade of the Scottish banker John Maynard Keyns
This theory was based on the experience of the grate crisis of 1929-1933 and was focused on creation of active demand for the people through the state employment and the more active involvement of the state into economy. The aim was to be avoided the appearance of the circular crises

The system of the former so called existed socialism .

The causes of the extended state enterprise activity that was applied after the war world II by the western European governments, (nationalisation- state monopolies of some enterprises mainly of crucial, then, sectors of the economy ) were simultane-
ously economic and political as well:

1) the will to be unified the management of the social sources for faster and more efficient overcome of the destructive consequences of the war

2) the will for unified control of the main-strategic for that time period, sectors of the economy that are necessary to assure the unbreakable continuous of the productive process (energy-transport-telecommunications, research centers e.t.c.). The grate volume of capital needed to be invested and due to this reason the low ratio of pay back made these sectors not attractive to private investors

3) the unified control of the military industry (during the cold war)

4) the protection of the system from the domination of a certain team of interests that their activity for maximisation of their profits could create barriers to the normal continuation of the productive process of the majority of the owners of the product media

5) effectively facing of the danger due to the failure of some investors who reached their companies into bankruptcy. That failure could create negative impacts for the normal continuation of the productive process of the country and on the stability of the system. In that case the state acquired the bankrupted company and assured the continuation of its operation

6) the unified and immediate control of the grate during that period unemployment and the assurance of a satisfactory labor income

7) the creation of the necessary presuppositions for succesful correspondence of the system of free market to the competition with the system of the former so called existed socialism .

What has changed concerning the aforementioned causes
that resulted to privatisation

1) the destructive consequences of the war world II have been overcome

2) the cold war and the system of the former so called existed socialism belongs to the past consequently there is no need for all these measures to respond to the competition of the systems

3) the economies of the European countries have been rapidly developed

4) the national borders were barriers to the further development at list in Europe. More over the competition among Europe, USA and Japan was tended. The efficient facing of that competition through the unification of the markets of the E.U. members countries was the main reason for establishing the E.U.

5) The volume of the concentrated capital and the rapid evolution of the technology gave the opportunity to private investors to invest on sectors where two-three decades ago was exclusive field of the state.

6) The establishment of E.U. changed the methods and the mechanisms of state interference in the economy
7) For the market forces become obvious that the state involvement into economy could not continue through the same tracks but it was necessary the coordination of all the members of the E.U. at the application of the policies at each sector of the economy

8) The tool of public enterprises not only considered as a non useful tool for the social management but the market forces accused public enterprises for unaccepted increase of the operational cost argued that the private sector could achieved lower cost.

 

 

EUROPEAN UNION FORMER NATIONAL AIR CARRIERS
SHARE OF STATE OWNERSHIP

STATE PRIVATE

Aer Lingus…………………………….
Air France………………..…….100%.………0%
Air Portugal (TAP)…..…………100.%………0% (1)
Alitalia……………………..……100%………0%
Austrian Airlines………………………
Braathens (Norway)……………….0%…….100%
British Airways…………………..49%……..51%
Finnair…………………………….70%……..30%
Iberia………………………………0%…….100%
KLM……..…………….………….25%……..75% (2)
Lufthansa…………………………
Olympic Airways…………………100%……… 0%
Sabena……………………………..51%.……. 49% (3)
Scandinavian Air System (SAS)…50%..……..50%
Swissair……………………………….

1) intended to be introduced into stock market. However the state preserves the authority to control at any time the 51% of the capital
3) Swissair

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CONCLUSIONS
THE IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION
ON WORLD COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY
Increased the total number of employees round 80% while the number of a/c engineers increased only 40 %
1) Αt the mean time the product increased 300%
2) Decreased of the number of job specialties
3) Increased labour’s productivity of a/c engineers round 100%
4) WORSENED THE TERMS OF LABOUR:
a) Increased the labor time (on a year base)
b) Decreased the number of days off, allowances, annual leave,
c) Dominated the trend of limited the employees permanency introducing flexible labour relations
d) Introduced personal contracts instead of collective agreements with unions
5) Finally achieved deunionisation
6) Achieved rapid the technological evolution
7) Decrease relatively the labor income
8) Increased the tense level of employees,
9) Tented the competition between the employees
10) Tended the employees effort for self-improvement to
survive into the tended competition among employees
11) Worsening of the welfare state (the terms of social
insurance and pension e.t.c.)
12) Increased a/c engineers uncertainty
13) Decreased of a/c engineers satisfaction level from their labor
14) Decreased of a/c engineers social acceptance level
15) Decreased of a/c engineers self acceptance-respect level
16) Decreased Aircraft engineers labor motivation power
17) Tended the /c engineers stress
18) Negative impact on their family and social life
19) Negative impact on the quantity and especially on the
quality of their labor what means
20) The aforementioned resulted to the decrease-for a period of time-of the flight safety level

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Air Transport Research Society (ATRS) 8th Annual World Conference,
July 1-3, 2004 Istanbul, Turkey

Particularities of labor’s productivity in an international scheduled airline. Case study: The change of the Olympic Airway’s (Greece) average labor’s productivity trend, compared with the Ι.Α.Τ.Α.’s (1975-2002)
Yiannis S. Lainos
Ph.D. in Aviation Economics, Management Human factors

ABSTRACT
Competition nowadays has sharply increased in the International Air Transport Industry, as a consequence of the changes in the international regulated environment (U.S.A. 1978 Deregulation Act, E.U.1993 Third Package of Liberalization-Open skies policy) and the application of the information technology.
Due to the aforementioned changes labour productivity (supplied or demanded product per average employee) became a crucial factor, for the survival and the development of any airline.
The labor’s productivity in a scheduled passengers’ airline can be considered from two different perspectives: from the internal and from the external corporate environ- ment, although these two environments are not separated by a Great Wall of China.
Our present paper examines the productivity’s determinants and indices only from the internal corporate environment. point of view.
Although the indices of the airline’s productivity appear to be simple, they are very complicated, due to the special features of the Air Transport product. The difficulties in comparing the airlines’ productivity are due to the following factors:
a) All the airlines do not produce the same number and quality of products
b) Airlines accept services by third parties and offer services to third parties.
This is the reason why in the present paper the term “productivity’s trend” is used instead off “productivity level”.
Keywords: Airline-productivity, Air-transport-management Available-Seat-Kilometers, Available-Tone-Kilometers Revenue-Tone-Kilometers, Revenue-Passenger-Kilometers
Aim of the paper
Aim of the present paper is the identification of:
a) The meaning and the role of the labor’s productivity in the Airline,
b) The airline’s productivity indices,
c) the change of the productivity’s trend per average employee of the Olympic Airways (O.A.) compared with the I.A.T.A’s for the given time period (1975-2002) )
d) the circumstances, and the causes of this change (for the O.A.)

The methodology applied
• The source, of the data used, are form the IATA’s annual publication “World Air Transport Statistics” from 1975 to 2002. The productivity indices used are the official IATA’s indices.
• In order to express the annual productivity of the OA and IATA per index , the annual volume of product per every index was divided by the number of the employees
• From the aforementioned calculation the annual Olympic Airways results per index were divided by the IATA’s .
• These final results reflect the relationship of the productivity’s trend per average employee per used index, between the Olympic Airways and the I.A.T.A.

The author’s contribution is:
• The determination of the presuppositions for an objective comparison of the productivity among Int’l scheduled Airlines.
• The determination of the comparative change of the average annual productivity’s trend between the Olympic Airways and the IATA.
• The unified methodology applied for the O.A. as well as for the IATA,
which is the division of the annual production’s volume per index used,
by the number of employees.
• This methodology can be applied in any similar case.
1. Introduction.
1.1. The role of the productivity in the Air transport commercial industry
During the last fifty years competition, as the basic mechanism of the market’s functions, had not the same “special weight” in the life of the int’l commercial scheduled Airline industry. That was due to the different international institutional framework (regulated, Chicago 1944- deregulated U.S.A. 1978 Deregulation Act, E.U.1993 Third Package of liberalization)).
Due to the aforementioned factors the competition, nowadays, has sharply intensified. Consequently the productivity has become a crucial factor for the survival and the development of an Airline company.
The upgrading of productivity’s level, through introduction of information technology in all levels of airline’s production chain and the modernization of the applied managerial systems, gives to an Airline company the capability to correspond to the requirements of the intensified competition.

2. Brief theoretical approach
2.1. Definitions – Assumptions .(Lainos 1999, 2003)
2.1.1. Aircraft configuration
Is the number and the structure of the supplied seats per aircraft.
2.1.2. Available Tone Kilometers (ATK’s).
Is the payload of each aircraft multiplied with the distance of each flight.
2.1.3. Available Seat Kilometers (A.S.K.’s).
Is the sum of the offered number of seats of each aircraft type at each flight multiplied with the distance of this flight and the frequency.
2.1.4. Average aircraft’s passengers load factor.
Is the demanded-sold capacity in passenger or passenger kilometers (R.P.K.’s) divided by the supplied-offered seats or seat kilometers (A.S.K’s).
2.1.5. Average general aircraft load factor.
Is the demanded capacity in tones or tone Kilometers (R.T.K.’s) divided by the supplied capacity in tones or tone kilometers (A.T.K.’s)
2.1.6. Average stage length.
Is the sum of the kilometers flown divided by the number of landings (destinations).
2.1.7. Fleet’s size: Is the number of aircraft in a fleet
2.1.8. Fleet’s composition
Is the percentage participation of the number of each a/c type to the total number of a/c of the fleet.
2.1.9. Fleet’s utilization.
Is the time expressed in “Block Hours” (chock to chock) or in “Flight Hours” in a time period (usually day).
2.1.10. Number of the flights.
Is the annual sum of the daily number of the flights of the entire network.
2.1.11. The term productivity is defined as the quotient of a fraction, the numerator of which includes the volume of the demanded or the supplied product (of the same quality) during a period of time and the denominator includes the number of the employees who participated in the particular production process.
2.1.12. Revenue Tone Kilometers (R.T.K.’s).
Is the demanded (sold) capacity in tones of each aircraft type at each flight multiplied with the distance of this flight.
2.1.12. Revenue Passenger Kilometers (R.T.K.’s).
Is the demanded (sold) capacity in seats or passengers carried, of each aircraft type at each flight multiplied with the distance of this flight.

2.2. Determinants of the airline labor’s productivity
The productivity of an airline company can be be considered from two different perspectives.
a) The internal corporate environment and b) the external one although these two environments cannot be separated with the Great Wall of China.
The external environment includes the environment of the air transport industry (mainly the international institutional framework-the slots, the airports, the relationships-competition-among the airlines etc) and the wider economic and political environment.
The internal airline corporate environment includes:
a) The capital (airplanes, premises, machines, spare parts etc.)
b) The number of destinations and the structure of the network
c) the organizational structure
d) the applied administrational systems
e) the personnel etc.
Our present paper is focused on the productivity’s determinants and the factors of only the internal corporate environment.
The productivity is the resultant of many determinants. The main of these determinants are the efficiency and the effectiveness of the airline management functions : (TABLE 1). (Ambrose Mike A. 1996, Brown A. 1998, Burnes B. 1996, Deal T.-Kennedy A.1999). Based on the content of the managerial functions it becomes obvious that the productivity’s level reflects mainly the efficiency and the effectiveness of the management functions. (-Hofstede, G 1980a Summer, 1983 Fall, 1991, Kotter J. 1995 March-April, -Maurino, D. E. 1994, Salas, E., Bowers, C.A., & Edens, E.(2001). It must be noticed that the human resource management is included in the managerial functions.
Calculating the productivity index is a simple division. But the result of the afore- mentioned division does not always represent the actual real fair and true productivity of a given airline The reason is that the numerator of the fraction (the volume of the product) does not necessarily includes the entire supplied product of the airline.
For example, there is a possibility that, the product supplied to third party Ground Handling services or Maintenance services etc. is not included, although the denominator includes the total number of the employees that participated in the production process of these services. In this case the productivity appears lower than the actual one. The denominator of the above mentioned fraction “number of the involved employees”, depends and is strongly affected by:
a) the permanent employees: the annual working hours per employee I) as
per the collective labor agreements and the national labor legislation II) the
actual annual working hours per employee (overtime, sick leave, etc)
b) the seasonal employees I) whether they are included in the submitted to the IATA data and II) if their working hours are annualised according to the collective labor agreements and the national labor legislation
In this paper for a more accurate approach, the productivity’s level will be examined through all the eight indices of the airline’s productivity (supplied and demanded
product) which are determined by the IATA. (TABLE 2)
In the present paper the term change of the productivity’s trend is used instead of change of the productivity. The cause is that the submitted data of the IATA members reflect the following differences :
– the number of the airlines IATA’s members that they report their data annually
TABLE 1

– the number of destinations ,
– the frequency of flights ,
– the average stage length
– the number and type of airplanes ,
– the fleet utilization,
– the seasonality,
– the number of self produced services
TABLE 2

1) Kilometers Flown
2) Hours Flown
3) Aircraft Departures
4) Passengers Carried
5) Revenue Passenger Kilometers
6) Available Seat Kilometers
7) Revenue Tone Kilometers
8) Available Tone Kilometers

– the number of services purchased by third party (maintenance and overhaul, ground commercial and technical handling, catering etc.) .
– the percentage of the airlines’ activities supplied to third parties etc. (maintenance and overhaul, ground commercial and technical handling, catering etc.).
– the aircraft’s ground time (between flights and for maintenance).
– the air traffic and airport congestion.
The examined period includes the years from 1975 to 2002 when the O.A. was under the state owned regime.

2.3. The product indices – Determinants.
According to the index «volume of the product» the airline product is divided in supplied product and demanded product. This classification is a result of the particularities of the airline product. Since the airline product cannot be stored it must be consumed as soon as it is produced. After the departure of the airplane the non-consumed quantity is lost and consequently it burdens the final cost of the flight. Further more the airline product is not produced in pieces (one seat or one tone) but in a group of pieces and tones (the number of seats and the available tones of the aircraft ). These are the main causes of the classification of the airline product and productivity’s indices into the supplied and the demanded.
2.3.1. The supplied product indices.
The supplied (produced) capacity of a scheduled Airline, is expressed by two main indices : a) weight (tones) and b) number of seats. If these indices are multiplied with the kilometers of each flight they are transformed into the Available Tone Kilometers and Available Passenger Kilometers
2.3.1.1. Available Tone Kilometers (ATK’s).
The determinants of this index are:
– Fleet’s size (number of aircraft).
– Fleet’s composition (number of aircraft types and number of aircrafts per a/c type . The type of an a/c is determined by it’s capacity and range).
– Fleet’s utilisation (block hours per a/c per time period)).
– Average stage length (number of flights divided by the sum of their total distance)
– Number of the flights.
2.3.1.2. Available Seat Kilometers (A.S.K.’s).
The determinants of this index are:
-Fleet’s size.
-Fleet’s composition.
-Fleet’s utilization.
-Average stage length,
-Number of the flights.
-Aircraft configuration (the number and the structure of the supplied seats per aircraft).
2.3.2. The demanded product indices
The total revenue (sold) capacity of a scheduled Airline, is presented by two main indices: a) number of revenue tones and b) number of passengers carried. If these indices are multiplied with the kilometers of each flight they are transformed into their corresponded a) revenue tone kilometers and b) revenue passenger kilometers
2.3.2.1. Revenue Tone Kilometers (R.T.K.’s).
The determinants of this index are :
Fleet’s composition
Fleet’s utilization (hours).
Effective and efficient utilization of the fleet.
Average stage length
Number of the flights
Average general aircraft’s load factor.
2.3.2.2. Revenue Passenger Kilometers.
The determinants of this index are :
Fleet’s composition
Fleet’s utilization (hours).
Average stage length
Number of the flights
Passengers carried.

3. Case study: The change of the Olympic Airways’s (Greece) average labor’s productivity trend, compared with the Ι.Α.Τ.Α.’s (1975-2002)

3.1. Clarifications
For better understanding of the causes of the O.A.’s productivity level per index, the presentation of some particular terms and conditions of the O.A.’s internal environment which affected either positively or negatively its productivity level, follows: (Lainos 2003)
• The number of the O.A.’s seasonal employees between the years 1975 and 2002 fluctuated from 7% to 30% of its permanent employees on an annual basis but it was not included in the reported personnel number by O.A. to IATA .
• Up to 1992, the O.A. had the exclusive privilege to offer ground handling services
at all the Greek airports to all third parties which used these airports. About the 25% of the O.A.’s personnel was occupied in this duty. Since then this percentage has followed a declining trend. The product volume of these employees was not included in the reported data by the O.A. to the IATA although the reported number of employees were included.
• The annual overtimes used to represent a 5% of the official annual labor time.
• Between the years 1993 and 2002 two recapitalisation programs were applied to the O.A. by the conservative (1989-1993) and the socialist (1994-2004) governments and two unsuccessful efforts of the O.A.’s privatization. During this period of time the number of the O.A.’s permanent employees decreased to 45%.
• A 2% of the O.A.’s personnel was occupied on duties to the political parties and unions.

3.2. The percentage participation of the OA’s production indices, on the three basic categories of its destinations’ network
At the brief theoretical approach of the present paper, are mentioned the effects of the airline’s network composition (short-medium-long haul), on the level of the airline’s production and productivity’s indices.
The follow TABLE 3 shows the percentage participation of the OA’s eight production indices on the three basic categories of its destinations’ network

Percentage participation of the O.A.’s production indices per network category
TABLE 3
Production Indices NETWORK category
Short Medium Long
1) Kilometers Flown 16% 59% 25%
2) Aircraft Departures 53% 44% 3%
3) Hours Flown 25% 57% 18%
4) Passengers Carried 52% 40% 8%
5) Revenue Passenger Kilometers 10% 55% 45%
6)Available Seat Kilometers 8,8% 48,2% 43%
7) Revenue Tone Kilometers 9,7% 43,3% 47%
8) Available Tone Kilometers 9 % 43% 48%

From the above table, the differentiation of the effect of the OA’s destinations’ network structure (three basic network categories), on each one of the eight labour’s productivity indices, becomes obvious.

3.3. The annual percentage change of the trend of the productivity index
“number of Kilometers Flown per average employee”
between the Olympic Airways S.A. (O.A.) and the I.A.T.A. (1975-2002)

The relationship of the O.A.’s productivity index “number of Kilometers Flown per average employee” compared with the I.A.T.A’s, fluctuated at 62 % in 1975 while in 2002 it fluctuated at 68 %. (FIGURE 1)

 

FIGURE 1

 

 

During this period of time the lowest price of this relationship was 46 % in 1991 due to the Gulf crisis, and the highest price was 94% in 2000 due to the increase in 2000, of the production index “number of Kilometers Flown” for the O.A. to 13,7 % and for the I.A.T.A.only to 5,7%. In 2000 the number of the O.A.’s employees decreased to 5,3% while the I.A.T.A.’s increased to 2,4 %.
Regarding the Olympic Airways S.A. (O.A.). (TABLE 4)
The price of the O.A.’s productivity index “number of Kilometers Flown per average employee” increased between the years 1975 and 2002 to 97% with maximum increase to 156% in 2000 Between the years 1975 and 2000 the O.A.’s total Number of Employees decreased by 4%.The price of the O.A.’s production index Kilometers Flown between the years 1975 and 2002 increased to 89%. The impressive decrease of the price of the O.A.’s productivity index number of Kilometers Flown per average employee in the years 2001 and 2002 is due to the decrease of the O.A.’s Kilometers Flown to 6,2% and 17,3% respectively while the O.A’s total Number of employees increased in 2001 to 6,9% and in 2002 decreased to 0,2%
Regarding the International Air Transport Association (TABLE 4)
The I.A.T.A.’s productivity index “number of Kilometers Flown per average employee” compared with the base year 1975, increased to 78% in 2002, which is the highest price of the index during the researched period of time
In the same period of time the I.A.T.A.’s production index “number of Kilometers Flown” increased to 252% while the Number of Employees increased to 97%.
TABLE 4

1975-2002 Ο.Α. Ι.Α.Τ.Α.
Number of Kilometers Flown per average employee 97% 78%
Number of Kilometers Flown 89% 252 %
Total Number of Employees (4%) 97 %

3.4. The annual percentage change of the trend of the productivity index
“number of Aircraft Departures per average employee”
between the Olympic Airways S.A. (O.A.) and the I.A.T.A. (1975-2002)
The relationship of the O.A.’s productivity index “number of Aircraft Departures per average employee” compared with the I.A.T.A’s, fluctuated at 73 % in 1975 and at 114% in 2002. (FIGURE 2)

 

FIGURE 2

 

 

During this period of time the lowest price of this relationship was 73% in 1975 first year of the O.A.’s nationalization and the highest price was 146% in 2000 due to the increase in 2000, of the production index “number of Aircraft Departures” for the O.A. to 5,1% and for the I.A.T.A. to 6,4%. At the year 2000 the number of the O.A.’s employees decreased to 5,3% while the I.A.T.A.’s increased to 2,4%.
Regarding the Olympic Airways S.A. (TABLE 5)
The price of the O.A.’s productivity index “number of Aircraft Departures per average employee” increased between the years 1975 and 2002 to 97% with maximum increase to 156% in 2000. Between the years 1975 and 2000 the O.A.’s total Number of Employees decreased by 4%.
The impressive decrease of this index in the years 2001 and 2002 is due to the decrease of the O.A.;s number of Aircraft Departures to 4,7% and 11,1% respectively.
The price of the O.A.’s production index number of Aircraft Departures between the years 1975 and 2002 increased to 89%
Regarding the International Air Transport Association (TABLE 5)
The I.A.T.A.’s productivity index “number of Aircraft Departures per average employee” compared with the base year 1975, increased to 28% in 2002. Its highest price was the 31% in 2001.
In the same period of time the I.A.T.A.’s production index “number of Aircraft Departures ” increased to 152% while the Number of Employees increased to 97%.
TABLE 5

1975-2002 Ο.Α. Ι.Α.Τ.Α.
Number of Aircraft Departures per average employee 98% 28%
Number of Aircraft Departures 90% 152%
Total Number of Employees (4%) 97 %

3.5. The annual percentage change of the trend of the productivity index
“number of Hours Flown per average employee”
between the Olympic Airways S.A. (O.A.) and the I.A.T.A. (1975-2002)
The relationship of the O.A.’s productivity index “number of Hours Flown per average employee” compared with the I.A.T.A’s fluctuated at 72 % in 1975 while in 2002 it fluctuated at 81%. (FIGURE 3)
During this period of time the lowest price of this relationship was 55 % in 1991 due to the Gulf crisis and the highest price was 108 % in 2000 due to the increase in 2000, of the production index “number of Hours Flown ” for the O.A. to 11,3 % while for the I.A.T.A. increased to 9,5 %. At the same year- 2000- the number of the O.A.’s employees decreased to 5,3% while the I.A.T.A.’s increased to 2,4%.
Regarding the Olympic Airways S.A. (TABLE 6)
The price of the O.A.’s productivity index “number of Hours Flown per average employee” increased between the years 1975 and 2002 to

 

FIGURE 3

 

 

102% with maximum increase to 158% in 2000. Between the years 1975 and 2000 the O.A.’s total Number of Employees decreased by 4%.
The price of the O.A.’s production index number of Hours Flown between the years 1975 and 2002 increased to 93%. The impressive decrease of the O.A.’s productivity index “number of Hours Flown per average employee” in the years 2001 and 2002 is due to the decrease of the number of Hours Flown to 4,4% and 12,6% respectively.
Regarding the International Air Transport Association (TABLE 6)
The I.A.T.A.’s productivity index “number of Hours Flown per average employee” compared with the base year 1975, increased to 79% in 2002 which is its highest price. In the same period of time-1975-2002- the I.A.T.A.’s production index “number of Hours Flown” increased to 253% while the Number of Employees increased to 97%.
TABLE 6

1975-2002 Ο.Α. Ι.Α.Τ.Α.
Number of Hours Flown per average employee 102% 79 %
Number of Hours Flown 93% 253%
Total Number of Employees (4%) 97%

3.6. The annual percentage change of the trend of the productivity index
“number of Passengers Carried per average employee”
between the Olympic Airways S.A. (O.A.) and the I.A.T.A. (1975-2002)
The relationship of the O.A.’s productivity index “number of Passengers Carried per average employee” compared with the I.A.T.A’s, fluctuated at 97 % in 1975 while in 2002 it fluctuated at 92 % (FIGURE 4)
During this period of time the lowest price of this relationship was 70% in 1991 due to the Gulf crisis and the highest price was 129% in 1980 when the production index number of Passengers Carried decreased for the O.A. to 2,7% and for the IATA to2,3%. At the same period of time –1980- the number of the O.A.’s employees decreased to 1,6% while the I.A.T.A.’s increased to1,6%.

 

FIGURE 4

 

 

 

 

Regarding the Olympic Airways S.A. (TABLE 7)
The price of the O.A.’s productivity index “number of Passengers Carried per average employee” increased between the years 1975 and 2002 to 104% with maximum increase to 162% in 2000. The O.A.’s total Number of Employees decreased by 4%. between the years 1975 and 2002
The price of the O.A.’s production index number of Passengers Carried between the years 1975 and 2002 increased to 96% with its maximum price to 135% in 2000. The impressive decrease of the O.A.’s productivity index “number of Passengers Carried per average employee” in the years 2001 and 2002 is due to the decrease of the O.A.’s production index number of Passengers Carried to 4,7% and 11,1% respectively.
Regarding the International Air Transport Association (TABLE 7)
The I.A.T.A.’s productivity index “number of Passengers Carried per average employee” compared with the base year 1975, increased to 28% in 2002. Its highest price was the 31% in 2001.
In the same period of time the I.A.T.A.’s production index “number of Passengers Carried ” increased to 152% while the Number of Employees increased to 97%.
TABLE 7

1975-2002 Ο.Α. Ι.Α.Τ.Α.
Number of Passengers Carried per average employee 204% 215%
Number of Passengers Carried 96% 324%
Total Number of Employees (4%) 97 %

3.7. The annual percentage change of the trend of the productivity index
“number of Revenue Passenger Kilometers per average employee “
between the Olympic Airways S.A. (O.A.) and the I.A.T.A. (1975-2002)

The relationship of the O.A.’s productivity index “number of Revenue Passenger Kilometers per average employee” compared with the I.A.T.A’s fluctuated at 79 % in 1975 while in 2002 it fluctuated at 61 % (FIGURE 5)

 

FIGURE 5

 

 

 

During this period of time the lowest price of this relationship was 52% in 1991 due to the Gulf crisis and the highest price was 86 % in 1976 (second year of the O.A.’s nationalisation) when the production index number of Revenue Passenger Kilometers increased for the O.A. to 34,5% and for the IATA to 9,5 %. At the same period of time -1976- the number of the O.A.’s employees increased to 13,5% and the I.A.T.A.’s increased 0,6%.
Regarding the Olympic Airways S.A. (TABLE 8).
The price of the O.A.’s productivity index “number of Revenue Passenger Kilometers per average employee” increased between the years 1975 and 2002 to 104% with maximum increase to 162% in 2000 The O.A.’s total Number of Employees decreased between the years 1975-2002 by 4%.
The price of the O.A.’s production index number of Revenue Passenger Kilometers
between the years 1975 and 2002 increased to 118% with its maximum price to 168% in 1997.
The impressive decrease of the O.A.’s productivity index “number of Revenue Passenger Kilometers per average employee” in the years 2001 and 2002 is due to the decrease of the O.A.’s production index number of Revenue Passenger Kilometers to 4,7% and 11,1% respectively.
Regarding the International Air Transport Association (TABLE 8).
The I.A.T.A.’s productivity index “number of Revenue Passenger Kilometers per average employee” compared with the base year 1975, increased in 2002 to 196%. which is its highest price.
In the same period of time the I.A.T.A.’s production index “number of Revenue Passenger Kilometers ” increased to 484 % while the Number of Employees increased to 97%.
TABLE 8

1975-2002 Ο.Α. Ι.Α.Τ.Α.
Number of Revenue Passenger Kilometers per average employee 104% 196%
Number of Revenue Passenger Kilometers 118% 484%
Total Number of Employees (4%) 97%

3.8. The annual percentage change of the trend of the productivity index
“number of Available Seat Kilometers per average employee “
between the Olympic Airways S.A. (O.A.) and the I.A.T.A. (1975-2002)
The relationship of the O.A.’s productivity index “number of Available Seat Kilometers per average employee” compared with the I.A.T.A’s, fluctuated at 79 % in 1975 while in 2002 it fluctuated at 68 % (FIGURE 6)

FIGURE 6

 

 

During this period of time the lowest price of this relationship was 56% in 1991 due to the Gulf crisis and the highest price was 92 % in 2000 when the production index
number of Available Seat Kilometers increased for the O.A. to 1,8% and for the IATA to 4,2 %. At the same year-2000- the number of the O.A.’s employees decreased to 5,3% and the I.A.T.A.’s increased 2,4 %.
Regarding the Olympic Airways S.A. (TABLE 9)
The price of the O.A.’s productivity index “number of Available Seat Kilometers per average employee” increased between the years 1975 and 2002 to 94% with maximum increase to 147% in 2000 The O.A.’s total Number of Employees
decreased between the years 1975-2002 by 4%. The price of the O.A.’s production index number of Available Seat Kilometers between the years 1975 and 2002 increased to 86% with its maximum price to 121% in 1997. The impressive decrease of the O.A.’s productivity index “number of Available Seat Kilometers per average employee” in the years 2001 and 2002 is due to the decrease of the O.A.’s production index number of Available Seat Kilometers to 4,7% and 11,1% respectively.
Regarding the International Air Transport Association (TABLE 9)
The I.A.T.A.’s productivity index “number of Available Seat Kilometers per average employee” compared with the base year 1975, increased in 2002 to 125%. which is its highest price. In the same period of time the I.A.T.A.’s production index “number of Available Seat Kilometers ” increased to 343 % while the Number of Employees increased to 97%.
TABLE 9

1975-2002 Ο.Α. Ι.Α.Τ.Α.
Number of Available Seat Kilometers per average employee 94% 125%
Number of Available Seat Kilometers 86% 343%
Total Number of Employees (4%) 97 %

3.9. The annual percentage change of the trend of the productivity index
“number of Revenue Tone Kilometers per average employee“
between the Olympic Airways S.A. (O.A.) and the I.A.T.A. (1975-2002)

The relationship of the O.A.’s productivity index “number of Revenue Tone Kilometers per average employee” compared with the I.A.T.A’s, fluctuated at 60 % in 1975 while in 2002 it fluctuated at 46 % (FIGURE 7)
During this period of time the lowest price of this relationship was 32% in 1991 due to the Gulf crisis and the highest price was 66 % in 2000 when the production index number of Revenue Tone Kilometers decreased for the O.A. to 7,3% and for the IATA increased to 10,7 %. At the same year-2000- the number of the O.A.’s employees decreased to 5,3 % and the I.A.T.A.’s increased 2,4 %.
Regarding the Olympic Airways S.A. (TABLE 10)The price of the O.A.’s productivity index “number of Revenue Tone Kilometers per average employee” increased between the years 1975 and 2002 to 139 % with maximum increase to 213% in 2000 The O.A.’s total Number of Employees decreased between the years 1975-2002 to 4%. The price of the O.A.’s production index number of Revenue Tone Kilometers between the years 1975 and 2002 increased to 129% with its
maximum price to 191 % in 1997. The impressive decrease of the O.A.’s
productivity index “number of Revenue Tone Kilometers per average employee” in
the years 2001 and 2002 is due to the decrease of the O.A.’s production index number of Revenue Tone Kilometers to 4,7% and 11,1% respectively.
Regarding the International Air Transport Association (TABLE 10)
The I.A.T.A.’s productivity index “number of Revenue Tone Kilometers per average employee” compared with the base year 1975, increased in 2002 to 125%. which is its highest price. In the same period of time the I.A.T.A.’s production index “number of Revenue Tone Kilometers ” increased to 521 % while the Number of Employees increased to 97%.

 

FIGURE 7

 

 

 

TABLE 10

1975-2002 Ο.Α. Ι.Α.Τ.Α.
Number of Revenue Tone Kilometers per average employee 139% 125 %
Number of Revenue Tone Kilometers 129% 521 %
Total Number of Employees (4%) 97 %

3.10. The annual percentage change of the trend of the productivity index
“number of Available Tone Kilometers per average employee“
between the Olympic Airways S.A. (O.A.) and the I.A.T.A. (1975-2002)

The relationship of the O.A.’s productivity index “number of Available Tone Kilometers per average employee” compared with the I.A.T.A’s, fluctuated at 68 % in 1975 while in 2002 it fluctuated at 53 % (FIGURE 8)
During this period of time the lowest price of this relationship was 43% in 1991 due to the Gulf crisis and the highest price was 75 % in 2000 when the production index number of Available Tone Kilometers decreased for the O.A. to 0,3% and for the
IATA increased to 8,1 %. At the same year-2000- the number of the O.A.’s
employees decreased to 5,3 % and the I.A.T.A.’s increased 2,4 %.

 

FIGURE 8

 

 

 

Regarding the Olympic Airways S.A. (TABLE 11)
The price of the O.A.’s productivity index “number of Available Tone Kilometers per average employee” increased between the years 1975 and 2002 to 101 % with maximum increase to 159% in 2000 The O.A.’s total Number of Employees decreased between the years 1975-2002 by 4%. The price of the O.A.’s production index number of Available Tone Kilometers between the years 1975 and 2002 increased to 92% with its maximum price to 140 % in 1997. The impressive decrease of the O.A.’s productivity index “number of Available Tone Kilometers per average employee” in the years 2001 and 2002 is due to the decrease of the O.A.’s production index number of Available Tone Kilometers to 4,7% and 11,1% respectively.
Regarding the International Air Transport Association (TABLE 11)
The I.A.T.A.’s productivity index “number of Available Tone Kilometers per average employee” compared with the base year 1975, increased in 2002 to 157%. which is its highest price. In the same period of time the I.A.T.A.’s production index “number of Available Tone Kilometers ” increased to 407 % while the Number of Employees increased to 97%.

 

TABLE 11

1975-2002 Ο.Α. Ι.Α.Τ.Α.
Number of Available Tone Kilometers per average employee 101% 157 %
Number of Available Tone Kilometers 92% 407%
Total Number of Employees (4%) 97 %

3.11. The causes of the low level of labor’s productivity in the O.A.
The main causes of the aforementioned low level of the O.A.’s labor productivity between the years 1975 and 2002 are considered to be:
1) The absence of reliable, effective and efficient programming regarding the composition of the fleet, introduction and application of I.T., hiring personnel etc (European Union 1994, Greek Government gazette 1994 and 1998, Greek Parliament. 1994 and 1998, Greek Parliamentary Committee of “Public Enterprises-Banks etc 2002, Lainos 1992, 1995a,b, 1997, 1998a,b,c,d,e,1999,2001, 2003, Speedwing 1999.)
2) The absence of a reliable, effective and efficient organizational structure (European Union 1994, Greek Government gazette 1994 and 1998, Greek Parliament. 1994and 1998, Greek Parliamentary Committee of “Public Enterprises-Banks etc 2002, Lainos 1992 1995,1997, 1998a,b,c,d,e,1999,2001, 2003, McKinsey 1997, Speedwing 1999).
3) The applied ineffective and the inefficient administrational methods, systems, mechanisms (European Union 1994, Greek Government gazette 1994 and 1998, Greek Parliament. 1994and 1998, Greek Parliamentary Committee of “Public Enterprises-Banks etc 2002, Lainos 1992 1995,1997, 1998a,b,c,d,e,1999,2001, 2003, Speedwing 1999.)
4) The ineffective and the inefficient human resource management -The favoritism in staff hiring and promotion to the hierarchy, the absence of motivation etc. (composition of the fleet, introduction of I.T., hiring personnel etc (European Union 1994, Greek Government gazette 1994 and 1998, Greek Parliament. 1994and 1998, Greek Parliamentary Committee of “Public Enterprises-Banks etc 2002, Lainos 1992 chapter 5 p.112-177; 208, 1995,1997, 1998a,b,c,d,e 1999,2001, 2003, Speedwing 1999.)
5) The absence of efficient control mechanisms (European Union 1994, Greek Government gazette 1994 and 1998, Greek Parliament. 1994and 1998, Greek Parliamentary Committee of “Public Enterprises-Banks etc 2002, Lainos 1992, 1995,1997,1999,2001, 2003, Speedwing 1999.)
References
Ambrose Mike A. (1996) “Training is not always learning” Proceedings. 8th annual European Aviation Safety Seminar Aviation Safety: Challenges and Solutions Amsterdam, Netherlands February 27-29,1996
Brown A. (1998) Organisational Culture Financial Times. Pitman Publishing London, Hong-Kong, Johannesburg, Melbourne, Singapore, Washington D.C.
Burnes B. (1996) Managing Change Financial Times Pitman Publishing Second Edition
Burnes, B. (2000) Managing Change: a strategic approach to organisational dynamics, 3rd edition, London: FT Prentice Hall
Deal T.-Kennedy A.(1999) The new corporate cultures Orion Business Books U.K.
European Union (1994) Official gazette of the. The O.A.’s restructuring program Decision of the European Commission Greek edition, L.273/23
Greek Parliament. (1994) Proceedings of the 2271/1994, 9th to 11th December debate
Greek Government gazette (1994) Law 2271/1994
Greek Ministry of Economics (1996) Research for O.A.’s recovery. 21st March 1996
Greek Parliament (1998 Proceedings of the law 2602/1998 ). debate
Greek Government gazette (1998). Law 2602/1998
Greek Parliamentary committee of “ “Public Enterprises-Banks etc (2002) ” Testimony proceedings.
a) K. Eliadis Former –1998-2002-General Economic Director of the O.A.
b) D. Kalofonos Former -2000-2003- C.E.O. of the O.A.
-Hofstede, G (1980a Summer). Motivation, Leadership and Organizations : Do American theories apply abroad? Organi zational Dynamics,42-63
-Hofstede, G (1983 Fall). The cultural relativity of organizational practices and theories. Journal of International Business Studies, 75-89.
-Hofstede, G (1991). Cultures and Organizations: Software of the mind. Maidenhead, England: McGraw-Hill
-Kotter J. (1995 March-April) Leading Change Why Transformation Efforts Fail. Harvard Business Review on Change (pp 1-20)
Lainos J.S. (1992) Is privatization the only way? The file of the Olympic Airways S.A. Editions “Stahy”. Athens -GREECE.
_______(1994a) O.A.’s Research Division, «The impact on O.A.’s efficiency from: a. the violation by the State shareholder of the State-O.A. convention. b. the burden of O.A.’s cost with expenses of the State Budget», research on behalf of the Board of Directors. Included in O.A.’s recovery program approved by E.U.
______ (1995a) Air Transport Economics. Editions Stamoulis. Athens – Piraeus (GREECE) Pages 78-107.
_______(1995b) Weekly Financial gazette “Investor (Athens), December 9
-10 “Why the Olympic flies into fog”
_______(1997) The Greek Commercial Air Transport Industry. Transportation
Systems IFAC/IFIP/FORS Symposium Chania-Cretan island. Greece
_______(1998a) Weekly Financial gazette “Investor (Athens), March 14-15
“Is the suspension of the O.A.’s operation a weapon to be used by
the government during the negotiations with O.A.’s unions, or it is an
economic necessity?”
_______(1998b Weekly Financial gazette “Investor (Athens), March 28-29 “Will the crisis of the O.A. be overcome with the change of labor relations? ”
_______(1998c) Weekly Financial gazette “Investor” (Athens), April 25-26
“What is not included in the new law for the recapitalisation of the
Olympic”
_______(1998d Weekly Financial gazette “Investor (Athens), May 16-17
“Many tactics-one strategic goal has the government for the Olympic
Airways”
_______(1998e) Weekly Financial gazette “Investor (Athens), June 6-7
“Loss making selection of airplanes by the board of directors of the
Olympic Airways”
_______(1999) “Air Transport Economics in a competitive environment».
Stamoulis. 2nd Edition. Athens- Greece
_______(2001) The results of the reorganization policy applied by the Greek
governments in the O.A. (1994-2001) International Conference on
Air Transport and Airport. Evolutions in the 21st century. University
of Patras. Transport and Traffic Engineers Study Unit 12/3-4
(2003) « The labor productivity in air transport. The case study of
Olympic Airways 1975-2000 ». Scientific volume in honore of Prof
Lazaris. University of Piraeus. Greece.
Lainos J S. Nikolaidis E.D. (2003) Presuppositions for the effective
introduction of changes to the aviation safety culture, through Crew
Resource Management training program. The case study of the
Olympic Airways Proceedings on 12th International Symposium On
Aviation Psychology Write University. Dayton-Ohio-USA
Margulies N.-A.P. Raia (1987) “Organizational Developement” McGraw Hill
Series in Management. N.Y. U.S.A..
-Maurino, D. E. (1994) Cross-cultural perspectives in human factors training :
Lessons from the ICAO Human Factors Program. The International
Journal of Aviation Psychology, 4, 173-181.
McKinsey (1997) External consultant of the Olympic Airways. Report 1997-5-7
Speedwing (1999) Former (1999-2000) Olympic Airways Manager Contract
for Olympic Airways SA Phase One Report 18-10-1999. Pages
5,10, 68,69.
-Salas, E., Bowers, C.A., & Edens, E.(2001) (Eds.) Improving teamwork in
organizations: Applications of resource management training.
Hillsdale, NJ: LEA, I nc.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

World Conference on Transport RESEARCH 4-8/7/04 ISTANBUL. TURKEY

Yiannis S. Lainos
Ph.D. in Aviation Economics-Management Human factors

Presuppositions for upgrading of the reliability and the comparability
of the accident reports in order to upgrade aviation’s safety level

Abstract
ICAO’s exclusive objective for air accident investigation is the prevention of future accidents/incidents. For an effective and efficient contribution to the upgrading of the aviation’s safety level, the various accident reports have to be comparable. A reliable comparability of the various accident reports requires a unified perception of the examined environment by the investigators. A unified methodology and structure of the presentation of the findings, conclusions and recommendations is also required. Reading the various accident reports one realizes that in each one of them, the different fields of the same managerial function are allocated in different paragraphs of the given structure. In the institutional framework that the ICAO has established regarding the air accident investigation report, the following presuppositions are defined:
– for being an investigator (the general qualifications of the investigators)
– for making an accident investigation and
– for presenting the results in the accident report (the structure of the accident report and the titles of the contents)
The lack of detailed description in the aforementioned information leaves space for differentiation of the investigators’ perception-knowledge-qualifications. Consequently, this weakness does not contribute positively to the maximization of the effectiveness and efficiency of the accident reports and finally to the upgrading of aviation’s safety level. (C2 Safety Analysis and Policy)
Key words
Aviation-accident-incident-final report, aviation-accident-investigation, aviation-safety, Air-carrier-management-functions, determinants of human perception.
Aim of the paper
Aim of the paper is to determine:
a) the vagueness of some sectors of the general framework, that the ICAO has established in order to set the presuppositions for being an investigator, making an accident investigation and presenting the results in an accident report. and
b) the consequences of this vagueness on the reliability and comparability of the accident reports
The author’s contribution is:
1) The determination of the existing vagueness at some sectors of the general institutional framework, that the ICAO has established, for the presuppositions of an accident investigation, and its negative consequences on the reliability and comparability of accident reports
2) The proposals for overcoming the aforementioned vagueness and its negative consequences on the reliability and comparability of the accident reports and
3) The methodology applied, that is the dialectic analysis and synthesis, which discriminates the symptoms from the causes, focusing on the primary causes. The specific methodology can be implemented efficiently to any similar case.
Introduction
For an effective and efficient contribution to the upgrading of the aviation’s safety level, the various accident reports have to be comparable. A reliable comparability of the various accident reports requires a unified perception and comprehension of the examined environment by the investigators and a unified methodology and structure of the presentation of the findings, the conclusions and the recommendations. .
Reading the various accident reports one realizes that in each one of them the same issues are included in different paragraphs of the given structure.
Of course the absolute unification of the objectivity-reliability level of the perception of each investigator is not possible due to:
– the existence of factors that cannot be determined,
– the infinity of the stimuli by the environment towards the human organism
– the fact that the biological and mental abilities of the human organism are limited.
Among the determinants of the investigators’ perception, the ICAO mentions their general job specialty (doctors, pilots etc) and the minimum level of their knowledge (titles of the issues of the investigators training syllabus)
However it does not determine:
a) the specific job specialty of the doctor (pathologist, psychiatrist etc), or the specific job specialty of the pilot (jet, tourboprop etc) and the specific aircraft type they have to be certified at, the duration and the field of their experience. This weakness has a negative impact on the unification of the investigators’ level of knowledge
b) the content of each title of the syllabus, consequently the uniformity of the investigators’ level of knowledge
c) the qualifications of the investigators’ trainers (the science the sector and the level of their knowledge and experience)
d) the investigators’ psychological and physical health
The a, b, c, weaknesses contribute negatively to the uniformity of the investigators’ level of knowledge although, knowledge is a basic determinant of the quality of the investigators’ perception. The d weakness determines the objectivity-reliability of the investigator’s perception.
The problem of the ability, of the process and the determinants of the perception and comprehension of the environment by the human being, is one of the first and main issues that ancient Greek philosophy (Andriopoulos 2003) had faced. (Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Plato, Aristotle etc.)
Two main aspects were posed from the beginning:
a) the ability or the inability of the human being to have access to the cognition of the physical environment and
b) the predominance either of the human senses or the human spirit as to their contribution to the cognition of the physical environment (Andriopoulos 2003).
Since then, the aforementioned problems that compose knowledge theory,
have been an integral part of any philosophical theory or system.
(Windelband & Heimsoeth 1976). Research during the last (20th) century
has concluded that: (Goleman 1995, Hayes 1994, Louria 1978,
Papadopoulos 2003, Scharfetter 1976, Steanberg 1996)
– Perception is one of the mental processes of the human being
– The human’s mental processes involve: consciousness, attention, perception, memory, thinking, emotion, intelligence, learning, orientation etc,
– The parameters of the human mental processes are in a continuous interaction
– The senses are the gates through which the stimuli from the environment are transferred to the relative brain centers through the nervous system.
Consequently the identification of the causes of a particular level of perception requires the analysis into its parameters and the examination of each of these parameters separately. It is obvious that, due to the interaction of the various parameters of mental processes, a disorder in one of them, may cause the disorder of all the others in a different level and intensity This is the reason for our decision to make a brief presentation about: a) mental processes, b) the presuppositions of their regular function, and c) the determinants and the consequences of their disorder.
The present paper is focused on the determinants of the investigators’ perception-comprehension, including their level and areas of knowledge as well as the structure of the accident report, using as case study the paragraph 1.17. Organizational and Management information

PART ONE
Brief theoretical approach
1. Definitions
“Investigation”. (ICAO 2001) Α process conducted for the purpose of accident prevention which includes the gathering and analysis of information, the drawing of conclusions, including the determination of causes and, when appropriate, the making of safety recommendations.
Investigator-in-charge. (ICAO 2001) Α person charged, on the basis of his or her qualifications, with the responsibility for the organization, conduct and control of an investigation
”Qualifications” are defined as the totality of capabilities, theoretical knowledge and practical experience upon a particular cognitive field. The qualifications of every employee are basic determinants of his-her quality and of the quantity of the employees’ product in a particular period of time.

2. The necessary presuppositions for the comparability of all accident
reports
The necessary presuppositions for the fulfillment of ICAO’s goal regarding the accident investigation- prevention of future accidents/incidents- is the comparability of all accident reports filled in by every investigator all over the world. This reliable comparability of accident reports, requires the unification of the level of reliability for every region of the world, regarding the:
1) perception-comprehension of the environment by the accident investigators
2) qualifications of the accident investigators (job specialty, knowledge, experience)
3) structure of the accident report
4) titles of the chapters of the accident report
5) content of the chapters of the accident report
6) methodology of filling in the accident report.
We must make clear that an absolute unification of the level of the aforementioned factors cannot be achieved, due to the differentiation and limitation of the capabilities of human nature. However we consider that the existing difficulties should not stop us from continuing the effort to achieve the higher level of uniformity which contributes to a higher level of aviation safety.

3 The mental processes as determinants of perception (Goleman 1995, Hayes 1994, Louria 1978, Papadopoulos 2003, Scharfetter 1976, Steanberg 1996)
Human perception is the resultant, the unified expression of a totality of components of mental processes, which are in continuous interaction. To specify the causes of a particular perception’s level, this perception should be analyzed into its components and each component should be examined separately.
The mental processes that form each component of perception are: consciousness, attention, memory, thought, emotion, intelligence, learning, orientation etc.
It is obvious that, because of this interaction, the disordered function of one of them causes disorder to the others, in different levels and intensity.
Perception
Perception, like any other mental process, doesn’t function independently. The quality of its function is in relation with the function quality of all other interacting mental processes. Perception is the mental process, which, along with other mental processes, gives an individual the ability to be aware of external or internal objects, by means of stimuli, which are received by the sensory organs, transmitted to the brain and processed by it. In psychiatry an “object” is defined as anything that can stimulate emotions in a human being. e.g. an idea, a fantasy, a person, a material object, a situation, one’s own self etc. The process of perceiving an object is composed by the phases of: observation-attention (stimulus), sensation, transmission of the stimulus to the corresponding brain centers through the nervous system, encoding of the stimuli (characteristics and qualities of the object) within the consciousness, processing, understanding and interpretation according past knowledge and experience, and finally transmission of the conclusions to those brain centers that will then give our nervous system the orders for the various reactions of the organism. Consequently, perception is not a static process of a given quantity and quality, but it evolves dynamically through development (learning etc).
Only one part of objective reality is possible to be perceived. Full perception of objective reality cannot be achieved by a human being, because our senses are not aroused by a series of visual, auditory stimuli, vibrations, movements of particles, atoms, electrons etc. On the other hand, human brain has the capacity of processing a limited quantity and quality of information. Consequently, the limited ability of our senses to be aroused by the totality of stimuli from the environment, correlates with the ability of our brain to process them, in the context of the defense mechanisms of our organism.
Factors influencing the functional level of perception (Scharfetter 1976)
The following factors influence the process of perception:
a) the subjective factor (emotional state, previous experience, level of knowledge, level of intelligence etc) and
b) the objective factor (intensity, simplicity or complexity of the object).
Disorders of perception
Perception disorders may be caused by conditions such as:
A) Organic disorders
1) of the receptive capacity of the sensory organs,
2) of the various brain centers (e.g. the individual can see or hear, but cannot recognize)
B) Psychological disorders
1) Hallucination (perception of a non-existing object),
2) Illusion (distorted perception of an existing object).
Consciousness
“Consciousness” in psychiatry is described as the level of alertness of the individual and it is analyzed in two parts:
a) the sensory part, which involves the ability of the individual to process the stimuli provided by the external environment and
b) the kinetic part, which involves the ability of the individual to process stimuli of the external environment, to select the answer and finally give it.
In the course of this process, defense mechanisms are also involved. They act as a filter and decide which stimuli from the external environment will be kept in consciousness and which will pass into the subconscious. It is obvious that consciousness disorders affect every other mental process.
Consciousness disorders may be the result of:
a) psychological causes (stress, fear, psychiatric personality disorders etc)
b) organic causes (injuries, brain tumors, toxic and infectious causes etc)
c) biochemical causes (medications, alcohol, other toxic substances, drugs etc).
The consequences of consciousness disorders are a decline in other mental processes, such as perception of objective reality, attention, judgment and association processes.
Attention
By the term “attention” is specified the mental process through which the individual classifies by time and space in his memory an internal or external stimulus.
The causes of attention disorders are head trauma or injury, physical and psychological burnout, anxiety, normal phobias, stressful situations, intense emotions (anger, sadness etc), medications, alcohol, other toxic substances, drugs etc).
The consequences of attention disorders are: exhaustion, easy fatigue,
fixation, short attention span, destructiveness, selective and non-selective inattentiveness. In the context of the above-mentioned disorders, the individual is incapable of performing the process of attention :
a) concentrates on one or a few objects,
b) is incapable of concentrating in general,
c) is incapable of evaluating external or internal stimuli
d) is not able to concentrate on one or more stress-inducing objects (defense mechanism of repression).
Memory
Memory is the mental process that gives an individual the ability to store past experience, to recall it and motivate it (recognition, recall, constructive memory) each time this is considered to be necessary. All these facts make memory a basic component of the quality of perception and normal behavior. Memory, along with thinking and learning, is a cognitive mental process.
Factors affecting the function of memory are: function level of consciousness-alertness, lapse of time between encoding and storing of the information, function level of perception, function level of attention, motivation and interest of the individual, emotional investment on the information to be stored, various rules of memory techniques for organising information.
As consequences of the memory disorders are reported:
a) amnesias (incapability of storing information due to e.g. chronic alcoholism, brain injury and incapability of recalling the information because of recent emotional disorder, intense anxiety, fear etc, permanent or temporary brain damage)
b) hypermnesia, panoramic revival of experience, hyperactivity of constructive memory, exceptionally vivid memory
c) paramnesias-delusional memory: recalling events or situations that never occurred
d) confabulation: the “making up” of memories in order to justify specific situations or just to show off, to the point that the individual comes to believe them as reality.
Emotion
Emotion is a mental process that charges pleasantly or unpleasantly every human activity, determining our disposition regarding the activity’s intensity and duration, as well as communication with the environment. It is a strictly subjective situation, and for this reason it is rather experienced than described. Emotions can motivate the individual positively or negatively towards a situation or an object.
Factors affecting the function level of an emotion are: the normal function of the brain (central nervous system), which may be disrupted by injuries, tumors, functional disorders, the peripheral nervous system the endocrinal system.
Disorders in the above-mentioned systems cause emotional disorders, like:
a) ambivalence (simultaneous appearance of positive and negative affect regarding a choice),
b) euphoria (permanent and unjustified),
c) depression and melancholy,
e) shallowness of affect (incapability of expressing strong emotions),
e) incapability of experiencing any feelings at all,
f) emotional rigidity – inflexibility (incapability of differentiating a feeling
according to different stimuli from the environment),
g) instability (rapid change of emotions even as a result of unimportant stimuli),
h) incapability of controlling feelings,
i) inappropriate affect (the manifestation of emotions that do not correspond to the stimulus)
It is obvious that the emotional state of a person (fear, anger, happiness, anxiety, jealousy etc) invariably affects the function of perception.
Learning
It is a complicated process that affects the behavior of a person, and has to do (Skinner) with: “alteration of the probability of a response under the same conditions in which the conjunction between stimuli and response takes place.
Factors affecting the function level of learning are:
A) Factors related to the person:
1) function level of the central nervous system,
2) motivation for learning
3) emotional interest towards the object of learning,
4) degree of a person’s maturity
5) previous experiences,
6) level of intelligence.
The above-mentioned factors, in combination, form the conditions for faster and more complete learning. We underline the word combination, because for example, a high level of intelligence without emotional interest, or, even worse, with emotional aversion does not promote learning process.
B) Factors related to the environment:
Personality and environment are in a constant interacting process. The quality (clarity, intensity etc), the quantity and coherence of the stimuli contribute positively or negatively to the learning process. As long as the environment is conducive to the emotional investment on the object of learning, or furthermore to the satisfaction of essential needs of the individual as the result of learning, the learning process is facilitated.
Functional disorders of learning are due to:
a) disorders of the central nervous system
b) psychological disorders that block emotional investment on the object of learning.
c) the quality (clarity, intensity etc) and the quantity of external stimuli.
Thought – Reasoning
Thought-reasoning can be defined as the mental process which is related to the dynamic evolving process of problem-solving through which the classification of material and non material objects concerning the self and the environment is performed. (Scharfetter 1976) Through thinking, meaning and importance is attached to these objects, they are understood and their causal relations are explained, meanings are connected to each other, decisions are taken, judgments are made.
Thought-reasoning as a process is wider than perception, having as a basis the brain (central nervous phenomena).
It is activated when the man seeks the solution of a problem, the satisfaction of a need. It is the expression of a man’s personality, that’s why thought disorders initiate disorders of the personality. Action is the primary manifestation of thought and a crucial criterion for its rightfulness.
Factors affecting the function level of thought-reasoning are:
A) Psychological and biological conditions, such as:
1) consciousness state 2) state and level of memory, 3) level of intelligence, which is defined by biological and social parameters, 4) emotional state, 5) level of the organic function of the brain.
B) Social and cultural factors
Thought-reasoning disorders are divided in: disorders of thought process and disorders of thought content.
a) Disorders of process
1) the simple, temporary, frequent or constant blocking of thinking, 2) slowness of thinking, 3) flight of thought (distraction into many objects, incapability of concentrating on something specific), 4) verbiage, trifle talk, pedantic thinking (concentration on the examination of a single object in depth, focusing on details, on the insignificant aspects, which results in the incapability of perceiving the general essence), 5) incoherent, chaotic thinking (combination or differentiation of things, situations etc, without specific criteria) persistent repetition of particular words or sentences, with or without meaning, 6) incoherence -loose associations (articulated thoughts without any reasonable or emotional coherence)
b) Disorders of the content of thinking
1) compulsive thoughts against the will of the person
2) paranoid or unreasonable thoughts
Consequently the necessary conditions of a minimum level of objective-reliable perception and comprehension of the environment by the investigator is his-her physiological function of:
a) all the senses,
b) the nervous system that transfers the external stimulus from the senses at the proper cerebral centers,
c) the cerebral centers that process the stimulus,
d) all the mental processes since they affect perception and
e) the level of knowledge and experience upon the investigated environment (which is included in the determinant of mental processes)

4. Κnowledge-experience as a basic determinant of perception (Paries Ashleigh 1998, Marsh 2000, Lainos & Nikolaidis 2003,)
Κnowledge (theoretical and practical-experience) that is, the characteristics, the properties, the theoretical principles of evolution – the actual evolution during a particular period of time, the relationships-interactions-consequences of the environment (objects, events, situations) is a basic determinant of perception’s-comprehension’s quality. Consequently it affects decisively the quality of decision-making and therefore effectiveness of action. But knowledge is useful only if it can facilitate the understanding of the environment (close and wider) by a human being who, based on that, may then proceed to decision-making and action towards the fulfillment of a goal.
The optimum quantity of information relative to a particular environment is what the user can perceive, understand and process according to his-her biological, psychological and cognitive abilities. The support provided by the available machinery and electronic means enlarges these abilities. Excessive, unnecessary information especially if it is irrelevant, may cause additional ambiguities to the user, affecting the objectivity of his-her perception and also causing further delay to decision making. Consequently it results to a lower quality of situation awareness instead of a higher one, to a further delay of decision making and acting, due to the user’s inability to process the available quantity and quality of information. This can be described as “analysis-paralysis”.
Comprehension-understanding, is the result of a very complicated process. It concerns the correlation between information perceived and stored in the user’s memory. This information is relative to objects, events, situations perceived (developing a mental picture) from the environment through the senses. Perception includes the characteristics, properties, theoretical evolution principles-actual evolution during a particular period of time, relationships-interactions-consequences of the objects, events, situations.
For example when, during an aerobatic air-show an airplane dives with its nose vertical to the ground, the watcher considers this to be an aerobatic maneuver.
If however the same watcher sees a commercial airplane at the same position, he-she rather considers that it is going to crash. These two different considerations are a result of the correlation between the position of each airplane and its characteristics, properties etc., that the watcher has stored in his-her memory.
The reliability-objectivity of human understanding is based-apart from physical and mental functions- on the determination of the percentage of the understanding. This is based: on known information, on assumed information, on known ignorance and on unknown ignorance. It must be noticed that the absolute perception of the objective reality is impossible for every individual due to
– the infinity of external stimuli to the human organism
– the limited capabilities:
a) of the human senses to recognize these stimuli,
b) of the nervous system to transfer these stimuli to the proper brain centers
c) of the brain centers to process these stimuli
.
5. The role of the management functions on the accident occurrence
Even since the first quarter of the 20th century (Hawthorn etc.) up to recent times research has proved that the activity-behavior of every individual at his-her working place, during working time, is strongly, directly and indirectly affected by factors that compose the wider internal airline’s environment. (Andries-Kompier, -Smulders 1996, Beehr 1995, Bright-Mitchel.- Rickman 1996, Daniels-Harris 1998, MacDonald-Karasek-Punnett-Scharf 2001, Westfall 1998 )
“However the results of this research were not correlated with the managerial decisions and functions, through which the top management introduces the suggestions of the researchers in the internal corporate environment”. (Lainos 2003)
“[…]Only now are safety practitioners realizing the complex nature of accident/incident causation and the role organizations play in the genesis and management of human error. In fact it is the emphasis that organizational models place on the fallible decisions of managers, supervisors and others in the organization that sets them apart from the other perspectives previously discussed[…]” (Shapell-Wiegmann 2003 )
“[…] Organizational accidents may be truly accidental in the way in which the various contributing factors combine to cause the bad outcome, but there is nothing accidental about the existence of these precursors, nor in the conditions that created them.[…]” (Reason 1997)
Recent studies have proved that the activity-behaviour of the staff at working place, during working time, is strongly, directly and indirectly affected by factors from the wider internal corporate environment (Αnderson-Kjellberg-Lindberg-Skoldstrom 1996, Beehr 1995, Bright-Mitchel-Rickman 1996, Kelley 1996, Biner 2000,Fingret 2000, Hendy 2003, Caldwell-Caldwell 2003)
The introduction and preservation of these factors is ultimately determined by the top management decisions (C.E.O., B.O.D.). (Lainos 2003)
“[…] Responsibility for aviation safety begins at the very top of an airline company. History has demonstrated repeatedly that without the complete commitment of the highest management levels within a company, operational safety margins are seriously eroded. This does not suggest that a company will have an accident, but it does suggest that the risk of having an accident is high-the laws of probability will prevail. Management has great leverage in affecting operational safety within a company. Through its attitudes and actions management influences the attitudes and actions of all others within a company: Management defines the safety culture of an organization. This safety culture extends all the way to the maintenance shop floor, to the ramp to the cabin and to the cockpit. Further more the public and the government authorities are increasingly recognizing management’s role in air safety by holding management accountable for a serious incident or accident; this accountability is magnified many-fold if a company suffers several such incidents or accidents during a course of a few years […].” (Flight Safety Foundation 1994)
“[…]The ultimate responsibility for safety rests with the directors and management of the Company. The Company’s attitude to safety—the Company’s safety culture—is established from the outset by the extent to which senior management accepts responsibility for safe operations, particularly the proactive management of risk. Regardless of the size, complexity, or type of operation, senior management deter- mines the Company’s safety culture. However, without the wholehearted commitment of all personnel, any safety programme is unlikely to be effective[…].” (Airbus
Industry 1999),
This consideration is based on the fact that the top management has the authority to program, organize, administrate, staff and control the corporate operation and to apply its decisions in the internal corporate environment, through the authorized members of the hierarchy (Lainos 2003). Even in the case that some of the factors of the internal corporate environment that affect negatively the staff’s activity are not the result of top management decisions, but the result of mismanagement by the members of the hierarchy at the various organizational levels, the ultimate responsibility still rests with the top management. The cause is that the top management has the ultimate responsibility of staffing. (Lainos 2003).

6. The functions of the organizations’ management and their content
The knowledge of the functions of the corporate management, its content, its consequences on the influenced areas of the internal corporate environment and the impact of these functions on the employees’ will is a basic determinant of the investigator’s opinion about the primary cause(s) and contributing factors of the accident incident (Lainos 2003)
The functions of the corporate management are: Planning, Organizing, Administrating, Staffing, and Controlling. These functions pursue the achievement of corporate goals based on the economic principle, which is the maximization of the profits. The corporate areas and operations that are affected by these functions are showed in TABLE 1.
TABLE 1

 

In order to create a more clear perception of the managerial functions’ impact, on the employees will, the internal corporate factors which affect the employees will are mentioned bellow (see TABLE 2)
TABLE 2
14. Wages level Programming-Administrating-Staffing
15. Hygiene and safety conditions (warm-cold,
light-dark, noise, radiation, chemicals etc.) Programming-Administrating
16. Stress and fatigue due to workload Programming-Administrating- Controlling
17. Job security Programming-Administrating (motivating)- Staffing
18. Skills and training Administrating (motivating)- Staffing
19. Meritocracy or favoritism Administrating (Culture)
20. The applied management style (human or product
oriented, motivation’s efficiency, virtual recognition
of the employees’ contribution to the development
of the airline, the superiors’ behavior etc) Administrating
21. Corporate culture applied by the top Management Administrating
22. Efficiency of the corporate labor
programming and organizing Programming-Organizing-controlling
23. Professional and social status
of a particular labor position Administrating- Staffing
24. Satisfaction from
achievement in work Administrating- Staffing –Controlling
25. Health and physical
situation of the employee Administrating- Staffing -Controlling
26. Social status of the airline Programming-Organizing-Administrating-Staffing-
Controlling

PART TWO
The case study of the ICAO’s manuals regarding accident and incident investigation

7. The qualifications of the accident investigators
Assuming that all aforementioned presuppositions are fulfilled, job specialty, knowledge and experience play a decisive role in the process which shapes the objective perception.
The qualifications of the accident investigators are described in the ICAO’s Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation 1-2-2 Paragraph 2.4.3.
7.1. “ Qualifications of the Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigator
“ It is essential that accident investigators have a practical background in aviation as a foundation on which to develop investigation skills. The experience can be acquired by working as a professional pilot, as an aeronautical engineer or as an aircraft maintenance engineer. Other specialized areas of aviation which could also provide useful experience include management, operations, airworthiness, air traffic services, meteorology and human factors. Since accident investigations will often involve all of these specialized areas, it is important that investigators understand the aviation infrastructure and are able to relate to each of these different areas. It is also beneficial for investigators to leave some piloting experience in addition to their other experience”
In the aforementioned paragraph, ICAO, describes as qualifications of the air accident investigators the required areas of their general job specialty (doctors, pilots, aeronautical engineers, aircraft maintenance engineers) and the required areas of their experience (management, operations, airworthiness, air traffic services, meteorology and human factors). As a basic job specialty and experience is considered to be piloting, a basic knowledge which is required by every investigator. However the investigator during the investigation is obliged to get involved in areas of knowledge different than his-her own job specialty. This is the reason why the ICAO considers necessary for every investigator to have a wider knowledge –regardless of his-her job specialty- in areas such as management, operations, airworthiness, air traffic services, meteorology and human factors. The titles of the chapters that the investigators have to be trained in are mentioned by the ICAO in the description of the information that has to be included in each paragraph of the accident report.
We consider that this system appears to have certain weaknesses, because it does not determine:
a) the specific job specialty of the doctor (pathologist psychiatrist etc), or of the pilot (jet, tourboprop etc) and the aircraft type the pilots had to be certified at.
b) the duration of the required experience of every investigator,
c) the content of each title of the syllabus to which each investigator has to be trained.
d) the qualifications of the investigators’ trainers: sector, science, level of
knowledge, duration of experience)
e) the physical and mental health of the investigator, although it is a necessary presupposition for an acceptable level of the investigator’s perception.
This vagueness causes ambiguities regarding which exact characteristics, properties, knowledge, experience etc., ICAO wants the air accident investigators to be armed with.
Consequently we consider that the system under these circumstances does not ensure the unified level of knowledge of the investigator although this unity is considered to be a necessary presupposition for the comparability of accident reports findings, conclusions and recommendations.
However, the investigators’ qualifications – like any other employees’- generally determine the quality of their perception. It is obvious that any differentiation in the qualifications differentiates-ceteris paribus- the quality of perception. This differentiation has a negative impact on the effort of ICAO: a) to focus on upgrading the unification of the perception’s level of the investigators per involved job specialty, during the accident investigation and b) to achieve a higher level comparability of the various accident reports.

8. Criteria of the structure of an accident report
According to ICAO Annex 13 the structure of an accident report must be as shown in the table 3 below.
From the structure of accident reports it becomes obvious that ICAO uses both operational and managerial criteria indiscriminately and without prioritization (special weight). The operational criteria are related rather to the organizational functions while the managerial are related to the management functions
As a consequence, various fields of the same managerial function for example “staffing” are mentioned in more than two chapters, paragraphs etc. that is: 1.5. personnel
TABLE 3
1. FACTUAL INFORMATION
1. History of Flight
2. Injuries to persons
3. Damage to Airplane
4. Other damage
5. Personnel information
6. Airplane information
7. Meteorological Information
8. Aids to Navigation
9. Communications
10. Airport Information
11. Flight Recorders
12. Wreckage and Impact Information
13. Medical and Pathological Information
14. Fire
15. Survival Aspects
16. Tests and Research
17. Organizational and Management information
18. Additional Information
g) ANALYSIS
1. General
2. Weather Factors on the approach
3. Accident Sequence
4. Flight Crew Performance
5. Pilot Training
6. Air Traffic Control Factors
7. Emergency Response
8. Controlled Flight Into Terrain
9. Oversight Issues
10. Flight Data Recorder Documentation
h) CONCLUSIONS
1. Findings
2. Probable Cause
i) RECOMMENDATIONS
j) APPENDIXES

Information, 1.17. Organizational and Management information, 2.4. Flight Crew Performance, 2.5. Pilot Training 2.7. Emergency Response.
We consider that the mixing up of two completely different criteria and the mentioning of different fields of the same managerial function (e.g. staffing) in different paragraphs of the accident report, is more probable to confuse, and consequently to put barriers to the investigators’ perception (recognition-comprehension) rather than assist them to focus on the main, primary cause(s) and contributing factors.

9. Content of the section “1.17. Organizational and Management information” of the accident report
Regarding the criteria of “ the content of the chapters of the accident report” this paper focuses on Section 1 paragraph 17 “Organizational and Management information”
The content of this section according to ICAO’s instructions (ICAO ANNEX 13) is described as follows:
[…]1.17.1. Provide pertinent information on the organizations involved in influencing the operation of the aircraft, if such influence had a bearing on the accident. The organizations to be reported upon in this section could include, but need not to be limited to the following: the operator; the maintenance organization; the air traffic services, aerodrome administration, weather service agencies, the aircraft manufacturer, the certification of listening authority, and the regulatory authority. The information could include, but need not be limited to the following: organizational structure and functions, safety culture; resources; financial viability status; management decisions, policies and practices, internal and external communications and relationships, certification, monitoring, and regulatory framework when these had a bearing on the accident or whose actions, or lack thereof, was related to, or influenced the accident”
1.17.2. Provide pertinent information concerning the operator, such as type and date of issuance of air operator certificate, types of operations authorized, types and number of aircraft authorized for use, and authorized areas of operation and routes. Also include relevant information concerning the operator’s company operations manual”[…]
A first indication from the comparison of accident reports of United States of
America National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002) and United Kingdom Air Accidents Investigation Branch (UK AAIB 1988,1990,2000a,b, 2001a,b) is that the “Management and organization” chapter of the NTSB reports is filled in more often and in a more detailed way than those of the UK ΑΑΙΒ.
From the aforementioned approach it becomes obvious that the NTSB investigators have wider and more accurate knowledge on issues such as:
– the meaning and content of the management functions,
– the impact from the introduction and preservation in the internal corporate environment of factors which affect decisively the employees’ will,
This knowledge is a basic presupposition for an objective classification and assessment of the findings during an accident investigation, because apart from others it contributes to the discrimination between the initial and the secondary cause(s)-contributing factors.
Error is the result of systemic and not of personal failure. The system of the commercial air transport industry is consisted of organizations such as manufacturers airlines, maintenance centers, airports, civil aviation authorities, airport authorities, weather forecasting service, air traffic controllers etc. That is the reason why ICAO changed its philosophy regarding the responsibility for an accident-incident, from causal factor to contributing factors. Consequently the investigator who wants to contribute positively to the upgrading of aviation safety is obliged to determine the initial cause(s), the actions or omissions of the managerial functions which affected the employee’s will and resulted in the accident-incident occurrence.
This consideration of the role of the investigator is for the benefit of:
a) the shareholders and the top management of the air-carrier, because it determines the causes of probable future errors, and consequently it contributes positively to the upgrading of the quality of their functions (safer, cheaper, more competitive, wider market share, higher long term profits etc.)
b) the passengers (safer and cheaper flights)
c) the insurance companies (fewer accidents-less claims)
d) the employees (safer work)
Consequently:
a) if the investigators want to determine all the contributing factors of an accident/incident and make an objective assessment of these factors, they must be able to know the source of every error committed by any employee
b) they must be aware of the functions of the top management, their content and the affected areas of the internal corporate environment.
Regarding the content of the chapter of the accident report :
“1.17.organization-management”.
Based on a number of recent accident reports, we noted that the implementation of the aforementioned process presents certain difficulties related to the presentation of the findings-facts. These difficulties refer to either the avoidance by the accident investigators to fill in the particular chapter “Organization and Management information” or to report findings that are the results of management functions under the proper chapter. These difficulties are considered to be the result of the classification weaknesses by the investigators. Perhaps due to ignorance of the meaning and role of the two different groups of criteria used in final reports: the operational which rather reflects the results of the organizational functions, and the managerial which concerns the results of the managerial functions.

10. The ICAO’s Training guidelines for Aircraft Accident investigators
In the ICAO’s Training guidelines for Aircraft Accident investigators Chapter 2 “Background Experience For Investigators” Cir 298 AN 172 June 2003, it is mentioned:
“[…] 2.2. Potential accident investigators must have considerable practical experience in aviation as a foundation on which to build their investigation skills. The experience can be acquired from civil or military qualification as […] aviation related management might also be suitable for accident investigator training […]”
In the chapter 3 Training Guidelines in the paragraph 3.1.3. in the qualifications required for accident investigators’ trainers are included “[…] experienced investigators, aviation medicine physicians, psychologists, aeronautical engineers and manufacturers’ representatives[…]”
In the aforementioned description of the experience required for a potential accident investigator, the following remarks may be made
1) As background experience for investigators, the verb “might” is used for aviation related management, while for the pilots, aeronautical engineers and aircraft maintenance engineers the verb “must” is used.
2) Concerning the aviation related management qualification of the investigators, only the criterion of experience is mentioned and not for theoretical knowledge, while the job specialty of the pilots, aeronautical engineers and aircraft maintenance engineers includes the necessary theoretical knowledge as well.
3) For the trainers, managerial knowledge and experience is not required. The omission of determining the trainers’ level of knowledge and specific field of experience in the air transport management, creates a wide vacuum in the investigators’ knowledge regarding the content and impact of the air transport management functions on the internal corporate environment factors which influence the employees’ will
4) The accident investigators’ initial training syllabus (Chapter 3.2.) does not include any issue regarding the goal, content, areas of authority, impact etc. of the aviation management.
The aforementioned formulations might create the impression that the ICAO underestimates the knowledge and experience on the field of air transport management, although the investigators are appointed to investigate the negative impact resulting from the implementation of managerial functions on aviation safety.
In the Chapter 4.1.2.20. Organizational information of ICAO’s Training Guidelines For Aircraft Accident investigators, it is mentioned:
“[…] Conducting a review of the organizational structure and functions as well as the management policies and practices of the agencies, authorities and aircraft operator involved is a subject that should be covered. For example, an investigator should have the competence to review an aircraft operator’s management functions, policies and practice in their entirety. There are many aspects of the supervisory process which may have a direct bearing on the accident, such as acceptance of inadequate flight crew qualifications; deficient guidance material; maintenance shortcuts; improper crew rostering; failure to provide proper training in aircraft type; shortcomings in crew resource management; and unreasonable pressure to complete schedules on time. The methods of investigating management and organizational aspects of an organization to determine the presence of any risk factors or other shortcomings is a requirement of a well rounded accident investigation course. An examination of the means of supervision is very important and will include a review of orders regulations, manuals and independent audits as well as the performance of supervisors, instructors and company management
4.1.2.21. Human performance […]”
4.1.2.22. Determination of the flight crews suitability for the flight […]”
Remarks on ICAO’s Training guidelines for Aircraft Accident investigators
Our consideration, regarding the content of the Chapter 4.1.2.20. “Organizational information”, ICAO’s Training Guidelines for Aircraft Accident investigators, is:
1) There are certain ambiguities regarding the meaning under which the terms “ organizational function” and “managerial function” are used, since their content is entirely distinguished in the science of management nowadays.
2) Issues that belong to different managerial functions are mentioned without any differentiation e.g. inadequate flight crew qualifications; failure to provide proper training in aircraft type (staffing), supervision (controlling), improper crew rostering (programming), administrating etc.
3) The issues described in paragraphs 4.1.2.21. “Human performance” and 4.1.2.22. “Determination of the flight crews suitability for the flight”, mainly refer to the content of the managerial function of staffing. The isolated reference in these two different paragraphs of issues which are included in the previous 4.1.2.20. “Organizational information” paragraph, might create the wrong impression that these issues are independent from the managerial function of staffing which is included in the previous paragraph.
The aforementioned approach might generate areas of possible ambiguity , concerning the ICAO’s consideration of :
a) the content and impact of the management functions in the life of the organization
b) the need for implementation by the investigators of scientific criteria in order to assess the top management’s involvement in the accident/incident occurrence,
c) the level of the hierarchy members that are burdened with the main responsibility in case of error commitment
These facts might give the impression that aviation related management is not considered to be a basic necessary experience of accident investigators.
However, from the analysis of the aforementioned chapters the crucial role of knowledge-experience in situation awareness (recognition-comprehension) of the environment, the decision making and action became clear. How could the investigators recognize and understand the impact of the managerial functions on an accident occurrence, if they do not have adequate and proper theoretical knowledge combined with practical experience upon aviation management issues?
The investigators lack of knowledge regarding the content and the areas of internal corporate environment affected by the management functions, combined with ICAO’s approach of operational and managerial criteria , might create obstacles in the objectivity and the unity of the investigators’ perception.
A higher unification of the investigator’s perception is necessary because leads to:
a) a higher level of recognition and understanding of the various parts of the investigated environment
b) it contributes positively to the unified categorization of the findings according to their sources, which leads to the identification and objective prioritizing of the contributing factors.
c) it contributes positively to the unified assessment of the findings according to unified criteria and knowledge, based on unified methodology
d) it helps the investigators to identify the source(s) of each contributing factor of the accident and consequently to suggest the appropriate safety recommendations
e) it helps the readers to assess whether the conclusions and the safety recommendations reflect the source(s) of the identified contributing factors since they are presented under the appropriate chapter of the accident report
f) it facilitates the unified understanding by the readers who belong to different cultures with different values, different considerations etc.
The obvious incompatibility between ICAO’s aim of upgrading the aviation’s safety level and the measures applied for achieving this aim, exists because it does not determine and ensure:
a) a minimum level of the normal function of the investigators’ senses and mental processes which are decisive determinants of the investigators’ perception-comprehension
b) a unified content of the syllabus of investigators’ training .
c) the field and level of knowledge, as well as field, level and duration of the experience of the trainers
d) the identification of the exact qualifications of the investigators; specific job specialty of the doctor -pathologist psychiatrist etc-, or the pilot –jet, tourboprop etc- the aircraft type they had to be certified at, and how long experience must each investigator have at his-her job specialty. These are necessary presuppositions for the unification of the investigators’ knowledge.
e) the unification of criteria of the accident report structure (managerial and operational criteria are used indiscriminately)
f) the obligatory filling in by the investigators of the accident report’s chapters with information compatible with the content of the particular chapter

11. Conclusions
1) The existing ICAO’s institutional framework which determines the presuppositions and the conditions of the accident investigation, has successfully contributed for decades years to the aviation safety .
For the achievement of the ICAO’s objective to upgrade the aviation’s safety level, the particular institutional framework needs restructuring in order to improve its efficiency and effectiveness in the near and distant future.
2) The purpose of this restructuring has to be the achievement of a reliable comparability between various accident reports. The achievement of this goal requires:
– unification of the perception and comprehension of the examined environment by the investigators
– unified methodology of the presentation of findings, conclusions and recommendations,
– restructuring of the accident report based on the differentiation of the use of the managerial and operational criteria. .
3) Regarding the reliability-objectivity of the investigators’ perception, any disorder of their mental processes may result to:
a) selective attention or selective inattentiveness
b) over generalization of a single negative fact, relation, condition etc
c) evaluation of the –objective-environment with subjective criteria
d) maximization or minimization of the negative impact of some contributing factors
e) minimization of positive impact of some factors
4) Comparing the ICAO’s consideration about its exclusive objective in an accident investigation and the tools that the ICAO uses for the accomplishment of this goal we consider that there is an incompatibility between the goal and the measures.
12. Proposals
1) Introduction of tests to access the functional status of the senses and mental processes of each investigator
2) Determination the specific:
a) job specialty of every accident investigator
b) field and duration of the required experience
c) content of the syllabus-field and level of knowledge (not only the titles) in which the investigators are trained, which must reflect the current global scientific knowledge on the particular cognitive field.
d) field of knowledge, level of knowledge, field and duration of the investigators trainers experience.
3) Separation of the managerial from the operational criteria is imperative.
The managerial criteria must be used in the chapters-paragraphs concerning the investigation of the sources of the contributing factors, while the operational criteria must be used in the chapters-paragraphs concerning the investigation of the conditions of the accident/incident.
5) To make a clear distinction between organizational and managerial functions and
their impact on the internal corporate environment
5) To introduce as obligatory in the investigator’s qualifications the theoretical
knowledge and practical experience on air transport organizational and managerial
functions and their impact on the internal corporate environment.
6) Obviously the same qualifications must be required from the investigators’ trainers as well.
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